Against Timocrates
Choose a text
id="mobileReaderAuthor" class="mobile-reader-author" href="/authors/demosthenes" aria-label="More works by Demosthenes">
—
⋯
Original / primary: Perseus Eng2
1
1
I do not think, gentlemen of the jury, that even Timocrates can lay the blame of the present prosecution upon anyone else: he has brought it on himself. Moved by desire to deprive the State of a large sum of money, he has most illegally introduced a law which is both inexpedient and iniquitous. You shall presently learn in detail, if you will listen to me, in how many respects this law, if ratified, will be injurious and detrimental to the common weal; but there is one result, the most important and the most obvious that I can name, which I shall not hesitate to put before you.
2
2
For it is the decision that you pronounce on oath on every question which is annulled and made worthless by the law proposed by the defendant; and his object is not any public benefit to the State,—that is impossible, for his law robs those Courts of Justice, which are the pillars of the constitution, of all power to impose the additional penalties attached by the laws to transgressions,—but that certain of those men who have long battened on your substance and pillaged your property may not even refund moneys which they were openly caught in the act of embezzling.
3
3
Also it is so much easier to curry favour privately with certain persons than to stand up in defence of your rights that, while Timocrates has their fee in his pocket, and never introduced his law until he got it, I,so far from getting any reward from you, am risking a thousand drachmas in your defence.
4
4
Now it is the common practice of those who take up any piece of public business to inform you that the matter on which they happen to be making their speeches is most momentous, and worthy of your best attention. But if that claim has ever been made with propriety, I think that I am entitled to make it now.
5
5
For I suppose that no man living will attribute the prosperity of Athens, her liberty, her popular government, to anything rather than to the laws. Well, the question for you today is this: shall all the laws that you have enacted for the restraint of evil-doers be invalidated, and this law alone be valid; or shall this law be annulled and the rest allowed to remain? That, to put it in brief summary, is the issue that you have to determine today.
6
6
But to forestall any surprise you may feel that I, who can claim to have hitherto lived a quiet life, should now be making my appearance in actions at law and public prosecutions, I desire to offer a brief explanation, which will not be irrelevant to the issue. Men of Athens, I once fell out with a worthless, quarrelsome, unprincipled fellow, with whom in the end the whole city also fell out,—I mean Androtion.
7
7
By this man I was far more grievously wronged than Euctemon, inasmuch as Euctemon suffered the loss of some money, but I, if he had made good his attack upon me, should have lost my life as well as my property; indeed, even the common privilege of an easy exit from life would have been denied me. He accused me of a crime which a man of good feeling would be loath even to mention,—of having killed my own father; he concocted an indictment for impiety, and brought me to trial. At that trial he failed to get a fifth part of the votes of the jury, and was fined a thousand drachmas. I was deservedly acquitted, for which I thank first the gods, and secondly those of you who were on the jury;
8
8
but the man who had wickedly brought me to that pass I accounted an enemy with whom I could make no terms. When I discovered that he had defrauded the whole commonwealth in the collection of the property-tax and in the manufacture of processional utensils, and that he held and refused to restore a great deal of money belonging to the Goddess, the Heroes, and the State, I proceeded against him with the aid of Euctemon, thinking it a favorable opportunity for doing the State a service, and at the same time getting satisfaction for the wrongs I had suffered. My purpose would naturally be that I should accomplish my desire, and that he should get his deserts.
9
9
The facts were indisputable; the Council condemned him; the Assembly spent a whole day over the case; two juries, each a thousand-and-one strong, brought in their verdict; and then, when there was no subterfuge left by which you could be kept out of your money, this man Timocrates, with the most insolent contempt of the whole proceeding, proposes this law,—a law by which he robs the gods of their consecrated treasure and the city of her just dues, invalidates the judgements pronounced by the Council, the Assembly, and the Courts of Justice, and has given free licence to everybody to plunder the treasury.
10
10
From all these wrongs we saw only one way of escape, that is, if we could abrogate the law by indicting it and bringing it before this court. I will therefore briefly recount the facts from the outset, in order that you may more readily grasp, and follow step by step, the manifold iniquities involved in the law itself.
11
11
A decree was moved by Aristophon in the Assembly, appointing a commission of inquiry, and directing anyone, who knew of any sacred or public money in private hands, to give information to the commission. Thereupon Euctemon laid an information that Archebius and Lysitheides, who had served as naval captains, held property captured in a ship of Naucratis to the value of nine talents and thirty minas. He approached the Council, and a provisional resolution was drafted. Subsequently the Assembly met, and the people voted in favour of further inquiry.
12
12
Then Euctemon stood up, and in the course of his speech told you the whole story: how the ship in question was taken by the galley that was conveying Melanopus, Glaucetes, and Androtion on their embassy to Mausolus, how the owners presented their petition, and how you voted that the goods were enemy property at the time of capture. He reminded you of the statutes by which in such circumstances the property belongs to the State.
13
13
You all thought that what he said was just. Androtion, Glaucetes, and Melanopus sprang to their feet,—and here you may judge whether I am telling the truth,—made noisy, indignant, abusive speeches, exonerated the captains, admitted that the money was in their hands, and asked that the inquiry should proceed at their own houses. You listened to them; and, when their clamor had subsided, Euctemon offered a proposal, the fairest that could possibly be made, that you should demand payment from the captains, that they should apply in turn to the men in possession, and that any dispute as to liability should be adjudicated, the loser of such action to be indebted to the State.
