Antidosis

Isocrates

Antidosis

Isocrates · Antidosis 249 · perseus-eng2 · More by Isocrates

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These are the requirements they set up, and yet they have never heard me make such promises, nor have they ever seen like results in the other arts and disciplines. On the contrary, all knowledge yields itself up to us only after great effort on our part, and we are by no means all equally capable of working out in practice what we learn. Nay, from all our schools only two or three students turn out to be real champions,

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the rest retiring from their studies into private life.

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And yet how can we fail to deny intelligence to those who have the effrontery to demand powers which are not found in the recognized arts of this which they declare is not an art and who expect greater advantages to come from an art in which they do not believe than from arts which they regard as thoroughly perfected?

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Men of intelligence ought not to form contrary judgements about similar things

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nor refuse to recognize a discipline which accomplishes the same results as most of the arts. For who among you does not know that most of those who have sat under the sophists have not been duped nor affected as these men claim,

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but that some of them have been turned out competent champions and others able teachers; while those who have preferred to live in private have become more gracious in their social intercourse

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than before, and keener judges and more prudent counsellors than the great majority? How then is it possible to scorn a discipline which is able to make of those who have taken advantage of it men of that kind?

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Furthermore, this also will be agreed to by all men, namely, that in all the arts and crafts we regard those as the most skilled who turn out pupils who all work as far as possible in the same manner. Now it will be seen that this is the case with philosophy.

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For all who have been under a true and intelligent guide will be found to have a power of speech so similar that it is evident to everyone that they have shared the same training. And yet, had not a common habit and a common technique of training been instilled into them, it is inconceivable that they should have taken on this likeness.

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Again, every one of you could name many of your schoolfellows who when they were boys seemed to be the dullest among their companions, but who, growing older, outstripped them farther in intelligence and in speech than they had lagged behind them when they were boys. From this fact you can best judge what training can do; for it is evident that when they were young they all possessed such mental powers as they were born with, but as they grew to be men, these outstripped the others and changed places with them in intelligence, because their companions lived dissolutely and softly, while they gave heed to their own opportunities and to their own welfare.

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But when people succeed in making progress through their own diligence alone, how can they fail to improve in a much greater degree both over themselves and over others if they put themselves under a master who is mature, of great experience, and learned not only in what has been handed down to him but in what he has discovered for himself?

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But there remain still other reasons why everyone may well be astonished at the ignorance in men who venture so blindly to condemn philosophy. For, in the first place, they know that pains and industry give proficiency in all other activities and arts, yet deny that they have any such power in the training of the intellect;

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secondly, they admit that no physical weakness is so hopeless that it cannot be improved by exercise and effort, but they do not believe that our minds, which are naturally superior to our bodies, can be made more serviceable through education and suitable training;

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again, they observe that some people possess the art of training horses and dogs and most other animals by which they make them more spirited, gentle or intelligent, as the case may be, yet they do not think that any education has been discovered for training human nature, such as can improve men in any of those respects in which we improve the beasts.

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Nay, so great is the misfortune which they impute to us all, that while they would acknowledge that it is by our mental powers that every creature is improved and made more useful, yet they have the hardihood to claim that we ourselves, who are endowed with an intelligence through which we render all creatures of greater worth, cannot help each other to advance in excellence.

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But most absurd of all, they behold in the shows which are held year after year lions which are more gentle toward their trainers than some people are toward their benefactors, and bears which dance about and wrestle and imitate our skill,

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and yet they are not able to judge even from these instances the power which education and training have, nor can they see that human nature will respond more promptly than the animals to the benefits of education. In truth, I cannot make up my mind which should astonish us the more—the gentleness which is implanted in the fiercest of wild beasts or the brutishness which resides in the souls of such men.

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One might say more upon this head, but if I say too much on questions about which most men are agreed, I fear you may suspect that I have little to say on questions which are in dispute. Therefore I shall leave this subject and turn my attention to a class of people who do not, to be sure, contemn philosophy but condemn it much more bitterly since they attribute the iniquities of those who profess to be sophists,

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but in practice are far different, to those whose ways have nothing in common with them.

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But I am speaking, not in behalf of all those who pretend to be able to educate the young, but in behalf of those only who have justly earned this reputation, and I think that I shall convince you that my accusers have shot very wide of the truth if only you are willing to hear me to the end.

