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9.571

There remains for consideration,

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said I,

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the tyrannical man himself—the manner of his development out of the democratic type and his character and the quality of his life, whether wretched or happy.

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Why, yes, he still remains,

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he said.

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Do you know, then, what it is that I still miss?

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What?

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In the matter of our desires I do not think we sufficiently distinguished their nature and number. And so long as this is lacking our inquiry will lack clearness.

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Well,

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said he,

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will our consideration of them not still be opportuneFor ἐν καλῷ cf. Soph. El. 348, Eurip. Heracleid. 971, Aristoph. Eccl. 321, Thesm. 292.?

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By all means. And observe what it is about them that I wish to consider. It is this. Of our unnecessary pleasuresCf. on 558 D. and appetites there are some lawless ones, I think, which probably are to be found in us all, but which, when controlledFor κολαζόμεναι cf. on 559 B, p. 293, note c. by the laws and the better desires in alliance with reason, can in some men be altogether got rid of, or so nearly so that only a few weak ones remain, while in others the remnant is stronger and more numerous.

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What desires do you mean?

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he said.

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Those,

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said I,

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that are awakened in sleepCf. Aristot. Eth. Nic. 102 b 5 ff. ὁ δ’ ἀγαθὸς καὶ κακὸς ἥκιστα διάδηλοι καθ’ ὕπνον, etc.; also his Problem. 957 a 21 ff. Cic. De divin. i. 29 translates this passage. Cf. further Herod. vi. 107, Soph. O.T. 981-982. Hazlitt writes We are not hypocrites in our sleep, a modern novelist, In sleep all barriers are down. The Freudians have at last discovered Plato’s anticipation of their main thesis. Cf. Trotter, Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War. p. 74: It has been perhaps Freud’s most remarkable thesis that dreams are manifestations of this emergence of desires and memories from the unconscious into the conscious field. The barriers of the Freudian unconscious are less tightly closed during sleep sententiously observes an eminent modern psychologist. Cf. Valentine, The New Psychology of the Unconscious, p. xiii. and ibid. p. 93: Freud refers to Plato’s view that the virtuous man does in actual life, but I believe he nowhere shows a knowledge of the following passage in the Republic. . . . Cf. ibid. p. 95: The germ of several aspects of the Freudian view of dreams, including the characteristic doctrine of the censor, was to be found in Plato. The Freudian view becomes at once distinctly more respectable. Many of the ancients, like some superstitious moderns, exalted the unconscious which reveals itself in dreams, and made it the source of prophecy. Cf. commentators on Aesch. Eumen. 104, Pindar, fr. 131 (96) Loeb, p. 589: εὕδει δὲ πρασσόντων μελέων, ἀτὰρ εὑδόντεσσιν ἐν πολλοῖς ὀνείροις | δείκνυσι τέρπνων ἐφέρποισαν χαλεπῶν τε κρίσιν, but it sleepeth while the limbs are active; yet to them that sleep, in many a dream it giveth presage of a decision of things delightful or doleful. (Sandys, Loeb tr.) Cf. Pausan. ix. 23, Cic. De div. i. 30, Sir Thomas Browne, Religio Medici, pp. 105-107 (ed. J. A. Symonds). Plato did not share these superstitions. Cf. the irony of Tim. 71 D-E, and my review of Stewart’s Myths of Plato, Journal of Philos. Psychol. and Scientific Methods, vol. iii., 1906, pp. 495-498. when the rest of the soul, the rational, gentle and dominant part, slumbers, but the beastly and savage part, replete with food and wine, gambols and, repelling sleep, endeavors to sally forth and satisfy its own instincts.The Greeks had no good word for instinct, but there are passages in Plato where this translation is justified by the context for ἦθος, φύσις and such words. You are aware that in such case there is nothing it will not venture to undertake as being released from all sense of shame and all reason. It does not shrink from attempting to lie with a mother in fancy or with anyone else, man, god or brute. It is ready for any foul deed of blood; it abstains from no food, and, in a word, falls short of no extreme of follyFor the idiom οὐδὲν ἐλλείπει cf. Soph. Trach. 90, Demosth. liv. 34. Cf. also 602 D and on 593 A, p. 200, note b. and shamelessness.

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Most true,

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he said.

