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I

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went down yesterday to the Peiraeus

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with Glaucon, the son of Ariston, to pay my devotions

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to the Goddess,

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and also because I wished to see how they would conduct the festival since this was its inauguration.

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I thought the procession of the citizens very fine, but it was no better than the show, made by the marching of the Thracian contingent.

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After we had said our prayers and seen the spectacle we were starting for town when Polemarchus, the son of Cephalus, caught sight of us from a distance as we were hastening homeward

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and ordered his boy

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run and bid us to wait

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for him, and the boy caught hold

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of my himation from behind and said,

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Polemarchus wants you to wait.

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And I turned around and asked where his master

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was.

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There he is,

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he said,

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behind you, coming this way. Wait for him.

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So we will,

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said Glaucon,

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and shortly after Polemarchus came up and Adeimantus, the brother of Glaucon, and Niceratus, the son of Nicias, and a few others apparently from the procession. Whereupon Polemarchus said,

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Socrates, you appear to have turned your faces townward and to be going to leave us.

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Not a bad guess,

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said I.

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But you see how many we are?

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he said.

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Surely.

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You must either then prove yourselves the better menCf. the playful threat in Philebus 16 A, Phaedrus 236 C, Horace, Satire i. 4. 142. or stay here.

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Why, is there not left,

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said I,

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the alternative of our persuadingFor the characteristic Socratic contrast between force and persuasion cf. 411 D, and the anecdote in Diogenes Laertius vii. 24. you that you ought to let us go?

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But could you persuade us,

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said he,

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if we refused to listen?

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Nohow,

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said Glaucon.

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Well, we won’t listen, and you might as well make up your minds to it.

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Do you mean to say,

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interposed Adeimantus,

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that you haven’t heard that there is to be a torchlight race

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this evening on horseback in honor of the Goddess?

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On horseback?

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said I.

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That is a new idea. Will they carry torches and pass them along to one another as they race with the horses, or how do you mean?

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That’s the way of it,

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said Polemarchus,

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and, besides, there is to be a night festival which will be worth seeing. For after dinner we will get upRise from the table. This is forgotten. and go out and see the sights and meet a lot of the lads there and have good talk. So stay and do as we ask.

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It looks as if we should have to stay,

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said Glaucon.

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Well,

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said I,

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if it so be, so be it.

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So we went with them to Polemarchus’s house, and there we found Lysias and Euthydemus, the brothers of Polemarchus, yes, and

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Thrasymachus, too, of Chalcedon, and Charmantides of the deme of Paeania, and Kleitophon the son of Aristonymus. And the father of Polemarchus, Cephalus, was also at home.

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And I thought him much aged,

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for it was a long time since I had seen him. He was sitting on a sort of couch with cushions and he had a chaplet

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on his head, for he had just finished sacrificing in the court. So we went and sat down beside him, for there were seats there disposed in a circle.

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As soon as he saw me Cephalus greeted me and said,

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You are not a very frequentThe language recalls the Homeric formula, πάρος γε μὲν οὔτι θαμίζεις, Iliad xviii. 386, Odyssey v. 88, Jebb on O.C. 672. Cephalus’ friendly urgency to Socrates is in the tone of Laches 181 C. visitor, Socrates. You don’t often come down to the Peiraeus to see us. That is not right. For if I were still able to make the journey up to town easily there would be no need of your resorting hither, but we would go to visit you. But as it is you should not space too widely your visits here. For I would have you know that, for my part, as the satisfactions of the body decay,Plato characteristically contrasts the transitory pleasures of the body with the enduring joys of the mind. Phaedrus 258 E. Anaximenes imitates and expands the passage, Stobaeus, 117. 5. Pleasures are not strictly speaking of the body, but in or relating to it. See my Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 45. in the same measure my desire for the pleasures of good talk and my delight in them increase. Don’t refuse then, but be yourself a companion to these lads and make our house your resort and regard us as your very good friends and intimates.

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Why, yes, Cephalus,

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said I,

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and I enjoy talking with the very aged. For to my thinking we have to learn of them as it were from wayfarersMuch of this passage, including the comparison of old men to travellers, is copied by Cicero, De sen. 3 ff. who have preceded us on a road on which we too, it may be, must some time fare—whatCf. Horace, Epistles i. 11 Quid tibi visa Chios? The vague neuter and the slight anacoluthon give a colloquial turn to the sentence. it is like—is it roughHesiod, Works and Days 290, says that the path of virtue is rough at first and then grows easy. and hard going or easy and pleasant to travel. And so now I would fain learn of you what you think of this thing, now that your time has come to it, the thing that the poets call the thresholdThis, whatever its precise meaning, was a familiar phrase like our One foot in the grave. Cf. Leaf on Iliad xxii. 60, xxiv 487; Hyperides (i. xx. 13) employs it without apology in prose. of old age. Is it a hard part of life to bear or what report have you to make of it?

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Yes, indeed, Socrates,

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he said,

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I will tell you my own feeling about it. For it often happens that some of us elders of about the same age come together and verifyLit. preserving. For the reverse Cf. Symposium 174 B. Cicero renders, similes cum similibus veteri proverbio facile congregantur. The proverb is ἧλιξ ἥλικα τέρπει Phaedrus 240 C, or, as in Lysis 214 A, Protagoras 337 D, Symposium 195 B, the reference may be to Homer’s ὡς αἰεὶ τὸν ὁμοῖον ἄγει θεὸς ὡς τὸν ὁμοῖον, Odyssey xvii. 218. Milton, Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce, x., The ancient proverb in Homer . . . entitles this work of leading each like person to his like, peculiarly to God, himself. the old saw of like to like. At these reunions most of us make lament, longing for the lost joys of youth and recalling to mind the pleasures of wine, women, and feasts, and other things thereto appertaining, and they repine in the belief that the greatest things have been taken from them and that then they lived well and now it is no life at all.The sentiment of the sensualist from Mimnermus to Byron; cf. also Simonides fr. 71, Sophocles Antigone 1165, Antiphanes, in Stobaeus 63. 12. For the application to old age Cf. Anth. Pal. ix. 127, Horace Epistles ii. 2. 55, and the ψόγος γήρως in Stobaeus, 116. And some of them complain of the indignities that friends and kinsmen put upon old age and thereto recite a doleful litanyFor such a litany cf. Sophocles O. C. 1235. of all the miseries for which they blame old age. But in my opinion, Socrates, they do not put the blame on the real cause.This suggests Aristotle’s fallacy of the false cause, Soph. El. 167 b 21. Cf. Philebus 28 A and Isocrates xv. 230. For if it were the cause I too should have had the same experience so far as old age is concerned, and so would all others who have come to this time of life. But in fact I have ere now met with others who do not feel in this way, and in particular I remember hearing Sophocles the poet greeted by a fellow who asked, How about your service of Aphrodite, Sophocles—is your natural force still unabated? And he replied, Hush, man, most gladly have I escaped this thing you talk of, as if I had run away from a raging and savage beast of a master.Allusions to the passage are frequent. Theon, Progymn. ii. 66 (Spengel), turns to the anecdote in an edifying χρεία. Ammianus Marcellinus xxv. 4. 2 tells us that the chastity of the emperor Julian drew its inspiration hence. Schopenhauer often dwelt on the thought, cf. Cicero Cato M. 14, Plutarch, De cupid. divit. 5, An seni p. 788, Athen. xii. p. 510, Philostr. Vit. Apoll. 1. 13. I thought it a good answer then and now I think so still more. For in very truth there comes to old age a great tranquillity in such matters and a blessed release. When the fierce tensionsCf. Phaedo 86 C, Philebus 47 A, Laws 645 B, 644 E σπῶσι. of the passions and desires relax, then is the word of Sophocles approved, and we are rid of many and madCf. Euripides I. A. 547 μαινομένων οἴστρων. masters. But indeed in respect of these complaints and in the matter of our relations with kinsmen and friends there is just one cause, Socrates—not old age, but the character of the man. For if men are temperate and cheerfulFor Sophocles as εὔκολος cf. Aristophanes Frogs 82, and on this quality, Laws 791 C. even old age is only moderately burdensome. But if the reverse, old age, Socrates, and youth are hard for such dispositions.

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And I was filled with admiration

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for the man by these words, and desirous of hearing more I tried to draw him out and said,

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I fancy, Cephalus, that most people, when they hear you talk in this way, are not convinced but think that you bear old age lightly not because of your character but because of your wealth. For the rich, they say, have many consolations.

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You are right,

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he said.

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They don’t accept my view and there is something in their objection, though not so much as they suppose. But the retort of Themistocles comes in pat here, who, when a man from the little island of SeriphusLit. the Seriphean of the anecdote, which, however, Herodotus (viii. 125) tells of another. Cicero Cato M. 8 Seriphio cuidam. grew abusive and told him that he owed his fame not to himself but to the city from which he came, replied that neither would he himself ever have made a name if he had been born in Seriphus nor the other if he had been an Athenian. And the same principle applies excellently to those who not being rich take old age hard; for neither would the reasonable man find it altogether easy to endure old age conjoined with poverty, nor would the unreasonable man by the attainment of riches ever attain to self-contentment and a cheerful temper.

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May I ask, Cephalus,

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said I,

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whether you inherited most of your possessions or acquired them yourself?

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Acquired, eh?

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he said.

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As a moneymaker, I hold a place somewhere halfway between my grandfather and my father. For my grandfather and namesakeCephalus, Lysanias, Cephalus, and so frequently. inherited about as much property as I now possess and multiplied it many times, my father Lysanias reduced it below the present amount, and I am content if I shall leave the estate to these boys not less but by some slight measure more than my inheritance.

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The reason I asked,

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I said,

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is that you appear to me not to be over-fond of money. And that is generally the case with those who have not earned it themselves.Aristotle makes a similar observation, Eth. Nic. iv. 1.20, Rhet. i. 11. 26, ii. 16. 4. For nouveaux riches, γενναῖοι ἐκ βαλλαντίου, see Starkie on Aristophanes Wasps, 1309. But those who have themselves acquired it have a double reason in comparison with other men for loving it. For just as poets feel complacency about their own poems and fathers about their own sons,Cf. Theaetetus 160 E, Symposium 209 C, Phaedrus 274 E, with Epaminondas’ saying, that Leuctra and Mantineia were his children. so men who have made money take this money seriously as their own creation and they also value it for its uses as other people do. So they are hard to talk to since they are unwilling to commend anything except wealth.

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You are right,

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he replied.

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I assuredly am,

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said I.

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But tell me further this. What do you regard as the greatest benefit you have enjoyed from the possession of property?

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Something,

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he said,

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which I might not easily bring many to believe if I told them.Cf. Walter Scott’s Be a good man, my dear; nothing else will give you any comfort, when you come to lie here. Perhaps the earliest positive expression of faith in future life and judgement for sin is Pindar’s Second Olympian. See Rohde’s Psyche and Adam in Cambridge Praelections. The Epicureans and sometimes the Stoics unfairly reprobated Plato’s appeal here to this motive, which he disregards in his main argument and returns to only in the tenth book. Cf. 363 C-D, 386 B, 613 E ff., also 496 E, 498 D, 608 D. For let me tell you, Socrates,

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he said,

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that when a man begins to realize that he is going to die, he is filled with apprehensions and concern about matters that before did not occur to him. The tales that are told of the world below and how the men who have done wrong here must pay the penalty there,

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though he may have laughed them down

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hitherto,

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then begin to torture his soul with the doubt that there may be some truth in them. And apart from that the man himself

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either from the weakness of old age or possibly as being now nearer to the things beyond has a somewhat clearer view of them. Be that as it may, he is filled with doubt, surmises, and alarms and begins to reckon up and consider whether he has ever wronged anyone.

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Now he to whom the ledger of his life shows an account of many evil deeds starts up

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even from his dreams like children again and again in affright and his days are haunted by anticipations of worse to come. But on him who is conscious of no wrong

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that he has done a sweet hope

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ever attends and a goodly to be nurse of his old age, as Pindar

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too says. For a beautiful saying it is, Socrates, of the poet that when a man lives out his days in justice and piety

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sweet companion with him, to cheer his heart and nurse his old age, accompanies

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Hope, who chiefly rules the changeful mind of mortals.

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Pindar Frag. 214, Loeb

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That is a fine saying and an admirable. It is for this, then, that I affirm that the possession of wealth is of most value

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not it may be to every man but to the good man. Not to cheat any man even unintentionally or play him false, not remaining in debt to a god

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for some sacrifice or to a man for money, so to depart in fear to that other world—to this result the possession of property contributes not a little. It has also many other uses. But, setting one thing against another, I would lay it down, Socrates, that for a man of sense this is the chief service of wealth.

