Panegyricus
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Original / primary: Perseus Eng2
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I, however, take the view, in the first place, that it is no sign that we ruled badly if some of those who were at war with us are shown to have been severely disciplined, but that a much clearer proof that we administered the affairs of our allies wisely is seen in the fact that among the states which remained our loyal subjects not one experienced these disasters.
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In the second place, if other states had dealt more leniently with the same circumstances, they might reasonably censure us; but since that is not the case, and it is impossible to control so great a multitude of states without disciplining those who offend, does it not follow that we deserve praise because we acted harshly in the fewest possible cases and were yet able to hold our dominion for the greatest length of time?
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But I believe that all men are of the opinion that those will prove the best leaders and champions of the Hellenes under whom in the past those who yielded obedience have fared the best. Well, then, it will be found that under our supremacy the private households grew most prosperous and that the commonwealths also became greatest. For we were not jealous of the growing states,
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nor did we engender confusion among them by setting up conflicting polities side by side, in order that faction might be arrayed against faction and that both might court our favor. On the contrary, we regarded harmony among our allies as the common boon of all, and therefore we governed all the cities under the same laws, deliberating about them in the spirit of allies, not of masters;
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guarding the interests of the whole confederacy but leaving each member of it free to direct its own affairs; supporting the people but making war on despotic powers,
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considering it an outrage that the many should be subject to the few, that those who were poorer in fortune but not inferior in other respects should be banished from the offices, that, furthermore, in a fatherland which belongs to all in common
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some should hold the place of masters, others of aliens,
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and that men who are citizens by birth
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should be robbed by law of their share in the government.
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It was because we had these objections, and others besides, to oligarchies that we established the same polity
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in the other states as in Athens itself—a polity which I see no need to extol at greater length, since I can tell the truth about it in a word: They continued to live under this regime for seventy years,
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and, during this time, they experienced no tyrannies, they were free from the domination of the barbarians, they were untroubled by internal factions, and they were at peace with all the world.
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On account of these services it becomes all thinking men to be deeply grateful to us, much rather than to reproach us because of our system of colonization;
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for we sent our colonies into the depopulated states for the protection of their territories and not for our own aggrandizement. And here is proof of this: We had in proportion to the number of our citizens a very small territory,
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but a very great empire; we possessed twice as many ships of war as all the rest combined,
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and these were strong enough to engage double their number; at the very borders of
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Attica
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lay
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Euboea
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,
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which was not only fitted by her situation to command the sea, but also surpassed all the islands in her general resources,
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and
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Euboea
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lent itself more readily to our control than did our own country besides, while we knew that both among the Hellenes and among the barbarians those are regarded most highly who have driven their neighbors from their homes
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and have so secured for themselves a life of affluence and ease, nevertheless, none of these considerations tempted us to wrong the people of the island;
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on the contrary, we alone of those who have obtained great power suffered ourselves to live in more straitened circumstances than those who were reproached with being our slaves.
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And yet, had we been disposed to seek our own advantage, we should not, I imagine, have set our hearts on the territory of
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Scione
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(which, as all the world knows, we gave over to our Plataean refugees),
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and passed over this great territory which would have enriched us all.
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Now although we have shown ourselves to be of such character and have given so convincing proof that we do not covet the possessions of others, we are brazenly denounced by those who had a hand in the decarchies
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—men who have befouled their own countries, who have made the crimes of the past seem insignificant, and have left the would-be scoundrels of the future no chance to exceed their villiany; and who, for all that, profess to follow the ways of
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Lacedaemon
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, when they practise the very opposite, and bewail the disasters of the Melians, when they have shamelessly inflicted irreparable wrongs upon their own citizens. For what crime have they overlooked?
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What act of shame or outrage is wanting in their careers? They regarded the most lawless of men as the most loyal; they courted traitors as if they were benefactors; they chose to be slaves to one of the Helots
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so that they might oppress their own countries; they honored the assassins and murderers of their fellow-citizens more than their own parents;
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and to such a stage of brutishness did they bring us all that, whereas in former times, because of the prosperity which prevailed, every one of us found many to sympathize with him even in trifling reverses, yet under the rule of these men, because of the multitude of our own calamities, we ceased feeling pity for each other, since there was no man to whom they allowed enough of respite so that he could share another’s burdens.
