Civil War

Julius Caesar

Civil War

Julius Caesar (julius-caesar) · Bell Civ 1.argument · perseus-eng3 · More by Julius Caesar (julius-caesar)

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I. Different opinions in the senate in relation to Caesar’s letter. III. The origin and causes of the opposition formed against him. IV. The senate’s severe decree, and flight of Caesar’s friends. V. War against Caesar resolved on. VI. Caesar harangues his troops. VII. Pompey sends proposals of peace. VIII. Caesar’s answer IX. Pompey sends proposals a second time. X. Which not pleasing Caesar, he prepares for war. XI. Caesar makes himself master of Iguvium and Auximum. XII. Which so alarms his enemies at Rome, that they hastily quit the city, and retire to Capua. XIII. Caesar, by his expedition, obliges many of the towns in Italy to submit. XXIII. Pompey, after the reduction of Corfinium by Caesar, withdraws with his troops to Brundusium. XXIV. Caesar besieges him there. XXVI. He escapes by sea, after which the town surrenders. XXVIII. Caesar cannot pursue him for want of a fleet. XXIX. Valerius and Curio, partisans of Caesar, drive Cotta from Sardinia, and Cato from Sicily. Varus compels Tubero to desist from his design upon Africa. XXX. Caesar’s speech to the senate. XXXI. Which producing no effect, he sets out for Transalpine Gaul. XXXII. The people of Marseilles shut their gates against Caesar. XXXIV. Who commands Brutus and Trebonius to besiege the place. XXXV. Fabius sent before into Spain. XXXIX. Caesar follows, and comes up with Afranius and Petreius at Lerida. XLI. A skirmish, with almost equal advantage on both sides. XLVI. A sudden storm having broke down his bridges, Caesar is shut up between two rivers. XLVIII. And reduced to great straits for want of provisions. LI. He extricates himself at length, and surprises the enemy’s foragers. LII. Brutus defeats the people of Marseilles in a sea-fight. LIII. Caesar obtains the superiority near Lerida. LIV. Many states declare for him. LV. Afranius and Petreius remove towards Celtiberia. LVI. Caesar pursues them with his cavalry. LVII. Then drawing out the legions, continues to urge them in their retreat. LXIV. He cuts off their provisions. LXVI. Afraniius and Petreius’s men talk with Caesar’s about a surrender. LXVII. Petreius interrupts the conference. LXVIII. And obliges the soldiers to take an oath of fidelity to their generals. LXX. Who, finding both their provisions and forage intercepted, resolve to return to Lerida. LXXI. Caesar follows, and greatly molests them in their march. LXXIII. At length, water, forage, and every thing failing them, they are forced to sue for peace, and accept of Caesar’s terms.

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I think it needless to say any thing here, in opposition to those who pretend, that the following Commentaries, concerning the Civil War, were not penned by Caesar himself. We have not only the express testimony of Suetonius to the contrary, but the very style sufficiently declares, that Caesar alone could be the author of the work. There is room however to suspect, from the abrupt manner in which the subject is introduced, that the beginning of this first book is wanting: for history takes notice of several previous facts, of which no mention is made here. I have therefore collected out of Plutarch, Appian, and Dion, as much as was necessary to connect this and the former Commentary, and fancy it will not be disagreeable to the reader, to offer it here by way of preface. Gaul being wholly reduced, Caesar, upon his arrival in Lombardy, thought proper, for many reasons, to send deputies to Rome, to demand the consulship, and a prolongation of his command. Pompey, who, though averse to Caesar’s interest, had not yet openly declared against him, neither furthered nor opposed his request. But the consuls Marcellus and Lentulus, who had already joined the party of his enemies, resolved by every method in their power to frustrate the design. Marcellus scrupled not to add other injuries to that of which we speak. For Caesar had lately planted a colony at Novocomum in Cisalpine Gaul; and Marcellus, not satisfied with stripping the inhabitants of the privilege of Roman citizens, seized one of their chief magistrates at Rome, ordered him to be scourged, and then dismissed him to carry his complaints to Caesar, an ignominy from which all free citizens were expressly exempted by the laws. While affairs were in this train, C. Curio, tribune of the people, came to Caesar in Gaul. This nobleman, after many attempts in behalf of the commonwealth, and to promote Caesar’s interest; finding at length all his endeavours without effect, fled from Rome, to avoid the malice of his enemies, and informed Caesar of all that was transacted against him. Caesar received him with great marks of respect, as well on account of his rank in the commonwealth, as the many services he had done himself and the state; and thanked him for the signal zeal he had shown in his cause. But Curio advised him, since his enemies were now openly preparing for war, to draw his army together without delay, and rescue the commonwealth from the tyranny of an aspiring faction. Caesar, though fully satisfied of the truth of Curio’s report, resolved to sacrifice all other considerations to the public tranquillity, that no man might justly charge him with being the author of a civil war. He therefore only petitioned by his friends, that the government of Cisalpine Gaul and Illyricum, with the command of two legions, might be continued to him, in all which his principal aim was, by the equity of his demands, to induce his enemies to grant peace to the commonwealth. These offers appeared so reasonable, that even Pompey himself knew not how to oppose them. But the consuls still continuing inflexible, Caesar wrote a letter to the senate, wherein, after briefly enumerating his Rome, to dismiss his army, provided Pompey did the same: but could by no means resolve, so long as he continued in command and authority, to divest himself of troops, and lay himself open to the injuries of his enemies. Curio was commissoned to carry this letter, who travelling with incredible despatch, reached Rome in three days (a distance of a hundred and sixty miles,) before the beginning of January, and ere the consuls could get any thing determined relating to Caesar’s command. Curio, upon his arrival, refused to part with the letter, resolving not to deliver it but in full senate, and when the tribunes of the people were present: for he was apprehensive, should he do otherwise, that the consuls would suppress it.

1.1

Caesar’s letter being delivered to the consuls, the tribunes, with much difficulty, procured it a reading in the senate; but could by no means prevail to have his demands brought under deliberation. The consuls proposed to debate upon the state of the republic. Lentulus promised to stand by the senate and the people, if they would deliver their sentiments with freedom and courage; but if they regarded Caesar, and affected to court his friendship, as had been the practice for some time past, he knew, he told them, what he had to do, and was determined to disclaim their authority; not doubting but he would find a ready admittance to the favour and protection of Caesar. Scipio spoke much to the same purpose: That Pompey was firmly bent not to abandon the republic, if he found the senators ready to support him; but if they cooled, or were remiss in their resolves, it would be in vain for them to expect his aid, if they saw cause afterwards to apply for it.

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This speech of Scipio, as the senate was held in the city, and Pompey resided in the suburbs, was considered as coming from Pompey’s own mouth. Some were for following milder counsels, of which number was M. Marcellus, who gave it as his opinion: That it was not proper to enter upon the present deliberation, till troops were raised over all Italy, and an army got ready, under whose protection the senate might proceed with freedom and safety in their debates. Callidius was for sending Pompey to his government, to take away all occasion of discord; because Caesar had reason to fear, as two of his legions had been taken from him, that Pompey retained them in the neighbourhood of Rome, with a view to employ them against him. M. Rufus nearly agreed with Callidius. But they were all severely reprimanded by the consul Lentulus, who expressly refused to put Callidius’s motion to the vote. Marcellus, awed by the consul’s reprimand, retracted what he had said. Thus the clamours of Lentulus, the dread of an army at the gates of Rome, and the menaces of Pompey’s friends, forced the greater part of the senate, though with the utmost reluctance and dislike, into a compliance with Scipio’s motion: That Caesar should be ordered to disband his army before a certain day then fixed; and that in case of disobedience, he should be declared an enemy to the republic. M. Antonius and Q. Cassius, tribunes of the people, opposed their negative to this decree. Immediately a debate arose, upon the validity of their interposition. Many severe speeches were made against them; and the more warm and passionate any one appeared, the more was he applauded by Caesar’s enemies.

1.3

In the evening the senate rose; and Pompey sending for all those of his party, commended the forward; confirmed them in their resolutions; reproved and animated the more moderate. Multitudes of veterans, who had formerly served under him, flocked to him from all parts, allured by the expectation of rewards and dignities. A great number of officers belonging to the two legions lately returned by Caesar, had likewise orders to attend him. Rome was filled with troops. Curio

1.4

But all these proposals were rejected, because the consul, Scipio, and Cato, declared against them. Cato was incited by the remembrance of an old quarrel, and the disappointment he had sustained in standing candidate for the pretorship with Caesar. Lentulus was oppressed with debt, and flattered himself with the command of armies, the government of provinces, and the largesses of the kings for whom he should procure the title of allies and friends of the Roman people. He was besides wont to boast, among those of his own party, that he doubted not of becoming a second Sylla, in whom the whole authority of the commonwealth should centre. Scipio entertained the same hope of commands and governments, which he expected to share with his son-in-law Pompey: added to this his dread of a prosecution; his vanity and self-conceit; and the flatteries and applauses of his friends, who at that time bore a considerable sway in the commonwealth and courts of justice. Pompey himself, instigated by Caesar’s enemies, and not able to endure an equal dignity, was now entirely alienated from him, and had joined with their common adversaries, most of whom Caesar had contracted during his affinity with Pompey. Beside, the fraudulent step he had taken, in detaining, for the purposes of his own ambition, the two legions destined to serve in Asia and Syria, determined him to use all his endeavours to bring on a civil war,

1.5

Thus nothing but tumult and violence was to be seen in the public debates. Caesar’s friends had no time given them to inform him of what passed. Even the tribunes themselves were not exempt from danger, nor durst they have recourse to that right of intercession, which Sylla had left them, as the last bulwark of liberty; insomuch that the seventh day after entering upon their office, they saw themselves obliged to provide for their safety; whereas in former times, the most turbulent and seditious tribunes never began to apprehend themselves in danger, till towards the eighth month of their administration. Recourse was had to that rigid and ultimate decree which was never used but in the greatest extremities, when the city was threatened with ruin and conflagration: That the consuls, the pretors, the tribunes of the people, and the proconsuls that were near Rome, should take care that the commonwealth received no detriment. This decree passed the seventh of January; so that during the first five days in which it was permitted the senate to assemble, after Lentulus’s entrance upon the consulship, (for two days are always appropriated to the holding of the comitia,) the most severe and rigorous resolutions were taken, both in relation to Caesar’s government, and the tribunes of the people, men of eminent worth and dignity. The tribunes immediately quitted the city, and fled to Caesar, who was then at Ravenna, waiting an answer to his late demands, whose equity he hoped would dispose all parties to entertain thoughts of peace.