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But when, I suppose, a man’s condition is healthy and sober, and he goes to sleep after arousing his rational part and entertaining it with fair words and thoughts, and attaining to clear self-consciousness, while he has neither starved nor indulged to repletion his appetitive part, so that it may be lulled to sleepCf. Browning, Bishop Blougram’s Apology, And body gets its sop and holds its noise. Plato was no ascetic, as some have inferred from passages in the Republic, Laws, Gorgias and Phaedo. Cf. Herbert L. Stewart, Was Plato an Ascetic? Philos. Re., 1915, pp. 603-613; Dean Inge, Christian Ethics, p. 90: The asceticism of the true Platonist has always been sane moderate; the hallmark of Platonism is a combination of self-restraint and simplicity with humanism. and not disturb the better part by its pleasure or pain, but may suffer that in isolated purity to examine and reach out towards and apprehend some of the things unknown to it, past, present or future;

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and when he has in like manner tamed his passionate part, and does not after a quarrel fall asleepCf. Ephesians iv. 26 Let not the sun go down upon your wrath. with anger still awake within him, but if he has thus quieted the two elements in his soul and quickened the third, in which reason resides, and so goes to his rest, you are aware that in such case ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ: cf. 382 B, 465 A, 470 C, 492 C, 590 A, Lysis 212 C, Laws 625 D. he is most likely to apprehend truth, and the visions of his dreams are least likely to be lawless.

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3

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I certainly think so,

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he said.

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This description has carried us too far,Plato always returns to the point after a digression. Cf. 543 C, 471 C, 544 B, 568 D, 588 B, Phaedo 78 B, Theaet. 177 C, Protag. 359 A, Crat. 438 A, Polit. 287 A-B, 263 C, 302 B, Laws 682 E, 697 C, 864 C, and many other passages. Cf. also Lysias ii. 61 ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἐξήχθην, Demosth. De cor. 211, Aristot. De an. 403 b 16, also p. 193, note i, and Plato’s carefulness in keeping to the point under discussion in 353 C, Theaet. 182 C, 206 C, Meno 93 A-B, Gorg. 479 D-E, 459 C-D, etc. but the point that we have to notice is this, that in fact there exists in every one of us, even in some reputed most respectable,For the irony of the expression Cf. Laws 693 D, Aesch. Eumen. 373. a terrible, fierce and lawless brood of desires, which it seems are revealed in our sleep. Consider, then, whether there is anything in what I say, and whether you admit it.

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Well, I do.

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Now recallCf. 559 D f. our characterization of the democratic man. His development was determined by his education from youth under a thrifty father who approved only the acquisitive appetites and disapproved the unnecessary ones whose object is entertainment and display. Is not that so?

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Yes.

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And by association with more sophisticated men, teeming with the appetites we have just described, he is impelled towards every form of insolence and outrage, and to the adoption of their way of life by his hatred of his father’s niggardliness. But since his nature is better than that of his corrupters, being drawn both ways he settles down in a compromise εἰς μέσον: cf. p. 249, note f. between the two tendencies, and indulging and enjoying each in moderation, forsooth,Ironical. δή. See p. 300, note a. Cf. modern satire on moderate drinking and moderate preparedness. as he supposes, ὡς ᾤετο is another ironical formula like ἵνα δή, ὡς ἄρα, etc. he lives what he deems a life that is neither illiberal nor lawless, now transformed from an oligarch to a democrat.

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That was and is our belief about this type.

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Assume, θές: Cf. Theaet. 191 C, Phileb. 33 D. then, again,

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said I,

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that such a man when he is older has a son bred in turnThis is the αὖ of the succession of the generations. Cf. p. 247, note f. in his ways of life.

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I so assume.

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And suppose the experience of his father to be repeated in his case. He is drawn toward utter lawlessness, which is called by his seducers complete freedom. His father and his other kin lend support toCf. 559 E. these compromise appetites while the others lend theirs to the opposite group.

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And when these dread magiAn overlooked reference to the Magi who set up the false Smerdis. Cf. Herod. iii. 61 ff. and king-makers come to realize that they have no hope of controlling the youth in any other way, they contrive to engender in his soul a ruling passionCf. Symp. 205 D. to be the protector προστάτην: cf. 562 D and 565 C-D. of his idle and prodigalFor τὰ ἕτοιμα cf. 552 B, Symp. 200 D and E, and Horace, Odes i. 31. 17 frui paratis. appetites, a monstrous wingedCf. Alc. I. 135 E ἔρωτα ὑπόπτερον and the fragment of Eubulus (fr. 41, Kock ii. p. 178): τίς ἦν ὁ γράψας πρῶτος ἀνθρώπων ἄρα ἢ κηροπλαστήσας Ἔρωθ’ ὑπόπτερον drone. Or do you think the spirit of desire in such men is aught else?