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In the first place, then, we must determine what are the objects which make people venture to do evil; for if we define these correctly, you will be better able to make up your minds whether the charges which have been made against us are true or false. Well then, I maintain that everyone does everything which he does for the sake of pleasure or gain or honor; for I observe that no desire springs up in men save for these objects.

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If this be so, it only remains to consider which of these objects we should attain by corrupting the young. Do you suppose it would give us pleasure to see or hear that our pupils were bad and in evil repute with their fellow-citizens? And who is so insensate that he would not be distressed to have such things reported about himself?

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But surely we could not expect to be admired nor to enjoy great honor for sending out disciples of that sort; on the contrary, we should be much more despised and hated than those who are charged with other forms of villainy. And, mark you, even if we could shut our eyes to these consequences, we could not gain the most money by directing a training of that character;

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for, I suppose, all men are aware that a sophist reaps his finest and his largest reward when his pupils prove to be honorable and intelligent and highly esteemed by their fellow-citizens, since pupils of that sort inspire many with the desire to enjoy his teaching, while those who are depraved repel even those who were formerly minded to join his classes. Who, then, could be blind to the more profitable course, when there is so vast a difference between the two?

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Perhaps, however, some might venture to reply that many men, because of their incontinence, are not amenable to reason, but neglect their true interests and rush on in the pursuit of pleasure. I grant you that many men in general and some who pretend to be sophists are of this nature.

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Nevertheless, no one even of their number is so incontinent as to desire his pupils also to show the same lack of control; for he would not be able to share in the pleasures which they might enjoy as the result of their incontinence, while he would bring down upon his own head most of the evil repute which would result from their depravity. Again, whom would they corrupt and what manner of people would they get as pupils?

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For this is worth inquiring into. Would they get those who are already perverse and vicious? And who, pray, would make an effort to learn from another what his own nature teaches him? Would they, then, get those who are honest and ambitious to lead a useful life? But no such person would deign to speak with men who are evil in their words and in their deeds.

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I should like to ask those who disapprove of me what they think about the students who cross the sea from Sicily, from the Pontus, and from other parts of the world in order to enjoy my instruction. Do they think that they voyage to Athens because of the dearth of evil-minded men at home? But anywhere on earth anyone can find no lack of men willing to aid him in depravity and crime.

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Do they think, then, that they come here in order to become intriguers and sycophants, at great expense to themselves? But, in the first place, people of this mind are much more inclined to lay hold of other people’s property than to part with anything of their own; and, in the next place, who would pay out money to learn depravity, since it is easy to be depraved at no expense whatever, whenever one is so inclined? For there is no need of taking lessons in evil-doing; all that a man has to do is to set his hands to it.

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No, it is evident that these students cross the sea and pay out money and go to all manner of trouble because they think that they themselves will be the better for it and that the teachers here are much more intelligent than those in their own countries. This ought to fill all Athenians with pride and make them appreciate at their worth those who have given to the city this reputation.

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But, in fact, some of our people are extremely unreasonable. They know that neither the strangers who come here nor the men who preside over their education occupy themselves with anything harmful, but that they are, on the contrary, the most unofficious and the most peaceable of all who live in Athens, giving their minds to their own affairs and confining their intercourse to each other,

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and living, furthermore, day by day in the greatest simplicity and decorum, taking their pleasures in discourse—not the kind of discourse which is employed in petty litigation nor that which is offensive to anyone, but the kind which has the approbation of all men. Nevertheless, although they know all this about them, they do not refrain from traducing them and saying that they engage in this training in order that they may defeat the ends of justice in the courts and win their own advantage.

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And yet who that engages in the practice of injustice and of evildoing would be willing to live more continently than the rest? Whom have these traducers ever seen reserving and treasuring up their depravities for future use instead of indulging from the first the evil instincts present in their nature?

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But, apart from these considerations, if it be true that cleverness in speech results in plotting against other people’s property, we should expect all able speakers to be intriguers and sycophants; for the same cause produces in every instance the same effect.

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In fact, however, you will find that among our public men who are living today or who have but lately passed away those who give most study to the art of words are the best of the statesmen who come before you on the rostrum, and, furthermore, that among the ancients it was the greatest and the most illustrious orators who brought to the city most of her blessings.

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First of all was Solon.