1.6

The following days the senate assembled without the city, where Pompey confirmed everything he had before intimated by the mouth of Scipio. He applauded the resolution and courage of the senators, acquainted them with the state of his forces, that he had ten legions already in arms, and was besides well informed, that Casar’s troops were by no means satisfied with their general; nay, had even refused to support and follow him. It was then proposed in the senate, that troops should be raised over all Italy; that Faustus Sylla should be sent propretor into Mauritania; that Pompey should be supplied with money out of the public treasury, and that king Juba should be declared friend and ally of the people of Rome: but Marcellus opposed the last of these; and Philippus, tribune of the people, would not agree to the propretorship of Sylla. The other motions were approved by the senate. The affair of the provinces was next decided; two of which were consular, the rest pretorian. Syria fell to the share of Scipio, and Gaul fell to L. Domitius. Philippus and Marcellus were set aside, through the private views of the prevailing party. The rest of the provinces were assigned to men of pretorian rank; who waited not to have their nomination confirmed by the people, as had been the custom in former years, but after taking the usual oath, departed for their several commands in a military habit. The consuls left the city, a thing unheard of till that time, and lictors were seen walking before private men in the forum and capitol, contrary to the express practice of former ages. Troops were levied over all Italy, arms enjoined, money demanded of the colonies and free towns, and even taken from the very temples; in fine, neither divine nor human rights were regarded.

1.7

Caesar having intelligence of these proceedings, addressed himself to his troops: He took notice of the many injuries he had received on all occasions from his enemies, who had alienated Pompey from him, by filling him with an envy and jealousy of his reputation, though he had done every thing in his power to promote his glory, and favour his advancement to the highest dignities. He complained of the new precedent introduced into the commonwealth, in checking, and hindering by arms, the opposition of the tribunes, which of late years had been restored to its wonted force. That Sylla, who had almost annihilated the tribuneship, had yet left it the liberty of opposition; whereas Pompey, who valued himself upon the re-establishment of that office, deprived it now of a privilege it had always enjoyed. That the decree enjoining the magistrates to provide for the safety of the commonwealth, which implied an order to the Roman people to repair to arms, was never wont to be used but on occasion of dangerous laws, seditious measures pursued by the tribunes, or a general secession of the people, when they possessed themselves of the temples and places of strength; crimes, which in former ages had been expiated by the fate of Saturninus and the Gracchi. That at present nothing of this kind had been attempted, nor so much as thought of; no law promulged, no endeavour used to seduce the people, no appearance of revolt or disaffection. He therefore conjured them to defend against the malice of his enemies, the honour and reputation of a general, under whom they had served nine years with so much advantage to the commonwealth, gained so many battles, and subdued all Gaul and Germany. The soldiers of the thirteenth legion, who were present, and whom he had sent for in the beginning of the troubles, (the rest not being yet arrived,) cried out, that they were determined to maintain the honour of their general, and to revenge the wrongs done to the tribunes.

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Being assured of the good will of the soldiers, he marched with that legion to Rimini, where he was met by the tribunes of the people, who had fled to him for protection He ordered the other legions to quit their winter quarters, and follow him with all expedition. While he was at Rimini, young L. Caesar, whose father was one of his lieutenants, came to him; and after acquainting him with the occasion of his journey, added, that he had a private message to him from Pompey, who was desirous of clearing himself to Caesar, that he might not interpret those actions as designed to affront him, which had no other aim but the good of the commonwealth: that it had been his constant maxim, to prefer the interest of the republic to any private engagement: that it was worthy of Caesar, to sacrifice his passion and resentment to the same noble motive; and not prejudice the commonwealth, by pushing too far his revenge against his private enemies. He added something more to the same purpose, mingled with excuses for Pompey. The pretor Roscius joined likewise in the negotiation, declaring he was commissioned so to do.

1.9

Though all this tended little to redress the injuries of which Caesar complained, yet considering these as proper persons by whom to transmit his thoughts, he begged of them, that as they had not scrupled to bring Pompey’s demands to him, they would likewise carry back his proposals to Pompey; that, if possible, so small a labour might put an end to mighty differences, and deliver all Italy from the fear of a civil war. He told them That the interest of the commonwealth had always been dearer to him than life; but he could not help grieving at the malice of his enemies, who had frustrated the good intentions of the Roman people in his favour, by cutting off six months from his command, and obliging him to return to Rome to sue for the consulship, though a law had been made dispensing with his personal attendance; that he had yet, for the sake of the commonwealth, patiently submitted to this assault upon his honour; that even his proposal of disbanding the armies on both sides, which he had made by a letter to the senate, had been rejected: that new levies were making over all Italy: that two legions, which had been taken from him, under pretence of the Parthian war, were still retained in the service of his enemies: that the whole state was in arms. What could all this aim at but his destruction ? That, nevertheless, he was ready to agree to any proposal, and expose himself to any danger, for the sake of his country. Let Pompey go to his government: let all the armies be disbanded: let every body throughout Italy lay down their arms: let every thing that participates of terror and force be removed: let the elections of magistrates he made with perfect freedom; and let the republic be administered by the authority of the senate and people. And the better to settle all these articles, and corroborate them with the sanction of an oath, let either Pompey himself draw nearer; or suffer Ceesar to approach him; as all their differences may be most easily terminated by a conference.

1.10

Roscius and L. Caesar, having received this answer, departed for Capua, where they found Pompey and the consuls, and laid before them Caesar’s proposals. After deliberating upon the affair, they sent a reply, in writing, by the same messengers, the purport of which was: That Caesar should quit Rimini, return to Gaul, and disband his army; which conditions performed, Pompey would go into Spain. In the meantime, till Caesar gave security for the performance of what he had promised, neither Pompey nor the consuls would discontinue the levies.

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It was, by no means, a fair proposal, that Caesar should be obliged to quite Rimini and return to Gaul, while Pompey held provinces and legions that were none of his: that he should dismiss his army, whilst the other was levying troops: and, that only a general promise of going into Spain should be given, without fixing a day for his departure; by which evasion, was he to be found in Italy, even at the expiration of Caesar’s consulship, he could not yet be charged with breach of faith. His forbearing too to appoint a time for a conference, and declining to approach nearer, gave little reason to hope for a peace. He therefore sent Antony to Arretium, with five cohorts; remained himself at Rimini, with two, where he resolved to levy troops; and seizing Pisaurum, Fanum, and Ancona, left a cohort in each for a garrison.

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Meantime, being informed that Thermus the pretor had entered Iguvium, with five cohorts, and was endeavouring to fortify the town; as he knew the inhabitants to be well inclined to his interest, he detached Curio thither, with three cohorts, drawn from Lisaurum and Rimini. Upon this, Thermus, who could not confide in the townsmen, retired with his cohorts, and quitted the place: but his troops abandoning him in their march, returned severally to their own homes. Curio was received into the place with great demonstrations of joy: which being reported to Caesar, as he found he had the good will of the colonies and free towns, he drew the cohorts of the thirteenth legion out of garrison, and marched to Auximum, which Attius held with a body of troops, and whence he had despatched senators to levy forces overall Picenum.

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Caesar’s arrival being known, the chief citizens of Auximum went in a body to Attius Varus, and told him: That it did not belong to them to determine on which side justice lay; but that neither they, nor the other municipal towns, could endure to see their gates shut against Caesar, who by his great actions had deserved so well of the commonwealth: that therefore he would do well to consult his own safety and reputation. Attius, moved by this speech, drew off his garrison and fled. But some of Caesar’s first ranks pursuing him, obliged him to stop; and a battle ensuing, he was deserted by his men. Some of the troops returned home; the rest went over to Caesar, and brought along with them L. Pupius, first centurion of the legion, who had formerly held the same rank in Pompey’s army. Caesar commended Attius’s soldiers: dismissed Papius: returned thanks to the inhabitants of Auximum; and promised to retain always a grateful remembrance of their attachment.

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These things being reported at Rome, the consternation was so great over the whole city, that when the consul Lentulus came to the treasury, to deliver out the money to Pompey, in consequence of the decree of the sepate, he scarce waited the opening of the inner door, but precipitately left the place, upon a false rumour, that Caesar was approaching, and some of his cavalry already in view. He was soon followed by his colleague Marcellus, and the greater part of the magistrates, Pompey had left the town the day before, and was upon his way to Apulia, where he had quartered the legions he had received from Caesar. The levies were discontinued within the city, and no place appeared secure on this side Capua. Here, at last, they took courage and rallied, and began to renew their levies in the colonies round about, which had been sent thither by the Julian law. Lentulus summoned into the forum the gladiators whom Caesar had ordered to be trained up there, gave them their liberty, furnished them with horses, and commanded them to follow him. But being afterwards admonished by his friends that this step was universally condemned, he dispersed them into the neighbouring town of Campania, to keep garrison there.

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Caesar meanwhile leaving Auximum, traversed the whole country of Picenum; where he was joyfully received in all parts by the inhabitants, who furnished his army with every thing necessary. Even Cingulum itself, a town founded by Labienus, and built at his own expense, sent deputies to him, with an offer of their submission and services. He demanded a certain number of soldiers, which were sent immediately. Meantime the twelfth legion joined him; and with these two he marched to Asculum, a town of Picenum. Here Lentulus Spinther commanded with ten cohorts; who, hearing of Caesar’s approach, quitted the place with his troops, who almost all deserted him upon the march. Being left with only a few, he fell in with Vibullius Rufus, whom Pompey had sent into Picenum to encourage his followers in those parts. Vibullius understanding from him the state of affairs in Picenum, dismissed Lentulus, and took the soldiers under his command. He likewise drew together from the neighbouring provinces as many as he could meet with of Pompey’s levies: among the rest, Lucilius Hirus, who was flying, with six cohorts, from Camerinum, where they had been quartered. Out of all these he formed thirteen cohorts, with which he posted, by great journeys, to Corfinium, where Domitius Ahenobarbus commanded; whom he informed that Caesar was approaching with two legions. Domitius had already got together, with great expedition, twenty cohorts from Alba, the country of the Marsi, Peligni,and the neighbouring provinces.