14
14
They challenge the decree; it is brought before this Court; and to cut the story short, it was held to be legal, and escaped condemnation. Now what should have been the sequel? The State should have got the money, and the embezzler should have been punished; but assuredly there was no need of any new statute whatsoever. So far no wrong had been done to you by Timocrates, the defendant in this case; but afterwards he took over responsibility for everything that I have recounted, and it will be shown that the whole of your injuries are due to him. He made himself the hired agent of the artifices and impostures of these men, and, by that offer of his services, as I will prove to your satisfaction, he took upon himself the burden of their iniquities.
15
15
However, to begin with, I must remind you of dates, and of the conjuncture at which he proposed his new law; and indeed it will be apparent that he was impertinently laughing in your faces. It was the month of Scirophorion when those men lost the action they brought against Euctemon. Then they hired this man, and, without making the least preparation to satisfy your claim, they put up some newsmongers to tell people in the market-place that they were ready to pay the bare amount of the debt, but that they really could not afford to pay it twice over.
15
1
16
16
This was a mere manoeuvre, with banter thrown in—a device to divert attention from the enactment of this law. That it was so, we have the testimony of plain fact: all the time they never paid over a shilling of the money, while they disannulled most of the established laws by a single statute, and that the most disgraceful and scandalous ever enacted in your assembly.
17
17
Before speaking of the law that I have indicted, I wish to give you a brief account of the existing statutes under which indictments of this kind are laid; for after hearing this account you will find the information useful for the rest of my speech. In our laws at present in force, men of Athens, every condition that must be observed when new statutes are to be enacted is laid down clearly and with precision.
18
18
First of all, there is a prescribed time for legislation; but even at the proper time a man is not permitted to propose his law just as he pleases. He is directed, in the first place, to put it in writing and post it in front of the Heroes for everyone to see. Then it is ordained that the law must be of universal application, and also that laws of contrary purport must be repealed; and there are other directions with which I do not think I need trouble you now. If a man disobeys any of these directions, anyone who chooses is empowered to indict him.
19
Now if Timocrates had not been liable to prosecution on every count, if he had not contravened every one of these directions when he introduced his law, a single charge, whatever it might be, would have been preferred against him; but, as the matter stands, I am compelled to take the points one by one and address you on each in its turn. I will therefore take his first offence first, that is, that he tried to legislate in defiance of all the statutes. Afterwards I will deal in turn with any other topic on which you are willing to hear me.—Please take the statutes,—here they are,—and read them.—You will find that he has not satisfied any one requirement. I ask your attention, gentlemen of the jury, to the statutes as they are read. Ratification of Laws
20
20
In the first presidency and on the eleventh day thereof, in the Assembly, the Herald having read prayers, a vote shall be taken on the laws, to wit, first upon laws respecting the Council, and secondly upon general statutes, and then upon statutes enacted for the nine Archons, and then upon laws affecting other authorities. Those who are content with the laws respecting the Council shall hold up their hands first, and then those who are not content; and in like manner in respect of general statutes. All voting upon laws shall be in accordance with laws already in force.
21
21
If any law already in force be rejected on show of hands, the presidents in whose term of office the voting takes place shall appoint the last of the three meetings of the Assembly for the consideration of laws so rejected. The commissioners who preside by lot at the Assembly are required, immediately after religious observances, to put the question respecting the sessions of the Legislative Committee, and respecting the fund from which their fees are to be paid. The Legislative Committee shall consist of persons who have taken the judicial oath.
22
22
If the Presidents do not convene the Assembly according to the written regulations, or if the commissioners do not put the question, each president shall forfeit one thousand drachmas of sacred money to Athena, and each commissioner shall forfeit forty drachmas of sacred money to Athena, and information thereof shall be laid before the Judges in such manner as when a man holds office being in debt to the treasury; and the Judges shall bring before the Court according to the law all persons against whom such information is laid; otherwise they shall not be raised to the Council of Areopagus, as obstructing the rectification of the statutes.
23
23
Before the meeting of the Assembly any Athenian citizen who wishes shall write down the laws proposed by him and exhibit the same in front of the Eponymous Heroes, to the end that the People may vote on the question of the time allowed to the Legislative Committee with due regard to the total number of laws proposed. Whosoever proposes a new statute shall write it on a white hoard and exhibit it in front of the Heroes on every day until the meeting of the Assembly. On the eleventh day of the month Hecatombaeon the people shall elect from the whole body of citizens five persons to speak in defence of laws proposed for repeal before the Legislative Committee.
24
24
These are all old-established laws, gentlemen of the jury; they have been repeatedly tested and found advantageous to you, and no man ever denied that they were well-conceived. Naturally; for there is nothing offensive or violent or oligarchical in their provisions; they order business to be done in a courteous, democratic spirit.
25
25
In the first place, they entrusted to you citizens the decision whether a new law is to be introduced or the existing laws judged satisfactory. Then, if your vote is in favour of introduction, they did not order immediate enactment, but appointed the next assembly but one, and even at that assembly, they do not permit you to legislate, but only to consider the terms on which the Legislative Committee shall sit. In the intervening time they instructed persons wishing to introduce laws to exhibit them in front of the Heroes, so that anyone who chooses may inspect them, and, if he discovers anything injurious to the public interest, may inform you and have time to speak against the laws.
26
26
Now, of all these rules the defendant Timocrates has not observed one. He never exhibited his law; he gave no one a chance to read it and oppose it; nor did he wait for any of the dates appointed by statute. The assembly at which your vote was taken fell on the eleventh of Hecatombaeon, and he introduced his law on the twelfth, the very next day, although it was a feast of Cronos and the Council therefore stood adjourned; for he had contrived, with the help of persons whose intentions are unfriendly to you, to get by decree a sitting of the Legislative Committee, on an excuse afforded by the Panathenian Festival.