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An admirable sentiment, Cephalus,

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said I.

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But speaking of this very thing, justice, are we to affirm thus without qualificationIt is Platonic Doctrine that no act is per se good or bad. Plat. Sym. 181a. This opens the door to casuistry, Xen. Mem. 4.2.12, Cic. De offic. 3.25. For the argument cf. Xen. Mem. 4.2.18, Cic. De offic. 3.25. For the proverb, a knife to a child or a madman cf. Athen. 5.52, Iambl. Protrep. 18k, Jebb’s Bentley, p. 69, where Jebb misses Bentley’s allusion to it. that it is truth-telling and paying back what one has received from anyone, or may these very actions sometimes be just and sometimes unjust? I mean, for example, as everyone I presume would admit, if one took over weapons from a friend who was in his right mind and then the lender should go mad and demand them back, that we ought not to return them in that case and that he who did so return them would not be acting justly—nor yet would he who chose to speak nothing but the truth to one who was in that state.

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You are right,

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he replied.

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Then this is not the definition of justice: to tell the truth and return what one has received.

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Nay, but it is, Socrates,

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said Polemarchus breaking in,

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if indeed we are to put any faith in Simonides.

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Very well,

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said Cephalus,

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indeed I make over the whole argumentThe argument, or one side of it, is often treated as a thesis which may be thus transferred. Cf. Philebus 12 A, Charmides 162 E, Protagoras 331 A. to you. For it is time for me to attend the sacrifices.

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Well,

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said I,

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is not Polemarchus the heir of everything that is yours?

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Certainly,

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said he with a laugh, and at the same time went out to the sacred rites.

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Tell me, then, you the inheritor of the argument, what it is that you affirm that Simonides says and rightly says about justice.

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That it is just,

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he replied,

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to render to each his due.The defintion is not found in the fragments of Simonides. Cf. 433 E, and the Roman Jurists’ Iustitia est constans et perpetua voluntas suum cuique tribuens. For the various meanings of the Greek word cf. my Articles Righteousness and Theognis in Hastings, Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics. In saying this I think he speaks well.

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I must admit,

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said I,

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that it is not easy to disbelieve Simonides. For he is a wise and inspired man.The Platonic Socrates ironically treats the poets as inspired but not wise because they cannot explain their fine sayings. Apology 22 A-B, Ion 542 A. He always assumes that the utterances of the wise men must be true. Theaetetus 152 B, Phaedrus 260 A, Laws 888 E, Euthydemus 280 A. But they are often obscure, and he reserves for himself the right of interpretation (335 E). Since the poets contradict one another and cannot be cross-examined they are not to be taken seriously as authorities. Protagoras 347 E, Meno 71 D, Lysis 214-215, Hippias Minor 365 D. But just what he may mean by this you, Polemarchus, doubtless know, but I do not. Obviously he does not mean what we were just speaking of, this return of a depositOwing to the rarity of banks reddere depositum was throughout antiquity the typical instance of just conduct. Cf. 442 E, Mayor on Juvenal Satire 13. 15, Herodotus. vi. 86, Democr. fr. 265 Diels, Philo, De spec. leg. 4. 67. Salt was a symbol of justice because it preserves ἃ παραλαμβάνει: Diogenes Laertius viii. 35. Earth is iustissima tellus because she returns the seed with interest. Socrates’ distinction between the fact of returning a deposit, and returning it rightly is expressed in Stoic terminology: ut si iuste depositum reddere in recte factis sit, in officiis ponatur depositum reddere, Cicero De fin. iii. 18. to anyone whatsoever even if he asks it back when not in his right mind. And yet what the man deposited is due to him in a sense, is it not?

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Yes.

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But rendered to him it ought not to be by any manner of means when he demands it not being his right mind.

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True,

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said he.

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It is then something other than this that Simonides must, as it seems, mean by the saying that it is just to render back what is due.

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Something else in very deed,

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he replied,

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for he believes that friends owe it to friends to do them some good and no evil.

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I see,

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said I;

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you mean thatAdam insists that the meaning of μανθάνω ὅτι here and everywhere is it is because. he does not render what is due or owing who returns a deposit of gold if this return and the acceptance prove harmful and the returner and the recipient are friends. Isn’t that what you say Simonides means?

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Quite so.

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But how about this—should one not render to enemies what is their due?

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By all means,

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he said,

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what is dueIn the Greek the particles indicate slight irritation in the speaker. and owing to them, and there is due and owing from an enemy to an enemy what also is proper for him, some evil.

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It was a riddlingCf. Lysis 214 D, Charmides 162 A, Theaetetus 152 C, 194 C, Alc. II. 147 B. The poet, like the soothsayer, is inspired, but only the thinker can interpret his meaning. Cf. 331 E, Tim. 72 A. Allegory and the allegorical interpretation are always conscious and often ironical in Plato. definition of justice, then, that Simonides gave after the manner of poets; for while his meaning, it seems, was that justice is rendering to each what befits him, the name that he gave to this was the due.

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What else do you suppose?

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said he.

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In heaven’s name!

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said I,

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supposeSocrates often presents an argument in this polite form. Cf. 337 A-B, 341 E, Gorgias 451 B, Hippias Major 287 B ff., Thompson on Meno 72 B. someone had questioned him thus: Tell me, Simonides, the art that renders what that is due and befitting to what is called the art of medicine.Socrates tests ambitious general definitions by the analogy of the arts and their more specific functions. Cf. Gorgias 451 A, Protagoras 311 B, 318 B. The idiomatic double question must be retained in the translation. The English reader, if puzzled, may compare Calverly’s Pickwick examination: Who thinks that in which pocket of what garment and where he has left what entreating him to return to whom and how many what and all how big? What do you take it would have been his answer?

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Obviously,

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he said,

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the art that renders to bodies drugs, foods, and drinks.

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And the art that renders to what things what that is due and befitting is called the culinary art?

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Seasoning to meats.

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Good. In the same way tell me the art that renders what to whom would be denominated justice.

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If we are to follow the previous examples,Similarly Protagoras 312 A. Socrates, it is that which renders benefits and harms to friends and enemies.

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To do good to friends and evil to enemies,Simonides’ defintion is reduced to the formula of traditional Greek morality which Plato was the first to transcend not only in the Republic infra, 335 D-336 A, but in the Crito 49 B-C. It is often expressed by Xenophon (Memorabilia ii. 3. 14, ii. 6. 35) and Isocrates (i. 26). But the polemic is not especially aimed at them. Cf. Schmidt, Ethik, ii. 313, 319, 363, Pindar, Pyth. ii. 85, Aeschylus Choeph. 123, Jebb, introduction to Sopocles Ajax, p. xxxix, Thumser, Staats-Altertumer, p. 549, n. 6, Thompson on Meno 71 E. then, is justice in his meaning?

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I think so.

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Who then is the most able when they are ill to benefit friends and harm enemies in respect to disease and health?

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The physician.

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And who navigators in respect of the perils of the sea?

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The pilot.

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Well then, the just man, in what action and for what work is he the most competent to benefit friends and harm enemies?

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In making war and as an ally, I should say.

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Very well. But now if they are not sick, friend Polemarchus, the physician is useless to them.

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True.

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And so to those who are not at sea the pilot.

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Yes.

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Shall we also say this that for those who are not at war the just man is useless?

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By no means.

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There is a use then even in peace for justice?

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Yes, it is useful.

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But so is agriculture, isn’t it?

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Yes.

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Namely, for the getting of a harvest?

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Yes.

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But likewise the cobbler’s art?

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Yes.

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Namely, I presume you would say, for the getting of shoes.

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Certainly.

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Then tell me, for the service and getting of what would you say that justice is useful in time of peace?

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In engagements and dealings, Socrates.

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And by dealings do you mean associations, partnerships, or something else?

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Associations, of course.

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Is it the just man, then, who is a good and useful associate and partner in the placing of draughts or the draught-player?

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The player.

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And in the placing of bricks and stones is the just man a more useful and better associate than the builder?

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By no means.

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Then what is the associationJustice (the political art) must be something as definite as the special arts, yet of universal scope. This twofold requirement no definition of a virtue in the minor dialogues is ever able to satisfy. It is met only by the theory worked out in the Republic. Cf. Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 14. in which the just man is a better partner than the harpist as an harpist is better than the just man for striking the chords?

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For money-dealings,Justice is more nearly defined as having to do with money or legal obligations—the common-sense view to which Aristotle inclines. I think.

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Except, I presume, Polemarchus, for the use of money when there is occasion to buy in common or sell a horse. Then, I take it, the man who knows horses, isn’t it so?

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Apparently.

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And again, if it is a vessel, the shipwright or the pilot.

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It would seem so.

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What then is the use of money in common for which a just man is the better partner?

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When it is to be deposited and kept safe, Socrates.

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You mean when it is to be put to no use but is to lie idleInterest is ignored. Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 1120 a 9, splits hairs on this.?

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Quite so.

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Then it is when money is useless that justice is useful in relation to it?

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It looks that way.

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And similarly when a scythe is to be kept safe, then justice is useful both in public and private. But when it is to be used, the vinedresser’s art is useful?

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Apparently.

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And so you will have to say that when a shield and a lyre are to be kept and put to no use, justice is useful, but when they are to be made use of, the military art and music.

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Necessarily.

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And so in all other cases, in the use of each thing, justice is useless but in its uselessness useful?

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It looks that way.

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Then, my friend, justice cannot be a thing of much worthA virtue is presumably a good. A defintion that makes justice useless is ipso facto refuted. This line of argument is a standardized procedure in the minor dialogues. Cf. my Unity of Plato’s Thought, n. 78. The argument continues: The arts are faculties of opposites. The fallacy is intentional, as in Hippias Minor 365, where it is argued that the voluntary lie is better than the involuntary. This impressed Aristotle, who met it with his distinction between habit and faculty (ἕξις and δύναμις). Cf Topics, vi. 12. 6, Eth. Nic. v. 1. 4, vi. 5. 7, Met. 1046 b, Unity of Plato’s Thought, n. 38. if it is useful only for things out of use and useless. But let us consider this point. Is not the man who is most skilful to strike or inflict a blow in a fight, whether as a boxer or elsewhere, also the most wary to guard againstThe shift from the active to the middle here helps Plato to his transition from guarding to guarding against. a blow?

1.333

Assuredly.

1.333

Is it not also true that he who best knows how to guard against disease is also most cunning to communicate it and escape detection?

1.333

I think so.

1.334

But again the very same man is a good guardian of an army who is good at stealing a marchThe play on the Greek word recalls Shakespeare’s If you do take a thief . . . let him show himself what he is and steal out of your company, Much Ado, III. iii. upon the enemy in respect of their designs and proceedings generally.

1.334

Certainly.

1.334

Of whatsoever, then, anyone is a skilful guardian, of that he is also a skilful thief?

1.334

It seems so.

1.334

If then the just man is an expert in guarding money he is an expert in stealing it.

1.334

The argument certainly points that way.

1.334

2

1.334

A kind of thief then the just man it seems has turned out to be, and it is likely that you acquired this idea from Homer.Plato playfully follows the fashion of tracing all modern wisdom to Homer. Cf. Theaetetus 152 E. For he regards with complacency Autolycus,A snapper-up of unconsidered trifles (Winter’s Tale, IV. iii. 26), whom Homer celebrates (Hom. Od. 19.395). The naivete of Homer’s amoral standpoint (Cf. Odyssey xiii. 290 ff.) tickles Plato’s sense of humor, and he amuses himself by showing that the popular rule help friends and harm enemies is on the same ethical plane. So in the Euthyphro, popular piety is gravely reduced to a kind of καπηλεία or retail trade in prayer and blessings. Cf. also Dio Chrys. Or. xi. 315 R., and modern laments over the Decay of Lying. the maternal uncle of Odysseus, and says he was gifted beyond all men in thievery and perjury. Hom. Od. 19.395 So justice, according to you and Homer and Simonides, seems to be a kind of stealing, with the qualification that it is for the benefit of friends and the harm of enemies. Isn’t that what you meant?

1.334

No, by Zeus,

1.334

he replied.

1.334

I no longer know what I did mean.For humorous bewilderment of Socrates’ interlocutors cf. Xenophon Memorabilia iv. 2. 19, Lysis 216 C, Alc. I. 127 D, Meno 80, Euthyphro 11 B, Symposium 201 B, Theaetetus 149 A, 169 C. Yet this I still believe, that justice benefits friends and harms enemies.