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Caesar having made himself master of Asculum, and obliged Lentulus to retire, ordered the soldiers who had deserted him, to be sought after, and new levies to be made. He remained only one day there, to settle what related to provisions, and then pursued his march to Corfinium. Upon his arrival there, he found five cohorts, whom Domitius had detached from the garrison, employed in breaking down a bridge about three miles distant from the town. But Caesar’s advanced parties attacking them, they quickly abandoned the bridge, and retired to Corfinium. Caesar having passed with his legions, halted before the town, and encamped under the walls.

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Upon this, Domitius engaged, by great rewards,persons well acquainted with the country, to carry letters into Apulia to Pompey, wherein he earnestly requested him to come to his aid. He told him, That it would be easy, in that close country, to shut up Caesar between two armies, and cut off his provisions: that unless this course was followed, he himself, with above thirty cohorts, and a greatnumber of senators and Roman knights, would be exposed to imminent danger. Meanwhile,having encouraged his men, he disposed engines along the walls, appointed every one his particular post, and, the more to animate them, promised each soldier four acres of land out of his own estate, and, in proportion, to every centurion and volunteer.

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Meantime Caesar was informed that the people of Sulmona, a town seven miles distant from Corfinium, desired to put themselves under his protection, but were restrained by Q. Lucretius, a senator, and Attius, a Pelignian, who held them in subjection with a garrison ot seven cohorts. He therefore despatched M. Antony thither, with five cohorts of the seventh legion, whose ensigns were no sooner descried from the walls of Sulmona, than the gates were thrown open, and the whole people in a body, both soldiers and townsmen, came out to congratulate Antony on his arrival. Lucretius and Attius endeavoured to escape over the wall: but Attius being taken, and brought to Antony, requested that he might be sent to Caesar. Antony returned the same day, bringing along with him the cohorts and Attius. Caesar joined these cohorts to his army, and set Attius at liberty. Caesar resolved to employ the three first days in strongly fortifying his camp, in procuring corn from the neighbouring towns, and waiting the arrival of the rest of his forces. During this space, the eighth legion joined him, with two and twenty cohorts of new levies from Gaul, and about three hundred horse from the king of Noricum. This obliged him to form a second camp on the other side of the town, under the command of Curio. The remaning days were spent in drawing a line with redoubts round the place, which work was nearly completed when the messengers, that had been sent to Pompey, returned.

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Domitius, perusing the despatches, thought proper to dissemble the contents, and declared, in council, that Pompey would speedily come to their assistance. Meantime he exhorted them to behave with courage, and provide every thing necessary for a vigorous defence. He conferred, however, privately with a few of his most intimate friends, and, in concert with them, determined upon flight. But as his looks and speech were found to disagree; as he behaved not with his usual composure and firmness; and was observed, contrary to custom, to be much in secret conference with his friends; avoiding public appearances, and councils of war: it was not possible for the truth to remain any longer concealed. For Pompey had wrote back, That he could not put all to hazard for his sake; that he had neither advised nor consented to his shutting himself up in Corfinium; that he must therefore endeavour to extricate himself as well as he could, and come and join him with all his forces. But as Caesar had invested and carried his lines round the place, this retreat was now become impracticable.

1.20

Domitius’s design being discovered, the soldiers who were at Corfinium began to assemble in the evening, and, by means of their tribunes, centurions, and other officers, made known their thoughts to one another: That they were besieged by Caesar, who had already, in a manner, completed his works: that their general, Domitius, in whose promises of assistance they had placed their chief hope, abandoning all concern for their safety, was contriving to escape privately by flight: that it was therefore incumbent upon them to look also to their own preservation. The Marsi at first opposed this resolution, and possessed themselves of the strongest part of the town; nay, the dispute was so warm, that it almost came to be decided by the sword. But shortly after, being made accquainted with Domitius’s intended flight, of which before they had no knowledge; they all, in a body, surrounded Domitius, secured his person, and sent deputies to Caesar: That they were ready to open their gates, receive his orders, and deliver up Domitius alive.

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Though Caesar was fully sensible of how great importance it was to get possession of the town immediately, and join the garrison to his own army; lest by largesses, promises of speedy relief, or false reports, any change should be produced; as in war great revolutions often arise from very trifling causes: yet, fearing that if he introduced his soldiers in the dark, they would take that opportunity to plunder the town, he sent back the deputies, with thanks for their proffer, resolving to have the walls and gates watched with great care. To that end he disposed his men along the works, not at a certain distance, as usual, but in one continued rank, so as to touch each other, and completely invest the town. He ordered the military tribunes, and officers of the cavalry, to patrol about the works, and not only be on their guard against sallies, but even take care to prevent the escape of particular persons. And indeed so alert and vigilant were our soldiers, that not a man closed his eyes that night; each expecting the event with impatience, and carrying his thoughts from one thing to another; what would be the fate of the Corfinians, what of Domitius, what of Lentulus, and the other illustrious persons in the place: in fine, what was like to be the issue of so complicated a scene.

1.22

About the fourth watch of the night, Lentulus Spinther called from the wall to the guard, and desired to be conducted to Caesar. His request being granted, he came out of the town, attended by some of Domitius’s soldiers, who never left him till they had conducted him into Caesar’s presence. He begged him to spare his life, and pardon the injuries he had done him, in consideration of their former friendship. He owned the many obligations he had laid him under, in procuring him an admission into the college of priests, obtaining for him the government of Spain, after the expiration of the pretorship, and supporting him in the demand of the consulship. Caesar interrupted him by saying: That he was not come out of the bounds of his province, with an intent to injure any body; but to repel the injuries done him by his enemies; to revenge the wrongs of the tribunes; and to restore to the Roman people, who were oppressed by a small faction of the nobles, their liberties and privileges. Lentulus, encouraged by this speech, asked leave to return into the town, where, he said, the assurances he had obtained of his own safety, would contribute not a little to the consolation of others, some of whom were so terrified, that they were ready to take desperate resolutions. Leave being granted, he departed for the town.

1.23

As soon as it was light, Caesar ordered before him all the senators, senators' sons, military tribunes, and Roman knights. There were ofsenatorian rank, L. Domitius, P. Lentulus Spinther, L. Vibullius Rufus, Sextus Quintilius Varus, questor, L. Rubrius; also Domitius’s son, and many young men of quality, with a great number of Roman knights, and some decurions, or senators of the neigbouring municipal towns, who had been sent for by Domitius. As soon as they appeared, he gave orders to secure them from the insults of the soldiery; and, addressing them in a few words, remonstrated: That they had made a very ill requital for the many signal services received at his hands. After which, he set them at liberty. He likewise restored to Domitius six millions of sesterces, which that general had brought with him to Corfinium, and deposited in the hands of the two treasurers of the town, who surrendered it to Caesar. As this was public money, assigned by Pompey to pay the forces with, Caesar might justly have seized it; but he was willing to show himself generous, as well as merciful. He ordered Domitius’s soldiers to take the usual oath to him, decamped that very day; made the ordinary march; and after staying in all seven days before Corfinium, arrived in Apulia, through the territories of the Marrucini, Frentani, and Larinates.

1.24

Pompey, having intelligence of what passed at Corfinium, retreated from Luceria to Canusium, and from thence to Brundusium. He ordered all the new levies to join him, armed the shepherds and slaves, furnished them with horses, and formed a body of about three hundred cavalry. Meanwhile the pretor L. Manlius flying from Alba, with six cohorts; and the pretor Rutilus Lupus, from Tarracina, with three; saw Caesar’s cavalry at a distance, commanded by Bivius Curius: upon which, the soldiers immediately abandoned the two pretors, and joined the troops under the conduct of Curius. Several other parties, flying different ways, fell in, some with the foot,otherswith the horse. Cn. Magius of Cremona, Pompey’s chief engineer, being taken on his way to Brundusium, was brought to Caesar, who sent him back to Pompey with this message: That as he had not yet obtained an interview, his design was to come to Brundusium, there to confer with him in relation to the common safety; because they soon would be able to despatch, in a personal treaty, what, if managed by the intervention of others, could not be hindered from running into a tedious negotiation.

1.25

Having dismissed him with these instructions, he arrived before Brundusium with six legions, three of which were composed of veteran soldiers, and the rest of new levies drawn together upon his march; for as to Domitius’s troops, he had sent them directly from Corfinium to Sicily. He found the consuls were gone to Dyrrhachium with great part of the army, and that Pompey remained in Brundusium with twenty cohorts. Nor was it certainly known whether he continued there with design to keep possession of Brundusium, that he might be master of the whole Adriatic Sea, the extreme parts of Italy, and the country of Greece, in order to make war on both sides the gulf; or for want of shipping to transport his men. Fearing, therefore, that it was his intention to keep footing in Italy he resolved to deprive him of the advantages he might receive from the port of Brundusium. The works he contrived for this purpose were as follows: He carried on a mole on either side the mouth of the haven where the entrance was narrowest, and the water shallow. But as this work could not be carried quite across the port, by reason of the great depth of the sea, he prepared double floats of timber, thirty feet square, which were each secured by four anchors from the four corners, to enable them to resist the fury of the waves. These, extending all the way between the two moles, were covered over with earth and fascines, that the soldiers might pass and repass with ease, and have firm footing to defend them. The front and sides were armed with a parapet of hurdies, and every fourth float had a tower of two stories, the better to guard the work from fire and the shocks of the vessels.

