Against Leptines
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Original / primary: Perseus Eng2
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Gentlemen of the jury, it is chiefly because I consider that the State will benefit by the repeal of this law, but partly also out of sympathy with the young son of Chabrias, that I have consented to support the plaintiffs to the best of my ability. It is clear, men of Athens, that Leptines and anyone else who defends the law will have nothing fair to say in its favor, but will urge the unworthiness of certain persons who have used their exemption as a means of shirking the public services, and he will take his stand chiefly on that ground.
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For my own part, I shall forbear to retort that it is unjust to take away this privilege from all because you find fault with some; for that objection has already been partially stated,
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and you probably realize its force. But I should like to ask Leptines on what grounds, even if not some, but all the recipients had been to the last degree undeserving, he has meted out the same treatment to you as to them; for by the clause
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none shall be exempt
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he has taken away the privilege from those who now enjoy it, while by the addition
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nor shall it be lawful hereafter to grant it
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he takes away from you the right to bestow it. For surely he cannot mean that precisely as he thought the holders of this privilege unworthy, so he thought the people unworthy of the right to dispense its own favors to whomsoever it wishes.
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But perhaps he may object here that he framed his law in this way because the people are so easily gulled. But by parity of reasoning why should you not be deprived of all your rights—of the whole constitution in fact? For there is no single—right which has not been abused in this way. You have often been deceived into passing decrees; you have sometimes been induced to choose weak allies rather than strong; and generally, I suppose, in many of your public proceedings the same thing is bound to happen.
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Shall we then make a law that hereafter neither Council nor Assembly shall be permitted to deliberate or to vote on any subject? Not so, in my opinion; for we ought not to be deprived of our rights, where we have been misled; we ought to be instructed how to avoid such mistakes, and we ought to make a law, not to strip us of our own authority, but to punish those who mislead us.
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Now if, putting these considerations aside, you would examine the real problem, whether it is more advantageous that you should possess the power of bestowing this privilege, even though you are sometimes duped into bestowing it on a scoundrel, or that by being wholly dispossessed of it you should be unable to grant honors even where they are deserved, you would find the former course the more advantageous. And why? Because the result of rewarding too many citizens is to encourage many to do you good service, but the result of rewarding no one, even if deserving, is to discourage emulation in all.
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There is also this other reason, that those who reward an undeserving individual may be credited with some degree of artlessness,
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but those who never requite their benefactors are charged with baseness. Just so far as it is better to be thought artless than unscrupulous, it is more honorable to repeal this law than to enact it.
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Nor again, men of Athens, on reflection does it seem to me reasonable, when finding fault with some on the ground of the rewards they already enjoy, to rob useful citizens of their honors. For if, while these immunities exist, some of the recipients are, as our opponents say, worthless and unprofitable, what result are we to expect when there is no chance whatever of reward for the good citizens?
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Then again, you must consider this point, that in accordance with the existing laws of long standing—laws of which Leptines himself cannot deny the soundness—there is an interval of a year between each public service, so that half the time a citizen is immune. And then, when all citizens, even those who have not benefited you in the least, enjoy a half share in that privilege, are we to take away from your real benefactors the addition that we made to it? Surely not; for that would be dishonorable and, in your case, especially unbecoming.
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When we have a law which forbids cheating in the marketplace, where a falsehood entails no public injury, is it not disgraceful that in public affairs the same state should not abide by the law which it enjoins on private individuals, but should cheat its benefactors, and that although it is itself likely to incur no small penalty?
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For we must take account not only of loss of money, but of loss of good fame, which you are more anxious to keep than your money—yes, you and your ancestors also. The proof of this is that when they had accumulated vast sums, they spent all for honor, and when reputation was at stake, they never shrank from danger, but even lavished their private fortunes without stint.
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As it stands, then, this law reflects on your city not honor but disgrace, unworthy alike of your ancestors and of yourselves; for
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is incurring the three worst reproaches—that men should think us envious, faithless, ungrateful.
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Next, men of
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, that it is absolutely contrary to the national character to ratify such a law as this, I will also endeavor to show you briefly by an example of our conduct in the past. The Thirty Tyrants are said to have borrowed money from the Lacedaemonians for use against the patriots in the
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Piraeus
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.
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But when unity was restored to the State and those disputes were settled, the Lacedaemonians sent envoys to demand payment.
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When the question was discussed and some were for ordering the city-party, who were the real borrowers, to repay, while others claimed that the first sign of reconciliation should be the joint settlement of the debt, they say that the people chose to pay their contribution and bear their share of the loss, so that there should be no breach of the agreement. On that occasion, men of Athens, to avoid a breach of faith, you consented to pay money to those who had injured you, but now, when you might without any expense requite your benefactors by repealing this law, will it not be strange if you prefer to break your faith? I for one cannot approve of it.
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The instance I have quoted, men of Athens, as well many others, will show what our national character is—truthful, honest, and, where money is concerned, not asking what pays best, but what is the honorable thing to do. But as to the character of the proposer of this law, I have no further knowledge of him, nor do I say or know anything to his prejudice; but if I may judge from his law, I detect a character very far removed from what I have described.