27
I wish to read to you the decree that was adopted on division, to show you that the whole business was managed by collusion, and nothing was left to chance.—Take the decree, sir, and read it to the jury. Decree During the first presidency, namely, that of the Pandionid Tribe, and on the eleventh day of that presidency, it was moved by Epicrates that, in order that the sacrifices may be offered, that provision may be adequate, and that any lack of funds for the Panathenian Festival may be made good, the Presidents of the Pandionid Tribe do tomorrow set up a Legislative Committee, and that such Legislative Committee do consist of one thousand and one citizens who have taken the oath, and that the Council co-operate therewith in legislative business.
28
28
Observe, as the decree is read, how ingeniously the man who drafted it, under a pretext of finance and the urgency of the Festival, cancelled the date fixed by statute, and put in his own date,—that they should legislate to-morrow. I protest that his intention was, not that something belonging to the Festival should be done as handsomely as possible, for in fact there was nothing left to be done, and no financial deficiency to be made good; but that this law of theirs, the subject of the present trial, might be enacted and come into force without any living man having wind of it beforehand or offering opposition.
29
29
Here is the proof: when the Legislative Committee was in session, nobody introduced any law, good or bad, in respect of the business specified, that is, of financial provision for the Panathenian Festival, but this man Timocrates coolly and quietly proceeded to legislate about matters that lay outside the terms of the decree, and were forbidden by statute. He assumed that the date specified in the decree was more authoritative than the date prescribed by law; and, while you were all holidaymaking, and though there is a standing law that at such a time we shall do one another no wrong either in private or public life nor transact business that does not concern the Festival, he was not in the least afraid of making an exhibition of himself by doing wrong, not to this or that person, but to the whole community.
30
30
Yet was it not outrageous that, well knowing that the statutes which you heard read just now were still in force, well knowing also that another law declares that no decree, even though in itself constitutional, shall have higher authority than a statute, he should draft and propose to you a new law, in virtue of a decree that, as he was fully aware, had been moved in defiance of the laws?
31
31
Was it not atrocious that, when the State had granted to us individually security against any disagreeable or offensive treatment at that time, by declaring a religious holiday, the State itself should have obtained no such immunity from Timocrates, but, during that very holiday, should have been subjected to most grievous ill-treatment? How, indeed, could any private person ill-treat the State more gravely than by subverting the laws by which the State is administered?
32
That Timocrates has done nothing that he ought to have done, nothing that the laws expressly enjoin, may be concluded from consideration of what I have already said; and before long you shall be satisfied, point by point, that he transgressed not merely in so far as he ignored the dates fixed by statute, and entirely annulled your right of deliberate consideration, by attempting to legislate during the holiday, but also in this respect,—that the law he introduced is inconsistent with all existing statutes.—But first take and read the statute I have here, which expressly forbids the introduction of any conflicting law, and authorizes an indictment if such a law should have been introduced.The Law
33
33
It shall not he lawful to repeal any established law except at a Legislative Committee; and then any Athenian citizen may move for such repeal only on condition that he proposes a law to be substituted for the law so repealed. The Commissioners shall take a show of hands upon such laws, in the first instance upon the established law, whether it appear to be advantageous to the Athenian democracy or not, and afterwards upon the law proposed. And whichever law is approved on division by the Legislative Committee shall then be operative. It shall not be lawful to introduce any law contrary to existing laws; and if any person having repealed any existing law proposes in substitution another law that is either disadvantageous to the Athenian democracy or contrary to any established law, an indictment shall lie against him according to the law made and provided in the case of the proposer of a disadvantageous law.
34
34
You have heard the law. Our city possesses many excellent laws, but in my judgement there is not one that has been framed in a more praiseworthy manner than this. Observe in what an equitable and thoroughly democratic spirit it is enacted. It forbids the introduction of anything repugnant to existing laws, except after abrogation of the law previously enacted. What is the purpose? First, to enable a jury to give a just and conscientious verdict;
35
35
for, if there were two inconsistent laws, and if two litigants were contending in this court, whether in a public or a private dispute, and if each of them, by citing a different law, claimed your verdict, you could not of course give judgement in favour of both of them,—that is absurd,—nor could you give your verdict for either without breaking your oath, because such a decision contravenes the opposite law, which is equally valid.
36
36
As a safeguard against such a dilemma the lawgiver made this provision in your interest. He also wished to make you the established guardians of the law, well knowing that the other safeguards provided by him may be evaded in many ways. The advocates
36
1
36
appointed by you, for instance, may be persuaded to hold their peace. He enjoined the exhibition of a proposed law that we may all have knowledge of it beforehand; but it may happen that it is unobserved by those who would oppose it if they knew in time, and that the rest read it without attention.
37
37
But, it may be objected, it is open to anyone to indict the law, as I have done on this occasion. Well, even in that event the State is outwitted if a man gets the prosecutor to stand aside. What, then, is the only honest and trustworthy safeguard of the law? You, the common people. It is beyond the power of mortal man to take away from you the right to determine and to approve the best policy. No man, by getting you to stand aside, or by bribing you, can ever induce you to substitute a bad law for a good one.
38
38
Therefore the lawgiver anticipates every avenue of iniquity, thwarting the plans and forbidding the advance of men whose intentions are hostile to you. All these precautions, so admirably and so righteously enacted, Timocrates has subverted and obliterated, so far as in him lay; he has introduced a law repugnant to all or nearly all the existing statutes, without reading any for comparison, without repealing any, without leaving you the right of choice, without taking any other of the steps that he was required to take.