1.26

Against these preparations, Pompey made use of several large ships which he found in the port of Brundusium: and having fi ted them with towers of three stories, which he filled with a great number of engines and darts, let them loose upon Caesar’s floats, to break through the staccado, and interrupt the works. Thus daily skirmishes happened with darts, arrows, and slings, at a distance. Amidst these hostilities, Caesar’s thoughts were still bent upon peace; and though he could not but wonder that Magius, whom he had sent with proposals to Pompey, was not yet returned with an answer; and even saw his designs and undertakings retarded by his frequent offers of this kind, he nevertheless still persevered in these peaceable resolutions. Accordingly, he despatched Caninius Rebilus, one of his lieutenants, a relation and intimate friend of Scribonius Libo, to confer with him on this subject. He charged him to exhort that nobleman to think seriously of peace, and, if possible, procure an interview between him and Pompey. Could this be effected, he showed there was the greatest ground to believe that peace would soon be concluded on reasonable terms; the honour and reputation of which would in a manner wholly redound to Libo, if, by his mediation, both parties slould be prevailed with to lay down their arms. Libo, after conferring with Caninius, waited on Pompey: soon after he returned with this answer; that the consuls were absent, without whom Pompey had no power to treat of an accommodation. Thus Caesar having often tried in vain to bring about a peace, thought it now time to drop that design, and bend all his thoughts to war.

1.27

Caesar having spent nine days about his works, had now half finished the staccado, when the ships employed in the first embarkation, being sent back by the consuls from Dyrrhachium, returned to Brundusium. Pompey, either alarmed at Caesar’s works, or because from the first he had determined to relinquish Italy, no sooner saw the transports arrive, than he prepared to carry over the rest of his forces. And the better to secure himself against Caesar, and prevent his troops from breaking into the town during the embarkation, he walled up the gates, barricaded the streets, or cut ditches across them, filled with pointed stakes, and covered with hurdles and earth. The two streets which led to the port and which he left open for the passage of his men, were fortified with a double palisado of very strong well sharpened stakes. These preparations being made, he ordered the soldiers to embark with great silence, having placed on the walls and towers some select archers and slingers, who were to wait till all the troops had got aboard, and then retire, upon a signal given, to some small ships that waited them at a convenient distance.

1.28

The people of Brundusium, provoked by the affronts they had received from Pompey, and the insults of his soldiers, wished well to Caesar’s cause; and having notice of Pompey’s intended departure while the soldiers were busied with the care of embarking, found means to signify it from the tops o their houses. Caesar, upon this intelligence, ordered scaling ladders to be prepared, and the soldiers to repair to their arms, that he might not lose any opportunity of acting Pompey weighed anchor a little before night, and gave the signal for recalling the soldiers that were upon the walls, who repaired with all expedition to the ships prepared for them. Meantime the scaling ladders are applied to the walls, and Caesar’s troops enter the town. But being informed by the Brundusians of the snares and ditches provided for them by the enemy, they were obliged to take a great circuit, which gave Pompey time enough to put to sea. Two transports only, impeded by Caesar’s mole, were taken with the troops on board.

1.29

Though Caesar was fully sensible, that to finish the war at a blow, he must pass the sea immediately, and endeavour to come up with Pompey, before he could draw his transmarine forces together; yet he dreaded the delay and length of time that such a project might require; because Pompey having carried with him all the ships on the coast, rendered the present execution of the design impracticable. He must therefore wait the arrival of ships from Picenum, Sicily, and the remoter coasts of Gaul, which was a tedious business, and, at that season of the year, subject to great uncertainty. It appeared likewise of dangerous consequence, to suffer a veteran army, and the two Spains, one of which was wholly devoted to Pompey, to strengthen themselves in his rival’s interest; to let them grow powerful by levies of horse and foot, and leave Gaul and Italy open to their attacks in his absence.

1.30

He determined, therefore, to lay aside, for the present, the design of pursuing Pompey, and turn all his thoughts towards Spain. He ordered the magistrates of the municipal towns to assemble all the vessels they could, and send them to Brundusium. He sent Valerius, one of his lieutenants, into Sardinia, with one legion, and the propretor Curio into Sicily with three, ordering him, as soon as he had mastered Sicily, to pass over with his army into Africa. M. Cotta commanded in Sardinia; M. Cato in Sicily; and Africa had fallen by lot to Tubero. The inhabitants of Cagliari, hearing of Valerius’s commission, of their own accord, before he had left Italy, drove Cotta out of their city; who terrified by the unanimous opposition he met with from the province, fled into Africa. In Sicily, Cato applied himself with great diligence to the refitting of old ships, and building of new. He sent his lieutenant to raise forces in Lucania, and the country of the Brutians, and ordered the states of Sicily to furnish him with a certain number of horse and foot. When these preparations were almost completed, being informed of Curio’s arrival, he called his chief officers together, and complained, That he was betrayed and abandoned by Pompey, who, without any previous preparation, had involved the commonwealth in an unnecessary war; and upon being questioned by himself and others in the senate, had assured them, that he was abundantly able to sustain it. Having thus declared his mind, he quitted the province, which by this means submitted without trouble to Curio, as Sardinia had before done to Valerius.

1.31

Tubero arriving in Africa, found Attius Varus in possession of that province, who, after the loss of his cohorts at Auximum, as we have shown above, had fled into those parts, and, with the consent of the natives, taken upon him the command. Here he had found means to levy two legions, by his knowledge of the people and country, where he had been governor some years before, after the expiration of his pretorship. Tubero coming before Utica with his fleet, was forbid the harbour and town; nor could he even obtain leave for his son to land, though he had a fit of sickness upon him, but was obliged to weigh anchor and be gone.

1.32

These affairs despatched, Caesar that his troops might enjoy some repose, cantoned them in the nearest towns, and set out himself for Rome. There he assembled the senate, and after complaining of the injuries of his enemies, told them, That he had never affected extraordinary honours, but waited patiently the time prescribed by the laws, to solicit for a second consulship, to which every Roman citizen had a right to aspire: that the people, with the concurrence of their tribunes, (in spite of the attempts of his enemies, and the vigorous opposition of Cato, who endeavoured, according to custom, to spin out the time in speaking,) had permitted him to stand candidate though absent, and that even in the consulship of Pompey; who, if he disapproved of the decree, why did he let it pass? But if he allowed it, why now oppose the execution ? He set before them his moderation, in voluntarily proposing that both parties should lay down their arms, by which he must have been himself divested of his government and command. He displayed the malice of his enemies, who sought to impose terms on him, to which they would not submit themselves; and chose rather to involve the state in a civil war than part with their armies and provinces. He enlarged upon the injury they had done him, in taking away two of his legions, and their cruelty and insolence, in violating the authority of the tribunes. He spoke of his many offers of peace, his frequent desire of an interview, and the continual refusals he had received. For all these reasons, he requested and conjured them to undertake the administration of the republic, jointly with him. But if they declined it through fear, he had no intention to force so great a burden upon them, and would take the whole charge alone. That in the mean time it would be proper to send a deputation to Pompey, to treat of an accommodation: nor was he frighted at the difficulty Pompey had started some time before in the senate; that to send deputies was to acknowledge the superiority of him to whom they were sent, and a sign of timidity in the sender. That this was a little low way of thinking; and that, in the same manner as he had endeavoured at a superiority in action, he would also strive to be superior in justice and equity.

1.33

The senate liked the proposal of a deputation to Pompey; but the great difficulty was, to find deputies; every one, out of fear, refusing to charge himself with that commission. For Pompey, at his departure from Rome, had declared in the senate, That he would esteem those who stayed beind, as no less guilty than those in Caesar’s camp. Thus three days were spent in debates and excuses. The tribune L. Metellus had likewise been suborned by Caesar’s enemies to traverse his design, and hinder whatever he should propose. Which Caesar coming to understand, and that he only wasted his time to no purpose; he set out from Rome, without effecting what he intended, and arrived in farther Gaul.

1.34

Here he was informed, that Pompey had sent into Spain Vibullius Rufus, the same who, a few days before, had been made prisoner at Corfinium, and set at liberty by Caesar; that Domitius was gone to take possession of Marseilles, with seven galleys, which he had fitted out at Igilium and Cosanum, and manned with his slaves, freedmen, and labourers; that the deputies of the above-mentioned state, young men of the first quality, (whom Pompey, at his departure from Rome, had exhorted not to suffer the memory of his past services to their country to be blotted out by those lately received from Caesar,) had been sent before, to prepare the way for his reception. In consequence of their remonstrances, the inhabitants of Marseilles shut their gates against Caesar, and summoned to their assistance the Albici, a barbarous people, who had long been under their protection, and inhabited the adjoining mountains. They brought provisions from the neighbouring country and castles, refitted their navy, and repaired their walls and gates.

1.35

Caesar sending for fifteen of the principal men of the city, exhorted them not to be the first to begin the war, but to be swayed rather by the authority of all Italy, than the will of one particular person. He forgot not such other considerations as seemed most likely to bring them to reason. The deputies returning into the town, brought back this answer from the senate: That they saw the Romans divided into two parties, and it did not belong to them to decide such a quarrel: that at the head of these parties were Pompey and Caesar, both patrons of their city, the one having added to it the country of the Vulcae Arecomici and Helvians; the other after the reduction of Gaul, considerably augmented its territories and revenues; that as they were therefore equally indebted to both, it became them not to aid the one against the other; but to remain neuter, and grant neither an admittance into their city nor port.

1.36

Whilst these things were in agitation, Domitius arrived at Marseilles with his fleet, and being received into the town, was appointed governor, and charged with the whole administration of the war. By his order, they sent out their fleet to cruise round the coasts; seized and brought in all the merchant vessels they could find, and made use of the nails, rigging, and timber, of such as were unfit for service, to repair the rest. They deposited in public granaries, all the corn that was to be found in the city, and secured whatever else they thought might be serviceable to them in case of a siege. Caesar, provoked at these preparations, brought three legions before the town, began to erect towers and galleries, and gave orders for building twelve galleys at Arles, which being finished, launched, and brought to Marseilles, within thirty days from the cutting of the wood they were composed of, he put them under the command of D. Brutus, and having directed the manner of the siege, left the care of it to C. Trebonius, his lieutenant.

1.37

During these orders and preparations, he sent C. Fabius before him into Spain, with three legions that had wintered about Narbonne, charging him to secure with all diligence the passage of the Pyrenean Mountains, which was at that time guarded by a party of Afranius’s army. His other legions, whose quarters were more remote, had orders to follow as fast as they could. Fabius, according to his instructions, having made great despatch, forced the passes of the Pyrenees, and by long marches came up with Afranius’s army.