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For what man dwelt beyond their reach? What man was so far removed from public life that he was not forced into close touch with the disasters into which such creatures plunged us? But in the face of all this, these men, who brought their own cities to such a pitch of anarchy, do not blush to make unjust charges against our city; nay, to crown their other effronteries, they even have the audacity to talk of the private and public suits which were once tried in
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Athens
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, when they themselves put to death without trial more men
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in the space of three months than
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Athens
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tried during the whole period of her supremacy.
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And of their banishments, their civil strife, their subversion of laws, their political revolutions, their atrocities upon children, their insults to women, their pillage of estates, who could tell the tale? I can only say this much of the whole business—the severities under our administration could have been readily brought to an end by a single vote of the people,
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while the murders and acts of violence under their regime are beyond any power to remedy.
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And, furthermore, not even the present peace, nor yet that “autonomy” which is inscribed in the treaties
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but is not found in our governments, is preferable to the rule of
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Athens
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. For who would desire a condition of things where pirates command the seas
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and mercenaries occupy our cities;
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where fellow-countrymen, instead of waging war in defense of their territories against strangers, are fighting within their own walls
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against each other; where more cities have been captured in war
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than before we made the peace; and where revolutions follow so thickly upon each other that those who are at home in their own countries are more dejected than those who have been punished with exile? For the former are in dread of what is to come, while the latter live ever in the hope of their return.
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And so far are the states removed from “freedom” and “autonomy”
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that some of them are ruled by tyrants, some are controlled by alien governors, some have been sacked and razed,
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and some have become slaves to the barbarians—the same barbarians whom we once so chastened for their temerity in crossing over into
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Europe
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, and for their overweening pride,
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that they not only ceased from making expeditions against us, but even endured to see their own territory laid waste;
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and we brought their power so low, for all that they had once sailed the sea with twelve hundred ships, that they launched no ship of war this side of Phaselis
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but remained inactive and waited on more favorable times rather than trust in the forces which they then possessed.
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And that this state of affairs was due to the valor of our ancestors has been clearly shown in the fortunes of our city: for the very moment when we were deprived of our dominion marked the beginning of a dominion
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of ills for the Hellenes. In fact, after the disaster which befell us in the
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Hellespont
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,
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when our rivals took our place as leaders, the barbarians won a naval victory,
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became rulers of the sea, occupied most of the islands,
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made a landing in
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Laconia
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, took
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Cythera
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by storm, and sailed around the whole
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Peloponnesus
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, inflicting damage as they went.
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One may best comprehend how great is the reversal in our circumstances if he will read side by side the treaties
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which were made during our leadership and those which have been published recently; for he will find that in those days we were constantly setting limits to the empire of the King,
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levying tribute on some of his subjects, and barring him from the sea; now, however, it is he who controls the destinies of the Hellenes, who dictates
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what they must each do, and who all but sets up his viceroys in their cities.
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For with this one exception, what else is lacking? Was it not he who decided the issue of the war, was it not he who directed the terms of peace, and is it not he who now presides over our affairs? Do we not sail off to him as to a master, when we have complaints against each other? Do we not address him as “The Great King” as though we were the captives of his spear? Do we not in our wars against each other rest our hopes of salvation on him, who would gladly destroy both Athens and Lacedaemon ?
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Reflecting on these things, we may well be indignant at the present state of affairs, and yearn for our lost supremacy: and we may well blame the Lacedaemonians because, although in the beginning they entered upon the war
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with the avowed intention
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of freeing the Hellenes, in the end they delivered so many of them into bondage, and because they induced the Ionians to revolt from
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Athens
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, the mother city from which the Ionians emigrated and by whose influence they were often preserved from destruction, and then betrayed them
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to the barbarians—those barbarians in despite of whom they possess their lands and against whom they have never ceased to war.
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At that time the Lacedaemonians were indignant because we thought it right by legitimate means to extend our dominion over certain peoples.
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Now, however, they feel no concern, when these peoples are reduced to such abject servitude that it is not enough that they should be forced to pay tribute and see their citadels occupied by their foes, but, in addition to these public calamities, must also in their own persons submit to greater indignities than those which are suffered in our world by purchased slaves
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; for none of us is so cruel to his servants as are the barbarians in punishing free men.
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But the crowning misery is that they are compelled to take the field with the enemy
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in the very cause of slavery and to fight against men who assert their right to freedom, and to submit to hazards of war on such terms that in case of defeat they will be destroyed at once, and in case of victory they will strengthen the claims of their bondage for all time to come.