39
I suppose that you are all satisfied that he is amenable to the indictment, as having introduced a law that contravenes existing statutes; but, to show you the character of the laws he has contravened and of the law he has introduced, the clerk will read to you, first his new law, and then the other laws to which it is repugnant. Law of Timocrates During the first presidency, namely, that of the Pandionid Tribe, and on the twelfth day of that presidency, it was moved by Timocrates that, if the additional penalty of imprisonment has been or shall hereafter be inflicted in pursuance of any law or decree upon any person in debt to the treasury, it shall be competent for him or for any other person on his behalf to nominate as sureties for the debt such persons as shall be approved by vote of the Assembly, on an undertaking to pay in full the amount in which he was indebted. The Commissioners are required to put the question whensoever any debtor wishes to nominate sureties.
40
40
The debtor who has given sureties shall be released from the penalty of imprisonment on payment to the State of the money, in respect of which he gave such sureties; but if at the time of the ninth presidency neither he nor his sureties shall have paid in the money, the man who gave sureties shall be imprisoned and the property of the sureties shall be confiscated. But in the case of tax-farmers, their sureties, and their collectors, and of the lessees of leasable revenues and their sureties, the State may exact payment according to the established laws. If any man incur debt during the ninth presidency he shall pay in full during the ninth or the tenth presidency of the next ensuing year.
41
You have heard the law, and I beg you to bear in mind this phrase, if the additional penalty of imprisonment has been or shall hereafter be inflicted, and also that he excepts from the operation of his law tax-farmers and lessees and their sureties. The law as a whole, but those provisions more especially, is contrary to all existing statutes. That you will recognize when you have listened to the actual laws.—Read. The Law
42
42
Moved by Diocles: that laws enacted under democratic government before the archonship of Eucleides and all laws that were enacted during the archonship of Eucleides and are on record shall be in force. Laws enacted after the archonship of Eucleides or laws that shall hereafter be enacted shall be in force as from the day of their several enactment, unless a clause be appended defining the date of their first coming into force. The Clerk of the Council shall affix his mark to all laws now established within thirty days; and hereafter whosoever is acting as clerk shall forthwith make a note that the law is in force as from the date of enactment.
43
43
The existing laws are excellent, gentlemen of the jury; but the law just read has defined them, if I may so put it, and given them new authority. It ordains that every statute shall be operative as from the date of enactment, unless any date is appended, and, in that case, that the specified date shall mark the beginning of its operation. The reason is that a clause had been appended to many statutes, to the effect that this law shall be in force from the time of the next ensuing archon. But the man who, to confirm such statutes, proposed the statute that has just been read, did not, in drafting his law at a later date, think it right to carry back to their dates of enactment those laws whose operation had been deferred to a date later than their enactment, and so make them operative earlier than their several authors intended.
44
44
You must therefore observe how contrary to that statute is the law that Timocrates has proposed. The statute ordains that either the date specified or the date of enactment shall hold good; Timocrates writes, if the penalty has been inflicted, referring to past transactions. He did not even define the initial date by naming an archonship; nay, he has made his law operative not merely before the date of enactment, but before any of us were born, for he has included all past time without any limitation.—Your duty, Timocrates, was either not to compose your law, or to repeal the other one; you had no right to throw the whole business into confusion for the furtherance of your own purposes. Read another law.
45
The Law nor in respect of disfranchised citizens, for restoration of their franchise, nor in respect of persons indebted to the Gods or to the treasury of the Athenians, for remission or composition of their debt, unless permission be granted by not less than six thousand citizens giving an affirmative vote by ballot. In that event it shall be lawful to put the question in such manner as the Council and the Assembly approve.
46
46
Here is another law which forbids any proposal in respect of disfranchised or indebted persons, for remission or composition, to be made or put to the vote, except after permission granted, and that only if at least six thousand citizens have voted aye. But Timocrates expressly proposed that, if the additional penalty of imprisonment has been inflicted on any debtor, he shall have remission on production of sureties, without any preliminary resolution having been carried, or any permission granted for such a resolution.
47
47
Even when a man has got his permission, the law does not allow him to do the business as he chooses, but as the Council and the Assembly approve. Timocrates was not satisfied with the simple transgression of making his proposal and introducing his law on the matters in question without permission granted; he went further and, without laying any proposition before the Council or before the Assembly, on the sly, when the Council stood adjourned, and everybody was holiday-making in honor of the festival, he brought in his bill surreptitiously.—
48
48
Yet, if your intentions had been honest, Timocrates, knowing as you did the statute which I have read, it was your duty, first to make written request for audience before the Council, then to confer with the Assembly, and after that, if the whole body of citizens had approved, to compose and bring in your bill on the matters in question, and even then to wait for the dates prescribed by law, in order that, doing business in that fashion, even though anyone tried to show that your law was disadvantageous to the State, you might not have been suspected of malicious intention, but only of the misfortune of erroneous judgement.
49
49
As it is, by thrusting your law into the statute-book clandestinely, hastily, and illegally, you have stripped yourself of all claim to indulgence; for indulgence belongs to those who offend unwittingly, not to those who have concerted a plot, as you are convicted of doing. However, I shall have a word to say on that point presently. Meantime,—read the next law.