1.38

Pompey had then three lieutenants in Spain, Afranius, Petreius, and Varro. The first of these was at the head of three legions, and governed the nearer Spain. The other two had each two legions, and commanded, the one from the Castilian Forest to the Anas; the other from the Anas, quite through Lusitania, and the territories of the Vettones. These three lieutenants, upon the arrival of Vibullius Rufus, whom Pompey had sent into Spain, as we have, seen above, consulted together, and agreed, that Petreius should join Afranius with his two legions, and that Varro should stay and secure farther Spain. These resolutions being taken, Petreius levied horse and foot in Lusitania, and Afranius in Celtiberia, and the barbarous nations bordering upon the ocean. When the levies were completed, Petreius speedily joined Afranius, through the territories of the Vettones; and both resolved to make Lerida the seat of the war, because the country lay convenient for their purpose.

1.39

We have already observed that Afranius had three legions, and Petreius two. Besides these, there were about eighty cohorts, some light, some heavy armed, and five thousand horse, raised in both provinces. Caesar had sent his legions before him into Spain, with six thousand auxiliary foot, and three thousand horse, who had served under him in all his former wars, and he was furnished with the like number from Gaul, all chosen troops. For hearing that Pompey was coming with his whole force through Mauritania into Spain, he sent circular letters to all the Gallic states, inviting by name those of the most known and approved valour, and in particular a select body of mountaineers from Aquitain, where it borders upon the Roman province. At the same time he borrowed money from the military tribunes and centurions, which he distributed among the soldiers. This policy was attended with two great advantages: it bound the officers to him by the obligation of interest, and the soldiers by the tie of gratitude.

1.40

Fabius, by letters and messengers, endeavoured to sound the disposition of the neighbouring states. He had laid two bridges over the Sicoris, four miles distant from each other, for the convenience of foraging, having consumed all the pasture on this side the river. Pompey’s generals did the same, with much the like view, which occasioned frequent skirmishes between the horse. Two of Fabius’s legions, which was the ordinary guard of the foragers, passing one day according to custom, and the cavalry and carriages following, the bridge broke down on a sudden, by the violence of the winds and floods, and separated them from the rest of the army. Afranius and Petreius perceiving it, by the fascines and hurdles that came down with the stream; detached immediately four legions, with all their cavalry, over the bridge that lay between the town and their camp, and marched to attack Fabius’s legions. Upon this, L. Plancus, who commanded the escort, finding himself hard pressed, seizing a rising ground, and forming his men into two divisions, posted them back to back, that he might not be surrounded by the enemy’s horse. By this disposition, though inferior in number, he was enabled to sustain the furious charge of their legions and cavalry. During the course of the battle, the ensigns of two legions were perceived at a distance, which Fabius had sent by the farther bridge to sustain his party, suspecting what might happen, and that Pompey’s generals might seize the opportunity offered them by fortune, to fall upon our men. Their arrival put an end to the engagement, and both parties returned to their respective camps.

1.41

Two days after, Caesar arrived in the camp with nine hundred horse, which he had kept for a body guard. He began by re-establishing in the night the bridge which had been broken down, and was not yet quite repaired. Next day he took a view of the country, and leaving six cohorts to guard the bridge, the camp, and the baggage, marched with all his forces in three lines to Lerida, and stopped near Afranius’s camp, where he remained some time under arms, and offered him battle on an even ground. Afranius drew out his troops, and formed them before his camp, half way down the hill. Caesar, finding that he declined an engagement, resolved to encamp within four hundred paces of the foot of the mountain; and to hinder his troops from being alarmed or interrupted in their works, by sudden incursions from the enemy, ordered them not to throw up a rampart, which must have appeared and betrayed them at a distance, but to cut a ditch in front, fifteen feet broad. The first and second lines continued in order of battle, as had been resolved from the beginning, and the third carried on the work behind them unperceived. Thus the whole was completed, before Afranius had the least suspicion of his design to encamp there. In the evening, Caesar retreated with his legions behind the ditch, and passed the whole night under arms.

1.42

Next day he carried the intrenchment quite round his camp, and because materials for a rampart must have been fetched from a great distance, he contented himself for the present with a naked ditch, as the day before, allotting a legion to each side of the camp, and keeping the rest of the troops under arms, to cover those that worked. Afranius and Petreius, to alarm our men and disturb the works, advanced with their troops to the foot of the mountain, and threatened to give battle, But Caesar, trusting to the three legions under arms, and the defence of the ditch, still persisted in his design. At last, after a short stay, and without daring to come forward into the plain, they retreated again to their camp. The third day, Caesar added a rampart to his camp, and brought into it the six cohorts, with the baggage which he had left in his former camp.

1.43

Between the city of Lerida, and the hill where Petreius and Afranius were encamped was a plain of about three hundred paces, in the midst of which was a rising ground, which Caesar wanted to take possession of; because, by that means, he could cut off the enemy’s communication with the town and bridge, and render the magazines they had in the town useless. In this hope, he drew out three legions, and having formed them in order of battle, commanded the first ranks of one of them to run before, and gain the place. Afranius perceiving his design, despatched the cohorts that were upon guard before the camp, a nearer way to the same eminence. The contest was sharply maintained on both sides: but Afranius’s party, who first got possession of the post, obliged our men to give ground, and being reinforced by fresh supplies, put them at last to rout, and forced them to fly for shelter to the legions.

1.44

The manner of fighting of Afranius’s soldiers was, to come forward briskly against an enemy, and boldly take possession of some post, neither taking care to keep their ranks, nor holding it necessary to fight in a close compact body. If they found themselves hard pushed, they thought it no dishonour to retire and quit their posts, following in this the custom of the Lusitanians, and other barbarous nations, as it almost always happens, that soldiers give in to the manners of the country where they have long been used to make war. This manner of fighting, however, as it was new and unexpected, disordered our men, who seeing the enemy come forward, without regard to their ranks, were apprehensive of being surrounded, and yet not think themselves at ensigns, or quit their post, without some very urgent cause. The first ranks therefore being put into disorder, the legion in that wing gave ground, and retired to a neighbouring hill.

1.45

Caesar, contrary to his expectation, finding the consternation like to spread through the whole army, encouraged his men, and led the ninth legion to their assistance. He soon put a stop to the vigorous and insulting pursuit of the enemy, obliged them to turn their backs, and pushed them to the very walls of Lerida. But the soldiers of the ninth legion, elated with success, and eager to repair the loss we had sustained, followed the runaways with so much heat that they were drawn into a place of disadvantage, and found themselves directly under the hill where the town stood, whence when, they endeavoured to retire, the enemy again facing about, charged vigorously from the higher ground. The hill was rough, and steep on each side, extending only so far in breadth as was sufficient for drawing up three cohorts; but they could neither be reinforced in flank, nor sustained by the cavalry. The descent from the town was indeed something easier for about four hundred paces, which furnished our men with the means of extricating themselves from the danger into which their rashness had brought them. Here they bravely maintained the fight, though with great disadvantage to themselves, as well on account of the narrowness of the place, as because being posted at the foot of the hill, none of the enemy’s darts fell in vain. Still however they supported themselves by their courage and patience, and were not disheartened by the many wounds they received. The enemy’s forces increased every moment, fresh cohorts being sent from the camp through the town, who succeeded in the place of those that were fatigued. Caesar was likewise obliged to detach small parties to maintain the battle, and bring off such as were wounded.

1.46

The fight had now lasted five hours without intermission, when our men, oppressed by the multitude of the enemy, and having spent all their darts, attacked the mountain sword in hand, and overthrowing such as opposed them, obliged the rest to betake themselves to flight. The pursuit was continued to the very walls of Lerida, and some out of fear took shelter in the town, which gave our men an opportunity of making good their retreat. At the same time the cavalry, though posted disadvantageously in a bottom, found means by their valour to gain the summit of the mountain, and riding between both armies, hindered the enemy from harassing our rear. Thus the engagement was attended with various turns of fortune. Caesar lost about seventy men in the first encounter, among whom was Q. Fulginius, first centurion of the Hastati of the fourteenth legion, who had raised himself by his valour to that rank, through all the inferior orders. Upwards of six hundred were wounded. On Afranius’s side was slain T. Caecilius, first centurion of a legion; also four centurions of inferior degree, and above two hundred private men.

1.47

Yet such were the circumstances of this day’s action, that both sides laid claim to the victory; the Afranians, because, though allowed to be inferior in number, they had long sustained our attack, kept possession of the eminence which occasioned the dispute, and obliged our men at first to give ground: Caesar’s troops, because they had maintained a fight of five hours, with a handful of men, and in a very disadvantageous post; because they had attacked the mountain sword in hand ; because they had driven their adversaries from the higher ground, and compelled them to take shelter in the town. Meantime Afranius fortified the hillock which had been the subject of dispute, with a great number of works, and posted there a large body of troops.

1.48

Two days after, a very unfortunate accident happened. For so great a storm arose, that the water was never known to be higher in those parts; and the snow came down in such quantities from all the mountains round about, that the river overflowed its banks, and in one day broke down both the bridges Fabius had built over it. Caesar’s army was reduced to great extremities on this occasion. For his camp, as we have before observed, was between the Sicoris and Cinga, two rivers that were neither of them fordable, and necessarily shut him up within the space of no more than thirty miles. By this means, neither could the states that had declared for him supply him with provisions, nor the troops that had been sent beyond the rivers to forage, return, nor the large convoys he expected from Gaul and Italy get to his camp. Add to all this, that it being near the time of harvest, corn was extremely scarce and the more, as before Caesar’s arrival, Afranius had carried great quantities of it to Lerida; and the rest had been consumed by Caesar’s troops. The cattle, which was the next resource in the present scarcity, had been removed to places of security, on the breaking out of the war. The parties sent out to forage and bring in corn, were perpetually harassed by the Spanish infantry, who being well acquainted with the country, pursued them every where. The rivers themselves did not impede them, because they were accustomed to pass them on blown-up skins, which they always brought with them into the field.

1.49

Afranius, on the contrary, abounded in all things. He had large magazines of corn already laid up, was continually receiving fresh supplies from the province, and had plenty of forage. The bridge of Lerida furnished all these conveniences without danger, and opened a free communication with the country beyond the river, from which Caesar was wholly excluded.