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I say, then, that it would be more honorable for Leptines to be guided by you in repealing the law than for you to be guided by him in ratifying it, and it would be more profitable for you, as well as for him, that Athens should persuade Leptines to assume a likeness to herself than that she should be persuaded by Leptines to be like him; for even if he is a really good man—and he may be, for aught I know—he cannot excel her in character.
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Moreover, gentlemen, I think that you would come to a sounder judgement in this matter if you would observe this further truth, that the present law removes just the one advantage which the rewards of a democracy have over those of other constitutions. For in the material value to the recipients of the rewards bestowed, a tyranny or an oligarchy has an immense advantage in that they can make anyone they choose instantaneously rich; but in honor and in security of possession you will find that the gifts of a democracy are to be preferred.
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For not the receipt of a flatterer’s pay with its taint of shame, but to be honored, where speech is free, as one who is deemed worthy—that is true glory; and to enjoy the willing admiration of equals seems better than to accept the richest gift from a tyrant’s hand. For in those communities the fear of tomorrow outweighs the favor of today, but in your city a man could keep what he won without fear of loss, at any rate in time past.
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So the law which destroys confidence in the rewards takes away the one thing that gives a higher value to rewards which you bestow. And indeed, if from any one of all known forms of government you take away the right of loyal supporters of the constitution to receive favors, you will find that you have deprived those governments of no unimportant safeguard.
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Now perhaps Leptines will try to divert your attention from these points and assert that at present the public services fall upon the poor, but that under his law they will be performed by the wealthiest class. At first hearing, the plea seems to have some weight; but examine it strictly and the fallacy will be exposed. For there are, as you know, among us some services that fall upon resident aliens and others that fall upon citizens, and the exemption, which Leptines would remove, has been granted in the case of both. For from special contributions for war or for national defence and also from the equipment of war-galleys, rightly and justly in accordance with earlier laws, no one is exempt, not even the descendants of Harmodius and Aristogiton, whom Leptines has specially named.
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Let us then see what additional contributors he provides to perform those public services, and how many will be passed over if we turn a deaf ear to him. Now the richest citizens, when equipping a war-galley, are already exempt from the ordinary services, while those whose wealth is insufficient necessarily enjoy exemption and are out of the reach of this tax; so his law will not provide us with another contributor from either of these classes.
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He may reply that he recruits many aliens for the services. But if he can point to five such, I will eat my words. I will assume, then, that this is not the case, but that if the law stands, both the number of aliens performing public services will be greater, and of the citizens none will be excused because he is equipping a war-galley. Now let us consider what the State will gain if all these perform the services, for it will prove to be no compensation at all for the disgrace it will entail.
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Put it thus. Of aliens there are exempt—I will assume ten. And by Heaven, as I said before, I do not believe there are five. Moreover of the citizens there are not half a dozen. Sixteen of both, then. Let us call it twenty, or thirty, if you like. How many, pray, are there that annually perform the regularly recurring services—chorus-masters, presidents of gymnasia, and public hosts? Perhaps sixty in all, or a trifle more.
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In order, then, that we may have thirty more men for the public services, spread over the whole period,
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is it worth our while to excite the distrust of all? But surely we must know this, that as long as
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stands, there will be plenty of citizens, without fail, to perform the services, but not a soul will want to do us a good turn, if he sees our previous benefactors wronged.
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So far, so good. But if there were the most serious shortage of possible contributors, in Heaven’s name, which would you prefer—to organize syndicates for those services as for the equipment of war-vessels, or to rob your benefactors of what you have given them? I think I should prefer the syndicates. By the present law, while each of these thirty is performing a public service, Leptines affords a respite for the others, and that is all; after that, each of them will have to spend as much as before; but in the other case, each would pay a small contribution, proportioned to his means, and none would be hardly treated, even if his property were quite small.
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Now some of our opponents, men of Athens, are so illogical that they make no attempt to answer these arguments, but take a different line, saying for instance how monstrous it is that on the one hand there is nothing left in the Exchequer, but on the other hand private individuals will grow wealthy because they have secured an immunity. But it is not fair to combine both these statements. For if a man has great wealth without doing you any wrong, there is surely no need to look on him with envy; but if they are prepared to say that he has stolen it or gained it in some other disreputable way, there are laws by which he can be suitably punished. But as long as they do not prosecute him, neither have they any right to make this allegation.
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Further, with regard to the alleged poverty of the Exchequer, you must reflect that you will not be a whit the better off if you abolish these exemptions, for the expenditure on these services has nothing to do with the revenues or the surplus of the State. And apart from all this, of two possible advantages—wealth and credit with the rest of the world—our State today enjoys the latter. But if anyone imagines that because we have no money we need not also keep our honor bright, his judgement is at fault. For myself indeed, I pray Heaven that, if so it may be, our wealth also may increase, but if not, then at least that our reputation for good faith and constancy may remain sure.
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Now take the large fortunes which, according to our opponents, some citizens will amass if relieved of the services, but which I will show to be available for your needs. For of course you are aware that no one is exempt from the equipment of war-galleys or from the special contributions for war. So this person, whoever he may be, who owns much, contributes much to those objects; there is no getting out of it. And again, all would agree that the resources which the State can rely on for these objects should be as great as possible. For money spent by the chorus-masters affords those of us who are in the theater gratification for a fraction of a day; but money lavished on equipment for war gives security to the whole city for all time.