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For these evils, who else, can we think, is to blame but the Lacedaemonians, seeing that they have so great power, yet look on with indifference while those who have placed themselves under the Lacedaemonian alliance are visited with such outrages, and while the barbarian builds up his own empire by means of the strength of the Hellenes? In former days, it is true, they used to expel tyrants and bring succor to the people, but now they have so far reversed their policy that they make war on responsible governments and aid in establishing absolute monarchies;
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they sacked and razed the city of
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Mantinea
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,
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after peace had been concluded; they seized the Cadmea
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in
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Thebes
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; and now
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they are laying siege to
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Olynthus
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and Phlius:
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on the other hand, they are assisting Amyntas, king of the Macedonians,
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and Dionysius,
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the tyrant of
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Sicily
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, and the barbarian king who rules over
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Asia
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,
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to extend their dominions far and wide.
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And yet is it not extraordinary that those who stand at the head of the Hellenes should set up one man as master over a host of human beings so great that it is not easy to ascertain even their numbers, while they do not permit the very greatest of our cities to govern even themselves, but try to compel them to submit to slavery or else involve them in the greatest disasters?
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But most monstrous of all it is to see a people who arrogate to themselves the right of leadership making war every day upon the Hellenes and committed for all time to an alliance with the barbarians.
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And let no one suppose that I am ill-natured, because I have recalled these facts to you in rather harsh terms, after having stated at the outset that I intended to speak on conciliation; for it is not with the intention of stigmatizing the city of the Lacedaemonians in the eyes of others that I have spoken as I have about them, but that I may induce the Lacedaemonians themselves, so far as it lies in the power of words to do so, to make an end of such a policy.
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It is not, however, possible to turn men from their errors, or to inspire in them the desire for a different course of action without first roundly condemning their present conduct; and a distinction must be made between accusation, when one denounces with intent to injure, and admonition,
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when one uses like words with intent to benefit; for the same words are not to be interpreted in the same way unless they are spoken in the same spirit.
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For we have reason to reproach the Lacedaemonians for this also, that in the interest of their own city they compel their neighbors to live in serfdom,
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but for the common advantage of their allies they refuse to bring about a similar condition, although it lies in their power to make up their quarrel with us and reduce all the barbarians to a state of subjection to the whole of
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Hellas
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.
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And yet it is the duty of men who are proud because of natural gifts and not merely because of fortune to undertake such deeds much rather than to levy tribute
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on the islanders,
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who are deserving of their pity, seeing that because of the scarcity of land they are compelled to till mountains, while the people of the mainland,
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because of the abundance of their territory, allow most of it to lie waste, and have, nevertheless, from that part of it which they do harvest, grown immensely rich.
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It is my opinion that if anyone should come here from another part of the world and behold the spectacle of the present state of our affairs, he would charge both the Athenians and the Lacedaemonians with utter madness, not only because we risk our lives fighting as we do over trifles when we might enjoy in security a wealth of possessions, but also because we continually impoverish our own territory while neglecting to exploit that of Asia.
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As for the barbarian, nothing is more to his purpose than to take measures to prevent us from ever ceasing to make war upon each other; while we, on the contrary, are so far from doing anything to embroil his interests or foment rebellion among his subjects that when, thanks to fortune, dissensions do break out in his empire we actually lend him a hand in putting them down. Even now, when the two armies are fighting in
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Cyprus
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,
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we permit him to make use of the one
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and to besiege the other,
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although both of them belong to
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Hellas
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;
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for the Cyprians, who are in revolt against him, are not only on friendly terms with us
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but are also seeking the protection of the Lacedaemonians; and as to the forces which are led by Tiribazus, the most effective troops of his infantry have been levied from these parts,
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and most of his fleet has been brought together from
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Ionia
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; and all these would much more gladly make common cause and plunder
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Asia
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than risk their lives fighting against each other over trifling issues.
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But these things we take no thought to prevent; instead, we wrangle about the islands of the Cyclades, when we have so recklessly given over so many cities and such great forces to the barbarians. And therefore some of our possessions are now his, some will soon be his, and others are threatened by his treacherous designs. And he has rightly conceived an utter contempt for us all;
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for he has attained what no one of his ancestors ever did: Asia has been conceded both by us and by the Lacedaemonians to belong to the King; and as for the cities of the Hellenes, he has taken them so absolutely under his control that he either razes them to the ground or builds his fortresses within them. And all this has come about by reason of our own folly, not because of his power.