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For when he was placed at the head of the people, he gave them laws, set their affairs in order, and constituted the government of the city so wisely that even now Athens is well satisfied with the polity which was organized by him. Next, Cleisthenes, after he had been driven from Athens by the tyrants, succeeded by his eloquence in persuading the Amphictyons to lend him money from the treasury of Apollo,

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and thus restored the people to power, expelled the tyrants, and established that democracy to which the world of Hellas owes its greatest blessings.

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After him, Themistocles,

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placed at the head of our forces in the Persian War, counselled our ancestors to abandon the city

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(and who could have persuaded them to do this but a man of surpassing eloquence?), and so advanced their circumstances that at the price of being homeless for a few days they became for a long period of time the masters of the Hellenes.

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Finally, Pericles,

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because he was both a good leader of the people and an excellent orator, so adorned the city with temples, monuments, and other objects of beauty, that even today visitors who come to Athens think her worthy of ruling not only the Hellenes, but all the world; and, more than this, he stored away in the Acropolis a sum of not less than ten thousand talents.

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And of these men who carried out such great enterprises not one neglected the art of discourse; nay, so much more did they apply their minds to eloquence than to other things, that Solon was named one of the seven sophists

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and was given the title which is now dishonored and on trial here; and Pericles studied under two of the sophists, Anaxagoras of Clazomenae

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and Damon,

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the latter in his day reputed to be the wisest among the Athenians.

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Could one, then, show more clearly than by these examples that the powers of eloquence do not turn men into evil-doers? No, but, on the other hand, those who are evil from their birth, like my accuser, will, I doubt not, continue to the end indulging their depravity both in words and in deeds.

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But I can show you also where you may see, if you desire, the names of our trouble-makers and of the men who are really liable to the charges which these people apply to the sophists. They are published by law on the tablets which the magistrates set up: public offenders and sycophants have their names published by the Thesmothetae; malefactors and their instigators, by the Eleven; and private offenders and authors of unjust complaints, by the Forty.

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In these lists you will find the names of this fellow and his friends recorded many times, but you will not find my name nor that of anyone of my profession published in a single one of them. On the contrary, you will find that we so order our own affairs as to stand in no need of your lawsuits.

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And yet, when men keep clear of these troubles, when they live decently and have had no part in any disgraceful act, why do you not give them their due of praise instead of subjecting them to trial? For it is evident that the principles which we instil into our students are such as we practice in our own lives.

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Now you will appreciate even more clearly from the things which I am going to say that I am far from being a corrupter of our youth. For if I were guilty of this, Lysimachus would not be the one to be incensed in their behalf, nor anyone of his kind, but you would see the fathers and relatives of my pupils up in arms, framing writs and seeking to bring me to justice.

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But instead of that they bring their sons to me and are ready to pay me money, and are rejoiced when they see them spending their days in my society,

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while the sycophants are the men who speak evil of me and hale me into court. And who more than these sycophants would like to see many of our citizens corrupted and depraved, since they know that when they live among such characters they wield great power,

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whereas when they fall into the hands of honorable and intelligent men, they are doomed to destruction?

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Therefore these men are wise in seeking to do away with all studies which they consider will make men better, and so render them more intolerant of the depravities and intrigues of the sycophants. It is well for you, however, to take the opposite course and regard those pursuits as the best to which you see that these men are most inimical.

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But I now find myself in a curious position; for I am going to be frank even if some will say that I shift my ground too easily. A little while ago I said that many good men had been misled about philosophy, and are consequently harshly disposed toward it. Now, however, I have assumed that the arguments which I have presented are so plain and evident to all that no one, it seems to me, can misapprehend its power or accuse me of corrupting my disciples or have any such feeling as I imputed to them a little while ago.

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Nevertheless, if I am to speak the truth and say what has now come into my mind, I am of the opinion that while all those who are envious of my success covet the ability to think and speak well, yet they themselves neglect to cultivate it, some because they are indolent, some because they discredit their own powers, and some on other pretexts (and these are legion);

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but when other men take great pains and show a desire to attain what they themselves covet, then they grow irritated, jealous, perturbed in spirit, and are much in the same state of mind as lovers are. Indeed, how could one more aptly explain their condition?

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They envy the good fortune of those who are able to use words eloquently; yet they reproach the youth who aspire to win this distinction. There is no one of them who would not pray the gods to bestow the power of eloquence upon himself, first of all, and failing that, upon his sons and his own kin;

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yet when men strive through work and study to accomplish for themselves what these people would like to have as a gift from the gods, they accuse them of going utterly astray. At one moment they make believe to mock at them as dupes and victims; and then again, for no reason at all, they change about and denounce them as adepts in grasping their own advantage.