1.50

The waters continued several days. Caesar endeavoured to re-establish his bridges, but could not get the better of the obstacles occasioned by the swelling of the river, and the enemy’s forces stationed on the opposite bank. They found it the easier to prevent his design, as the river was deep and rapid, and they could discharge their darts all along the bank, on that particular spot where our men were at work: whereas it was extremely difficult on our side to struggle with the force of the stream, and, at the same time, guard ourselves against the assaults of the enemy.

1.51

Meanwhile Afranius was informed that a large convoy, which was on its way to join Caesar, had been obliged to halt at the river side. It consisted of archers from Rovergue, Gaulish horse, with many carts and much baggage, according to the custom, of the Gauls, and about six thousand men of all sorts, with their domestics and slaves; but without discipline or commander, every one following his own choice, and all marching in perfect security, as if they had nothing more to apprehend than in former times. There were likewise many young gentlemen of quality, senators' sons, and Roman knights, with the deputies of the states of Gaul, and some of Caesar’s lieutenants; who were all stopped night, with three legions, and all his cavalry; and sending the horse before, attacked them when they least expected it. The Gaulish squadrons, forming with great expedition, began the fight. While the contest was upon equal terms, the Gauls, though few in number, bore up against the vast multitude of the enemy; but seeing the legions advance, and having lost some of their men, they retreated to the neighbouring mountains. This delay saved the convoy, for during the skirmish, the rest of the troops gained the higher ground. We lost that day about two hundred archers, a few troopers, and some servants and baggage.

1.52

All this served to enhance the price of provisions, a calamity inseparable from present scarcity, and the prospect of filture want. Corn was already at fifty denarii a bushel, the soldiers began to lose their strength, and the evil increased every moment. Nay, so great was the change produced in a few days, and such the alteration of fortune, that while our men were in the utmost want of all kind of necessaries, the enemy had plenty of every thing, and were accounted victorious. Caesar left nothing untried to remove the present scarcity: he dismissed all the useless mouths, and applied to the states that had declared for him, desiring them to send him cattle where they wanted corn.

1.53

These things were greatly exaggerated by Afranius, Petreius, and their friends, in the letters they sent, upon this occasion, to Rome. Nor was fame backward in adding to the account; insomuch that the war appeared to be almost at an end. These couriers and letters having reached Rome there was a great concourse of people at Afranius’s house, many congratulations passed, and multitudes of the nobility flocked out of Italy to Pompey; some to carry the first accounts of this grateful news; others, that they might not be so late as to subject them to the reproach of having waited for the event of things.

1.54

Affairs being in this extremity, and all the passes guarded by Afranius’s parties, without a possibility of repairing the bridges; Caesar ordered the soldiers to build some light boats, in imitation of those he had formerly seen in Britain, whose keel and ribs were of wood, and the rest of wicker, covered with leather. When he had got a sufficient number, he sent them by night in waggons, twenty-two miles off from his camp. In these he embarked a good number of soldiers, and sent them over the river; took possession unexpectedly of a hill adjoining to the bank on the other side; threw up a fortification before the enemy thought of hindering him; posted a legion in this fortification; and then threw a bridge over the Sicoris in two days. By this means he recovered his foragers, secured the convoy, and opened a passage for future supplies.

1.55

The same day he detached a great part of his cavalry over the river; who, falling unexpectedly upon the enemy’s foragers, dispersed up and down, without a suspicion of danger, made a considerable capture of men and horses; and observing some Spanish cohorts on the march to their assistance, skilfully divided themselves into two bodies; one to secure the booty; the other, to receive and return the enemy’s charge. One of their cohorts, which had rashly separated from the rest, and advanced too far before the main body, was surrounded and cut to pieces by our men, who returned over the same bridge to the camp, without loss, and enriched with a considerably booty.

1.56

Whilst these things passed at Lerida, the people of Marseilles, by the advice of L. Domitius, equipped seventeen galleys, eleven of which were covered. To these they added a multitude of smaller vessels, that they might strike a terror into our fleet by their very number; and manned them with archers, and the mountaineers we have already mentioned, whom they encouraged to perform their part by great rewards and promises. Domitius desired some of these ships, and filled them with the shepherds and labourers he had brought thither with him. Thus furnished and equipped, they sailed with great confidence, in quest of our fleet, which was commanded by Decimus Brutus, and rode at anchor at an island over against Marseilles.

1.57

Brutus was much inferior to the enemy in number of ships; but Caesar had manned them with his best soldiers, chosen out of all the legions, and headed by centurions of distinguished bravery, who had petitioned him for this service. These had provided themselves with hooks and grapplingirons, and a great number ofdarts,javelins, and offensive weapons of all sorts. Thus prepared, upon notice of the enemy’s arrival, they stood out to sea, and attacked their fleet. The conflict was sharp and vigorous. For the mountaineers, a hardy race, habituated to arms, and trained up in war, scarce yielded to the Romans in bravery; and, having but just parted from Marseilles, still retained a lively sense of the promises so lately made them. The shepherds too, animated by the hopes of liberty, and fighting under the eye of their master, did wonders to merit his approbation.

1.58

The townsmen themselves, confiding in the nimbleness of their ships, and the skill of their pilots, eluded the shock of our vessels, and baffled all their attempts. As they had abundance of sea-room, they extended their line of battle, in order to surround our fleet, or attack our ships singly with a number of theirs, or in running along-side, sweep away a range of oars. If they were compelled to come to a closer engagement, setting aside the skill and address of their pilots, they relied wholly on the bravery of their mountaineers. Our men were but indifferently provided with rowers and pilots, who had been hastily taken out of some merchant ships, and knew not so much as the names of the tackle. They were incommoded too by the weight and lumpishness of their vessels, which being built in haste, of unseasoned timber, were not so ready at tacking about. But when an opportunity offered of coming to close fight, they would boldly get between two of the enemy’s ships; and grappling them with theirhooks, charge them on each side, board them, and cut to pieces the mountaineers and shepherds that defend them. In this manner they sunk part of their vessels, took some with all the men on board, and drove the rest into the haven. In this engagement, the enemy had nine galleys sunk or taken.

1.59

The report of this battle reaching Lerida, and Caesar having finished his bridge over the Sicoris, affairs soon began to put on a new face. The enemy dreading the courage of our horse, durst not disperse about the country as formerly; but either foraged in the I neighbourhood of the camp, that they might the sooner make good their retreat; or, by a long circuit, endeavoured to avoid our parties: and upon receiving any check, or even descrying our cavalry at a distance, they would throw down their trusses, and fly. At last, they were reduced to omit foraging several days together, and resolved to pursue it of war.

1.60

In the mean time the Oscenses and Calagurritani, jointly sent deputies to Caesar. with an offer of their submission and services. The Tarraconenses, Jacitani, and Ausetani, and not many days after, the Illurgavonenses, who inhabit along the banks of the Iberus, followed their example. He only required them to supply him with corn, to which they readily agreed; and having got together a great number of carriage-horses, brought it to his camp. A cohort of the Illurgavonenses, hearing of the resolution taken by their state, deserted from the enemy, and came over to Caesar’s camp. The change was sudden and great; for, the bridge being finished, provisions secured, this rumour of Pompey’s march through Mauritania extinguished, and five considerable states having declared in his favour; a great number of distant provinces renounced their engagements with Afranius, and entered into new ones with Caesar.

1.61

These things having struck a terror into the enemy; that he might not be always obliged to send his cavalry so far about to forage, the bridges lying about seven miles from his camp, he bethought himself of draining the river, by turning some of its water into canals thirty feet deep, so as to make it fordable. The work being almost completed, Petreius and Afranius grew extremely apprehensive of being entirely cut off from their provisions and forage, because Caesar was very strong in cavalry. They therefore thought proper to quit a post that was no longer tenable, and to carry the war into Celtiberia. What contributed still further to confirm them in this resolution was, that of the two contrary parties, concerned in the late war,those who had declared for Sertorius, still trembled at the name of the conqueror, and dreaded his power, though absent; and those who had attached themselves to Pompey, continued to love him for the many services he had done them: but Caesar’s name was hardly known among these barbarians. Here they expected considerable reinforcements of horse and foot; and doubted not, by taking the advantage of places, to be able to protract the war till winter. In order to execute this plan, they collected all the boats to be found on the Iberus, and ordered them to be brought to Octogesa, a city on that river, about twenty miles from their camp. Here they commanded a bridge of boats to be built; and, having sent two legions over the Sicoris, fortified their camp with a rampart of twelve feet.

1.62

Caesar, having notice of this by his scouts, laboured day and night at his drains with the utmost diligence; and had already so far diminished the water of the Sicoris, that the cavalry could, with some difficulty, pass over: but it took the infantry as high as the shoulders, who had therefore both the depth of the river, and the rapidity of the stream to struggle with. Meanwhile it was known, that the bridge over the Iberus was almost finished, and Caesar’s ford in great forwardness.

1.63

This was a fresh motive to the enemy to quicken their march: wherefore, leaving two auxiliary cohorts, for a garrison, at Lerida, they crossed the Sicoris with all their forces, and joined the two legions they had sent over before. Caesar had now no other remedy left but to harass and fatigue them with his cavalry: for if he went with his whole army over his bridge, he lengthened his march prodigiously, and gave Afranius time enough to get to the Iberus. Accordingly the horse having forded the river, came up with Petreius and Afranius’s rear, who had decamped about midnight; and making a motion to surround them, began to stop and retard their march.

1.64

At day-break we discovered from the hills near the camp, that the enemy’s rear was greatly harassed by our cavalry. Sometimes they obliged them to halt, and disordered their ranks: at other times, the enemy facing about, charged with all their cohorts at once, and forced our men to give ground; who, wheeling again as soon as they began to march, failed not to renew the attack. At this sight, the legionary soldiers, running up and down the camp, complained that the enemy would escape out of their hands, and the war necessarily be prolonged. They addressed themselves to the centurions and military tribunes, and desired them to beg of Caesar not to spare them; that they feared neither danger nor fatigue, and were ready to pass the river as the horse had done. Caesar, moved by their alacrity and entreaties, though he saw some danger in exposing his army to the rapidity of a deep river, judged it yet proper to attempt and make trial of the passage. Having therefore withdrawn from every company such as were weak of body, or of less courage than the rest, he left them in the camp with the army happily passed the river, by the assistance of a double line of cavalry, placed above and below them. Some of the infantry were carried away by the violence of the current; but they were picked up and saved by the horse below them; so that no one man was lost. Having passed the river without loss, he drew up his army in order of battle, and began to pursue the enemy in three lines: and such was the ardour of the soldiers, that notwithstanding the army was obliged to make a circuit of six miles, notwithstanding the time necessarily lost in crossing the river, they got up at the ninth hour of the day to the enemy, who had set out at midnight.