1.334

May I ask whether by friends you mean those who seemThe antithesis of seeming and being is a common category of early Greek and Platonic thought. Cf. 361 A-B, 365 C, Aeschylus Agamemnon 788, and the fragments of Parmenides. This discussion of the true φίλος recalls the manner of the Lysis; cf. Aristotle Topics i. 8. 5. to a man to be worthy or those who really are so, even if they do not seem, and similarly of enemies?

1.334

It is likely,

1.334

he said,

1.334

that men will love those whom they suppose to be good and dislike those whom they deem bad.

1.334

Do not men make mistakes in this matter so that many seem good to them who are not and the reverse?

1.334

They do.

1.334

For those, then, who thus err the good are their enemies and the bad their friends?

1.334

Certainly.

1.334

But all the same is then just for them to benefit the bad and injure the good?

1.334

It would seem so.

1.334

But again the good are just and incapable of injustice.

1.334

True.

1.334

On your reasoning then it is just to wrong those who do no injustice.

1.334

Nay, nay, Socrates,

1.334

he said,

1.334

the reasoning can’t be right.

1.334

7

1.334

Then,

1.334

said I,

1.334

it is just to harm the unjust and benefit the just.

1.334

That seems a better conclusion than the other.

1.334

It will work out, then, for many, Polemarchus, who have misjudged men that it is just to harm their friends, for they have got bad ones, and to benefit their enemies, for they are good. And so we shall find ourselves saying the very opposite of what we affirmed Simonides to mean.

1.334

Most certainly,

1.334

he said,

1.334

it does work out so. But let us change our ground; for it looks as if we were wrong in the notion we took up about the friend and the enemy.

1.334

What notion, Polemarchus?

1.334

That the man who seems to us good is the friend.

1.334

And to what shall we change it now?

1.334

said I.

1.335

That the man who both seems and is good is the friend, but that he who seems but is not really so seems but is not really the friend. And there will be the same assumption about the enemy.

1.335

Then on this view it appears the friend will be the good man and the bad the enemy.

1.335

Yes.

1.335

So you would have us qualify our former notion of the just man by an addition. We then said it was just to do good to a friend and evil to an enemy, but now we are to add that it is just to benefit the friend if he is good and harm the enemy if he is bad?

1.335

By all means,

1.335

he said,

1.335

that, I think, would be the right way to put it.

1.335

Is it then,

1.335

said I,

1.335

the part of a good man to harm anybody whatsoever?

1.335

1

1.335

Certainly it is,

1.335

he replied;

1.335

a man ought to harm those who are both bad and his enemies.

1.335

When horsesFor Socratic comparison of animals and men Cf. Apology 30 C, Euthyphro 13 B-C, and on 451 C. are harmed does it make them better or worse?

1.335

Worse.

1.335

In respect of the excellence or virtue of dogs or that of horses?

1.335

Of horses.

1.335

And do not also dogs when harmed become worse in respect of canine and not of equine virtue?

1.335

Necessarily.

1.335

And men, my dear fellow, must we not say that when they are harmed it is in respect of the distinctive excellence or virtue of man that they become worse?

1.335

Assuredly.

1.335

And is not justice the specific virtue of man?

1.335

3

1.335

That too must be granted.

1.335

Then it must also be admitted, my friend, that men who are harmed become more unjust.

1.335

It seems so.

1.335

Do musicians then make men unmusical by the art of music?

1.335

Impossible.

1.335

Well, do horsemen by horsemanship unfit men for dealing with horses?

1.335

No.

1.335

By justice then do the just make men unjust, or in sum do the good by virtue make men bad?

1.335

Nay, it is impossible.

1.335

It is not, I take it, the functionThe special work (Xenophon Memorabilia iv. 2. 12, iv. 6. 14) is generalized as the idea of specific function, which after Plato and Aristotle retains a prominent place in the moralizing of the Stoics and in all philosophizing. See 351 D, 352 E, Aristotle Eth. Nic. i. 7. 10, Idea of Good p. 210, Diogenes Laertius vii. 103, Porphyr.De abstin. ii. 41, Courtney, Studies in Philosophy p. 125, Spencer, Data of Ethics 12. of heat to chill but of its opposite.

1.335

Yes.

1.335

Nor of dryness to moisten but of its opposite.

1.335

Assuredly.

1.335

Nor yet of the good to harm but of its opposite.

1.335

So it appears.

1.335

But the just man is good?

1.335

Certainly.

1.335

It is not then the function of the just man, Polemarchus, to harm either friend or anyone else, but of his opposite.

1.335

I think you are altogether right, Socrates.

1.335

If, then, anyone affirms that it is just to render to each his due and he means by this, that injury and harm is what is due to his enemies from the just manXenophon approves the doctrine (Memorabilia ii. 6. 35, ii. 3. 14) and attributes it to Simonides (Hiero 2. 2). But Plato is not thinking specially of him. See on 332 p. and benefits to his friends, he was no truly wise man who said it. For what he meant was not true. For it has been made clear to us that in no case is it just to harm anyone.

1.335

I concede it,

1.335

he said.

1.335

We will take up arms against him, then,

1.335

said I,

1.335

you and I together, if anyone affirms that either Simonides or BiasFor the legend and the varying lists of the Seven Wise Men see Zeller i. 158, n. 2. No sage or saint could have taught unedifying doctrine. His meaning must have been right. Cf. 331 E, 332 B, Protagoras 345 D, Simplic. on Aristotle Physics 107. 30. or Pittacus or any other of the wise and blessed said such a thing.

1.335

I, for my part,

1.335

he said,

1.335

am ready to join in the battle with you.

1.336

Do you know,

1.336

said I,

1.336

to whom I think the saying belongs—this statement that it is just to benefit friends and harm enemies?

1.336

To whom?

1.336

he said.

1.336

I think it was the saying of Periander or Perdiccas or Xerxes or IsmeniasCf. Thompson, Meno xl. the Theban or some other rich man who had great power in his own conceit.

1.336

2

1.336

That is most true,

1.336

he replied.

1.336

Very well,

1.336

said I,

1.336

since it has been made clear that this too is not justice and the just, what else is there that we might say justice to be?

1.336

3

1.336

Now Thrasymachus,

1.336

4

1.336

even while we were conversing, had been trying several times to break in and lay hold of the discussion but he was restrained by those who sat by him who wished to hear the argument out. But when we came to a pause after I had said this, he couldn’t any longer hold his peace. But gathering himself up like a wild beast he hurled himself upon us as if he would tear us to pieces. And Polemarchus and I were frightened and fluttered apart, and he bawled out into our midst,

1.336

What balderdash is this that you have been talking, and why do you Simple Simons truckle and give way to one another? But if you really wish, Socrates, to know what the just is, don’t merely ask questions or plume yourself upon controverting any answer that anyone gives—since your acumen has perceived that it is easier to ask questions than to answer them,Cf. Gorgias 483 A, Aristotle Soph. El. 183 b 7. Socrates asked questions but did not answer, for he admitted that he did not know. For similar complaints cf. Xenophon Memorabilia i. 2. 36, iv. 4. 9, Theaetetus 150 C, Clitophon passim. but do you yourself answer and tell what you say the just is. And don’t you be telling meThrasymachus objects to definition by substitution of synonyms (Cf. Clitophon 409 C). He demands an analysis of the underlying facts (338 D-E), such as is given in the later books. that it is that which ought to be, or the beneficial or the profitable or the gainful or the advantageous, but express clearly and precisely whatever you say. For I won’t take from you any such drivel as that!

1.336

And I, when I heard him, was dismayed, and looking upon him was filled with fear, and I believe that if I had not looked at him before he did at me I should have lost my voice.

1.336

7

1.336

But as it is, at the very moment when he began to be exasperated by the course of the argument

1.336

I glanced at him first, so that I became capable of answering him and said with a light tremor:

1.336

Thrasymachus, don’t be harshFor similar irony Cf. Gorgias 461 C-D, 489 D. with us. If I and my friend have made mistakes in the consideration of the question, rest assured that it is unwillingly that we err. For you surely must not suppose that whileFor this type of a fortiori or ex contrario argument cf. 589 E, 600 C-D, Crito 46 D, Laws 647 C, 931 C, Protagoras 325 B-C, Phaedo 68 A, Thompson on Meno 91 E. if our quest were for goldCf. Heracleitus fr. 22 Diels, and Ruskin, King’s Treasuries The physical type of wisdom, gold, Psalms xix. 10. we would never willingly truckle to one another and make concessions in the search and so spoil our chances of finding it, yet that when we are searching for justice, a thing more precious than much fine gold, we should then be so foolish as to give way to one another and not rather do our serious best to have it discovered.

1.337

You surely must not suppose that, my friend. But you see it is our lack of ability that is at fault. It is pity then that we should far more reasonably receive from clever fellows like you than severity.

1.337

And he on hearing this gave a great guffaw and laughed sardonically and said,

1.337

Ye gods! here we have the well-known ironyCf. Symposium 216 E, and Gomperz, Greek Thinkers iii. p. 277. of Socrates, and I knew it and predicted that when it came to replying you would refuse and dissemble and do anything rather than answer any question that anyone asked you.

1.337

That’s because you are wise, Thrasymachus, and so you knew very well that if you asked a man how many are twelve, and in putting the question warned him: don’t you be telling me, fellow, that twelve is twice six or three times four or six times two or four times three, for I won’t accept any such drivel as that from you as an answer—it was obvious I fancy to you that no one could give an answer to a question framed in that fashion. Suppose he had said to you, Thrasymachus, what do you mean? Am I not to give any of the prohibited answers, not even, do you mean to say, if the thing really is one of these, but must I say something different from the truth, or what do you mean? What would have been your answer to him?

1.337

Humph!

1.337

said he,

1.337

how very like the two cases are!

1.337

There is nothing to prevent,

1.337

said I;

1.337

yet even granted that they are not alike, yet if it appears to the person asked the question that they are alike, do you suppose that he will any the less answer what appears to him, whether we forbid him or whether we don’t?

1.337

Is that, then,

1.337

said he,

1.337

what you are going to do? Are you going to give one of the forbidden answers?

1.337

I shouldn’t be surprised,

1.337

I said,

1.337

if on reflection that would be my view.

1.337

What then,

1.337

he said,

1.337

if I show you another answer about justice differing from all these, a better one—what penalty do you think you deserve?

1.337

Why, what else,

1.337

said I,

1.337

than that which it befits anyone who is ignorant to suffer? It befits him, I presume, to learn from the one who does know. That then is what I propose that I should suffer.

1.337

I like your simplicity,

1.337

2

1.337

said he;

1.337

but in addition to learningyou must pay a fine of money.

1.337

Well, I will when I have got it,

1.337

I said.

1.337

It is there,

1.337

said Glaucon:

1.337

if money is all that stands in the way, Thrasymachus, go on with your speech. We will all contribute for Socrates.

1.337

Oh yes, of course,

1.337

said he,

1.337

so that Socrates may contrive, as he always does, to evade answering himself but may cross-examine the other man and refute his replies.

1.338

Why, how,

1.338

I said,

1.338

my dear fellow, could anybody answer if in the first place he did not know and did not even profess to know, and secondly even if he had some notion of the matter, he had been told by a man of weight that he mustn’t give any of his suppositions as an answer? Nay, it is more reasonable that you should be the speaker. For you do affirm that you know and are able to tell. Don’t be obstinate, but do me the favor to reply and don’t be charyGrudging. Cf. Laches 200 B. of your wisdom, and instruct Glaucon here and the rest of us.

1.338

When I had spoken thus Glaucon and the others urged him not to be obstinate. It was quite plain that Thrasymachus was eager to speak in order that he might do himself credit, since he believed that he had a most excellent answer to our question. But he demurred and pretended to make a point of my being the respondent. Finally he gave way and then said,

1.338

Here you have the wisdom of Socrates, to refuse himself to teach, but go about and learn from others and not even pay thanksCf. Cratylus 391 B. therefor.

1.338

That I learn from others,

1.338

I said,

1.338

you said truly, Thrasymachus. But in saying that I do not pay thanks you are mistaken. I pay as much as I am able. And I am able only to bestow praise. For money I lack.Socrates’ poverty (Apology 38 A-B) was denied by some later writers who disliked to have him classed with the Cynics. But that I praise right willingly those who appear to speak well you will well know forthwith as soon as you have given your answer. For I think that you will speak well.

1.338

Hearken and hear then,

1.338

said he.