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Therefore whatever you remit with one hand, you receive with the other; and you grant as an honor exemptions which even those who receive them cannot enjoy, if they have wealth sufficient for the equipment of a war-vessel. But although I suppose you all know that no one is exempt from the latter service, the clerk shall read to you the actual statute. Take the law about the trierarchy and read this clause only. [The clause is read] [And none shall be exempt from the trierarchy except the nine archons.]
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You see, Athenians, how explicitly the law lays down that none shall be exempt from the equipment of a war-galley except the nine archons. So those whose wealth falls short of the qualification for that service will contribute by groups to the special war-tax, but those who reach that qualification will be available both for the war-galleys and for the war-tax. Then what relief does your law, Leptines, afford to the main body of citizens, if from one or two tribes it provides a single contributor, who, having relieved one other citizen on one occasion, will thereafter be exempt?
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I can see no relief. On the other hand it taints the honor and credit of the whole State. Therefore, when the damage it will inflict is greater than the benefit it confers, ought it not to be repealed by this court? Such would be my verdict.
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My next point is this, gentlemen of the jury. The law of Leptines explicitly states that none, whether citizen or enfranchised alien or foreigner, shall be exempt, and does not specify from what, whether from the public service or from any other charge, but simply that none shall be exempt except the descendants of Harmodius and Aristogiton. The word none must be taken to include all classes, and foreigner is not further defined as resident at Athens.
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It follows that Leptines deprives Leucon,
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the ruler of the
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, and his children of the reward which you bestowed on them. For, of course, Leucon is a foreigner by birth, though by adoption an Athenian citizen, but on neither ground can he claim exemption, if this law stands. And yet, while of our other benefactors each has made himself useful to us on one occasion, Leucon will be found on reflection to be a perpetual benefactor, and that in a matter especially vital to our city.
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For you are aware that we consume more imported corn than any other nation. Now the corn that comes to our ports from the Black Sea is equal to the whole amount from all other places of export. And this is not surprising; for not only is that district most productive of corn, but also Leucon, who controls the trade, has granted exemption from dues to merchants conveying corn to Athens, and he proclaims that those bound for your port shall have priority of lading. For Leucon, enjoying exemption for himself and his children, has granted exemption to every one of you.
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See what this amounts to. He exacts a toll of one-thirtieth from exporters of corn from his country. Now from the
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there come to
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about four hundred thousand bushels; the figures can be checked by the books of the grain commissioners. So for each three hundred thousand bushels he makes us a present of ten thousand bushels, and for the remaining hundred thousand a present of roughly three thousand.
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Now, so little danger is there of his depriving our state of this gift, that he has opened another depot at Theudosia, which our merchants say is not at all inferior to the
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,
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and there, too, he has granted us the same exemption. I omit much that might be said about the other benefits conferred upon you by this prince and also by his ancestors, but the year before last, when there was a universal shortage of grain, he not only sent enough for your needs, but such a quantity in addition that Callisthenes had a surplus of fifteen talents of silver to dispose of.
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What, then, men of
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, do you expect of this man, who has proved himself such a friend to you, if he learns that you have deprived him by law of his immunity, and have made it illegal to bestow it hereafter, even if you change your minds? Are you not aware that this same law, if ratified, will take away the immunity, not only from Leucon, but from those of you who import corn from his country?
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For surely no one dreams that he will tolerate the cancelling of your gifts to him, and let his own gifts to you stand good. So to the many disadvantages that this law will obviously entail upon you, may be added the immediate loss of part of your resources. In view of this, are you still considering whether you ought to erase it from the statute-book? Have you not made up your minds long ago? Take and read them the decrees touching Leucon. [The decrees are read]
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How reasonable and just was the immunity which Leucon has obtained from you, these decrees have informed you, gentlemen of the jury. Copies of all these decrees on stone were set up by you and by Leucon in the
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, in the
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, and at Hierum.
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Just reflect to what depths of meanness you are dragged by this law, which makes the nation less trustworthy than an individual.
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For you must not imagine that the pillars standing there are anything else than the covenants of all that you have received or granted; and it will be made clear that Leucon observes them and is always eager to benefit you, but that you have repudiated them while they still stand; and that is a far worse offence than to pull them down
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; for when men wish to traduce our city, there will stand the pillars to witness to the truth of their words.
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Now mark! Suppose Leucon sends and asks us on what charge or for what fault we have taken away his immunity; what, in the name of wonder, shall we say, or in what terms will the proposer of your reply draft it? He will say, I suppose, that some of those who obtained immunity did not deserve it!
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If, then, Leucon replies to this, Yes; I dare say some of the Athenians are scoundrels, but I have not made that a reason for robbing the good citizens; on the contrary, because I think the Athenians, as a nation, are good men, I allow them all a share; will there not be more fairness in his words than in ours? To me, at least, it seems so. For it is the custom of all nations, for the sake of their benefactors, rather to include some bad men in their rewards, than to make the worthless men an excuse for withholding their rewards from those who are acknowledged to merit them.
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Nay more, upon consideration, I cannot even see why anyone should not, if he wishes, challenge Leucon to an exchange of property.