50
The Law If any person make petition to the Council or to the Assembly in respect of any sentence of a Court of Justice or of the Council or of the Assembly, if the person who has been fined himself make petition before he has paid the fine, an information shall lie against him in the same manner as when a person sits on a jury being indebted to the treasury; and if another person make petition on behalf of the person fined, his whole property shall be confiscated; and if any Commissioner shall allow the question to be put for anyone, whether for the person fined or for another on his behalf, he shall be disfranchised.
51
51
It is a long task, gentlemen of the jury, if we are to speak of all the laws to which the proposals introduced by the defendant are repugnant; but if any law deserves discussion it is surely that which the clerk has just read. The author of that law knew how kind-hearted and indulgent you Athenians are; he could see that in many instances you had already suffered serious detriment by your own act because of that easy disposition;
52
52
and therefore, wishing to leave no excuse for public losses, he declared it wrongful that men who had been convicted of misconduct by process and judgement with the sanction of law should enjoy the benefit of your good-nature, falling back upon prayers and solicitation in their distress. Accordingly he strictly forbade either the culprit himself or anyone else to supplicate you or make speeches upon such complaints; they must do what justice demands in silence.
53
53
Now if you were asked for whom you would more naturally do a service, for those who beg you or for those who bid you, I am sure you would reply, for those who beg; for the former service is the outcome of kindliness, the latter of cowardice. Well, the laws, all of them, command you to do your duty; suppliants beg you to do a favour. Then where supplication is forbidden, can it be permissible to introduce a law that contains a command? I think not. In cases in which you conceived it to be your duty even to refuse favours, it is shameful that you should allow the desires of certain people to be fulfilled against your will.—Read the statute that comes next in order.
54
The Law When there has been a prior judgement audit or adjudication about any matter in a court of law, whether in a public or a private suit, or where the State has been vendor, none of the magistrates may bring the matter into court or put any question to the vote, nor shall they permit any accusation forbidden by law.
55
55
Why, it looks as though Timocrates were compiling evidence of his own transgressions; for at the very outset of his law he makes a proposal exactly contrary to these provisions. The legislator does not permit any question once decided by judgement of the court to be put a second time; the law of Timocrates reads that, if any penalty has been inflicted on a man in pursuance of a law or a decree, the Assembly must reconsider the matter for him, in order that the decision of the court may be overruled, and sureties put in by the person amerced. The statute forbids any magistrate even to put the question contrary to these provisions; Timocrates proposes that, if sureties are nominated, the Commissioners shall be obliged to submit their names, and adds the phrase, whenever any debtor wishes.—
56
Read another statute. The Law Judgements and awards given under the law while the government was democratic shall be valid. No, says Timocrates; they shall not be valid, at least when the penalty of imprisonment has been imposed.—Proceed. Law But acts done and judgements delivered during the time of the Thirty Tyrants, whether in private or public suits, shall be invalid.
57
57
Stop. Tell me; hearing that, what would all of you name as the most terrible misfortune?Against what would you pray most earnestly? I suppose that your prayer would be that the state of things under the Thirty Tyrants should never recur. Anyhow, that, as I understand it, is the misfortune against which this statute provides, by ordaining that the acts of that time shall be invalid. Well, the defendant condemns as illegal acts done under popular government, exactly as you condemned the acts of the tyranny; or at least he makes them equally invalid.
58
58
Then what are we to say for ourselves, men of Athens, if we allow this law to be confirmed? That our tribunals, composed under popular government of men who have taken the judicial oath, are guilty of the same iniquities as the tribunals of the Thirty Tyrants? Preposterous! That they give righteous judgements? Then what reason can we allege for enacting a law to reverse those judgements? Unless indeed we plead that we were out of our minds. We have no other excuse to offer.—
59
Read another statute. The Law Nor shall it be lawful to propose a law applying to a particular man, unless the same be applicable to all Athenian citizens, except by the votes of not less than six thousand citizens voting in the affirmative by ballot. It forbids the introduction of any law that does not affect all citizens alike,—an injunction conceived in the true spirit of democracy. As every man has an equal share in the constitution generally, so this statute asserts his equal share in the laws. You know as well as I do for whose sake Timocrates introduced his law; but, leaving those names out of the question, we have his own admission that his law is not of universal application, for he added a clause excepting from its operation tax-farmers, lessees, and their sureties.—When, sir, there are certain persons whom you have put outside your law, you cannot claim that you have made the same law for all alike.
60
60
And there is another thing that you cannot say,— that of all persons punished by imprisonment tax farmers are the greatest offenders and do us the gravest wrong, and that that is why you do not give them the benefit of your law. Surely men who are traitors to the commonwealth, men who maltreat their own parents, men who enter the market-place with unclean hands, offend far more heinously; and all those criminals are threatened with imprisonment by the standing laws, while your law offers them instant release. But here again you reveal the men in whose favour you moved your law. They got into our debt not by tax-farming, but by embezzling, or rather by plundering, our money; and that, I warrant you, is the true reason why you had no consideration for the tax-farmers.
61
61
Many other excellent statutes might be cited, all contradicted by the law he has proposed. However, if I discuss every one of them, I shall, perhaps, be robbed of my chance of arguing that the law is altogether disadvantageous to the citizens. On the other hand, even if it is repugnant to one only of the existing laws, you can have no doubt that it is open to the indictment. What, then, is my decision? To pass over all the other laws, but to discuss one law proposed on a former occasion by the defendant himself, before I proceed to that part of my accusation in which I allege that the law, if operative, will be most injurious to the commonwealth.