1.338

I affirm that the just is nothing else thanFor this dogmatic formulation of a definition Cf. Theaetetus 151 E. the advantage of the stronger.To idealists law is the perfection of reason, or νοῦ διανομή, Laws 714 A; her seat is in the bosom of God (Hooker). To the political positivist there is no justice outside of positive law, and law is the command of a political superior to a political inferior. Whatsoever any state decrees and establishes is just for the state while it is in force, Theaetetus 177 D. The formula justice is the advantage of the superior means, as explained in Laws 714, that the ruling class legislates in its own interest, that is, to keep itself in power. This interpretation is here drawn out of Thrasymachus by Socrates’ affected misapprehensions (cf. further Pascal, Pensees iv. 4, la commodite du souverain. Leibniz approves Thrasymachus’s definition: justum potentiori utile . . . nam Deus ceteris potentior!). Well, why don’t you applaud? Nay, you’ll do anything but that.

1.338

Provided only I first understand your meaning,

1.338

said I;

1.338

for I don’t yet apprehend it. The advantage of the stronger is what you affirm the just to be. But what in the world do you mean by this? I presume you don’t intend to affirm this, that if Polydamas the pancratiast is stronger than we are and the flesh of beevesThe unwholesomeness of this diet for the ordinary man proves nothing for Plato’s alleged vegetarianism. The Athenians ate but little meat. is advantageous for him, for his body, this viand is also for us who are weaker than he both advantageous and just.

1.338

You’re a buffoon,The Greek is stronger—a beastly cad. A common term of abuse in the orators. Cf. Aristophanes Frogs 465, Theophrast.Char. xvii. (Jebb). Socrates, and take my statementCf. 392 C, 394 B, 424 C, Meno 78 C, Euthydemus 295 C, Gorgias 451 A δικαίως ὑπολαμβάνεις, you take my meaning fairly. For complaints of unfair argument cf. 340 D, Charmides 166 C, Meno 80 A, Theaetetus 167 E, Gorgias 461 B-C, 482 E. in the most detrimental sense.

1.338

Not at all, my dear fellow

1.338

said I;

1.338

I only want you to make your meaning plainer.

1.338

9

1.338

Don’t you know then,

1.338

said he,

1.338

that some cities are governed by tyrants, in others democracy rules, in others aristocracy?

1.338

10

1.338

Assuredly.

1.338

And is not this the thing that is strong and has the mastery κρατεῖ with emphasis to suggest κρείττων. Cf. Menexenus 238 D, Xenophon Memorabilia 1. 2. 43. Platonic dialectic proceeds by minute steps and linked synonyms. Cf. 333 A, 339 A, 342 C, 346 A, 353 E, 354 A-B, 369 C, 370 A-B, 379 B, 380-381, 394 B, 400 C, 402 D, 412 D, 433-434, 486, 585 C, Meno 77 B, Lysis 215 B, where L. and S. miss the point. in each—the ruling party?

1.338

Certainly.

1.338

And each form of government enacts the laws with a view to its own advantage, a democracy democratic laws and tyranny autocratic and the others likewise, and by so legislating they proclaim that the just for their subjects is that which is for their—the rulers’—advantage and the man who deviatesOn this view justice is simply τὸ νόμιμον (Xenophon Memorabilia iv. 4. 12; Cf. Gorgias 504 D). This is the doctrine of the Old Oligarch, [Xenophon] Rep. Ath. 2. Against this conception of class domination as political justice, Plato (Laws 713 ff.) and Aristotle Politics iii. 7) protest. Cf. Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, chap. ii.: We only conceive of the State as something equivalent to the class in occupation of the executive government etc. from this law they chastise as a law-breaker and a wrongdoer.

1.339

This, then, my good sir, is what I understand as the identical principle of justice that obtains in all states —the advantage of the established government. This I presume you will admit holds power and is strong, so that, if one reasons rightly, it works out that the just is the same thing everywhere,Thrasymachus makes it plain that he, unlike Meno (71 E), Euthyphro (5 ff.), Laches (191 E), Hippias (Hippias Major 286 ff.), and even Theaetetus (146 C-D) at first, understands the nature of a definition. the advantage of the stronger.

1.339

Now,

1.339

said I,

1.339

I have learned your meaning, but whether it is true or not I have to try to learn. The advantageous, then, is also your reply, Thrasymachus, to the question, what is the just—though you forbade me to give that answer. But you add thereto that of the stronger.

1.339

A trifling additionCf. Laches 182 C. perhaps you think it,

1.339

he said.

1.339

It is not yet clearFor the teasing or challenging repetition cf. 394 B, 470 B-C, 487 E, 493 A, 500 B, 505 D, 514 B, 517 C, 523 A, 527 C, Lysis 203 B, Sophocles O.T. 327. whether it is a big one either; but that we must inquire whether what you say is true, is clear.For the teasing or challenging repetition cf. 394 B, 470 B-C, 487 E, 493 A, 500 B, 505 D, 514 B, 517 C, 523 A, 527 C, Lysis 203 B, Sophocles O.T. 327. For since I too admit that the just is something that is of advantageFor Plato’s so-called utilitarianism or eudaemonism see 457 B, Unity of Plato’s Thought, pp. 21-22, Gomperz, ii. p. 262. He would have nearly accepted Bentham’s statement that while the proper end of government is the greatest happiness of the greatest number, the actual end of every government is the greatest happiness of the governors. Cf. Leslie Stephen, English Utilitarianism, i. p. 282, ii. p. 89.—but you are for making an addition and affirm it to be the advantage of the stronger, while I don’t profess to know,This profession of ignorance may have been a trait of the real Socrates, but in Plato it is a dramatic device for the evolution of the argument. we must pursue the inquiry.

1.339

Inquire away,

1.339

he said.

1.339

I will do so,

1.339

said I.

1.339

Tell me, then; you affirm also, do you not, that obedience to rulers is just?

1.339

I do.

1.339

May I ask whether the rulers in the various states are infallibleThe argument turns on the opposition between the real (i.e. ideal) and the mistakenly supposed interest of the rulers. See on 334 C. or capable sometimes of error?

1.339

Surely,

1.339

he said,

1.339

they are liable to err.

1.339

Then in their attempts at legislation they enact some laws rightly and some not rightly, do they not?

1.339

So I suppose.

1.339

And by rightly we are to understand for their advantage, and by wrongly to their disadvantage? Do you mean that or not?

1.339

That.

1.339

But whatever they enactCf. 338 E and Theaetetus 177 D. must be performed by their subjects and is justice?

1.339

Of course.

1.339

Then on your theory it is just not only to do what is the advantage of the stronger but also the opposite, what is not to his advantage.

1.339

What’s that you’re saying?

1.339

9

1.339

he replied.

1.339

What you yourself are saying,Cf. Berkeley, Divine Visual Language, 13: The conclusions are yours as much as mine, for you were led to them by your own concessions. See on 334 D, Alc. I. 112-113. On a misunderstanding of this passage and 344 E, Herbert Spencer (Data of Ethics, 19) bases the statement that Plato (and Aristotle), like Hobbes, made state enactments the source of right and wrong. I think. Let us consider it more closely. Have we not agreed that the rulers in giving orders to the ruled sometimes mistake their own advantage, and that whatever the rulers enjoin is just for the subjects to perform? Was not that admitted?

1.339

I think it was,

1.339

he replied.

1.339

Then you will have to think,

1.339

11

1.339

I said,

1.339

that to do what is disadvantageous to the rulers and the stronger has been admitted by you to be just in the case when the rulers unwittingly enjoin what is bad for themselves, while you affirm that it is just for the others to do what they enjoined. In that way does not this conclusion inevitably follow, my most sapientCf. Gorgias 495 D. Thrasymachus, that it is just to do the very oppositeCf. Laches 215 E, Phaedo 62 E. of what you say? For it is in that case surely the disadvantage of the stronger or superior that the inferior are commanded to perform.

1.340

Yes, by Zeus, Socrates,

1.340

said Polemarchus,

1.340

nothing could be more conclusive.

1.340

Of course,

1.340

said Cleitophon, breaking in,

1.340

if you are his witness.

1.340

1

1.340

What need is there of a witness?

1.340

Polemarchus said.

1.340

Thrasymachus himself admits that the rulers sometimes enjoin what is evil for themselves and yet says that it is just for the subjects to do this.

1.340

That, Polemarchus, is because Thrasymachus laid it down that it is just to obey the orders τὰ κελευόμενα ποιεῖν is a term of praise for obedience to lawful authority, and of disdain for a people or state that takes orders from another. Cleitophon does not apprehend the argument and, thinking only of the last clause, reaffirms the definition in the form it is just to do what rulers bid. Polemarchus retorts: And (I was right), for he (also) . . . of the rulers.

1.340

Yes, Cleitophon, but he also took the position that the advantage of the stronger is just. And after these two assumptions he again admitted that the stronger sometimes bid the inferior and their subjects do what is to the disadvantage of the rulers. And from these admissions the just would no more be the advantage of the stronger than the contrary.

1.340

O well,

1.340

said Cleitophon,

1.340

by the advantage of the superior he meant what the superior supposed to be for his advantage. This was what the inferior had to do, and that this is the just was his position.

1.340

That isn’t what he said,

1.340

replied Polemarchus.

1.340

Never mind, Polemarchus,

1.340

said I,

1.340

but if that is Thrasymachus’s present meaning, let us take it from himSocrates always allows his interlocutors to amend their statements. Cf. Gorgias 491 B, 499 B, Protagoras 349 C, Xenophon Memorabilia iv. 2. 18. in that sense. So tell me, Thrasymachus, was this what you intended to say, that the just is the advantage of the superior as it appears to the superior whether it really is or not? Are we to say this was your meaning?

1.340

Not in the least,

1.340

he said.

1.340

4

1.340

Do you suppose that I call one who is in error a superior when he errs?

1.340

I certainly did suppose that you meant that,

1.340

I replied,

1.340

when you agreed that rulers are not infallible but sometimes make mistakes.

1.340

That is because you argue like a pettifogger, Socrates. Why, to take the nearest example, do you call one who is mistaken about the sick a physician in respect of his mistake or one who goes wrong in a calculation a calculator when he goes wrong and in respect of this error? Yet that is what we say literally—we say that the physicianFor the idea cf. Rousseau’s Émile, i.: On me dira . . . que les fautes sont du médecin, mais que la médicine en elle-même est infaillible. A al bonne heure; mais qu’elle vienne donc sans le médecin. Lucian, De Parasito 54, parodies this reasoning. erred and the calculator and the schoolmaster. But the truth, I take it, is, that each of these in so far as he is that which we entitle him never errs; so that, speaking precisely, since you are such a stickler for precision,For the invidious associations of ἀκριβολογία (1) in money dealings, (2) in argument, cf. Aristotle Met. 995 a 11, Cratylus 415 A, Lysias vii. 12, Antiphon B 3, Demosthenes. xxiii. 148, Timon in Diogenes Laertius ii. 19. no craftsman errs. For it is when his knowledge abandons him that he who goes wrong goes wrong—when he is not a craftsman. So that no craftsman, wise man, or ruler makes a mistake then when he is a ruler, though everybody would use the expression that the physician made a mistake and the ruler erred.

1.341

It is in this loose way of speaking, then, that you must take the answer I gave you a little while ago. But the most precise statement is that other, that the ruler in so far forth as ruler does not err, and not erring he enacts what is best for himself, and this the subject must do, so that, even as I meant from the start, I say the just is to do what is for the advantage of the stronger.

1.341

So then, Thrasymachus,

1.341

said I,

1.341

my manner of argument seems to you pettifogging?

1.341

It does,

1.341

he said.

1.341

You think, do you, that it was with malice aforethought and trying to get the better of you unfairly that I asked that question?

1.341

I don’t think it, I know it,

1.341

he said,

1.341

and you won’t make anything by it, for you won’t get the better of me by stealth and , failing stealth, you are not of the forceCf. 365 D. to beat me in debate.

1.341

Bless your soul,

1.341

said I,

1.341

I wouldn’t even attempt such a thing. But that nothing of the sort may spring up between us again, define in which sense you take the ruler and stronger. Do you mean the so-called ruleri.e., the one who in vulgar parlance is so; cf. τῷ ῥήματι, Plat. Rep. 340d. or that ruler in the precise sense of whom you were just now telling us, and for whose advantage as being the superior it will be just for the inferior to act?

1.341

I mean the ruler in the very most precise sense of the word,

1.341

he said.

1.341

Now bring on against this your cavils and your shyster’s tricks if you are able. I ask no quarter. But you’ll find yourself unable.