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When any danger threatens the city, they seek counsel from those who can speak best upon the question at issue and act upon their advice; but when men devote their efforts to preparing themselves to serve the state in just such crises, they think it proper to traduce them. And they reproach the Thebans and our other enemies for their ignorance;

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yet when men seek by every means to escape from that malady, they never cease maligning them.

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But as a symptom, not only of their confusion of mind, but of their contempt for the gods, they recognize that Persuasion is one of the gods, and they observe that the city makes sacrifices to her every year,

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but when men aspire to share the power which the goddess possesses, they claim that such aspirants are being corrupted, as though their desire were for some evil thing.

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But what is most astonishing of all is that while they would grant that the mind is superior to the body, nevertheless, in spite of this opinion, they look with greater favor upon training in gymnastics than upon the study of philosophy.

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And yet how unreasonable it is to give higher praise to those who cultivate the less than to those who cultivate the greater thing, and that too when everyone knows it was not through excellence of body that Athens ever accomplished any noteworthy thing, but that through wisdom of men

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she became the most prosperous and the greatest of Hellenic states.

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It would be possible to bring together many more contradictions than the above in the views of these people, but that is a task for those who are younger than I and who are free from anxiety about the present occasion. For example, one might put the following questions on this very subject: Suppose the case of men who, having inherited large fortunes from their ancestors, used their wealth, not to render themselves serviceable to the state, but to outrage their fellow-citizens and to dishonor their sons and their wives; would anyone venture to put the blame upon the authors of their wealth instead of demanding that the offenders themselves be punished?

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Again, suppose the case of men who, having mastered the art of war, did not use their skill against the enemy, but rose up and slew many of their fellow-citizens; or suppose the case of men who, having been trained to perfection in the art of boxing or of the pancration, kept away from the games and fell foul of the passers-by; would anyone withhold praise from their instructors instead of putting to death those who turned their lessons to an evil use?

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We ought, therefore, to think of the art of discourse just as we think of the other arts, and not to form opposite judgements about similar things, nor show ourselves intolerant toward that power which, of all the faculties which belong to the nature of man, is the source of most of our blessings. For in the other powers which we possess, as I have already said on a former occasion,

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we are in no respect superior to other living creatures; nay, we are inferior to many in swiftness and in strength and in other resources;

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but, because there has been implanted in us the power to persuade each other and to make clear to each other whatever we desire, not only have we escaped the life of wild beasts, but we have come together and founded cities and made laws and invented arts; and, generally speaking, there is no institution devised by man which the power of speech has not helped us to establish.

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For this it is which has laid down laws concerning things just and unjust, and things honorable and base; and if it were not for these ordinances we should not be able to live with one another. It is by this also that we confute the bad and extol the good. Through this we educate the ignorant and appraise the wise; for the power to speak well is taken as the surest index of a sound understanding, and discourse which is true and lawful and just is the outward image of a good and faithful soul.

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With this faculty we both contend against others on matters which are open to dispute and seek light for ourselves on things which are unknown; for the same arguments which we use in persuading others when we speak in public, we employ also when we deliberate in our own thoughts; and, while we call eloquent those who are able to speak before a crowd, we regard as sage those who most skilfully debate their problems in their own minds.

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And, if there is need to speak in brief summary of this power, we shall find that none of the things which are done with intelligence take place without the help of speech, but that in all our actions as well as in all our thoughts speech is our guide, and is most employed by those who have the most wisdom.

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But without reflecting at all on these truths, Lysimachus has dared to attack those who aspire to an accomplishment which is the source of blessings so many and so great.

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But why should we be surprised at him when even among the professors of disputation

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there are some who talk no less abusively of the art of speaking on general and useful themes than do the most benighted of men, not that they are ignorant of its power or of the advantage which it quickly gives to those who avail themselves of it, but because they think that by decrying this art they will enhance the standing of their own.

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I could, perhaps, say much harsher things of them than they of me, but I refrain for a double reason. I want neither to descend to the level of men whom envy has made blind nor to censure men who, although they do no actual harm to their pupils are less able to benefit them than are other teachers. I shall, however, say a few words about them, first because they also have paid their compliments to me; second, in order that you, being better informed as to their powers, may estimate us justly in relation to each other;

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and, furthermore, that I may show you clearly that we who are occupied with political discourse and whom they call contentious are more considerate than they; for although they are always saying disparaging things of me, I shall not answer them in kind but shall confine myself to the simple truth.