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Nothing but that,

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he said.

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And when the other appetites, buzzingCf. 564 D. about it, replete with incense and myrrh and chaplets and wine, and the pleasures that are released in such revelries, magnifying and fostering it to the utmost, awaken in the drone the sting of unsatisfied yearnings,Cf. Phaedrus 253 E. why then this protector of the soul has madness for his body-guard and runs amuck,For οἰστρᾷ Cf. Phaedr. 240 D. and if it finds in the man any opinions or appetites accountedFor ποιουμένας in this sense cf. 538 C, 498 A, 574 D. worthy and still capable of shame, it slays them and thrusts them forth until it purgesCf. on 560 D, p. 299, note c. him of sobriety, and fills and infects him with frenzy brought in from outside. ἐπακτοῦ: cf. 405 B, Pindar, Pyth. vi. 10, Aesch. Seven against Thebes 583, Soph. Trach. 259.

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A perfect description,

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he said,

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of the generation of the tyrannical man.

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And is not this analogy,

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said I,

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the reason why Love has long since been called a tyrantCf. 573 D, Eurip. Hippol. 538, Andromeda, fr. 136 (Nauck)θεῶν τύραννε . . . Ἔρως, and What Plato Said, p. 546 on Symp. 197 B.?

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That may well be,

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he said.

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And does not a drunken man,For drunkenness as a tyrannical mood Cf. Laws 649 B, 671 B, Phaedr, 238 B. my friend,

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I said,

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have something of this tyrannical temper?

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Yes, he has.

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And again the madman, the deranged man, attempts and expects to rule over not only men but gods.

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Yes indeed, he does,

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he said.

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Then a man becomes tyrannical in the full sense of the word, my friend,

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I said,

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when either by nature or by habits or by both he has become even as the drunken, the erotic, the maniacal.

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Assuredly.

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Such, it seems, is his origin and character,Cf. Adam ad loc., who insists it means his origin as well as that of others, and says his character is still to be described. But it has been in C and before. but what is his manner of life?

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As the wits say, you shall tell me.Cf. Phileb. 25 B and perhaps Rep. 427 E with 449 D. The slight jest is a commonplace today. Wilamowitz, Platon, ii. p. 351, says it is a fragment of an elegy. He forgets the Philebus.

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I do,

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I said;

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for, I take it, next there are among them feasts and carousals and revellings and courtesansCf. Vol. I. p 160, note a on 373 A. Emendations are superfluous. and all the doings of those whose ὦν ἄν: cf. 441 D-E ὅτου, etc., 583 A ἐν ᾧ and my review of Jowett and Campbell, A.J.P. xvi. p. 237. souls are entirely swayedCf. Phaedr. 238 B-C. by the indwelling tyrant Eros.

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Inevitably,

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he said.

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And do not many and dread appetites shoot up beside this master passion every day and night in need of many things?

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Many indeed.

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And so any revenues there may be are quickly expended.

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Of course.

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And after this there are borrowings and levyingsFor παραιρέσεις cf. Thuc. i. 122. 1, Aristot. Pol. 1311 a 12, 1315 a 38. upon the estate?

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Of course.

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And when all these resources fail, must there not come a cry from the frequent and fierce nestlingsἐννενεοττευμένας Cf. Alc. I. 135 E, Laws 776 A, 949 C, Aristoph. Birds 699, 1108. of desire hatched in his soul, and must not such men, urged, as it were by goads, by the other desires, and especially by the ruling passion itself as captain of their bodyguard—to keep up the figure—must they not run wild and look to see who has aught that can be taken from him by deceit or violence?

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Most certainly.

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And so he is compelled to sweep it in from every sourceCf. Aesch. Eumen. 544. or else be afflicted with great travail and pain.Cf. Gorg. 494 A ἢ τὰς ἐσχάτας λυποῖτο λύπας.

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He is.

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And just as the new, upspringing pleasures in him got the better of the original passions of his soul and robbed them, so he himself, though younger, will claim the right to get the betterCf. Vol. I. 349 B f. of his father and mother, and, after spending his own share, to seize and convert to his own use a portion of his father’s estate.

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Of course,

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he said,

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what else?

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And if they resist him, would he not at first attempt to rob and steal from his parents and deceive them?

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Certainly.

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And if he failed in that, would he not next seize it by force?

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I think so,

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he said.