62
62
To have introduced a law contrary to the laws of others is a serious offence, but one which requires accusation by someone else; but, when a man legislates in opposition to a former enactment of his own, he is really making himself his own accuser. To show you that such is really the case, the clerk will read to you the actual law proposed by him, while I hold my peace.—Read.
63
The Law Moved by Timocrates: if any Athenian citizens are now in jail or shall hereafter be imprisoned on impeachment by the Council, if the judgement against such prisoners be not delivered to the Judges by the Secretary of the Presidency in pursuance of the law of impeachment, be it enacted that the Eleven shall bring them before the Court within thirty days of the day on which they receive them into custody, unless prevented by public business, and, if so prevented, as soon as possible. Any Athenian qualified as a prosecutor may prosecute. If the culprit be convicted, the Court of Heliaea shall assess such penalty, pecuniary or otherwise, as he appears to deserve. If the penalty assessed be pecuniary, he shall be imprisoned until he has paid the full amount of the fine inflicted.
64
You hear that, gentlemen of the jury?—Read those words again. The Law If the penalty assessed be pecuniary he shall be imprisoned until he has paid the full amount— That will do.—Could a man possibly propose two more contradictory enactments than these,—that convicted malefactors shall be kept in jail until they have paid their fines, and that these same malefactors may put in sureties, but must not be imprisoned. Here, then, is an accusation brought against Timocrates by Timocrates, not by Diodorus nor by any other of the great multitude of citizens.
65
65
Yet from what gain do you think that such a man would restrain his hand, or what would he hesitate to do for lucre’s sake, when he did not disdain to legislate in contradiction of himself, though the laws forbid contradiction even of others? It seems to me that, so far as effrontery goes, such a man is ready to do anything. Inasmuch, therefore, as the laws provide that evil doers of other kinds shall upon confession be punished without trial, you, men of Athens, have a right to give your verdict against this man without allowing him to speak or giving him a hearing, now that he has been caught in the act of maltreating the laws; for by proposing this law in contravention of the former law, he has pleaded guilty.
66
66
That the law he has proposed is contrary to the statutes just read, to those which I cited before, and, I may almost say, to every law in Athens, is now, I suppose, manifest to every one of you. I really wonder what he will have the face to say about those statutes. He cannot show that his law does not contradict the others; and he will not be able to convince you that he is a simple layman who did not know what he was doing through lack of experience, because for a long time past he has been celebrated for composing and introducing laws at so much apiece.
67
67
Moreover, there is another course that is not open to him: he cannot admit that he has done wrong and then plead that he deserves forgiveness; for it is quite clear that he did not propose his law unwillingly, or to help the distressed, or his own family, or people who have a claim upon him. He did it by intention, on behalf of men who have done you a grave injury, and who are in no way related to him,—unless he pretends that payment of wages is a bond of kinship.
68
68
I will now do my best to prove that the law he introduced is unacceptable and disadvantageous to the citizens. I presume that you will all agree with me that a really wholesome law, such as is calculated to benefit the people, ought, in the first place, to be drawn simply and intelligibly, not in such terms that one man thinks it means this and another that; and, secondly, that the proceedings prescribed by the law ought to be practicable, for if a law, though well-meant, were to enjoin what is impossible, it would be attempting the work not of a law, but of a prayer.
69
69
Furthermore, it should plainly appear that it does not offer an easy time to any wrongdoer. For if anyone supposes that indulgent laws are the mark of popular government, let him ask this further question: to whom are they to be indulgent? If he will look at the matter rightly, he will find that the answer is, to persons who are going to be tried, not to persons already convicted. For of the former we may say that it is still uncertain whether they have been unjustly calumniated; but the latter can no longer plead that they are not evil-doers.
70
70
Now it shall be made clear that the law before us exhibits none of the traits I have enumerated, but the very opposite, taking them one by one. There are many ways in which I might make good that statement; the best will be to go through the law itself, phrase by phrase. It is not a law well-conceived in parts, and defective in parts; from beginning to end, from the first syllable to the last, it is enacted to your detriment.—
71
The clerk shall take the actual manuscript, and read the law to the jury as far as the end of the first section.—That is the easiest way for me to explain, and for you to apprehend, what I mean. The Law of Timocrates During the first presidency, namely, that of the Pandionid Tribe, on the twelfth day of that presidency, the question was put by Aristocles of Myrrhinus, one of the Commissioners: moved by Timocrates, that if the additional penalty of imprisonment has been or shall hereafter be inflicted in pursuance of any law or decree upon any person in debt to the treasury, it shall be competent for him or for any person on his behalf to nominate as sureties for the debt—
72
72
Stop; you shall read it clause by clause presently. This, gentlemen of the jury, is very nearly the most scandalous provision of the whole statute. I do not think that any other man, when introducing a law for the use of his fellow-citizens, ever ventured upon an attempt to rescind judgements passed under earlier statutes. Yet that is what the defendant Timocrates has done without shame and even without concealment, inserting these plain words: if the additional penalty of imprisonment has been or shall hereafter be inflicted in pursuance of any law or decree upon any person in debt to the treasury.
73
73
If he had merely advised us of the right course for the future, there would have been no harm in it but, when a court of justice has given its verdict and determined the issue, is it not outrageous to introduce a law by which that verdict is to be rescinded? It is as though, after allowing the law of Timocrates to become operative, someone should draft a second law to this effect: if any persons being indebted, and having had the further penalty of imprisonment passed upon them, shall have put in sureties as the law directs, they shall not be entitled to such bail, and it shall not be lawful hereafter to release anyone on bail.