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For I believe that the teachers who are skilled in disputation and those who are occupied with astronomy and geometry and studies of that sort

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do not injure but, on the contrary, benefit their pupils, not so much as they profess, but more than others give them credit for.

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Most men see in such studies nothing but empty talk and hair-splitting; for none of these disciplines has any useful application either to private or to public affairs; nay, they are not even remembered for any length of time after they are learned because they do not attend us through life nor do they lend aid in what we do, but are wholly divorced from our necessities.

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But I am neither of this opinion nor am I far removed from it; rather it seems to me both that those who hold that this training is of no use in practical life are right and that those who speak in praise of it have truth on their side. If there is a contradiction in this statement, it is because these disciplines are different in their nature from the other studies which make up our education;

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for the other branches avail us only after we have gained a knowledge of them, whereas these studies can be of no benefit to us after we have mastered them unless we have elected to make our living from this source, and only help us while we are in the process of learning. For while we are occupied with the subtlety and exactness of astronomy and geometry

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and are forced to apply our minds to difficult problems, and are, in addition, being habituated to speak and apply ourselves to what is said and shown to us, and not to let our wits go wool-gathering, we gain the power, after being exercised and sharpened on these disciplines, of grasping and learning more easily and more quickly those subjects which are of more importance and of greater value.

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I do not, however, think it proper to apply the term “philosophy” to a training which is no help to us in the present either in our speech or in our actions, but rather I would call it a gymnastic of the mind and a preparation for philosophy. It is, to be sure, a study more advanced than that which boys in school pursue, but it is for the most part the same sort of thing;

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for they also when they have labored through their lessons in grammar, music,

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and the other branches, are not a whit advanced in their ability to speak and deliberate on affairs, but they have increased their aptitude for mastering greater and more serious studies.

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I would, therefore, advise young men to spend some time on these disciplines,

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but not to allow their minds to be dried up by these barren subtleties, nor to be stranded on the speculations of the ancient sophists, who maintain, some of them, that the sum of things is made up of infinite elements; Empedocles that it is made up of four, with strife and love operating among them; Ion, of not more than three; Alcmaeon, of only two; Parmenides and Melissus, of one; and Gorgias, of none at all.

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For I think that such curiosities of thought are on a par with jugglers’ tricks which, though they do not profit anyone, yet attract great crowds of the empty-minded, and I hold that men who want to do some good in the world must banish utterly from their interests all vain speculations and all activities which have no bearing on our lives.

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Now I have spoken and advised you enough on these studies for the present. It remains to tell you about “wisdom” and “philosophy.”

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It is true that if one were pleading a case on any other issue it would be out of place to discuss these words (for they are foreign to all litigation), but it is appropriate for me, since I am being tried on such an issue, and since I hold that what some people call philosophy is not entitled to that name, to define and explain to you what philosophy, properly conceived, really is.

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My view of this question is, as it happens, very simple. For since it is not in the nature of man to attain a science by the possession of which we can know positively what we should do or what we should say, in the next resort I hold that man to be wise who is able by his powers of conjecture to arrive generally at the best course, and I hold that man to be a philosopher who occupies himself with the studies from which he will most quickly gain that kind of insight.

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What the studies are which have this power I can tell you, although I hesitate to do so; they are so contrary to popular belief and so very far removed from the opinions of the rest of the world, that I am afraid lest when you first hear them you will fill the whole court-room with your murmurs and your cries. Nevertheless, in spite of my misgivings, I shall attempt to tell you about them; for I blush at the thought that anyone might suspect me of betraying the truth to save my old age and the little of life remaining to me.

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But, I beg of you, do not, before you have heard me, judge that I could have been so mad as to choose deliberately, when my fate is in your hands, to express to you ideas which are repugnant to your opinions if I had not believed that these ideas follow logically on what I have previously said, and that I could support them with true and convincing proofs.

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I consider that the kind of art which can implant honesty and justice in depraved natures has never existed and does not now exist, and that people who profess that power will grow weary and cease from their vain pretensions before such an education is ever found.