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For there is always property of his at
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, and by this law, if anyone tries to lay hands on it Leucon will either forfeit it or be compelled to perform public service. And it is not the question of expense that will trouble him most, but the reflection that you have robbed him of his reward.
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Again then, Athenians, it is not merely necessary to consider how Leucon may be spared injustice—a man whose anxiety about his privilege would arise from a sense of honor rather than from his needs—but we must also consider whether another man, who did you service when he was prosperous, may not find that the exemption he received from you then is a matter of necessity to him now. To whom, then, do I refer? To Epicerdes of Cyrene, than whom no recipient of this honor ever deserved it better, not because his gifts were great or extraordinary, but because they came at a time when we were hard put to it to find, even among those whom we had benefited, anyone willing to remember our benefactions.
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For Epicerdes, as this decree then passed in his honor declares, gave a hundred minae to our fellow-countrymen at that time prisoners in
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under such distressing circumstances,
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and thus he became the chief instrument in saving them from all perishing of hunger. Afterwards, when you had rewarded him with immunity, seeing that in the war
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just before the rule of the Thirty the people were straitened for want of funds, he gave them a talent as a freewill offering.
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In the name of Zeus and all the gods, men of Athens, ask yourselves how a man could more clearly show his goodwill towards you, or how he could be less deserving of an ill return than if, being first an eye-witness of that national disaster, he should prefer the beaten side and such favors as they might some day bestow, rather than the victors among whom he found himself in their hour of triumph; or if next, seeing a further need arise, he should be found once more a donor, anxious not to hoard his own private means, but to ensure that no cause of yours should fall short of success, so far as in him lay.
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Yet this man, who in actual deed on those momentous occasions shared his wealth with the people, but enjoyed only a nominal and honorary immunity, will be robbed by you, not of his immunity, for it is evident that he did not use it when he had it, but of his trust in you; and what could be more discreditable than that? Now you shall hear the very words of the decree then passed in his honor. And observe, men of Athens, how many decrees this law annuls, how many individuals it wrongs, and what occasions they chose for making themselves serviceable to you; for you will find that the law wrongs just the men who least deserve it. Read. The decree is read
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Gentlemen of the jury, you have heard from the decrees what were the services for which Epicerdes obtained his immunity. Do not stop to ask whether he gave you a hundred minae and a talent as well—for I expect that even those who received it were not struck by the amount of his gift—but think of his zeal, his spontaneous act, and the occasion that he chose.
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For recompense is due to all alike who are forward to do us service, but in a special degree to those who are friends in time of need; and such an one clearly was Epicerdes. Are we not then ashamed, men of Athens, if it appears that we have retained no memory of these services and have robbed of their reward the sons of such a benefactor, though we can charge them with no fault?
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For if those who were then saved by him and who bestowed on him this immunity were a different generation from you who now propose to take it away, yet that does not remove the infamy of the act; nay, it is just there that its atrocity lies. For if those who knew and experienced his generosity felt that it merited this return, while we, who have only heard the story told, shall revoke the gift as undeserved, shall we not be guilty of more than ordinary atrocity?
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Now my plea is the same in this case as for those who overthrew the Four Hundred, and for those who proved helpful to the democrats in exile; for I think they would all be atrociously treated if any portion of the rewards then decreed to them should be revoked.
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Now if any of you is persuaded that our city is far from needing such a benefactor today, let him pray Heaven it may be so, and I will join in that prayer; but let him also reflect, first, that he is going to give his vote on a law under which, if unrepealed, he will have to live, and secondly, that bad laws can injure even communities which fancy they are dwelling in security. For there would have been no changes for better or for worse in the fortunes of states, had it not been that a nation in peril is guided to safety by good policy, good laws, and good citizens and by the observance of order in all things, but in the case of a nation that seems established in perfect prosperity, all these things, being neglected, slip away from it little by little.
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For most men achieve prosperity by planning soundly and by despising nothing; but they do not take the trouble to guard it by the same means. Let not this mistake be yours today, and do not think that you ought to ratify a law which will taint the reputation of our city in the time of her prosperity and, if ever a crisis comes, will leave her destitute of those who would be willing to do her service.
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Again, Athenians, it is not only the men who, in a private capacity, chose to benefit you and to offer their services on those important occasions that have been described a little while ago by Phormio and mentioned by me just now—it is not only these men that you must be careful not to wrong, but many others also, who drew whole states, their own native cities, into alliance with us in the war against the Lacedaemonians,
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thus furthering by word and deed the interests of your city;
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and some of these men through their goodwill to you have no longer a fatherland. The first example that I propose to examine is that of the Corinthian exiles. And here I am obliged to mention facts which I myself have only heard from the lips of the older among you.
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Some occasions, then, on which they made themselves useful to us, I will pass over; but when the great battle against the Lacedaemonians was fought near
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, and when the party in that city determined after the battle not to admit our soldiers within their walls, but to send heralds to greet the Lacedaemonians,
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these men, though they saw that
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had lost the day and that our enemies were holding the pass,
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refused to betray us or to take steps for their own individual safety, but with the whole armed force of the
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close upon them, they opened their gates to us in defiance of the majority and chose along with you, who had been engaged in the battle, to suffer whatever might betide, rather than without you to enjoy a safety that involved no danger; and so they admitted the troops and succeeded in saving both you and your allies.