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And yet there are those who stand in awe of the greatness of the King’s power and maintain that he is a dangerous enemy,
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dwelling at length on the many reversals which he has brought about in the affairs of the Hellenes. In my judgement, however, those who express such sentiments do not discourage but urge on the expedition; for if he is going to be hard to make war against when we have composed our differences and while he, himself is still beset by dissensions, then verily we should be in utmost dread of that time when the conflicting interests of the barbarians are settled and are governed by a single purpose, while we continue to be, as now, hostile to each other.
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But even though these objectors do in fact lend support to my contention, yet, for all that, they are mistaken in their views about the power of the King; for if they could show that he had ever in the past prevailed over both
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Athens
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and
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at once, they would have reason for attempting to alarm us now. But if this is not the case, and the truth is that when we and the Lacedaemonians have been in conflict he has but given support to one of the two sides and so rendered the achievements of that one side more brilliant, this is no evidence of his own power. For in such times of crisis small forces have often played a great part in turning the scale;
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for example, even for the people of
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Chios
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I might make the claim that whichever side they have been inclined to support, that side has proved stronger on the sea.
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Nay, it is obviously not fair to estimate the power of the King from those exploits in which he has joined forces with the one or the other of us, but rather from the wars which he, unaided, has fought on his own behalf. Take, first, the case of
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Egypt
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: since its revolt from the King, what progress has he made against its inhabitants? Did he not dispatch to this war
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the most renowned of the Persians, Abrocomas and Tithraustes and Pharnabazus, and did not they, after remaining there three years and suffering more disasters than they inflicted, finally withdraw in such disgrace that the rebels are no longer content with their freedom, but are already trying to extend their dominion over the neighboring peoples as well?
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Next, there is his campaign against Evagoras. Evagoras is ruler over but a single city
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; he is given over to the Persians by the terms of the Treaty
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; his is an insular power and he has already sustained a disaster to his fleet; he has, at present, for the defense of his territory only three thousand light-armed troops; yet, humble as is the power of Evagoras, the King has not the power to conquer it in war, but has already frittered away six years in the attempt; and, if we may conjecture the future by the past, there is much more likelihood that someone else will rise in revolt before Evagoras is reduced by the siege—so slothful is the King in his enterprises.
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Again, in the Rhodian War,
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the King had the good will of the allies of
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because of the harshness with which they were governed, he availed himself of the help of our seamen; and at the head of his forces was Conon, who was the most competent of our generals, who possessed more than any other the confidence of the Hellenes, and who was the most experienced in the hazards of war; yet, although the King had such a champion to help him in the war, he suffered the fleet which bore the brunt of the defense of
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to be bottled up for three years by only an hundred ships, and for fifteen months he deprived the soldiers of their pay; and the result would have been, had it depended upon the King alone, that they would have been disbanded more than once; but, thanks to their commander
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and to the alliance which was formed at
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,
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they barely succeeded in winning a naval victory.
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And these were the most royal and the most imposing of his achievements, and these are the deeds about which people are never weary of speaking who are fain to exalt the power of the barbarians! So no one can say that I am not fair in my use of instances, nor that I dwell upon the minor undertakings of the King and pass over the most important;
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for I have striven to forestall just such a complaint, and have recounted the most glorious of his exploits. I do not, however, forget his minor campaigns; I do not forget that Dercylidas,
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with a thousand heavy-armed troops, extended his power over
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Aeolis
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; that Draco
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took possession of
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Atarneus
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, and afterwards collected an army of three thousand light-armed men, and devastated the plains of
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Mysia
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; that Thimbron,
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with a force only a little larger, crossed over into
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Lydia
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and plundered the whole country; and that Agesilaus, with the help of the army of Cyrus, conquered almost all the territory this side of the
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Halys river
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.
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And assuredly we have no greater reason to fear the army which wanders about
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with the King nor the valor of the Persians themselves; for they were clearly shown by the troops who marched inland
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with Cyrus to be no better than the King’s soldiers who live on the coast. I refrain from speaking of all the other battles in which the Persians were worsted, and I am willing to grant that they were split with factions, and so where not inclined to throw themselves wholeheartedly into the struggle against the King’s brother.
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But after Cyrus had been killed, and all the people of
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Asia
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had joined forces, even under these favorable conditions they made such a disgraceful failure of the war as to leave for those who are in the habit of vaunting Persian valor not a word to say. For they had to deal with only six thousand Hellenes
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—not picked troops, but men who, owing to stress of circumstances, were unable to live in their own cities.