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But I do hold that people can become better and worthier if they conceive an ambition to speak well,

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if they become possessed of the desire to be able to persuade their hearers, and, finally, if they set their hearts on seizing their advantage—I do not mean “advantage” in the sense given to that word by the empty-minded, but advantage in the true meaning of that term;

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and that this is so I think I shall presently make clear. For, in the first place, when anyone elects to speak or write discourses which are worthy of praise and honor, it is not conceivable that he will support causes which are unjust or petty or devoted to private quarrels, and not rather those which are great and honorable, devoted to the welfare of man and our common good; for if he fails to find causes of this character, he will accomplish nothing to the purpose.

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In the second place, he will select from all the actions of men which bear upon his subject those examples which are the most illustrious and the most edifying; and, habituating himself to contemplate and appraise such examples, he will feel their influence not only in the preparation of a given discourse but in all the actions of his life.

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It follows, then, that the power to speak well and think right will reward the man who approaches the art of discourse with love of wisdom and love of honor.

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Furthermore, mark you, the man who wishes to persuade people will not be negligent as to the matter of character; no, on the contrary, he will apply himself above all to establish a most honorable name among his fellow-citizens; for who does not know that words carry greater conviction when spoken by men of good repute than when spoken by men who live under a cloud, and that the argument which is made by a man’s life is of more weight than that which is furnished by words?

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Therefore,the stronger a man’s desire to persuade his hearers, the more zealously will he strive to be honorable and to have the esteem of his fellow-citizens.

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And let no one of you suppose that while all other people realize how much the scales of persuasion incline in favor of one who has the approval of his judges, the devotees of philosophy alone are blind to the power of good will. In fact, they appreciate this even more thoroughly than others, and they know, furthermore,

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that probabilities and proofs and all forms of persuasion support only the points in a case to which they are severally applied, whereas an honorable reputation not only lends greater persuasiveness to the words of the man who possesses it, but adds greater lustre to his deeds, and is, therefore, more zealously to be sought after by men of intelligence than anything else in the world.

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I come now to the question of “advantage”

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—the most difficult of the points I have raised. If anyone is under the impression that people who rob others or falsify accounts or do any evil thing get the advantage, he is wrong in his thinking; for none are at a greater disadvantage throughout their lives than such men; none are found in more difficult straits, none live in greater ignominy; and, in a word, none are more miserable than they.

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No, you ought to believe rather that those are better off now and will receive the advantage in the future at the hands of the gods

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who are the most righteous and the most faithful in their devotions, and that those receive the better portion at the hands of men who are the most conscientious in their dealings with their associates, whether in their homes or in public life, and are themselves esteemed as the noblest among their fellows.

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This is verily the truth, and it is well for us to adopt this way of speaking on the subject, since, as things now are, Athens has in many respects been plunged into such a state of topsy-turvy and confusion that some of our people no longer use words in their proper meaning but wrest them from the most honorable associations and apply them to the basest pursuits.

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On the one hand, they speak of men who play the buffoon and have a talent for mocking and mimicking as “gifted”

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—an appellation which should be reserved for men endowed with the highest excellence; while, on the other hand, they think of men who indulge their depraved and criminal instincts and who for small gains acquire a base reputation as “getting the advantage,” instead of applying this term to the most righteous and the most upright, that is, to men who take advantage of the good and not the evil things of life.

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They characterize men who ignore our practical needs and delight in the mental juggling of the ancient sophists as “students of philosophy,” but refuse this name to whose who pursue and practise those studies which will enable us to govern wisely both our own households and the commonwealth—which should be the objects of our toil, of our study, and of our every act. It is from these pursuits that you have for a long time now been driving away our youth,

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because you accept the words of those who denounce this kind of education.

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Yes, and you have brought it about that the most promising of our young men are wasting their youth in drinking-bouts, in parties, in soft living and childish folly, to the neglect of all efforts to improve themselves; while those of grosser nature are engaged from morning until night in extremes of dissipation which in former days an honest slave would have despised.

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You see some of them chilling their wine at the “Nine-fountains”

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; others, drinking in taverns; others, tossing dice in gambling dens; and many, hanging about the training-schools of the flute-girls. And as for those who encourage them in these things, no one of those who profess to be concerned for our youth has ever haled them before you for trial, but instead they persecute me, who, whatever else I may deserve, do at any rate deserve thanks for this, that I discourage such habits in my pupils.