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And afterwards, when peace, the peace of Antalcidas,In 387. Antalcidas was the Spartan diplomatist. The Greeks acknowledged the King of Persia as the arbiter of their disputes, and abandoned to him their cities in Asia. All other Greek states were to be independent, except Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros, which were to be retained by Athens. Sparta’s main object was to break up the power of Thebes over the other Boeotian cities. was concluded with the Lacedaemonians, the latter requited their acts with exile. But you, in giving them shelter, acted like good men and true; for you decreed them all that they needed. Yet now are we actually debating whether those decrees should remain valid? No! The bare statement is a disgrace, if it should be reported that Athenians are debating whether they ought to let their benefactors keep what they have given them; for that question ought to have been debated, yes, and decided, long ago. Read this decree also to the court. [The decree is read]
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Such, gentlemen of the jury, is the decree passed by you in favor of the Corinthians who were exiled on your account. But think! If one who knew those critical times—whether as an eye-witness or hearing the story from one who knew—if he should hear this law which revokes the gifts that were then bestowed, how he would denounce the baseness of us who made the law—and who were so generous and obliging when our need was pressing, but when we have satisfied all our hopes, are so thankless and churlish that we have robbed men of the rewards they enjoy, and have made a law that hereafter no, such rewards should be bestowed!
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Oh but, we shall be told, some of those who received these rewards did not deserve them; for that thought will run through all their argument. In that case shall we confess that we do not know that a man’s deserts should be examined at the time of the reward, and not an indefinitely long time after? For to give no reward in the first instance is an exercise of judgement; to take it away when given shows a grudging spirit, and you must not seem to have been prompted by that.
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Furthermore, on the question of merit I shall not shrink from saying this to you: I for one do not think that merit should be examined by the State in the same way as by an individual, because the examination is not concerned with the same questions. For in private life each of us tries to find who is worthy, say, to marry into our family, or something of that sort, and such questions are determined by convention and opinion; but in public affairs the State and the people try to find who is their benefactor and savior, and that question you will find is best decided by reference not to birth or opinion, but to plain fact. So, whenever we want to receive benefits, are we to allow anyone to confer them, but when we have received them, then shall we scrutinize the merits of the benefactor? That will be a topsy-turvy policy.
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But, it may be said, the only sufferers will be those I have mentioned, and all my remarks apply to them alone. That is quite untrue. But I could not even attempt to examine all the instances of men who have benefited you, but who by this law, if it is not repealed, will be robbed of their rewards; by calling your attention to one or two further decrees, I absolve myself from discussing these cases.
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In the first place, then, will you not wrong the Thasian supporters of Ecphantus, if you revoke their immunity—I mean the men who handed over
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to you by expelling the armed garrison of the Lacedaemonians and admitting Thrasybulus,
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and thus, by bringing their own country on to your side, were the means of winning for you the alliance of the district bordering on
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?
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In the second place, will you not wrong Archebius and Heraclides, who by putting
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into the hands of Thrasybulus made you masters of the
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, so that you farmed out the toll of ten per cent,
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and thus being well furnished with money forced the Lacedaemonians to conclude a peace favorable to you?
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When subsequently they were banished, you, Athenians, passed what I think was a very proper decree in favor of men exiled through devotion to your interests, conferring on them the title of Friends of the State
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and Benefactors, together with immunity from all taxes. For your sakes they were in exile, from you they received a just recompense; and are we now to let them be robbed of this, though we can charge them with no fault? But that would be scandalous.
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You will grasp the situation best if you will reason it out for yourselves in this way. Suppose at the present day a party of those in power at Pydna or Potidaea or any of those other places which are subject to Philip and hostile to you—
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just as Thasos and Byzantium then were friendly to the Lacedaemonians and estranged from you—promised to hand them over to you in return for the same rewards that you gave to Ecphantus of Thasos and Archebius of Byzantium; and suppose some of these gentlemen here objected to their proposal on the ground that it would be monstrous if a select few of the resident aliens were to escape the public services; how would you deal with their arguments? Is it not certain that you would refuse to listen to such malignant pettifoggers? If so, then it is disgraceful that you should consider such an objection malignant when you are going to receive a benefit, but should lend an ear to it when it is proposed to revoke your gifts to former benefactors. Now let us pass to another argument.
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The men who betrayed Pydna and the other places to Philip—what prompted them to injure us? Is it not obvious to everyone that it was the reward which they calculated on receiving from Philip for their services? Which, then, ought you to have chosen to do, Leptines? To induce our enemies, if you can, to give up honoring those who become their benefactors on the strength of injuries done to us, or to impose a law on us which takes away some part of the rewards which our own benefactors are enjoying? I fancy the former. But that I may not wander from the present point, take and read the decrees passed in honor of the Thasians and the Byzantines. [The decrees are read]
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You have heard the decrees, gentlemen of the jury. Perhaps some of the men named are no longer alive. But their deeds survive, since they were done once for all. It is fitting, therefore, to allow these inscriptions to hold good for all time, that as long as any of the men are alive, they may suffer no wrong at your hands, and when they die, those inscriptions may be a memorial of our national character, and may stand as proofs to all who wish to do us service, declaring how many benefactors our city has benefited in return.