1.65

When Afranius and Petreius perceived them at some distance, being with reason intimidated, they suspended their march, halted on an eminence, and formed in order of battle. Caesar would not hazard an action with his troops, thus fatigued, and halted likewise in the plain. On this the enemy resumed their march, and he the pursuit; which obliged them to encamp earlier than they designed. Hard by was a range of mountains, and about five miles farther, the ways were difficult and narrow. The enemy retired among these mountains, to avoid the pursuit of the cavalry; and having placed parties in all the passes, to stop Caesar’s army, hoped, by this means, to continue their march to the Iberus, without fear or danger. This was their great affair, and what before all things they should have endeavoured to effect but, being fatigued by a long march, and their continual skirmishes with Caesar’s cavalry, they deferred it till next day. Caesar likewise encamped on a hill that lay near him.

1.66

About midnight, the cavalry having surprised some of the enemy, who had adventured a little too far from their camp in quest of water; Caesar was informed by them, that Pompey’s lieutenants were decamping without noise. Immediately he ordered the alarm to be sounded, and gave his army the signal to march. The enemy, finding they should be pursued, kept still; being afraid of a nocturnal flight, wherein they would have had greatly the disadvantage, on account of their heavy baggage which they had with them, and the superiority of Caesar’s cavalry. Next day, Petreius went privately out with a party of horse, to take a view of the country. Caesar pose, under the command of Decidius Saxa. Both made the like report in their several camps; that for five miles together, the country was level and open, but after that rough and mountainous; and that whoever should first get possession of the defiles might easily prevent the other army from approaching them.

1.67

Upon this, a council of war was held by Petreius and Afranius, to deliberate about the time of beginning their march. The greater number were for setting out by night, in hopes of reaching the defiles before Caesar ould have notice of their departure. Others argued against the possibility of decamping privately, by the alarm given in Caesar’s camp the night before: That the enemy’s cavalry were continually patrolling in the night, and had beset all the ways and passes: that a nocturnal engagement was to be avoided, because, in a civil war, the soldiers were more apt to listen to their fears, than the obligations of the military oath: that shame and the presence of the centurions and tribunes, the great instruments of obedience and military duty, could have their proper effect only in the light, which rendered it of infinite importance to wait the approach of day; that in case of a disaster, yet the bulk of the army would escape, and be able to possess themselves of the post in question. This opinion prevailed in the council, and they resolved to set out the next morning by break of day.

1.68

Caesar having taken a view of the country, decamped as soon as it was light, taking a considerable circuit and observing no particular route; for the direct way to the Iberus and Octogesa lay in the rear of the enemy’s camp. He was therefore obliged to march through valleys and precipices, and over steep rocks, which the soldiers could not climb, but by disencumbering themselves of their arms, and returning them afterwards to one I another. But not a man murmured at these difficulties, in hopes of seeing a speedy end of all their labours, if they could but gain the Iberus before the enemy, and intercept their provisions.

1.69

As in this march we pursued at first an opposite course, and seemed to turn our backs upon the enemy, Afranius’s soldiers who observed us from their camp, came forth with joyful looks, and insulted us on our supposed flight, imagining the want of provisions obliged us to return to Lerida. Their generals applauded themselves upon their resolution of not decamping, and were confirmed in the notion of our retreat, as they saw we had neither horses nor carriages; whence they concluded the scarcity must be exceeding great. But when they saw us, after some time, turn to the right, and that our advanced guard had already gained the ground beyond their camp, there was not a man so tardy or indolent, as not to perceive the necessity of decamping and opposing our march. Immediately they ran to arms, and leaving a few cohorts to guard the camp, sallied in a body, pursuing their way directly to the Iberus.

1.70

All depended upon despatch, and getting the first possession of the defiles and mountains. Our troops were retarded by the difficulties of the way, and Afranius’s by the continual attacks of Caesar’s cavalry. But such was the situation of the Afranians, that even supposing them to gain the hills first, they could only secure their own retreat, without a possibility of preserving their baggage, and the cohorts left to guard the camp; because Caesar’s army getting between, cut them off from all communication with their own men. Caesar arrived first at the place in question; and having found a plain beyond the rocks, formed his men in order of battle against the enemy. Afranius, who now saw our army in his front, at the same time that his rear was continually harassed by the cavalry, halted on an eminence, from whence he detached four Spanish cohorts, to take possession of the highest mountain thereabouts; ordering them to make all the despatch they could to seize it, that he might get thither himself with the rest of his forces, and changing his route, march them over the hills to Octogesa. The Spaniards wheeling obliquely, to take possession of the place, were perceived by Caesar’s cavalry; who charged them furiously, broke them at the first onset, surrounded, and cut them in pieces in sight of both armies.

1.71

Caesar had now an opportunity of giving the enemy an effectual blow; whose army, in the present consternation it was under, would, he was sensible, make but a faint resistance; more especially as it was surrounded on all sides by the cavalry, and would be obliged to fight on equal ground. He was pressed, on all hands, to give the signal. The lieutenants, centurions, and military tribunes got round him, urging him not to delay the engagement: That the soldiers were all eager for a battle; whereas, on the contrary, the Afranians had given many marks of fear: that they had neither dared to support their own detachment, nor offered to descend from the hill, nor been able to withstand the very first charge of our cavalry; that they had brought their ensigns all into one place where they crowded confusedly round them, without observing ranks or order: that if he was afraid to attack them on the eminence, he would soon have an opportunity of more equal ground, as Afranius would be obliged to remove for want of water.

1.72

Caesar was in hopes of terminating the affair without bloodshed, or a battle; because he had intercepted the enemy’s provisions. Why therefore, even supposing the event to be prosperous, should he unnecessarily lose any of his men? Why should he expose to wounds, soldiers who had so well deserved of him? Why, in fine, should he tempt fortune? especially as it redounded no less to the honour of a good general, to gain the victory by his conduct, than by the force of his arms. He was also touched with compassion for Afranius’s soldiers; who after all, were fellow-citizens, and whom he must have slaughtered, when he could equally succeed without touching their lives. This resolution was not at all relished by the army; who, in their discontent, openly declared, that since Caesar did not lay hold of so favourable an opportunity, nor let them fight when they had a mind, they would not fight when he had a mind. But nothing could shake him. Nay, he even retreated a little, to give Afranius and Petreius liberty to regain their camp, which they did. He then posted troops on the mountains, to guard the defiles. and came and encamped as near the enemy as possible.

1.73

The day after, Pompey’s lieutenants, disturbed at finding their provisions cut off, and all the ways to the Iberus intercepted, consulted what was proper to be done. They had it still in their power to return to Lerida, or march to Tarraco. But while they were debating this matter, notice was brought them, that our cavalry had fallen upon their parties sent out in quest of water. Upon this intelligence, they formed several posts of horse and foot, intermixed with legionary cohorts; and to the place where they watered, that the soldiers might pass and repass under cover, without fear, and without a guard. Afranius and Petreius divided this work between them, and went to give directions about it in person.

1.74

In their absence, their soldiers found frequent opportunities of conversing with our men, and sought out every one his fellowcitizen and acquaintance. They began by thanking them for having spared them the day before, owning they were indebted to them for their lives. Afterwards they asked them, if they might trust to Caesar’s honour; testifying much grief at being obliged to fight with their countrymen and relations, with whom they were united by the strictest ties. At last they stipulated even for their generals, whom they would not seem to betray: and promised, if the lives of Petreius and Afranius were granted them, to change sides. At the same time they sent some of their principal officers to negotiate with Caesar; and these preliminaries to an accommodation being settled, the soldiers of both armies went into one another’s tents, so that the two camps were now in a manner one. A great number of centurions and military tribunes came to pay their court to Caesar, and beg his protection. The Spanish chiefs, who had been summoned to attend Afranius, and were detained in the camp as hostages, followed their example. Every man sought out his acquaintance and friend, who might recommend and procure him a favourable reception from Caesar. Things were carried to such a length, that Afranius’s son, a young gentleman, treated with Caesar, by the mediation of Sulpicius, to desire he would give his word for his life, and that of his father. The joy was general; they mutually congratulated each other; the one, in that they had escaped so imminent a danger; and the other, in that they had brought to a happy conclusion so important an enterprise, without striking a blow. Caesar, in the judgment of all, was upon the point of amply reaping the fruits of his wonted clemency, and every body applauded his late conduct.

1.75

Afranius, having notice of what passed, quitted the work he was engaged in, and returned to the camp; prepared, as it would seem, to bear with an equal mind not wanting to himself. He armed his slaves; and joining them to a pretorian cohort of target-bearers, and some Spanish horse, his dependents, whom he always kept about him to guard his person; he instantly flew to the rampart, broke off the conferences of the soldiers, drove our men from the camp, and put all of them he could find to the sword. The rest flocked together; where, alarmed at the danger to which they saw themselves exposed, they wrapped their cloaks round their left arms, drew their swords, and, trusting to the nearness of their camp, defended themselves against the Spanish target-bearers and cavalry, till they had retreated to our advanced guard, who screened them from any further assault.

1.76

After this he went through the whole camp, begging his troops, with tears, to have pity on him, and Pompey their general; and that they would not deliver them both up to the cruel vengeance of their enemies. Every one upon this flocks to the head-quarters. There Petreius proposes to the army to bind themselves by a new oath, not to abandon nor betray their commanders, nor to act separately, but all in concert, for the common good. He himself took this oath first, and then exacted it of Afranius, afterwards of the military tribunes and centurions, and lastly of all the companies, man by man, At the same time an order was issued that all who had any of Caesar’s soldiers in their tents should signify it, that they might be put to death in the sight of the whole army. But the majority detesting this bloody order, carefully hid those who were under their protection, and procured them means to escape in the night. However, the terror they had been thrown into by their generals, the severity shown in punishing, and the new oath they had been obliged to take, defeated, for the present, all hopes of a surrender, changed the soldiers' minds, and reduced the war to its former state.