74
74
I suppose that no man in his senses would do such a thing; and you, sir, were guilty when you tried to annul those other provisions. For if he thought it a fair thing to do, his proper course was to introduce a law governing future transactions; not to lump together all offences, past and future, proven and unproven, and then register an indiscriminate judgement upon all together. Surely it is outrageous that men who have already been convicted of offences against the common weal should be deemed worthy of the same judicial treatment as men of whom it is not yet known whether they will ever do anything that deserves prosecution?
75
75
Again, we may discern how monstrously he has acted in making his law retrospective, by asking ourselves what is the real difference between government by law and oligarchy; and why we regard those who prefer to live under laws as honest, sober-minded persons, and those who submit to oligarchical rule as cowards and slaves.
76
76
The outstanding difference you will find to be really this: under oligarchical government everybody is entitled to undo the past, and to prescribe future transactions according to his own pleasure; whereas the laws of a free state prescribe what shall be done in the future, such laws having been enacted by convincing people that they will be beneficial to those who live under them. Timocrates however, legislating in a democratically governed city, has introduced into his law the characteristic iniquity of oligarchy; and in dealing with past transactions has presumed to claim for himself an authority higher than that of the convicting jury.
77
77
Nor is this the only example of his arrogance. It is further enacted that if hereafter the additional penalty of imprisonment shall have been imposed, the prisoner may be released on producing sureties for payment of his fine. If he really thought imprisonment such a dreadful infliction, his proper course was to enact that no man who produces sureties shall be committed to prison; but not, having first found that you have passed sentence of imprisonment and so incurred the resentment of the convict, then to give him a discharge on bail. In fact, he has introduced his law in this fashion by way of advertising himself as one who will, on his own authority, release prisoners, though you may have decided to keep them in jail.
78
78
Can anyone see any public advantage in a law that is to override the decisions of a court of justice, and that requires unsworn persons to cancel the judgements of sworn juries ? I hope not. It is clear that the law of Timocrates has both these faults; and if you have, each one of you, any regard for the constitution, or if you claim authority for your own decision of the questions on which you give your verdict under oath, you must abrogate a law like this, and not permit it to be made valid today.
79
79
He was not satisfied with destroying the authority of this court in respect of additional penalties, but you will find that even the proceedings which he has prescribed in his law, and imposed upon culprits who have been condemned, have not been drafted with honesty and sincerity, but as though his main purpose was to mislead and overreach you. Observe the phrasing: Moved by Timocrates that, if the additional penalty of imprisonment has been or shall hereafter be inflicted in pursuance of any law or decree upon any person in debt to the treasury, it shall be competent for him or for any other person on his behalf to nominate as sureties for the debt such persons as shall be approved on vote by the Assembly.
80
80
See what a long stride he has taken from the court of justice and its sentences! Even to the Assembly; for he steals the person of the criminal, as well as the right to hand him over to the Eleven. What magistrate will ever hand over the delinquent? What member of the Eleven will ever accept custody? The order of Timocrates is that sureties are to be nominated in the Assembly; it is impossible for the Assembly and the Courts to be in session on the same day; and there is no injunction to keep the man in custody until he has named his sureties.
81
81
Why should he have been afraid to add a distinct injunction that the magistrate shall keep the delinquent in custody until he shall have put in his sureties? Is not that quite fair? I am sure you will all say yes. Would it have been contrary to any statute ? No, indeed; it would have been the only clause that does conform to the statutes. Then what was his reason? There is no discoverable reason except this,—that his purpose was not to help but to obstruct the punishment of criminals condemned by you.
82
82
Well, how does it go on? To nominate sureties on an undertaking to pay in full the amount in which he was indebted. Here again he has stolen away the right of the sacred funds to a tenfold payment, and one-half of the claim of the civil treasury, in cases where double payment is required by law. And how does he manage that? By writing the amount instead of the penalty, and in which he was indebted instead of which has accrued.
83
83
The difference is this: if he had proposed that sureties should be appointed to guarantee the payment of the accruing penalty, he would have embraced in his enactment the statutes under which certain debts are doubled, and others multiplied by ten; and so the debtor would have been obliged not only to pay in full the amount of the debt as recorded, but also to liquidate the penal payments legally added thereto. As it is, by the words nominate sureties on an undertaking to pay in full the amount in which he was indebted, he makes the payment depend on the plaint and the documents upon which the several delinquents were brought to trial; and in those documents only the original amount of the debt is recorded.
84
84
Again, after making such a big hole in the laws by juggling with words, he adds:
84
the CommissionersSee Dem. 24.22 above. are required to put the question whensoever any debtor wishes to nominate sureties,
84
for right through his law he thinks it his business to rescue the criminal who has been convicted in this court. By allowing the nomination of sureties to take place at the pleasure of the delinquent, he puts it into his power never to pay, and never to go to prison.
85
85
Of course he will put forward men of straw, and by the time you have rejected them, he will be out of your reach. For if anyone demands his retention in jail for failing to produce sureties, he will reply that he has done so, and intends to do so; and then he will point to the statute of Timocrates, which bids him nominate sureties whenever he likes, but says nothing about custody in the meantime, which gives no instruction for imprisonment in case you reject the sureties, which is, in short, a sort of universal talisman for would-be evil-doers.
86
86
The debtor who has given sureties, he goes on, shall be released from the penalty of imprisonment on payment to the State of the money in respect of which he gave sureties. Here again he persisted in the trick I mentioned just now; he had not forgotten it; he enacted that the man shall be released from prison on payment, not of the accruing penalty, but of the original debt.