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Nor indeed would I have you forget this, men of Athens, that it is a most disgraceful thing to show and proclaim to all mankind that the misfortunes which these men endured for your sake have been confirmed to them for ever, while the grants which they received from you in recompense have been even now rescinded.
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For it would have been far more fitting to mitigate their distress by letting them keep your gifts, than, while the distress remains, to rob them of your bounty. In Heaven’s name, I ask you, who is there that will choose to do you service with the prospect of instant punishment by your enemies, if he fails, and of a dubious gratitude from you, if he succeeds?
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Now I should be greatly vexed, gentlemen of the jury, if I thought that the only real charge I was bringing against the law was its depriving many of our alien benefactors of the immunity, but should seem unable to point to any deserving recipient of the honor among our own fellow-countrymen. For my prayer would ever be that Athens may abound in all blessings, but especially that the best men and the most numerous benefactors of this city may be her own citizens.
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First of all, then, in the case of
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Conon
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, ask yourselves whether dissatisfaction with the man or his performances justifies the cancelling of the gifts conferred on him. For, as some of you who are his contemporaries can attest, it was just after the return of the exiled democrats from the
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Piraeus
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,
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when our city was so weak that she had not a single ship, and Conon, who was a general in the Persian service and received no prompting whatever from you, defeated the Lacedaemonians at sea and taught the former dictators of
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Greece
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to show you deference; he cleared the islands of their military governors, and coming here he restored our Long Walls
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; and he was the first to make the hegemony of
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Greece
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once more the subject of dispute between
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Athens
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and
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Sparta
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.
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For, indeed, he has the unique distinction of being thus mentioned in his inscription; Whereas Conon, it runs, freed the allies of Athens. That inscription, gentlemen of the jury, is his glory in your estimation, but it is yours in the estimation of all Greece. For whatever boon any one of us confers on the other states, the credit of it is reaped by the fame of our city.
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Therefore his contemporaries not only granted him immunity, but also set up his statue in bronze—the first man so honored since Harmodius and Aristogiton. For they felt that he too, in breaking up the empire of the Lacedaemonians, had ended no insignificant tyranny. In order, then, that you may give a closer attention to my words, the clerk shall read the actual decrees which you then passed in favor of Conon. Read them. [The decrees are read]
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It was not, then, only by you, Athenians, that Conon was honored for the services that I have described, but by many others, who rightly felt bound to show gratitude for the benefits they had received. And so it is to your dishonor, men of Athens, that in other states his rewards hold good, but of your rewards alone he is to lose this part.
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Neither is this creditable—to honor him when living, with all the distinctions that have been recited to you, but when he is dead to take back some part of your former gifts. For many of his achievements, men of Athens, deserve praise, and all of them make it improper to revoke the gifts they earned for him, but the noblest deed of all was his restoration of the Long Walls.
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You will realize this if you compare the way in which Themistocles, the most famous man of his age, accomplished the same result. Now history tells us that Themistocles bade his countrymen get on with the building and detain anyone who came from Sparta, while he went off himself on an embassy to the Lacedaemonians; and while negotiations went on there and the news kept coming that the Athenians were fortifying, he denied it and told them to send envoys to see for themselves, and when these envoys did not return, he urged them to send more. Indeed, I expect you have all heard the story of how he hoodwinked them.
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Now I assert—and I earnestly appeal to you, Athenians, not to take offence at what is coming, but to consider whether it is true—I assert that in proportion as openness is better than secrecy, and it is more honorable to gain one’s end by victory than by trickery, so Conon deserves more credit than Themistocles for building the walls. For the latter achieved it by evading those who would have prevented it, but the former by beating them in battle. Therefore it is not right that so great a man should be wronged by you, or should gain less than those orators who will try to prove that you ought to deduct something from what was bestowed on him.
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Very well. But, they will say, we may let the son of Chabrias be robbed of the immunity which his father justly received from you and bequeathed to him. But I am sure there is not a single right-minded man who would approve of that. Now, perhaps you know, even without any words from me, that Chabrias was a man of high character; yet there is no harm if I too recall briefly his achievements.
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How skilfully, as your commander, he drew up your ranks at
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Thebes
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to face the whole power of the
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Peloponnese
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, how he slew Gorgopas in
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Aegina
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, what trophies he set up in
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Cyprus
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and afterwards in
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Egypt
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, how he visited, I might almost say, every land, yet nowhere disgraced our city’s name or his own—of all these exploits it is by no means easy to speak adequately, and it would be a great shame if my words should make them fall below the estimate of him which each one of you has formed in his own mind. But of some, which I think I could never belittle in describing them, I will try to remind you.
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Now, he beat the Lacedaemonians in a sea-fight
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and took forty-nine warships; he captured most of the islands near and handed them over to you, turning their previous enmity into friendship; he brought to
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Athens
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three thousand captives, and paid into the treasury more than a hundred and ten talents taken from the enemy. And in all these facts some of the oldest among you can bear me out. But in addition, he captured more than twenty warships, one or two at a time, and brought them all into your harbors.