1.341

Why, do you suppose,

1.341

I said,

1.341

that I am so mad to try to try to beard a lionA rare but obvious proverb. Cf. Schol. ad loc. and Aristides, Orat. Plat. ii. p. 143. and try the pettifogger on Thrasymachus?

1.341

You did try it just now,

1.341

he said,

1.341

paltry fellow though you be.

1.341

4

1.341

Something too muchCf. 541 B, Euthyphro 11 E, Charmides 153 D. of this sort of thing,

1.341

said I.

1.341

But tell me, your physician in the precise sense of whom you were just now speaking, is he a moneymaker, an earner of fees, or a healer of the sick? And remember to speak of the physician who is really such.

1.341

A healer of the sick,

1.341

he replied.

1.341

And what of the lot—the pilot rightly so called—is he a ruler of sailors or a sailor?

1.341

A ruler of sailors.

1.341

We don’t, I fancy, have to take into account the fact that he actually sails in the ship, nor is he to be denominated a sailor. For it is not in respect of his sailing that he is called a pilot but in respect of his art and his ruling of the sailors.

1.341

True,

1.341

he said.

1.341

Then for each of themPlato, like Herodotus and most idiomatic and elliptical writers, is content if his antecedent can be fairly inferred from the context. Cf. 330 C τοῦτο, 373 C, 396 B, 598 C τεχνῶν, Protagoras 327 C. is there not a something that is for his advantage?

1.341

Quite so.

1.341

And is it not also true,

1.341

said I,

1.341

that the art naturally exists for this, to discover and provide for each his advantage?

1.341

Yes, for this.

1.341

Is there, then, for each of the arts any other advantage than to be perfect as possiblePater, Plato and Platonism, p. 242, fancifully cites this for art for art’s sake. See Zeller, p. 605. Thrasymachus does not understand what is meant by saying that the art (= the artist qua artist) has no interest save the perfection of its (his) own function. Socrates explains that the body by its very nature needs art to remedy its defects (Herodotus i. 32, Lysis 217 B). But the nature of art is fulfilled in its service, and it has no other ends to be accomplished by another art and so on ad infinitum. It is idle to cavil and emend the text, because of the shift from the statement (341 D) that art has no interest save its perfection, to the statement that it needs nothing except to be itself (342 A-B). The art and the artist qua artist are ideals whose being by hypothesis is their perfection.?

1.341

What do you mean by that question?

1.341

Just as if,

1.341

I said,

1.341

you should ask me whether it is enough for the body to be the body or whether it stands in need of something else, I would reply, By all means it stands in need. That is the reason why the art of medicine has now been invented, because the body is defective and such defect is unsatisfactory. To provide for this, then, what is advantageous, that is the end for which the art was devised. Do you think that would be a correct answer, or not?

1.342

Correct,

1.342

he said.

1.342

But how about this? Is the medical art itself defective or faulty, or has any other art any need of some virtue, quality, or excellence—as the eyes of vision, the ears of hearing, and for this reason is there need of some art over them that will consider and provide what is advantageous for these very ends—does there exist in the art itself some defect and does each art require another art to consider its advantage and is there need of still another for the considering art and so on ad infinitum, or will the art look out for its own advantage? Or is it a fact that it needs neither itself nor another art to consider its advantage and provide against its deficiency? For there is no defect or error at all that dwells in any art. Nor does it befit an art to seek the advantage of anything else than that of its object. But the art itself is free from all harm and admixture of evil, and is right so long as each art is precisely and entirely that which it is. And consider the matter in that precise way of speaking. Is it so or not?

1.342

It appears to be so,

1.342

he said.

1.342

Then medicine,

1.342

said I,

1.342

does not consider the advantage of medicine but of the body?

1.342

Yes.

1.342

Nor horsemanship of horsemanship but of horses, nor does any other art look out for itself—for it has no need—but for that of which it is the art.

1.342

So it seems,

1.342

he replied.

1.342

But surely,The next step is the identification of (true) politics with the disinterested arts which also rule and are the stronger. Cf. Xenophon Memorabilia iii. 9. 11. γε emphasizes the argumentative implication of ἄρχουσι to which Thrasymachus assents reluctantly; and Socrates develops and repeats the thought for half a page. Art is virtually science, as contrasted with empiric rule of thumb, and Thrasymachus’s infallible rulers are of course scientific. Ruler is added lest we forget the analogy between political rule and that of the arts. Cf. Newman, Introduction Aristotle Politics 244, Laws 875 C. Thrasymachus, the arts do hold rule and are stronger than that of which they are the arts.

1.342

He conceded this but it went very hard.

1.342

Then no art considers or enjoinsIt is not content with theoretic knowledge, but like other arts gives orders to achieve results. Cf. Politicus 260 A, C. the advantage of the stronger but every art that of the weaker which is ruled by it.

1.342

This too he was finally brought to admit though he tried to contest it. But when he had agreed—

1.342

Can we deny, then,

1.342

said I,

1.342

that neither does any physician in so far as he is a physician seek or enjoin the advantage of the physician but that of the patient? For we have agreed that the physician, precisely speaking, is a ruler and governor of bodies and not a moneymaker. Did we agree on that?

1.342

He assented.

1.342

And so the precise pilot is a ruler of sailors, not a sailor?

1.342

That was admitted.

1.342

Then that sort of a pilot and ruler will not consider and enjoin the advantage of the pilot but that of the sailor whose ruler he is.

1.342

He assented reluctantly.

1.342

Then,

1.342

said I,

1.342

Thrasymachus, neither does anyone in any office of rule in so far as he is a ruler consider and enjoin his own advantage but that of the one whom he rules and for whom he exercises his craft, and he keeps his eyes fixed on that and on what is advantageous and suitable to that in all that he says and does.

1.343

When we had come to this point in the discussion and it was apparent to everybody that his formula of justice had suffered a reversal of form, Thrasymachus, instead of replying,

1.343

1

1.343

said,

1.343

Tell me, Socrates, have you got a nurse?

1.343

What do you mean?

1.343

said I.

1.343

Why didn’t you answer me instead of asking such a question?

1.343

Because,

1.343

he said,

1.343

she lets her little snotty run about drivelling κορυζῶντα L. and S., also s. v. κόυζα. Lucian, Lexiphanes 18, treats the expression as an affectation, but elsewhere employs it. The philosophers used this and similar terms (1) of stupidity, (2) as a type of the minor ills of the flesh. Horace, Satire i. 4. 8, ii. 2. 76, Epictet. i. 6. 30 ἀλλ’ αἱ μύξαι μου ῥέουσι. and doesn’t wipe your face clean, though you need it badly, if she can’t get you to knowLiterally, if you don’t know for her. For the ethical dative cf. Shakespeare Taming of the Shrew, I. ii. 8 Knock me here soundly. Not to know the shepherd from the sheep seems to be proverbial. Shepherd of the people, like survival of the fittest, may be used to prove anything in ethics and politics. Cf. Newman, Introduction Aristotle Politics p. 431, Xenophon Memorabilia iii. 2. 1, Suetonius Vit. Tib. 32, and my note in Class. Phil . vol. i. p. 298. the difference between the shepherd and the sheep.

1.343

And what, pray, makes you think that?

1.343

said I.

1.343

Because you think that the shepherds and the neat-herds are considering the good of the sheep and the cattle and fatten and tend them with anything else in view than the good of their masters and themselves; and by the same token you seem to suppose that the rulers in our cities, I mean the real rulers,Thrasymachus’s real rulers are the bosses and tyrants. Socrates’ true rulers are the true kings of the Stoics and Ruskin, the true shepherds of Ruskin and Milton. differ at all in their thoughts of the governed from a man’s attitude towards his sheepCf. Aristophanes Clouds 1203 πρόβατ’ ἄλλως, Herrick, Kings ought to shear, not skin their sheep. or that they think of anything else night and day than the sources of their own profit. And you are so far outThis (quite possible) sense rather than the ironical, so far advanced, better accords with ἀγνοεῖς and with the direct brutality of Thrasymachus. concerning the just and justice and the unjust and injustice that you don’t know that justice and the just are literallyτῷ ὄντι like ὡς ἀληθῶς, ἀτεχνῶς, etc., marks the application (often ironical or emphatic) of an image or familiar proverbial or technical expression or etymology. Cf. 443 D, 442 A, 419 A, 432 A, Laches 187 B, Philebus 64 E. Similarly ἐτήτυμον of a proverb, Archil. fr. 35 (87). The origin of the usage appears in Aristophanes Birds 507 τοῦτ’ ἄρ’ ἐκεῖν ἦν τοὔπος ἀληθῶς, etc. Cf. Anth. Pal. v. 6. 3. With εὐηθικῶν, however, ὡς ἀληθῶς does not verify the etymology but ironically emphasizes the contradiction between the etymology and the conventional meaning, simple, which Thrasymachus thinks truly fits those to whom Socrates would apply the full etymological meaning of good character. Cf. 348 C, 400 E, Laws 679 C, Thucydides iii. 83. Cf. in English the connexion of silly with selig, and in Italian, Leopardi’s bitter comment on dabbenaggine (Pensieri xxvi.). the other fellow’s goodJustice not being primarily a self-regarding virtue, like prudence, is of course another’s good. Cf. Aristotle Eth. Nic. 1130 a 3; 1134 b 5. Thrasymachus ironically accepts the formula, adding the cynical or pessimistic comment, but one’s own harm, for which see 392 B, Euripides Heracleid. 1-5, and Isocrates’ protest (viii. 32). Bion (Diogenes Laertius iv. 7. 48) wittily defined beauty as the other fellow’s good; which recalls Woodrow Wilson’s favourite limerick, and the definition of business as l’argent des autres.—the advantage of the stronger and the ruler, but a detriment that is all his own of the subject who obeys and serves; while injustice is the contrary and rules those who are simple in every sense of the word and just, and they being thus ruled do what is for his advantage who is the stronger and make him happy in serving him, but themselves by no manner of means. And you must look at the matter, my simple-minded Socrates, in this way: that the just man always comes out at a disadvantage in his relation with the unjust. To begin with, in their business dealings in any joint undertaking of the two you will never find that the just man has the advantage over the unjust at the dissolution of the partnership but that he always has the worst of it. Then again, in their relations with the state, if there are direct taxes or contributions to be paid, the just man contributes more from an equal estate and the other less, and when there is a distribution the one gains much and the other nothing. And so when each holds office, apart from any other loss the just man must count on his own affairsFor the idea that the just ruler neglects his own business and gains no compensating graft cf. the story of Deioces in Herodotus i. 97, Democ. fr. 253 Diels, Laches 180 B, Isocrates xii. 145, Aristotle Pol. v. 8. 15-20. For office as a means of helping friends and harming enemies cf. Meno 71 E, Lysias ix. 14, and the anecdote of Themistocles (Plutarch, Praecept. reipub. ger. 13) cited by Goodwin (Political Justice) in the form: God forbid that I should sit upon a bench of justice where my friends found no more favour than my enemies. Democr. (fr. 266 Diels) adds that the just ruler on laying down his office is exposed to the revenge of wrongdoers with whom he has dealt severely. falling into disorder through neglect, while because of his justice makes no profit from the state, and thereto he will displease his friends and his acquaintances by his unwillingness to serve them unjustly. But to the unjust man all the opposite advantages accrue.

1.344

I mean, of course, the one I was just speaking of, the man who has the ability to overreach on a large scale. Consider this type of man, then, if you wish to judge how much more profitable it is to him personally to be unjust than to be just. And the easiest way of all to understand this matter will be to turn to the most consummate form of injustice which makes the man who has done the wrong most happy and those who are wronged and who would not themselves willingly do wrong most miserable. And this is tyranny, which both by stealth and by force takes away what belongs to others, both sacred and profane, both private and public, not little by little but at one swoop.The order of the words dramatically expressses Thrasymachus’s excitement and the sweeping success of the tyrant. For each several part of such wrongdoing the malefactor who fails to escape detection is fined and incurs the extreme of contumely; for temple-robbers, kidnappers, burglars, swindlers, and thieves the appellations of those who commit these partial forms of injustice. But when in addition to the property of the citizens men kidnap and enslave the citizens themselves, instead of these opprobrious names they are pronounced happy and blessedThe European estimate of Louis Napoleon before 1870 is a good illustration. Cf. Theopompus on Philip, Polybius viii. 11. Euripides’ Bellerophon (fr. 288) uses the happiness of the tyrant as an argument against the moral government of the world. not only by their fellow-citizens but by all who hear the story of the man who has committed complete and entire injustice.Aristotle Eth. Nic. 1130 b 15 uses the expression in a different sense. For it is not the fear of doingThe main issue of the Republic. Cf. 360 D, 358 E and Gorgias 469 B. but of suffering wrong that calls forth the reproaches of those who revile injustice. Thus, Socrates, injustice on a sufficiently large scale is a stronger, freer, and a more masterful thing than justice, and, as I said in the beginning, it is the advantage of the stronger that is the just, while the unjust is what profits man’s self and is for his advantage.