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These were, moreover, unfamiliar with the country; they had been deserted by their allies; they had been betrayed by those who made the expedition with them; they had been deprived of the general whom they had followed;
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and yet the Persians were so inferior to these men that the King, finding himself in difficult straits and having no confidence in the force which was under his own command, did not scruple to arrest the captains of the auxiliaries in violation of the truce,
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hoping by this lawless act to throw their army into confusion, and preferring to offend against the gods rather than join issue openly with these soldiers.
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But when he failed in this plot—for the soldiers not only stood together but bore their misfortune nobly,—then, as they set out on their journey home, he sent with them Tissaphernes and the Persian cavalry. But although these kept plotting against them throughout the entire journey,
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the Hellenes continued their march to the end as confidently as if they had been under friendly escort, dreading most of all the uninhabited regions of that country, and deeming it the best possible fortune to fall in with as many of the enemy as possible.
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Let me sum up the whole matter: These men did not set out to get plunder or to capture a town, but took the field against the King himself, and yet they returned in greater security than ambassadors who go to him on a friendly mission. Therefore it seems to me that in every quarter the Persians have clearly exposed their degeneracy; for along the coast of
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they have been defeated in many battles, and when they crossed to
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Europe
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they were duly punished, either perishing miserably or saving their lives with dishonor; and to crown all, they made themselves objects of derision under the very walls of their King’s palace.
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And none of these things has happened by accident, but all of them have been due to natural causes; for it is not possible for people who are reared and governed as are the Persians, either to have a part in any other form of virtue or to set up on the field of battle trophies of victory over their foes.
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For how could either an able general or a good soldier be produced amid such ways of life as theirs? Most of their population is a mob without discipline or experience of dangers, which has lost all stamina for war and has been trained more effectively for servitude than are the slaves in our country.
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Those, on the other hand, who stand highest in repute among them have never governed their lives by dictates of equality or of common interest or of loyalty to the state; on the contrary, their whole existence consists of insolence toward some, and servility towards others—a manner of life than which nothing could be more demoralizing to human nature. Because they are rich, they pamper their bodies; but because they are subject to one man’s power, they keep their souls in a state of abject and cringing fear, parading themselves at the door of the royal palace, prostrating themselves, and in every way schooling themselves to humility of spirit, falling on their knees before a mortal man, addressing him as a divinity, and thinking more lightly of the gods than of men.
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So it is that those of the Persians who come down to the sea, whom they term satraps,
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do not dishonor the training which they receive at home, but cling steadfastly to the same habits: they are faithless to their friends and cowardly to their foes; their lives are divided between servility on the one hand and arrogance on the other; they treat their allies with contempt and pay court to their enemies.
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For example, they maintained the army under Agesilaus at their own expense for eight months,
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but they deprived the soldiers who were fighting in the Persian cause of their pay for double that length of time; they distributed an hundred talents among the captors of Cisthene,
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but treated more outrageously than their prisoners of war the troops who supported them in the campaign against
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Cyprus
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.
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To put it briefly—and not to speak in detail but in general terms,— who of those that have fought against them has not come off with success, and who of those that have fallen under their power has not perished from their atrocities? Take the case of Conon,
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who, as commander in the service of
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Asia
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, brought an end to the power of the Lacadaemonians: did they not shamelessly seize him for punishment by death? Take, on the other hand, the case of Themistocles,
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who in the service of
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Hellas
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defeated them at
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Salamis
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: did they not think him worthy of the greatest gifts?
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Then why should we cherish the friendship of men who punish their benefactors and so openly flatter those who do them injury? Who is there among us whom they have not wronged? When have they given the Hellenes a moment’s respite from their treacherous plots? What in our world is not hateful to them who did not shrink in the earlier war from rifling even the images and temples of the gods, and burning them to the ground?
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Therefore, the Ionians deserve to be commended because, when their sanctuaries had been burned, they invoked the wrath of Heaven upon any who should disturb the ruins or should desire to restore their shrines as they were of old;
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and they did this, not because they lacked the means to rebuild them, but in order that there might be left a memorial to future generations of the impiety of the barbarians, and that none might put their trust in men who do not scruple to commit such sins against our holy temples, but that all might be on their guard against them and fear them, seeing that they waged that war not against our persons only, but even against our votive offerings to the gods.