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But so inimical to all the world is this race of sycophants that when men pay a ransom

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of a hundred and thirty minae

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for women who bid fair to help them make away with the rest of their property besides, so far from reproaching them, they actually rejoice in their extravagance; but when men spend any amount, however small, upon their education, they complain that they are being corrupted. Could any charge be more unjust than this against our students?

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For, while in the prime of vigor, when most men of their age are most inclined to indulge their passions, they have disdained a life of pleasure; when they might have saved expense and lived softly, they have elected to pay out money and submit to toil; and, though hardly emerged from boyhood, they have come to appreciate what most of their elders do not know,

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namely, that if one is to govern his youth rightly and worthily and make the proper start in life, he must give more heed to himself than to his possessions, he must not hasten and seek to rule over others

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before he has found a master to direct his own thoughts, and he must not take as great pleasure or pride in other advantages as in the good things which spring up in the soul under a liberal education. I ask you, then, when young men have governed themselves by these principles, ought they not to be praised rather than censured, ought they not to be recognized as the best and the most sober-minded among their fellows?

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I marvel at men who felicitate those who are eloquent by nature on being blessed with a noble gift, and yet rail at those who wish to become eloquent, on the ground that they desire an immoral and debasing education. Pray, what that is noble by nature becomes shameful and base when one attains it by effort? We shall find that there is no such thing, but that, on the contrary, we praise, at least in other fields, those who by their own devoted toil are able to acquire some good thing more than we praise those who inherit it from their ancestors.

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And rightly so; for it is well that in all activities, and most of all in the art of speaking, credit is won, not by gifts of fortune, but by efforts of study. For men who have been gifted with eloquence by nature and by fortune, are governed in what they say by chance, and not by any standard of what is best, whereas those who have gained this power by the study of philosophy and by the exercise of reason never speak without weighing their words, and so are less often in error as to a course of action.

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Therefore, it behoves all men to want to have many of their youth engaged in training to become speakers, and you Athenians most of all. For you, yourselves, are pre-eminent and superior to the rest of the world, not in your application to the business of war, nor because you govern yourselves more excellently or preserve the laws handed down to you by your ancestors more faithfully than others, but in those qualities by which the nature of man rises above the other animals,

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and the race of the Hellenes above the barbarians,

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namely, in the fact that you have been educated as have been no other people in wisdom and in speech.

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So, then, nothing more absurd could happen than for you to declare by your votes that students who desire to excel their companions in those very qualities in which you excel mankind, are being corrupted, and to visit any misfortune upon them for availing themselves of an education in which you have become the leaders of the world.

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For you must not lose sight of the fact that Athens is looked upon as having become a school

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for the education of all able orators and teachers of oratory. And naturally so; for people observe that she holds forth the greatest prizes for those who have this ability, that she offers the greatest number and variety of fields of exercise to those who have chosen to enter contests of this character and want to train for them,

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and that, furthermore, everyone obtains here that practical experience which more than any other thing imparts ability to speak; and, in addition to these advantages, they consider that the catholicity and moderation of our speech,

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as well as our flexibility of mind and love of letters, contribute in no small degree to the education of the orator. Therefore they suppose, and not without just reason, that all clever speakers are the disciples of Athens.

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Beware, then, lest it make you utterly ridiculous to pronounce a disparaging judgement upon the reputation which you have among the Hellenes even more than I have among you. Manifestly, by such an unjust verdict, you would be passing sentence upon yourselves.

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It would be as if the Lacedaemonians were to attempt to penalize men for training themselves in preparation for war, or as if the Thessalians

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saw fit to punish men for practicing the art of horsemanship. Take care, therefore, not to do yourselves this wrong and not to lend support to the slanders of the enemies of Athens rather than to the eulogies of her friends.

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I think that you are not unaware that while some of the Hellenes are hostile to you, some are extremely friendly, and rest their hopes of security upon you. These say that Athens is the only city, the others being mere villages, and that she deserves to be termed the capital of Hellas both because of her size and because of the resources which she furnishes to the rest of the world, and most of all because of the character of her inhabitants;

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for no people, they insist, are more kindly or more sociable,

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nor could anyone find any people with whom he could spend all his days in friendlier intercourse. Indeed, so extravagant are they in their praise that they do not even hesitate to say that they would rather suffer injury at the hands of an Athenian gentleman than benefit through the rudeness of people from another city.

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There are, on the other hand, those who scoff at this praise, and, dwelling upon the cruel and iniquitous practices of the sycophants, denounce the whole city as savage and insupportable.

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