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To sum up; he alone of all our generals never lost a city, a fort, a ship, or a man, as long as he led you; and none of your enemies can boast a single trophy won from you and him, while you possess many won from many enemies while he was your general. But for fear lest my speech should omit any of his exploits, the clerk shall read to you an inventory of all the ships he took and where he took each, the number of cities and the amount of treasure captured, and the place where he set up each trophy. Read. [The exploits of Chabrias are read]
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Does it seem to any of you, gentlemen of the jury, that this man, who captured so many cities and ships from your enemies by his victories on sea, and who was the source of so much honor, but never of disgrace, to your city, deserves to be deprived of the immunity which he obtained at your hands and bequeathed to his son? I cannot believe it, for it is out of all reason. Had he lost a single city or as few as ten ships, Leptines and his supporters would have impeached him for high treason, and if he had been convicted, he would have been a ruined man for ever.
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But since, on the contrary, he took seventeen cities, and captured seventy ships and three thousand prisoners, and paid into the treasury a hundred and ten talents, and set up so many trophies, in that case shall not his rewards for these services stand good? Moreover, Athenians, it will be seen that Chabrias during his lifetime did everything in your behalf, and that he met death itself in no other service; so that for this, as well as for all that he did in his life, you ought to show yourselves generously disposed to his son.
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Then this too, Athenians, demands your consideration—that we must not prove less generous than the Chians in our treatment of our benefactors. For if they, against whom Chabrias carried arms as an enemy, have not now revoked any of their former gifts, but have made ancient services outweigh recent offences, while you, in whose cause he marched against them to his death, so far from honoring him the more on that account, are even going to rob him of part of the reward of his past services, how will you escape the ignominy that you deserve?
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Moreover, should the son be robbed of part of his reward, his treatment would be undeserved in view of the fact that no man’s child was ever orphaned through the fault of Chabrias, though he frequently led you in war, but the boy himself has grown up an orphan, just because of his father’s devotion to your cause. For to me he seems truly to have been such a staunch patriot, that though reputed to be the most cautious of commanders, as indeed he was, it was for your sake that he displayed that quality whenever he led you, but for his own sake, when he found himself assigned to the post of danger, he forgot all his caution and preferred to lay down his life rather than tarnish the honors that you had bestowed.
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After that, are we to rob the son of those honors which inspired the father to conquer or to die? And what shall we say, men of Athens, when the trophies that he set up as general in your name stand plain for all men to see, but a part of the reward for those trophies is found to have been filched away? Will you not observe, men of Athens, and reflect that today we are not judging the law, to see whether it is suitable or not? It is you who are under examination, to see whether you are suitable persons to receive benefits in the future or whether you are not.
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Turn now to the decree passed in honor of Chabrias. Just look and see; it must be somewhere there.This aside is intended to give an air of reality to the published speech. Editors well compare a similar trick in Cicero Verr. 2.4.3. There is one thing further that I want to say about Chabrias. You, Athenians, in honoring Iphicrates, honored not only him but also on his account Strabax and Polystratus; and again, when giving your reward to Timotheus, you also for his sake rewarded Clearchus and some others with the citizenshipIphicrates was honored for the defeat of the Spartan mora in the Corinthian War (390), Timotheus for his successful expedition to Corcyra after the battle of Naxos (376). Strabax was presumably a foreign mercenary; Polystratus is mentioned in Dem. 4.24, as a commander of Athenian mercenaries at Corinth. These last two were rewarded for services under the command of Iphicrates. Clearchus cannot be identified with certainty.;
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but in the case of Chabrias your honors were for him alone. Now, if at the time when he was receiving his reward, he had claimed that as you had rewarded others for the sake of Iphicrates and Timotheus, so for his sake you should reward some of those men who have actually received the immunity, but to whom our opponents object so strongly that they want all alike to be deprived of it, would you not have granted him that boon? I cannot doubt it.
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For his sake you would have rewarded them then; yet now, on their account, will you take away the immunity from Chabrias himself? Why, that is absurd! For it is inconsistent to seem so generous, when the benefits are recent, that you honor not the benefactors only but their friends as well, but, when a short time has elapsed, to take away even the rewards that you have given to the benefactors.The argument seems to be this. Some recipients of immunity obtained similar favors for their friends. Chabrias did not, but he might have done so, and his friends might have been the undeserving persons now enjoying immunity. In this rather hypothetical case, after rewarding the jackals from gratitude to the lion, you now penalize the lion out of contempt for the jackals. [The decrees on the honour of Chabrias are read]
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So these whose names you have heard, as well as many others, are the men whom you will injure if you do not repeal the law. Just reflect and ponder in your own minds, if any of these men now passed away could somehow come to know of the present proceedings, what just ground they would have for indignation! For if of the deeds that each wrought for your advantage there is to be a judgement based on words, if actions nobly performed by them, unless nobly avowed by us in speech, have been wrought in vain for all their toil, are they not suffering a terrible wrong?
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Now, to satisfy you, Athenians, that every argument that we submit to you is based on perfectly just grounds, and that not a single argument is intended to mislead and deceive you, the clerk shall read the law drafted and proposed by us to take the place of the present one, which we contend is mischievous. For our law will show you that we take some care to ensure that you shall be saved from the appearance of a dishonorable act; that if anyone objects to one of the recipients, he can deprive him of his gift, if the objection is sound, after trial in your courts; and also that those whose claim to the gifts none could dispute shall keep them.