87
87
But if at the time of the ninth presidency neither he nor his sureties shall have paid in the money, the man who gave sureties shall be imprisoned, and the property of the sureties shall be confiscated. In this final clause, you will find, he has at last become the accuser of his own iniquities in the fullest sense. He did not forbid imprisonment on the broad ground that to imprison a free citizen is something shameful or terrible; but he stole from you your chance of catching your criminal in the place where he is, and so he left to you, who are the party aggrieved, the empty name of retribution, but robbed you of the reality. Without your consent he gave a discharge to people who forcibly appropriate your money; and he was within an ace of adding a clause enabling an action at law against the juries that had imposed the penalty of imprisonment.
88
88
But of all the objectionable enactments of his law, that of which I will now speak deserves our most vehement indignation. From beginning to end it is addressed to delinquents who put in sureties; but there is neither prosecution nor penalty for the man who offers no sureties, good or bad, but simply defies you. For that man he has provided the fullest imaginable impunity. The days of grace, defined as extending to the ninth presidency, he offers to the man who has put in bail.
89
89
You will see the point by observing that he adds a clause to the effect that the property of the sureties shall be confiscated, if they do not pay the debt in full. Yes, but suppose a man has not named any sureties,—then of course there are no sureties to punish. He compels the Commissioners, men chosen for that office by lot from the ranks of the citizens, to accept sureties whenever named; but on men who defraud the commonwealth he imposes no sort of compulsion,—he treats them as benefactors, and gives them the right to choose whether they will be punished or not.
90
90
Could any conceivable statute be more unsound or more opposed to your interests? First, it enjoins the reversal of your judgements in cases long ago decided; and secondly, in cases still to be tried, while instructing sworn jurors to inflict penalties, it makes those penalties inoperative. Further, it enfranchises state-debtors who do not discharge their liabilities, and, in general, it makes an exhibition of you jurors as men whose oaths, whose penalties, whose verdicts, whose censures, whose acts, in short, are all utterly futile. For my part, I conceive that if the author of the statute had been Critias of the Thirty Tyrants, he would hardly have framed and introduced it in any other fashion than this.
91
91
I think that you will easily be convinced that this law upsets the constitution, throws public business into confusion, and denudes the commonwealth of many honorable ambitions. For you cannot be unconscious that our city has often owed her safety to the warlike adventures of our navy and our land forces; and that you have frequently performed glorious achievements in the deliverance, or the chastisement, or the reconciliation, of other cities. What do I infer?
92
92
Such successes could only have been organized by the aid of those decrees and laws under which you levy contributions on some citizens, and require others to furnish war-galleys; bid some to serve in the navy, and others to perform their several duties. With that object, therefore, you impanel juries, and punish the insubordinate with imprisonment. Now mark how this gallant gentleman’s statute vitiates and makes havoc of all that business.
93
93
His clause reads, you remember: if the penalty of imprisonment has been or shall hereafter be inflicted upon any debtor, he shall, on nominating sureties on an undertaking to pay the money during the ninth presidency, be released from imprisonment. Then where are our resources? How shall any expedition be dispatched? How shall we collect ways and means, if every defaulter nominates sureties under this man’s act instead of discharging his obligation?
94
94
I presume that our reply to the Hellenic world will be: We have a law here,—the statute of Timocrates. Kindly wait till the ninth presidency; then after that we will start. No other excuse is left. And if you have to fight in self-defence, do you really think that the enemy will wait for the evasions and rogueries of every scoundrel in Athens? If our city enacts laws for her own discomfiture, laws exactly contrary to her own interests, do you think she will ever be able to play her true part in the world?
95
95
Men of Athens, we may well be satisfied if, with everything in good order, and with no such law as this, we hold advantage over our enemies, keep pace with the swift emergencies and sudden chances of warfare, and are never behindhand.—But if you, sir, distinguish yourself as the author of a law that makes havoc of everything by which our city has earned the respect and admiration of the world, is there any punishment that you do not deserve to suffer?
96
96
Moreover, men of Athens, the law shatters our financial system, both sacred and civil; and I will tell you how. You have a law in operation, as good a law as ever was enacted, that holders of sacred or civil moneys shall pay the money in to the Council house, and that, failing such payment, the Council shall recover the money by enforcing the statutes applicable to tax-farmers;
97
97
and on that law the administration of the treasury depends. That is the law that ensures the supplementary supply for the expenses of meetings of the Assembly, religious services, the Council, the cavalry, and so forth, because the revenue from taxation is not sufficient for current expenses, and what we call the supplementary payments are made under the constraint of that law.
98
98
It follows that the whole business of the State must go to rack and ruin when, the payments on account of taxation being insufficient, there is a large deficiency, when that deficiency cannot be made up until towards the end of the year, and when, as regards the supplementary payments, neither the Council nor the law-courts have authority to imprison defaulters, if they put in sureties until the ninth presidency.
99
99
What are we to do for the first eight ? Tell us this, Timocrates: are we never to meet and deliberate? If so, shall we still be living under popular government? Shall there be no sessions of the courts, civil or criminal? If so, what security will there be for complainants? Shall the Council not attend at their office to transact their legal business? If so, what remains but complete disorganization? You nay reply that we shall go on without payment of fees. Then is it not monstrous that the Assembly, the Council, and the law-courts must go unpaid for the sake of a statute which you were paid to introduce?
100
100
You ought at least to have added a clause, as you did in dealing with the tax-farmers and their sureties, that if in any other statute or decree it is provided that the debts of any defaulter may be recovered as in the case of tax-farmers, recovery from such defaulters shall be effected in accordance with the existing laws.