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Of my own countrymen also I have a similar tale to tell. For towards all other peoples with whom they have been at war, they forget their past enmities the moment they have concluded peace, but toward the Asiatics they feel no gratitude even when they receive favors from them; so eternal is the wrath which they cherish against the barbarians.
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Again, our fathers condemned many to death
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for defection to the Medes; in our public assemblies even to this day, before any other business is transacted, the Athenians call down curses
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upon any citizen who proposes friendly overtures to the Persians; and, at the celebration of the Mysteries, the Eumolpidae and the Kerykes,
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because of our hatred of the Persians, give solemn warning to the other barbarians also, even as to men guilty of murder, that they are for ever banned from the sacred rites.
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So ingrained in our nature is our hostility to them that even in the matter of our stories we linger most fondly over those which tell of the Trojan and the Persian wars,
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because through them we learn of our enemies’ misfortunes; and you will find that our warfare against the barbarians has inspired our hymns, while that against the Hellenes has brought forth our dirges;
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and that the former are sung at our festivals, while we recall the latter on occasions of sorrow.
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Moreover, I think that even the poetry of Homer has won a greater renown because he has nobly glorified the men who fought against the barbarians, and that on this account our ancestors determined to give his art a place of honor in our musical contests and in the education of our youth,
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in order that we, hearing his verses over and over again, may learn by heart the enmity which stands from of old between us and them, and that we, admiring the valor of those who were in the war against
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, may conceive a passion for like deeds.
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So it seems to me that the motives which summon us to enter upon a war against them are many indeed; but grief among them is the present opportunity, which we must not throw away; for it is disgraceful to neglect a chance when it is present and regret it when it is past. Indeed, what further advantage could we desire to have on our side when contemplating a war against the King beyond those which are now at hand?
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Are not
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Egypt
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and
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Cyprus
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in revolt against him? Have not
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Phoenicia
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and
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Syria
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been devastated because of the war? Has not
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Tyre
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, on which he set great store, been seized by his foes? Of the cities in
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Cilicia
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, the greater number are held by those who side with us and the rest are not difficult to acquire.
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Lycia
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no Persian has ever subdued.
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Hecatomnus, the viceroy of
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Caria
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, has in reality been disaffected for a long time now,
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and will openly declare himself whenever we wish. From
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Cnidus
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to Sinope
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the coast of Asia is settled by Hellenes, and these we need not to persuade to go to war—all we have to do is not to restrain them. With such bases at our command for the operation of our forces, and with so widespread a war threatening Asia on every side, why, then, need we examine too closely what the outcome will be? For since the barbarians are unequal to small divisions of the Hellenes, it is not hard to foresee what would be their plight if they should be forced into a war against our united forces.
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But this is how the matter stands: If the barbarian strengthens his hold on the cities of the coast by stationing in them larger garrisons than he has there now, perhaps those of the islands which lie near the mainland, as, for example, Rhodes and Samos and Chios, might incline to his side; but if we get possession of them first, we may expect that the populations of Lydia and Phrygia and of the rest of the up-country will be in the power of our forces operating from those positions.
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Therefore we must be quick and not waste time, in order that we may not repeat the experience of our fathers.
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For they, because they took the field later than the barbarians and had to abandon some of their allies,
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were compelled to encounter great numbers with a small force; whereas, if they had crossed over to the continent in time to be first on the ground, having with them the whole strength of
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, they could have subdued each of the nations there in turn.
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For experience has shown that when you go to war with people who are gathered together from many places, you must not wait until they are upon you, but must strike while they are still scattered. Now our fathers, having made this mistake at the outset, entirely retrieved it only after engaging in the most perilous of struggles; but we, if we are wise, shall guard against it from the beginning, and endeavor to be the first to quarter an army in the region of Lydia and Ionia,
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knowing that the King holds sway over the people of the continent, not because they are his willing subjects, but because he has surrounded himself with a force which is greater than any of those which they severally possess. So whenever we transport thither a force stronger than his, which we can easily do if we so will, we shall enjoy in security the resources of all Asia. Moreover, it is much more glorious to fight against the King for his empire than to contend against each other for the hegemony.