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And in all this there is nothing new, no innovation of our own; but the old law, transgressed by Leptines, lays down this procedure in legislation, that if a man disapproves of an existing law, he shall bring an indictment against it, but shall himself introduce an alternative, such as he proposes to enact after repeal of the other, and that you, after hearing arguments, shall choose the better law.
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For Solon, who imposed this method, did not think it right that while the junior archons, who are appointed by lot to administer the laws, undergo two scrutinies
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before entering on office, one in the Council and a second in the law-courts before you, the laws themselves, which regulate their official acts and all other civic duties, should be passed at haphazard to meet some emergency, and should be at once valid without passing a scrutiny.
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For in those days, indeed, while they legislated in that way, they kept to the existing laws and were not always proposing new ones; but ever since certain statesmen rose to power and, as I am informed, contrived to get into their own hands the right to initiate legislation at any time and in any way they wished, there are so many contradictory statutes that for a long time you have had to appoint a commission to sort out the contradictory ones;
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yet in spite of this the business never comes to an end. Our laws are no better than so many decrees; nay, you will find that the laws which have to be observed in drafting the decrees are laterνεώτεροι has been misunderstood and variously emended. Laws ought to be general and permanent, decrees particular and occasional; but there has been such a glut of hasty legislation, since the restoration of the democracy in 403, that many decrees still stand unrepealed after the laws on which they were based have been superseded. For the legislative commission see Introduction. than the decrees themselves. Not to be content, then, with a bare assertion, but to show you the actual law to which I refer, please take and read the law constituting the original legislative commission. [The law is read]
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You understand, Athenians, the beauty of Solon’s directions for legislating. The first stage is in your courts, before men under oath, where all other ratifications are made; the next is the repeal of the contradictory laws, so that there may be only one law dealing with each subject, and that the plain citizen may not be puzzled by such contradictions and be at a disadvantage compared with those who are acquainted with the whole body of law, but that all may have the same ordinances before them, simple and clear to read and understand.
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Moreover, before these proceedings, Solon ordered that the laws should be exposed before the statues of the eponymous heroes
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and handed in to the town-clerk to recite them at the meetings of the Assembly, so that each of you may hear them more than once and digest them at leisure, and if they are just and expedient, may add them to the statute-book. Now, numerous as those enactments are, Leptines yonder has observed not one of them, for, if he had, I do not think that you would ever have consented to pass his law. We on the other hand, Athenians, have observed them all, and we are submitting a much better and more equitable law than his. You will realize that when you hear it.
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Take and read first of all the clauses of his law which we have indicted, and next the clauses we propose to substitute for them. Read.By this, if correct, must be meant the preamble of the amended law, setting forth the objections to the existing law of Leptines. The second law read would be the amendments proposed; and at the end of Dem. 20.97 the whole law as amended is read. [The law is read] These are the parts of the law of Leptines which we arraign as unsatisfactory. Next in order read our proposed amendments. Pray attend, gentlemen of the jury, to these as they are recited. Read. [The law is read]
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Stop there. The laws now in force contain this provision—a capital one, men of Athens, and unambiguous—that all rewards granted by the people shall be valid. Equitable too, by all the powers! So Leptines should not have proposed his own law until he had indicted and repealed this. As it is, neglecting proof of his own violation of the law, he nevertheless proceeded to legislate, in face of the fact that another law proclaims his law indictable for this very offence, namely, for contradicting previous legislation. Here is the very law in question. [The law is read]
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Men of Athens, is not the provision that all rewards granted by the people shall be valid contradicted by the clause that no one shall be immune, no one, that is, of those to whom the people has granted immunity? That is plain enough, at any rate. But it is not so in the alternative law which my friendApsephion. here proposes, and which confirms what you have granted, and provides a fair ground of action against those who have imposed upon you, or have subsequently injured you, or are generally undeserving; so that you will thus prevent anyone you please from retaining his grant. Read the law. [The law is read]
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You hear the law, Athenians, and you understand that it enables the deserving to retain their rewards, and those who are judged otherwise to be deprived of any privilege they have unjustly secured; for the future everything is left in your hands, as is right, to grant or to withhold. Now I do not think that Leptines will deny that this law is sound and just, or, if he does, that he will be able to prove it. But perhaps he will try to lead you astray by repeating what he said before the junior archons.
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For he alleged that the publication of this amended law was a mere trick, and that should his own law be repealed, this one would never be passed.
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Now, to avoid dispute, I will not press the point that the old law of Solon, in accordance with which the junior archons have notified these amendments to you, clearly enjoins that if the law of Leptines is repealed by your vote, the alternative law shall be valid.
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I will pass to another point. Leptines, in saying this, obviously admits that our law is better and fairer than his own, but bases his argument on the way in which it is to be passed.
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Now, in the first place, there are many ways open to him, if he wishes, of compelling the amender to introduce his own law. In the next place, Phormio and myself and anyone else he likes to name are prepared to guarantee that we will introduce it. You know there is a law making death the penalty for anyone who breaks his promise to the Assembly or one of the Councils or law-courts. You have our guarantee, our promise. Let the archons record it, and let the matter rest in their hands.