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And then, good sir, if the old man and the old woman clung to it and resisted him, would he be careful to refrain from the acts of a tyrant?

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I am not without my fears,

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he said,

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for the parents of such a one.

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Nay, Adeimantus, in heaven’s name, do you suppose that, for the sake of a newly found belle amie bound to him by no necessary tie, such a one would strike the dear mother, his by necessityThe word ἀναγκαῖαν means both necessary and akin. Cf. Eurip. Androm. 671 τοιαῦτα λάσκεις τοὺς ἀναγκαίους φίλους. and from his birth? Or for the sake of a blooming new-found bel ami, not necessary to his life, he would rain blowsFor the idiom πληγαῖς . . . δοῦναι Cf. Phaedr. 254 E ὀδύναις ἔδωκεν with Thompson’s note. Cf. 566 C θανάτῳ δέδοται. For striking his father cf. 569 B, Laws 880 E ff., Aristoph. Clouds 1375 ff., 1421 ff. upon the aged father past his prime, closest of his kin and oldest of his friends? And would he subject them to those new favorites if he brought them under the same roof?

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Yes, by Zeus,

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he said.

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A most blessed lot it seems to be,

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said I,

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to be the parent of a tyrant son.

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It does indeed,

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he said.

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And again, when the resources of his father and mother are exhaustedFor ἐπιλείπῃ cf. 568 E, 573 E. and fail such a one, and the swarmCf. Meno 72 A, Cratyl. 401 E, Blaydes on Aristoph. Clouds 297. of pleasures collected in his soul is grown great, will he not first lay hands on the wallHe becomes a τοιχωρύχος or a λωποδύτης (Aristoph. Frogs 772-773, Birds 497, Clouds 1327). Cf. 575 B, Laws 831 E. of someone’s house or the cloak of someone who walks late at night, and thereafter he will make a clean sweep νεωκορήσει is an ironical litotes. So ἐφάψεται in the preceding line. of some temple, and in all these actions the beliefs which he held from boyhood about the honorable and the base, the opinions accounted just,For ποιουμένας cf. 573 B. for the thought cf 538 C. will be overmastered by the opinions newly emancipatedCf. 567 E. and released, which, serving as bodyguards of the ruling passion, will prevail in alliance with it—I mean the opinions that formerly were freed from restraint in sleep, when, being still under the control of his father and the laws, he maintained the democratic constitution in his soul.

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But now, when under the tyranny of his ruling passion, he is continuously and in waking hours what he rarely became in sleep, and he will refrain from no atrocity of murder nor from any food or deed, but the passion that dwells in him as a tyrant will live in utmost anarchy and lawlessness, and, since it is itself sole autocrat, will urge the polity,Cf. on 591 E. so to speak, of him in whom it dwells τὸν ἔχοντα: Cf. Phaedr. 239 C, Laws 837 B, Soph. Antig. 790 and also Rep. 610 C and E. to dare anything and everything in order to find support for himself and the hubbub of his henchmen,For the tyrant’s companions cf. Newman, i. p. 274, note 1. in part introduced from outside by evil associations, and in part released and liberated within by the same habits of life as his. Is not this the life of such a one?

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It is this,

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he said.

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And if,

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I said,

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there are only a few of this kind in a city, and the others, the multitude as a whole, are sober-minded, the few go forth into exile and serve some tyrant elsewhere as bodyguard or become mercenaries in any war there may be. But if they spring up in time of peace and tranquillity they stay right there in the city and effect many small evils.

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What kind of evils do you mean?

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Oh, they just steal, break into houses, cut purses, strip men of their garments, plunder temples, and kidnap,Cf. the similar lists of crimes in Gorg. 508 E, Xen. Mem. i. 2. 62. and if they are fluent speakers they become sycophants and bear false witness and take bribes.

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Yes, small evils indeed,So Shaw and other moderns argue in a somewhat different tone that crimes of this sort are an unimportant matter.

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he said,

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if the men of this sort are few.

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Why, yes,

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I said,

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for small evils are relatively small compared with great, and in respect of the corruption and misery of a state all of them together, as the saying goes, don’t come within hail οὐδ’ ἴκταρ βάλλει was proverbial, doesn’t strike near, doesn’t come within range. Cf. Aelian, N.A. xv. 29. Cf. also οὐδ’ ἐγγύς, Symp. 198 B, 221 D, Herod. ii. 121, Demosth. De cor. 97. of the mischief done by a tyrant. For when men of this sort and their followers become numerous in a state and realize their numbers, then it is they who, in conjunction with the folly of the people, create a tyrant out of that one of them who has the greatest and mightiest tyrant in his own soul.