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It were well to make the expedition in the present generation, in order that those who have shared in our misfortunes may also benefit by our advantages and not continue all their days in wretchedness. For sufficient is the time that is past, filled as it has been with every form of horror;
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for many as are the ills which are incident to the nature of man, we have ourselves invented more than those which necessity lays upon us, by engendering wars and factions among ourselves;
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and, in consequence, some are being put to death contrary to law in their own countries, others are wandering with their women and children in strange lands, and many, compelled through lack of the necessities of life to enlist in foreign armies,
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are being slain, fighting for their foes against their friends. Against these ills no one has ever protested; and people are not ashamed to weep over the calamities which have been fabricated by the poets, while they view complacently the real sufferings, the many terrible sufferings, which result from our state of war; and they are so far from feeling pity that they even rejoice more in each other’s sorrows than in their own blessings.
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But perhaps many might even laugh at my simplicity if I should lament the misfortunes of individual men, in times like these, when
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Italy
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has been laid waste,
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when
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Sicily
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has been enslaved,
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when such mighty cities have been given over to the barbarians,
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and when the remaining portions of the Hellenic race are in the gravest peril.
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I am amazed at those who hold power in our states,
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if they think that they have occasion to be proud when they have never been able either to propose or to conceive a remedy for a situation so momentous; for they ought, if they had been worthy of their present reputation, to have dropped all else, and have proposed measures and given counsel about our war against the barbarians.
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Perhaps they might have helped us to get something done; but even if they had given up before gaining their object, they would, at any rate, have left to us their words as oracles for the future. But as things are, those who are held in highest honor are intent on matters of little consequence, and have left it to us, who stand aloof from public life,
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to advise on matters of so great moment.
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Nevertheless, the more faint-hearted our leading men happen to be, the more vigorously must the rest of us look to the means by which we shall deliver ourselves from our present discord. For as matters now stand, it is in vain that we make our treaties of peace; for we do not settle our wars, but only postpone them and wait for the opportune moment when we shall have the power to inflict some irreparable disaster upon each other.
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We must clear from our path these treacherous designs and pursue that course of action which will enable us to dwell in our several cities with greater security and to feel greater confidence in each other. What I have to say on these points is simple and easy: It is not possible for us to cement an enduring peace unless we join together in a war against the barbarians, nor for the Hellenes to attain to concord until we wrest our material advantages from one and the same source and wage our wars against one and the same enemy.
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When these conditions have been realized, and when we have been freed from the poverty which afflicts our lives—a thing that breaks up friendships, perverts the affections of kindred into enmity, and plunges the whole world into war and strife
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—then surely we shall enjoy a spirit of concord, and the good will which we shall feel towards each other will be genuine. For all these reasons, we must make it our paramount duty to transfer the war with all speed from our boundaries to the continent, since the only benefit which we can reap from the wars which we have waged against each other is by resolving that the experience which we have gained from them shall be employed against the barbarians.
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But is it not well, you may perhaps ask, on account of the Treaty,
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to curb ourselves and not be over-hasty or make the expedition too soon, seeing that the states which have gained their freedom through the Treaty feel grateful toward the King, because they believe that it was through him that they gained their independence, while those states which have been delivered over to the barbarians complain very bitterly of the Lacedaemonians and only less bitterly of the other Hellenes who entered into the peace, because, in their view, they were forced by them into slavery? But, I reply, is it not our duty to annul this agreement, which has given birth to such a sentiment—the sentiment that the barbarian cares tenderly for
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, and stands guard over her peace, while among ourselves are to be found those who outrage and evilly entreat her?
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The crowning absurdity of all, however, is the fact that among the articles which are written in the agreement it is only the worst which we guard and observe. For those which guarantee the independence of the islands and of the cities in
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have long since been broken and are dead letters on the pillars,
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while those which bring shame upon us and by which many of our allies have been given over to the enemy—these remain intact, and we all regard them as binding upon us, though we ought to have expunged them and not allowed them to stand a single day, looking upon them as commands, and not as compacts; for who does not know that a compact is something which is fair and impartial to both parties, while a command is something which puts one side at a disadvantage unjustly?
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On this ground we may justly complain of our envoys who negotiated this peace,
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because, although dispatched by the Hellenes, they made the Treaty in the interest of the barbarians. For they ought, no matter whether they took the view that each of the states concerned should retain its original territory, or that each should extend its sovereignty over all that it had acquired by conquest, or that we should each retain control over what we held when peace was declared—they ought, I say, to have adopted definitely some one of these views, applying the principle impartially to all, and on this basis to have drafted the articles of the Treaty.
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But instead of that, they assigned no honor whatsoever to our city or to Lacedaemon, while they set up the barbarian as lord of all Asia; as if we had gone to war for his sake, or as if the rule of the Persians had been long established, and we were only just now founding our cities—whereas in fact it is they who have only recently attained this place of honor, while Athens and Lacedaemon have been throughout their entire history a power among the Hellenes.