1.344

After this Thrasymachus was minded to depart when like a bathman

1.344

5

1.344

he had poured his speech in a sudden flood over our ears. But the company would not suffer him and were insistent that he should remain and render an account of what he had said. And I was particularly urgent and said,

1.344

I am surprised at you, Thrasymachus; after hurlingCf. Euripides Alcestis 680 οὐ βαλὼν οὕτως ἄπει. such a doctrine at us, can it be that you propose to depart without staying to teach us properly or learn yourself whether this thing is so or not? Do you think it is a small matterSocrates reminds us that a serious moral issue is involved in all this word-play. So 352 D, Gorgias 492 C, 500 C, Laches 185 A. Cf. 377 B, 578 C, 608 B. that you are attempting to determine and not the entire conduct of life that for each of us would make living most worth while?

1.344

Well, do I deny it?

1.344

8

1.344

said Thrasymachus.

1.344

You seem to,

1.344

said I,

1.344

or elseFor the impossibility of J. and C.’s or rather see my note in A.J.P. vol. xiii. p. 234. to care nothing for us and so feel no concern whether we are going to live worse or better lives in our ignorance of what you affirm that you know.

1.345

Nay, my good fellow, do your best to make the matter clear to us also: it will be no bad investmentκείσεται of an investment perhaps. Cf. Plautus, Rudens 939 bonis quod bene fit, haud perit. for you—any benefit that you bestow on such company as this. For I tell you for my part that I am not convinced, neither do I think that injustice is more profitableIsocrates viii. 31 and elsewhere seems to be copying Plato’s idea that injustice can never be profitable in the higher sense of the word. Cf. also the proof in the Hipparchus that all true κέρδος is ἀγαθόν. than justice, not even if one gives it free scope and does not hinder it of its will.Plato neglects for the present the refinement that the unjust man does not do what he really wishes, since all desire the good. Cf. 438 A, 577 D, and Gorgias 467 B. But, suppose, sir, a man to be unjust and to be able to act unjustly either because he is not detected or can maintain it by violence,Cf. 365 D. all the same he does not convince me that it is more profitable than justice. Now it may be that there is someone else among us who feels in this way and that I am not the only one. Persuade us, then, my dear fellow, convince us satisfactorily that we are ill advised in preferring justice to injustice.

1.345

And how am I to persuade you?

1.345

5

1.345

he said.

1.345

If you are not convinced by what I just now was saying, what more can I do for you? Shall I take the argument and ramThe language is idiomatic, and the metaphor of a nurse feeding a baby, Aristophanes Eccl. 716, is rude. Cf. Shakespeare, He crams these words into my ears against the stomach of my sense. it into your head?

1.345

Heaven forbid!

1.345

I said,

1.345

don’t do that. But in the first place when you have said a thing stand by it,Cf. Socrates’ complaint of Callicles’ shifts, Gorgias 499 B-C, but Cf. 334 E, 340 B-C. or if you shift your ground change openly and don’t try to deceive us. But, as it is, you see, Thrasymachus—let us return to the previous examples—you see that while you began by taking the physician in the true sense of the word, you did not think fit afterwards to be consistent and maintain with precision the notion of the true shepherd, but you apparently think that he herds his sheep in his quality of shepherd not with regard to what is best for the sheep but as if he were a banqueter about to be feasted with regard to the good cheer or again with a view to the sale of them as if he were a money-maker and not a shepherd. But the art of the shepherdThe art = the ideal abstract artist. See on 342 A-C. Aristotle Eth. Nic. 1098 a 8 ff. says that the function of a harper and that of a good harper are generically the same. Cf. Crito 48 A. surely is concerned with nothing else than how to provide what is best for that over which is set, since its own affairs, its own best estate, are entirely sufficiently provided for so long as it in nowise fails of being the shepherd’s art. And in like manner I supposed that we just now were constrained to acknowledge that every form of ruleAristotle’s despotic rule over slaves would seem to be an exception (Newman, Introduction Aristotle Politics p. 245.). But that too should be for the good of the slave; infra 590 D. in so far as it is rule considers what is best for nothing else than that which is governed and cared for by it, alike in political and private rule. Why, do you think that the rulers and holders of office in our cities—the true rulersSee on 343 B, Aristotle Eth. Nic. 1102 a 8. The new point that good rulers are reluctant to take office is discussed to 347 E, and recalled later, 520 D. See Newman, l.c. pp. 244-245, Dio Cass. xxxvi. 27. 1.—willingly hold office and rule?

1.345

I don’t think,

1.345

he said,

1.345

I know right well they do.

1.346

But what of other forms of rule, Thrasymachus? Do you not perceive that no one chooses of his own will to hold the office of rule, but they demand pay, which implies that not to them will benefit accrue from their holding office but to those whom they rule? For tell me this: we ordinarily say, do we not, that each of the arts is different from others because its power or function is different? And, my dear fellow, in order that we may reach some result, don’t answer counter to your real belief.Cf. Gorgias 495 A. But elsewhere Socrates admits that the argument may be discussed regardless of the belief of the respondent (349 A). Cf. Thompson on Meno 83 D, Campbell on Soph. 246 D.

1.346

Well, yes,

1.346

he said,

1.346

that is what renders it different.

1.346

And does not each art also yield us benefitAs each art has a specific function, so it renders a specific service and aims at a specific good. This idea and the examples of the physician and the pilot are commonplaces in Plato and Aristotle. that is peculiar to itself and not general,Hence, as argued below, from this abstract point of view wage-earning, which is common to many arts, cannot be the specific service of any of them, but must pertain to the special art μισθωτική. This refinement is justified by Thrasymachus’ original abstraction of the infallible craftsman as such. It also has this much moral truth, that the good workman, as Ruskin says, rarely thinks first of his pay, and that the knack of getting well paid does not always go with the ability to do the work well. See Aristotle on χρηματιστική, Politics i. 3 (1253 b 14). as for example medicine health, the pilot’s art safety at sea, and the other arts similarly?

1.346

Assuredly.

1.346

And does not the wage-earner’s art yield wage? For that is its function. Would you identify medicine and the pilot’s art? Or if you please to discriminate precisely as you proposed, none the more if a pilot regains his health because a sea voyage is good for him, no whit the more, I say, for this reason do you call his art medicine, do you?

1.346

Of course not,

1.346

he said.

1.346

Neither, I take it, do you call wage-earning medicine if a man earning wages is in health.

1.346

Surely not.

1.346

But what of this? Do you call medicine wage-earning, if a man when giving treatment earns wages?

1.346

No,

1.346

he said.

1.346

And did we not agree that the benefit derived from each art is peculiar to it?

1.346

So be it,

1.346

he said.

1.346

Any common or general benefit that all craftsmen receive, then, they obviously derive from their common use of some further identical thing.

1.346

It seems so,

1.346

he said.

1.346

And we say that the benefit of earning wages accrues to the craftsmen from their further exercise of the wage-earning art.

1.346

He assented reluctantly.

1.346

Then the benefit, the receiving of wages does not accrue to each from his own art. But if we are to consider it precisely medicine produces health but the fee-earning art the pay, and architecture a house but the fee-earning art accompanying it the fee, and so with all the others, each performs its own task and benefits that over which it is set, but unless pay is added to it is there any benefit which the craftsman receives from the craft?

1.346

Apparently not,

1.346

he said.

1.346

Does he then bestow no benefit either when he works for nothing?

1.346

I’ll say he does.

1.346

Then, Thrasymachus, is not this immediately apparent, that no art or office provides what is beneficial for itself—but as we said long ago it provides and enjoins what is beneficial to its subject, considering the advantage of that, the weaker, and not the advantage the stronger?

1.347

That was why, friend Thrasymachus, I was just now saying that no one of his own will chooses to hold rule and office and take other people’s troublesκακά = troubles, miseres, 517 D. For the thought cf. 343 E, 345 E, Xen. Mem. 2.1.8, Hdt. 1.97. in hand to straighten them out, but everybody expects pay for that, because he who is to exercise the art rightly never does what is best for himself or enjoins it when he gives commands according to the art, but what is best for the subject. That is the reason, it seems, why payCf. 345 E, Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1134b 6. must be provided for those who are to consent to rule, either in form of money or honor or a penalty if they refuse.

1.347

What do you mean by that, Socrates?

1.347

said Glaucon.

1.347

The two wages I recognize, but the penalty you speak of and described as a form of wage I don’t understand.Plato habitually explains metaphors, abstractions, and complicated defintions in this dramatic fashion. Cf. 352 E, 377 A, 413 A, 429 C, 438 B, 510 B.

1.347

Then,

1.347

said I,

1.347

you don’t understand the wages of the best men for the sake of which the finest spirits hold office and rule when they consent to do so. Don’t you know that to be covetous of honor and covetous of money is said to be and is a reproach?

1.347

I do,

1.347

he said.

1.347

Well, then,

1.347

said I,

1.347

that is why the good are not willing to rule either for the sake of money or of honor. They do not wish to collect pay openly for their service of rule and be styled hirelings nor to take it by stealth from their office and be called thieves, nor yet for the sake of honor, for they are not covetous of honor. So there must be imposed some compulsion and penalty to constrain them to rule if they are to consent to hold office. That is perhaps why to seek office oneself and not await compulsion is thought disgraceful. But the chief penalty is to be governed by someone worseCf. Aristotle Politics 1318 b 36. In a good democracy the better classes will be content, for they will not be ruled by worse men. Cf. Cicero, Ad Att. ii. 9 male vehi malo alio gubernante quam tam ingratis vectoribus bene gubernare; Democr. fr. 49 D.: It is hard to be ruled by a worse man; Spencer, Data of Ethics, 77. if a man will not himself hold office and rule. It is from fear of this, as it appears to me, that the better sort hold office when they do, and then they go to it not in the expectation of enjoyment nor as to a good thing,The good and the necessary is a favorite Platonic antithesis, but the necessary is often the condicio sine qua non of the good. Cf. 358 C, 493 C, 540 B, Laws 628 C-D, 858 A. Aristotle took over the idea, Met. 1072 b 12. but as to a necessary evil and because they are unable to turn it over to better men than themselves or to their like. For we may venture to say that, if there should be a city of good menThis suggests an ideal state, but not more strongly than Meno 100 A, 89 B. only, immunity from office-holding would be as eagerly contended for as office is now,The paradox suggests Spencer’s altruistic competition and Archibald Marshall’s Upsidonia. Cf. 521 A, 586 C, Isocrates vii. 24, xii. 145; Mill, On Representative Government, p. 56: The good despot . . . can hardly be imagined as conseting to undertake it unless as a refuge from intolerable evils; ibid. p. 200: Until mankind in general are of opinion with Plato that the proper person to be entrusted with power is the person most unwilling to accept it. and there it would be made plain that in very truth the true ruler does not naturally seek his own advantage but that of the ruled; so that every man of understanding would rather choose to be benefited by another than to be bothered with benefiting him. This point then I by no means concede to Thrasymachus, that justice is the advantage of the superior. But that we will reserve for another occasion.εἰσαῦθις lays the matter on the table. Cf. 430 C. The suggestiveness of Thrasymachus’ defintion is exhausted, and Socrates turns to the larger question and main theme of the Republic raised by the contention that the unjust life is happier and more profitable than the just. A far weightier matter seems to me Thrasymachus’s present statement, his assertion that the life of the unjust man is better than that of the just. Which now do you choose, Glaucon?

1.347

said I,

1.347

and which seems to you to be the truer statement?

1.347

That the life of the just man is more profitable, I say,

1.347

he replied.

1.348

Did you hear,

1.348

said I,

1.348

all the goods that Thrasymachus just now enumerated for the life of the unjust man?

1.348

I heard,

1.348

he said,

1.348

but I am not convinced.

1.348

Do you wish us then to try to persuade him, supposing we can find a way, that what he says is not true?

1.348

Of course I wish it,

1.348

he said.