1.77

Caesar ordered diligent search to be made after such of the enemy’s soldiers as had come to his camp during the time of conference, and carefully sent them back. Some military tribunes and centurions voluntarily chose to stay with him; whom he afterwards treated with great distinction; promoting the centurions to higher ranks, and honouring the Roman knights with the office of military tribunes.

1.78

The Afranian troops were destitute of forage, and could not water without much difficulty. The legionary soldiers had, indeed, some provisions, because they had been ordered to bring two and twenty days' corn with them from Lerida; but the Spanish infantry and auxiliaries had none; for they neither had opportunities of supplying themselves, nor were their bodies inured to carry heavy burdens. Accordingly, they every day deserted in shoals to Caesar. In this extremity, of the two expedients proposed, that of returning to Lerida appeared the safest, as they had still some provisions in that city, and might there concert what further measures to pursue. Tarraco was at a greater distance, and they would of course be exposed to more accidents by the way. This resolution being taken they decamped. Caesar sent the cavalry before, to harass and retard them in their march; and followed himself with the rest of the army. The cavalry gave the enemy no respite, being continually engaged with their rear.

1.79

The manner of fighting was thus: Some light-armed cohorts formed the rearguard, which, in a plain, halted from time to time, and made head against our cavalry. When they fell in with an eminence, the very nature of the ground furnished them with the means of defending themselves, because those who were first could, cover them behind. But when a valley or descent came in the way, the van could give no assistance to the rear, and our cavalry annoyed them with their darts from the higher ground, which put them in imminent danger. In this case, the legions were obliged to halt, and endeavour to drive back the cavalry a good way, after which they ran down the valley precipitately, until they came to the opposite eminence. For their cavalry, of which they had a considerable number, was so terrified by their ill success in former skirmishes, that, far from being of any service, they were forced to place it in the centre to secure it; and if any of them chanced to straggle from the main body, they were immediately taken by Caesar’s horse.

1.80

During these continual skirmishes, in which the enemy were often obliged to halt, in order to disengage their rear, it is easy to perceive that their march could not be very expeditious. This was in fact the case; so that after advancing four miles, finding themselves greatly incommoded by the cavalry they halted on an eminence, and drew a line before them, as it were to encamp, but did not unload their beasts of burden. When they saw that Caesar had marked out his camp, pitched his tents, and sent his cavalry to forage; suddenly, towards noon, they resumed their march briskly, hoping to be rid of the cavalry which had so much incommoded them. But Caesar set out immediately with his legions, leaving a few cohorts to guard the baggage, and sent orders to his cavalry to return with all diligence. The cavalry returned accordingly, and having overtaken the enemy before the close of day, attacked their rear so vigorously, that they were almost routed, a great number of soldiers, and even some centurions being slain. Caesar’s whole army came up, and threatened them with an immediate attack.

1.81

As they could then neither choose a proper place for a camp, nor continue their march, they were forced to halt where they were, far from any water, and on very disadvantageous ground. Caesar did not offer to attack them, for the reasons mentioned before: he would not even permit any tents to be pitched that day, that he might be the readier to pursue with all his forces, should they attempt to escape either by night or by day. The Afranians perceiving the disadvantage of their situation, employed the whole night in throwing up intrenchments, and disposed their camp directly fronting ours. The same they did the following day, from sun-rise till evening. But the farther they extended their camp, and produced their lines, in order to better their position, the farther they went from water, and to avoid one inconvenience, fell into another. The first night nobody went out of the camp for water, and the next day the whole army was obliged to do it in order of battle, so that they could not forage that day. Caesar waited to humble them by these misfortunes, and reduce them by want and necessity rather than force. He began, however, to draw lines round the camp, the better to check their sudden sallies and irruptions, to which he foresaw they would be obliged to have recourse at last. Want, soon constrained them to kill all the beasts of burden.

1.82

Two days were spent in forming and executing those resolutions; on the third, Caesar had considerably advanced his works. Afranius and Petreius, sensible of the consequences, drew all their forces out of the camp, and formed them in order of battle. Caesar previously called in his workmen, assembled his cavalry, and put his army in a condition to receive them, for he was aware of the hurt his reputation might sustain, if, contrary to the opinion of the troops, and the earnest expectations of all, he should still seem to decline an engagement. However, for the reasons already mentioned, he resolved to keep only upon the defensive; and the rather, because the distance between the two camps was so small, that should he even put his adversaries to rout, he could not flatter himself with the hopes of a complete victory. In fact, from camp to camp was not above two thousand feet; the armies were posted on each side of this space, which was left void for the mutual charge and assault of the soldiers. On supposition therefore of a battle, the nearness of their camp furnished an easy retreat to the vanquished. For this reason he resolved to wait the enemy’s charge, and not enter the first into action.

1.83

Afranius’s troops were ranged in two lines, consisting of five legions, and the cohorts wont to be stationed in the wings, formed a body of reserve. Caesar’s army was upon three lines; in the first of which were posted four cohorts, detached out of each of the five legions; in the second three; and in the third the like number, all from their respective legions: the archers and slingers were disposed in the midst, and the cavalry on the two wings. The armies being drawn up in this manner, each general kept firm to his resolution; Caesar, not to engage, unless forced to it; and Afranius, to prevent the progress of our works. In this posture they continued till sun-set, when both armies returned to their several camps. The next day, Caesar prepared to finish his lines; and Pompey’s lieutenants, as their last resource, endeavoured to find a fordable place in the Sicoris. But Caesar, penetrating their design, sent his light-armed Germans, with part of good bodies of troops along the banks, at a small distance from one another.

1.84

At last, having no hope left, and being in want of every thing, wood, water, forage, corn, they demanded an interview, and that it might be, if possible, in some place out of the sight of the soldiers. Caesar denied the last part of their request, but offered to grant them a public interview; whereupon Afranius, having given his son for a hostage, went to the place appointed by Caesar, where, in the presence of both armies, he addressed him to this effect: That it was no just matter of blame, either in him or his soldiers, to have preserved their fidelity to their general, Pompey; but that they had now sufficiently acquitted themselves of their duty, and suffered enough in his cause, by the want of all kind of necessaries; that like wild beasts caught in a toil, they were deprived of the most common enjoyments, having their bodies oppressed by want, and their minds overwhelmed with ignominy, that they therefore acknowledged themselves vanquished, and besought and conjured him, not to make a rigorous use of his victory, but to spare the lives of his unhappy countrymen. This speech was delivered with all possible marks of humility and submission.

1.85

Caesar replied, That he of all mankind, had least reason to complain, or implore compassion: that all the rest had fully done their duty; himself, in forbearing to attack him, with all the advantages of time and place, that the way to an accommodation might be the more open; his army, in returning untouched, the men that were in their power, after injuries received, and the massacre of their comrades: in fine, even his own troops, in endeavouring to conclude a peace, whereon they thought their safety depended. Thus all orders had shown an inclination to treat, while Afranius and Petreius alone opposed an accommodation, refusing both interview and truce, and barbarously murdering those whom the faith of a conference had enticed to their camp: that it had therefore happened to them, as frequently happens to men of obstinacy and arrogance, and they were forced to have recourse to those conditions, and earnestly solicit the very same terms, which not long before they had despised. However, he would not take advantage of their present submission, or the favourable circumstances in which he found himself, to demand any thing tending to the increase of his own power, but only that they would disband those troops which they had now for so many years kept on foot against him. For with what other view had six legions been sent into Spain; a seventh levied there, so many powerful navies equipped, so many able and experienced officers sent over. These mighty preparations could not be meant against Spain, or to supply the wants of the province, which having enjoyed a long run of peace, had no occasion for such extraordinary forces. Their real aim was to pave the way to his destruction; to effect which, a new species of power had been introduced into the commonwealth, and the same man appointed to command in Italy, at the gates of Rome, and hold for so many years, though absent, the government of the two most potent provinces of the republic. For this reason the magistrates were stripped of their prerogatives, and not suffered to take possession of their provinces, at the expiration of the pretorship or consulship, as had always been the custom; but particular governors were sent, by the choice and management of a faction. For this reason even the excuse of old age was disallowed; and those who had merited a discharge by their past services, were compelled to take arms again, to complete the number of their troops. In fine, for this reason, he alone had been denied that justice, which was never refused to any general before him; that after having successfully served the commonwealth, he should be allowed to return home, and disband his own army, with some marks of honour, orat least without ignominy. All which, nevertheless, he had hitherto borne, and still resolved to bear with patience; nor was it now his design, to take from them their soldiers, and enlist them, as it would be easy for him to do, but to prevent their employing them against him. Therefore, as he had already intimated, they must resolve to quit Spain, and disband their forces, in which case he would injure no man. This was his final resolution, and the only condition of peace they were to expect.

1.86

These conditions were agreeable to Afranius’s soldiers, who, instead of being punished, as they feared, were in some sort rewarded by the discharge procured them. They plainly showed their satisfaction. For, while the place and time of their dismission were debating, they signified by their gestures and cries from the rampart, where they stood, that they desired to be disbanded immediately; because no sufficient security could be given for the performance of what was put off till another time. After some discussion of that article by Caesar and Afranius, it was regulated, that those who had houses or possessions in Spain, should be discharged on the spot; and the rest near the Var, a river between Gaul and Italy. Caesar, on his side, declared, that he would hurt nobody, nor force any one to take on in his service.

1.87

Caesar undertook to find them in corn until they got to the Var. He even promised to restore to them all they had lost in the war, that could be known again; himself indemnifying his own soldiers, who hereby lost quired their confidence to such a degree, that he was arbiter of all the disputes they had, either among themselves, or with their commanders. The soldiers being ready to mutiny about their pay, because Petreius and Afranius affirmed it was not yet due, the matter was referred to Caesar, who determined it to the satisfaction of both parties. About a third of the army was disbanded during the two days they continued here, after which the rest set out for the Var in this order. Two of Caesar’s legions marched at the head, the others in the rear, and the vanquished troops in the middle. Q. Fufius Calenus, one of Caesar’s lieutenants, presided over the march. In this manner they continued their route to the Var, where the remainder of the troops were disbanded.

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