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I think, however, that I shall show still more clearly both the dishonor which we have suffered, and the advantage which the King has gained by putting the matter in this way: All the world which lies beneath the firmament being divided into two parts, the one called Asia, the other
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, he has taken half of it by the Treaty, as if he were apportioning the earth with Zeus,
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and not making compacts with men.
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Yes, and he has compelled us to engrave this Treaty on pillars of stone and place it in our public temples
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— a trophy far more glorious for him than those which are set up on fields of battle; for the latter are for minor deeds and a single success, but this treaty stands as a memorial of the entire war and of the humiliation of the whole of
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.
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These things may well rouse our indignation and make us look to the means by which we shall take vengeance for the past and set the future right. For verily it is shameful for us, who in our private life think the barbarians are fit only to be used as household slaves, to permit by our public policy so many of our allies to be enslaved by them; and it is disgraceful for us, when our fathers who engaged in the Trojan expedition because of the rape of one woman, all shared so deeply in the indignation of the wronged that they did not stop waging war until they had laid in ruins the city of him who had dared to commit the crime,
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—it is disgraceful for us, I say, now that all Hellas is being continually outraged, to take not a single step to wreak a common vengeance, although we have it in our power to accomplish deeds as lofty as our dreams. For this war is the only war which is better than peace; it will be more like a sacred mission than a military expedition; and it will profit equally both those who crave the quiet life and those who are eager for war; for it will enable the former to reap the fruits of their own possessions in security and the latter to win great wealth from the possessions of our foes.
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You will find, if you weigh the matter carefully, that this undertaking is most desirable for us from many points of view. For against whom, pray, ought men to wage war who crave no aggrandizement, but look to the claims of justice alone? Is it not against those who in the past have injured Hellas, and are now plotting against her, and have always been so disposed towards us?
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And against whom should we expect men to direct their envy who, while not wholly lacking in courage, yet curb this feeling with prudence? Is it not against those who have compassed powers that are too great for man, and yet are less deserving than those who are unfortunate among us? And against whom should those take the field who both desire to serve their gods and are at the same time intent on their own advantage? Is it not against those who are both their natural enemies and their hereditary foes, who have acquired the greatest possessions and are yet, of all men, the least able to defend them? Do not the Persians, then, fulfill all these conditions?
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Furthermore, we shall not even trouble the several states by levying soldiers from them—a practice which now in our warfare against each other they find most burdensome. For it is my belief that those who will be inclined to remain at home will be far fewer than those who will be eager to join this army. For who, be he young or old, is so indolent that he will not desire to have a part in this expedition—an expedition led by the Athenians and the Lacedaemonians, gathered together in the cause of the liberty of our allies, dispatched by all Greece, and faring forth to wreak vengeance on the barbarians?
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And how great must we think will be the name and the fame and the glory which they will enjoy during their lives, or, if they die in battle, will leave behind them—they who will have won the meed of honor in such an enterprise? For if those who made war against an Alexander
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and took a single city were accounted worthy of such praise, what encomiums should we expect these men to win who have conquered the whole of Asia? For who that is skilled to sing or trained to speak will not labor and study in his desire to leave behind a memorial both of his own genius and of their valor, for all time to come?
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I am not at the present moment of the same mind as I was at the beginning of my speech. For then I thought that I should be able to speak in a manner worthy of my theme; now, however, I have not risen to its grandeur, and many of the thoughts which I had in mind to utter have escaped me. Therefore you must come to my aid and try to picture to yourselves what vast prosperity we should attain if we should turn the war which now involves ourselves against the peoples of the continent, and bring the prosperity of Asia across to Europe.
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And you must not depart to your homes as men who have merely listened to an oration; nay, those among you who are men of action must exhort one another to try to reconcile our city with
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; and those among you who make claims to eloquence must stop composing orations on “deposits,”
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or on the other trivial themes
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which now engage your efforts, and center your rivalry on this subject and study how you may surpass me in speaking on the same question,
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bearing ever in mind that it does not become men who promise great things to waste their time on little things,
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nor yet to make the kind of speeches which will improve no whit the lives of those whom they convince, but rather the kind which, if carried out in action, will both deliver the authors themselves from their present distress
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and win for them the credit of bringing to pass great blessings for the rest of the world.
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