1.348

If then we opposeThis is done in 358 D ff. It is the favorite Greek method of balancing pros and cons in set speeches and antithetic enumerations. Cf. Herodotus viii. 83, the διαλέξεις (Diels, Vorsokratiker ii. pp. 334-345), the choice of Heracles (Xenophon Memorabilia ii. 1), and the set speeches in Euripides. With this method the short question and answer of the Socratic dialectic is often contrasted. Cf. Protagoras 329 A, 334-335, Gorgias 461-462, also Gorgias 471 E, Cratylus 437 D, Theaetetus 171 A. him in a set speech enumerating in turn the advantages of being just and he replies and we rejoin, we shall have to count up and measure the goods listed in the respective speeches and we shall forthwith be in need of judges to decide between us. But if, as in the preceding discussion, we come to terms with one another as to what we admit in the inquiry, we shall be ourselves both judges and pleaders.

1.348

Quite so,

1.348

he said.

1.348

Which method do you like best?

1.348

said I.

1.348

This one,

1.348

he said.

1.348

Come then, Thrasymachus,

1.348

I said,

1.348

go back to the beginning and answer us. You affirm that perfect and complete injustice is more profitable than justice that is complete.

1.348

I affirm it,

1.348

he said,

1.348

and have told you my reasons.

1.348

Tell me then how you would express yourself on this point about them. You call one of them, I presume, a virtue and the other a vice?

1.348

Of course.

1.348

Justice the virtue and injustice the vice?

1.348

It is likely,Thrasymachus’s Umwertung aller Werte reverses the normal application of the words, as Callicles does in Gorgias 491 E. you innocent, when I say that injustice pays and justice doesn’t pay.

1.348

But what then, pray?

1.348

The opposite,

1.348

he replied.

1.348

What! justice vice?

1.348

No, but a most noble simplicityThrasymachus recoils from the extreme position. Socrates’ inference from the etymology of εὐήθεια (cf. 343 C) is repudiated. Injustice is not turpitude (bad character) but—discretion. εὐβουλία in a higher sense is what Protagoras teaches (Protagoras 318 E) and in the highest sense is the wisdom of Plato’s guardians (428 B). or goodness of heart.

1.348

Then do you call injustice badness of heart?

1.348

No, but goodness of judgement.

1.348

Do you also, Thrasymachus, regard the unjust as intelligent and good?

1.348

Yes, if they are capable of complete injustice,

1.348

he said,

1.348

and are able to subject to themselves cities and tribes of men. But you probably suppose that I mean those who take purses. There is profit to be sure even in that sort of thing,

1.348

he said,

1.348

if it goes undetected. But such things are not worth taking into the account, but only what I just described.

1.348

I am not unaware of your meaning in that,

1.348

I said;

1.348

but this is what surprised me,Socrates understands the theory, and the distinction between wholesale injustice and the petty profits that are not worth mentioning, but is startled by the paradox that injustice will then fall in the category of virtue and wisdom. Thrasymachus affirms the paradox and is brought to self-contradiction by a subtle argument (349-350 C) which may pass as a dramatic illustration of the game of question and answer. Cf. Introduction p. x. that you should range injustice under the head of virtue and wisdom, and justice in the opposite class.

1.348

Well, I do so class them,

1.348

he said.

1.348

That,

1.348

said I,

1.348

is a stiffer proposition, ἤδη marks the advance from the affirmation that injustice is profitable to the point of asserting that it is a virtue. This is a stiffer proposition, i.e. harder to refute, or possibly more stubborn. my friend, and if you are going as far as that it is hard to know what to answer.

1.349

For if your position were that injustice is profitable yet you conceded it to be vicious and disgraceful as some othere.g. Polus in Gorgias 474 ff., 482 D-E. Cf. Isocrates De Pace 31. Thrasymachus is too wary to separate the κακόν and the αἰσχρόν and expose himself to a refutation based on conventional usage. Cf. Laws 627 D, Politicus 306 A, Laws 662 A. disputants do, there would be a chance for an argument on conventional principles. But, as it is, you obviously are going to affirm that it is honorable and strong and you will attach to it all the other qualities that we were assigning to the just, since you don’t shrink from putting it in the category of virtue and wisdom.

1.349

You are a most veritable prophet,

1.349

he replied.

1.349

Well,

1.349

said I,

1.349

I mustn’t flinch from following out the logic of the inquiry, so long as I conceive you to be saying what you think.Cf. on 346 A. For now, Thrasymachus, I absolutely believe that you are not mocking us but telling us your real opinions about the truth.περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας suggests the dogmatic titles of sophistic and pre-Socratic books. Cf. Antiphon, p. 553 Diels, Campbell on Theaetetus 161 C, and Aristotle Met. passim.

1.349

What difference does it make to you,

1.349

he said,

1.349

whether I believe it or not?

1.349

Why don’t you test the argument?

1.349

No difference,

1.349

said I,

1.349

but here is something I want you to tell me in addition to what you have said. Do you think the just man would want to overreach

1.349

4

1.349

or exceed another just man?

1.349

By no means,

1.349

he said;

1.349

otherwise he would not be the delightful simpleton that he is.

1.349

And would he exceed or overreach or go beyond the just action?

1.349

Not that either,

1.349

he replied.

1.349

But how would he treat the unjust man—would he deem it proper and just to outdo, overreach, or go beyond him or would he not?

1.349

He would,

1.349

he said,

1.349

but he wouldn’t be able to.

1.349

That is not my question,

1.349

I said,

1.349

but whether it is not the fact that the just man does not claim and wish to outdo the just man but only the unjust?

1.349

That is the case,

1.349

he replied.

1.349

How about the unjust then? Does he claim to overreach and outdo the just man and the just action?

1.349

Of course,

1.349

he said,

1.349

since he claims to overreach and get the better of everything.

1.349

Then the unjust man will overreach and outdo also both the unjust man and the unjust action, and all his endeavor will be to get the most in everything for himself.

1.349

That is so.

1.349

Let us put it in this way,

1.349

I said;

1.349

the just man does not seek to take advantage of his like but of his unlike, but the unjust man of both.

1.349

Admirably put,

1.349

he said.

1.349

But the unjust man is intelligent and good and the just man neither.

1.349

That, too, is right,

1.349

he said.

1.349

Is it not also true,

1.349

I said,

1.349

that the unjust man is like the intelligent and good and the just man is not?

1.349

Of course,

1.349

he said,

1.349

being such he will be like to such and the other not.

1.349

Excellent. Then each is suchThe assumption that a thing is what it is like is put as an inference from Thrasymachus’s ready admission that the unjust man is wise and good and is like the wise and good. Jevons says in Substitution of Similars; Whatever is true of a thing is true of its like. But practical logic requires the qualification in respect of their likeness. Socrates, however, argues that since the good man is like the good craftsman in not overreaching, and the good craftsman is good, therefore the just man is good. The conclusion is sound, and the analogy may have a basis of psychological truth; but the argument is a verbal fallacy. as that to which he is like.

1.349

What else do you suppose?

1.349

he said.

1.349

Very well, Thrasymachus, but do you recognize that one man is a musicianCf. 608 E, Gorgias 463 E, Protagoras 332 A, 358 D, Phaedo 103 C, Soph. 226 B, Philebus 34 E, Meno 75 D, 88 A, Alc. I. 128 B, Cratylus 385 B. The formula, which is merely used to obtain formal recognition of a term or idea required in the argument, readily lends itself to modern parody. Socrates seems to have gone far afield. Thrasymachus answers quite confidently, ἔγωγε, but in δήπου there is a hint of bewilderment as to the object of it all. and another unmusical?

1.349

I do.

1.349

Which is the intelligent and which the unintelligent?

1.349

The musician, I presume, is the intelligent and the unmusical the unintelligent.

1.349

And is he not good in the things in which he is intelligentFamiliar Socratic doctrine. Cf. Laches 194 D, Lysis 210 D, Gorgias 504 D. and bad in the things in which he is unintelligent?

1.349

Yes.

1.349

And the same of the physician?

1.349

The same.

1.349

Do you think then, my friend, that any musician in the tuning of a lyre would want to overreachπλεονεκτεῖν is here a virtual synonym of πλέον ἔχειν. The two terms help the double meaning. Cf. Laws 691 A πλεονεκτεῖν τῶν νόμων. another musician in the tightening and relaxing of the strings or would claim and think fit to exceed or outdo him?

1.349

I do not.

1.349

But would the the unmusical man?

1.349

Of necessity,

1.349

he said.

1.350

And how about the medical man? In prescribing food and drink would he want to outdo the medical man or the medical procedure?

1.350

Surely not.

1.350

But he would the unmedical man?

1.350

Yes.

1.350

Consider then with regard to allGeneralizing from the inductive instances. forms of knowledge and ignorance whether you think that anyone who knows would choose to do or say other or more than what another who knows would do or say, and not rather exactly what his like would do in the same action.

1.350

Why, perhaps it must be so,

1.350

he said,

1.350

in such cases.

1.350

But what of the ignorant man—of him who does not know? Would he not overreach or outdo equally the knower and the ignorant?

1.350

It may be.

1.350

But the one who knows is wise?

1.350

I’ll say so.

1.350

And the wise is good?

1.350

I’ll say so.

1.350

Then he who is good and wise will not wish to overreach his like but his unlike and opposite.

1.350

It seems so,

1.350

he said.

1.350

But the bad man and the ignoramus will overreach both like and unlike?

1.350

So it appears.

1.350

And does not our unjust man, Thrasymachus, overreach both unlike and like? Did you not say that?

1.350

I did,

1.350

he replied.

1.350

But the just man will not overreach his like but only his unlike?

1.350

Yes.

1.350

Then the just man is like the wise and good, and the unjust is like the bad and the ignoramus.

1.350

It seems likely.

1.350

But furthermore we agreed that such is each as that to which he is like.

1.350

Yes, we did.

1.350

Then the just man has turned outCf. 334 A. on our hands to be good and wise and the unjust man bad and ignorant.

1.350

Thrasymachus made all these admissions

1.350

not as I now lightly narrate them, but with much baulking and reluctance

1.350

3

1.350

and prodigious sweating, it being summer, and it was then I beheld what I had never seen before—Thrasymachus blushing.

1.350

4

1.350

But when we did reach our conclusion that justice is virtue and wisdom and injustice vice and ignorance,

1.350

Good,

1.350

said I,

1.350

let this be taken as established.The main paradox of Thrasymachus is refuted. It will be easy to transfer the other laudatory epithets ἰσχυρόν, etc., from injustice back to justice. Thrasymachus at first refuses to share in the discussion but finally nods an ironical assent to everything that Socrates says. So Callicles in Gorgias 510 A. But we were also affirming that injustice is a strong and potent thing. Don’t you remember, Thrasymachus?

1.350

I remember,

1.350

he said;

1.350

but I don’t agree with what you are now saying either and I have an answer to it, but if I were to attempt to state it, I know very well that you would say that I was delivering a harangue.This is really a reminiscence of such passages as Theaetetus 162 D, Protagoras 336 B, Gorgias 482 C, 494 D, 513 A ff., 519 D. The only justification for it in the preceding conversation is 348 A-B. Either then allow me to speak at such length as I desire,So Polus in Gorgias 527 A. or, if you prefer to ask questions, go on questioning and I, as we do for old wivesCf. Gorgias 527 A. telling their tales, will say Very good and will nod assent and dissent.

1.350

No, no,

1.350

said I,

1.350

not counter to your own belief.

1.350

Yes, to please you,

1.350

he said,

1.350

since you don’t allow me freedom of speech. And yet what more do you want?

1.350

Nothing, indeed,

1.350

said I;

1.350

but if this is what you propose to do, do it and I will ask the questions.

1.350

Ask on, then.

1.351

This, then, is the question I ask, the same as before, so that our inquiry may proceed in sequence. What is the nature of injustice as compared with justice? For the statement made, I believe, was that injustice is a more potent and stronger thing than justice. But now,

1.351

I said,

1.351

if justice is wisdom and virtue, it will easily, I take it, be shown to be also a stronger thing than injustice, since injustice is ignorance—no one could now fail to recognize that—but what I want is not quite so simpleCf. 331 C, 386 B. Instead of the simple or absolute argument that justice, since it is wisdom and virtue, must be stronger, etc., then injustice, Socrates wishes to bring out the deeper thought that the unjust city or man is strong not because but in spite of his injustice and by virtue of some saving residue of justice. as that. I wish, Thrasymachus, to consider it in some such fashion as this. A city, you would say, may be unjust and try to enslave other cities unjustly, have them enslaved and hold many of them in subjection.

1.351

Certainly,

1.351

he said;

1.351

and this is what the best state will chiefly do, the state whose injustice is most complete.

1.351

I understand,

1.351

I said,

1.351

that this was your view. But the point that I am considering is this, whether the city that thus shows itself superior to another will have this power without justice or whether she must of necessity combine it with justice.

1.351

If,Thrasymachus can foresee the implications of either theory.

1.351

he replied,

1.351

what you were just now saying holds good, that justice is wisdom, with justice; if it is as I said, with injustice.

1.351

Admirable, Thrasymachus,

1.351

I said;

1.351

you not only nod assent and dissent, but give excellent answers.

1.351

I am trying to please you,

1.351

he replied.

1.351

Very kind of you. But please me in one thing more and tell me this: do you think that a city,For the thought cf. Spencer, Data of Ethics, 114: Joint aggressions upon men outside the society cannot prosper if there are many aggressions of man on man within the society; Leslie Stephen, Science of Ethics, Chapter. VIII. 31: It (the loyalty of a thief to his gang) is rather a spurious or class morality, etc.; Carlyle: Neither James Boswell’s good book, nor any other good thing . . . is or can be performed by any man in virtue of his badness, but always solely in spite thereof. Proclus, In Rempub. Kroll i. 20 expands this idea. Dante (Convivio I. xii.) attributes to the Philosopher in the fifth of the ethics the saying that even robbers and plunderers love justice. Locke (Human Understanding i. 3) denies that this proves the principles of justice innate: They practise them as rules of convenience within their own communities, etc. Cf. further Isocrates xii. 226 on the Spartans, and Plato Protagoras 322 B, on the inconveniences of injustice in the state of nature, ἠδίκουν ἀλλήλους. an army, or bandits, or thieves, or any other group that attempted any action in common, could accomplish anything if they wronged one another?

1.351

Certainly not,

1.351

said he.

1.351

But if they didn’t, wouldn’t they be more likely to?

1.351

Assuredly.

1.351

For factions, Thrasymachus, are the outcome of injustice, and hatreds and internecine conflicts, but justice brings oneness of mind and love. Is it not so?

1.351

So be it,

1.351

he replied,

1.351

not to differ from you.

1.351

That is good of you, my friend; but tell me this: if it is the business of injustice to engender hatred wherever it is found, will it not, when it springs up either among freemen or slaves, cause them to hate and be at strife with one another, and make them incapable of effective action in common?

1.351

By all means.

1.351

Suppose, then, it springs up between two, will they not be at outs with and hate each other and be enemies both to one another and to the just?

1.351

They will,

1.351

he said.

1.351

And then will you tell me that if injustice arises in oneThe specific function must operate universally in bond or free, in many, two, or one. The application to the individual reminds us of the main argument of the Republic. Cf. 369 A, 433 D, 441 C. For the argument many, few or two, one, Cf. Laws 626 C. it will lose its force and function or will it none the less keep it?

1.351

Have it that it keeps it,

1.351

he said.

1.352

And is it not apparent that its force is such that wherever it is found in city, family, camp, or in anything else it first renders the thing incapable of cooperation with itself owing to faction and difference, and secondly an enemy to itselfPlato paradoxically treats the state as one organism and the individual as many warring members (cf. Introduction p. xxxv). Hence, justice in one, and being a friend to oneself are more than metaphors for him. Cf. 621 C, 416 C, 428 D, Laws 626 E, 693 B, Epistles vii. 332 D, Antiphon 556.45 Diels ὁμονοεῖ πρὸς ἑαυτόν. Aritotle, Eth. Nic. v. 11, inquires whether a man can wrong himself, and Chrysippus (Plutarch, Stoic. Repug. xvi.) pronounces the expression absurd. and to its opposite in every case, the just? Isn’t that so?

1.352

By all means.

1.352

Then in the individual too, I presume, its presence will operate all these effects which it is its nature to produce. It will in the first place make him incapable of accomplishing anything because of inner faction and lack of self-agreement, and then an enemy to himself and to the just. Is it not so?

1.352

Yes.

1.352

But, my friend, the gods tooThis is the conventional climax of the plea for any moral ideal. So Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 1179 a 24, proves that the σοφός being likest God is θεοφιλέστατος. Cf. Democ. fr. 217 D. μοῦνοι θεοφιλέες ὅσοις ἐχθρὸν τὸ ἀδικεῖν; 382 E, 612 E, Philebus 39 E, Laws 716 D. The enlightened Thrasymachus is disgusted at this dragging in of the gods. Cf. Theaetetus 162 D θεούς τε εἰς τὸ μέσον ἄγοντες. He is reported as saying (Diels p. 544.40) that the gods regard not human affairs, else they would not have overlooked the greatest of goods, justice, which men plainly do not use. are just.

1.352

Have it that they are,

1.352

he said.

1.352

So to the gods also, it seems, the unjust man will be hateful, but the just man dear.

1.352

Revel in your discourse,

1.352

he said,

1.352

without fear, for I shall not oppose you, so as not to offend your partisans here.

1.352

Fill up the measure of my feast,ἑστιάσεως keeps up the image of the feast of reason. Cf. 354 A-B, Lysis 211 C, Gorgias 522 A, Phaedrus 227 B, and Tim. 17 A, from which perhaps it becomes a commonplace in Dante and the Middle Ages. then, and complete it for me,

1.352

I said,

1.352

by continuing to answer as you have been doing. Now that the just appear to be wiser and better and more capable of action and the unjust incapable of any common action, and that if we ever say that any men who are unjust have vigorously combined to put something over, our statement is not altogether true, for they would not have kept their hands from one another if they had been thoroughly unjust, but it is obvious that there was in them some justice which prevented them from wronging at the same time one another too as well as those whom they attacked; and by dint of this they accomplished whatever they did and set out to do injustice only half corruptedFor the idea cf. the argument in Protagoras 327 C-D, that Socrates would yearn for the wickedness of Athens if he found himself among wild men who knew no justice at all. by injustice, since utter rascals completely unjust are completely incapable of effective action—all this I understand to be the truth, and not what you originally laid down. But whether it is also trueThe main ethical question of the Republic, suggested in 347 E, now recurs. that the just have a better life than the unjust and are happier, which is the question we afterwards proposed for examination, is what we now have to consider. It appears even now that they are, I think, from what has already been said. But all the same we must examine it more carefully.Similarly 578 C. What has been said implies that injustice is the corruption and disease of the soul (see on 445 A-B). But Socrates wishes to make further use of the argument from ἔργον or specific function. For it is no ordinaryCf. on 344 D, ibid, pp. 71 f. matter that we are discussing, but the right conduct of life.

1.352

Proceed with your inquiry,

1.352

he said.

1.352

I proceed,

1.352

said I.

1.352

Tell me then—would you say that a horse has a specific workSee on 335 D, and Aristotle Eth. Nic. i. 7. 14. The virtue or excellence of a thing is the right performance of its specific function. See Schmidt, Ethik der Griechen, i. p. 301, Newman, Introduction Aristotle Politics p. 48. The following argument is in a sense a fallacy, since it relies on the double meaning of life, physical and moral (cf. 445 B and Cratylus 399 D) and on the ambiguity of εὖ πράττειν, fare well and do well. The Aristotelian commentator, Alexander, animadverts on the fallacy. For ἔργον cf. further Epictet. Dis. i. 4. 11, Max. Tyr. Dis. ii. 4, Musonius apud Stobaeus 117. 8, Thompson on Meno 90 E, Plato, Laws 896 D, Phaedrus 246 B. or function?

1.352

I would.

1.352

Would you be willing to define the work of a horse or of anything else to be that which one can do only with it or best with it?

1.352

I don’t understand,

1.352

he replied.

1.352

Well, take it this way: is there anything else with which you can see except the eyes?

1.352

Certainly not.

1.352

Again, could you hear with anything but ears?

1.352

By no means.

1.352

Would you not rightly say that these are the functions of these (organs)?

1.352

By all means.

1.353

Once more, you could use a dirk to trim vine branches and a knife and many other instruments.

1.353

Certainly.

1.353

But nothing so well, I take it, as a pruning-knife fashioned for this purpose.

1.353

That is true.

1.353

Must we not then assume this to be the work or function of that?

1.353

We must.

1.353

You will now, then, I fancy, better apprehend the meaning of my question when I asked whether that is not the work of a thing which it only or it better than anything else can perform.

1.353

Well,

1.353

he said,

1.353

I do understand, and agree that the work of anything is that.

1.353

Very good,

1.353

said I.

1.353

Do you not also think that there is a specific virtue or excellence of everything for which a specific work or function is appointed? Let us return to the same examples. The eyes we say have a function?

1.353

They have.

1.353

Is there also a virtue of the eyes?

1.353

There is.

1.353

And was there not a function of the ears?

1.353

Yes.

1.353

And so also a virtue?

1.353

Also a virtue.

1.353

And what of all other things? Is the case not the same?

1.353

The same.

1.353

Take note now. Could the eyes possibly fulfil their function well if they lacked their own proper excellence and had in its stead the defect?

1.353

How could they?

1.353

he said;

1.353

for I presume you meant blindness instead of vision.

1.353

Whatever,

1.353

said I,

1.353

the excellence may be. For I have not yet comePlatonic dialectic asks and affirms only so much as is needed for the present purpose. to that question, but am only asking whether whatever operates will not do its own work well by its own virtue and badly by its own defect.

1.353

That much,

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he said,

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you may affirm to be true.

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Then the ears, too, if deprived of their own virtue will do their work ill?

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Assuredly.

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And do we then apply the same principle to all things?

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I think so.

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Then next consider this. The soul, has it a work which you couldn’t accomplish with anything else in the world, as for example, management, rule, deliberation, and the like, is there anything else than soul to which you could rightly assign these and say that they were its peculiar work?

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Nothing else.

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And again life? Shall we say that too is the function of the soul?

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Most certainly,

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he said.

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And do we not also say that there is an excellence virtue of the soul?

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We do.

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Will the soul ever accomplish its own work well if deprived of its own virtue, or is this impossible?

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It is impossible.

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Of necessity, then, a bad soul will govern and manage things badly while the good soul will in all these things do well.For the equivocation Cf. Charmides 172 A, Gorgias 507 C, Xenophon Memorabilia iii. 9. 14, Aristotle Eth. Nic. 1098 b 21, Newman, Introduction Aristotle Politics p. 401, Gomperz, Greek Thinkers (English ed.), ii. p. 70. It does not seriously affect the validity of the argument, for it is used only as a rhetorical confirmation of the implication that κακῶς ἄρχειν, etc. = misery and the reverse of happiness.

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Of necessity.

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And did we not agree that the excellence or virtue of soul is justice and its defect injustice?

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Yes, we did.

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The just soul and the just man then will live well and the unjust ill?

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So it appears,

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he said,

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by your reasoning.

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But furthermore, he who lives well is blessed and happy, and he who does not the contrary.

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Of course.

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Then the just is happy and the unjust miserable.

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So be it,

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he said.

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But it surely does not pay to be miserable, but to be happy.

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Of course not.

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Never, then, most worshipful Thrasymachus, can injustice be more profitable than justice.

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Let this complete your entertainment, Socrates, at the festival of Bendis.

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A feast furnished by you, Thrasymachus,

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I said,

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now that you have become gentle with me and are no longer angry.For similar irony cf. Gorgias 489 D, Euthydemus 304 C. I have not dined well, however— by my own fault, not yours. But just as gluttonsSimilarly Holmes (Poet at the Breakfast Table, p. 108) of the poet: He takes a bite out of the sunny side of this and the other, and ever stimulated and never satisfied, etc. Cf. Lucian, Demosth. Encom. 18, Julian Orat. ii. p. 69 c, Polyb. iii. 57. 7. snatch at every dish that is handed along and taste it before they have properly enjoyed the preceding, so I, methinks, before finding the first object of our inquiry—what justice is—let go of that and set out to consider something about it, namely whether it is vice and ignorance or wisdom and virtue; and again, when later the view was sprung upon us that injustice is more profitable than justice I could not refrain from turning to that from the other topic. So that for me the present outcome of the discussionHirzel, Der Dialog, i. p. 4, n. 1, argues that διαλόγου here means inquiry (Erorterung), not the dialogue with Thrasymachus. is that I know nothing.For the profession of ignorance at the close of a Socratic dialogue Cf. Charmides 175 A-B, Lysis 222 D-E, Protagoras 361 A-B, Xenophon Memorabilia iv. 2. 39. Cf. also Introduction p. x. For if I don’t know what the just is,Knowledge of the essence or definition must precede discussion of qualities and relations. Cf Meno 71 B, 86 D-E, Laches 190 B, Gorgias 448 E. I shall hardly know whether it is a virtue or not, and whether its possessor is or is not happy.

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