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Naturally,

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he said,

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for he would be the most tyrannical.

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Then if the people yield willingly—’tis well,In the Greek the apodosis is suppressed. Cf. Protag. 325 D. Adam refers to Herwerden, Mn. xix. pp. 338 f. but if the city resists him, then, just as in the previous case the man chastized his mother and his father, so now in turn will he chastize his fatherland if he can, bringing in new boon companions beneath whose sway he will hold and keep enslaved his once dear motherlandSo also the Hindus of Bengal, The Nation,July 13, 1911, p. 28. Cf. Isoc. iv. 25 πατρίδα καὶ μητέρα, Lysias ii. 18 μητέρα καὶ πατρίδα, Plut. 792 E (An seni resp.) ἡ δὲ πατρὶς καὶ μητρὶς ὡς Κρῆτες καλοῦσι. Vol. I. p. 303, note e, on 414 E, Menex. 239 A.—as the Cretans name her—and fatherland. And this would be the end of such a man’s desire.Cf. the accidental coincidence of Swinburne’s refrain, This is the end of every man’s desire (Ballad of Burdens).

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Yes,

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he said,

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this, just this.

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Then,

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said I,

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is not this the character of such men in private life and before they rule the state: to begin with they associate with flatterers, who are ready to do anything to serve them, or, if they themselves want something, they themselves fawn ὑποπεσόντες: cf. on 494 C ὑποκείσονται. and shrink from no contortion σχήματα was often used for the figures of dancing. Cf. Laws 669 D, Aristoph. Peace 323, Xen. Symp. 7. 5, Eurip. Cyclops 221. Isoc. Antid. 183 uses it of gymnastics. or abasement in protest of their friendship, though, once the object gained, they sing another tune.Cf. Phaedr. 241 A ἄλλος γεγονώς, Demosth. xxxiv. 13 ἕτερος ἤδη . . . καὶ οὐχ ὁ αὐτός.

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Yes indeed,

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he said.

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Throughout their lives, then, they never know what it is to be the friends of anybody. They are always either masters or slaves, but the tyrannical nature never tastes freedomCf. Lucian, Nigrinus 15 ἄγευστος μὲν ἐλευθερίας, ἀπείρατος δὲ παρρησίαςAristot. Eth. Nic. 1176 b 19, 1179 b 15. or true friendship.

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Quite so.

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May we not rightly call such men faithlessCf. Laws 730 C, 705 A.?

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Of course.

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Yes, and unjust to the last degree, if we were right in our previous agreement about the nature of justice.

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But surely,

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he said,

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we were right.

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Let us sum up,Cf. Phaedr. 239 D ἓν κεφάλαιον then,

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said I,

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the most evil type of man. He is, I presume, the man who, in his waking hours, has the qualities we found in his dream state.

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Quite so.

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And he is developed from the man who, being by nature most of a tyrant, achieves sole power, and the longer he lives as an actual tyrant the stronger this quality becomes.

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Inevitably,

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said Glaucon, taking up the argument.

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And shall we find,

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said I,

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that the man who is shown to be the most evil will also be the most miserable, and the man who is most of a tyrant for the longest time is most and longest miserableCf. Gorgias 473 C-E. in sober truth? Yet the many have many opinions.Cf. the defiance of 473 A and 579 D κἂν εἰ μή τῳ δοκεῖ, Phaedr. 277 E οὐδὲ ἂν ὁ πᾶς ὄχλος αὐτὸ ἐπαινέσῃ, and Phileb. 67 B, also Gorg. 473 E you say what nobody else would say, and perhaps 500 D διαβολὴ δ’ ἐν πᾶσι πολλή. Cf. Schopenhauer’s The public has a great many bees in its bonnet.

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That much, certainly,

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he said,

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must needs be true.

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Does not the tyrannical man,

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said I,

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correspond to the tyrannical state in similitude,Cf. Tim. 75 D, Rep. 555 A, Parmen. 133 A. For the analogy of individual and state cf. on 591 E. the democratic to the democratic and the others likewise?

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Surely.

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And may we not infer that the relation of state to state in respect of virtue and happiness is the same as that of the man to the man?

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Of course.

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What is, then, in respect of virtue, the relation of a city ruled by a tyrant to a royal city as we first described it?

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They are direct contraries,

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he said;

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the one is the best, the other the worst.

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I’ll not ask which is which,

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I said,

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because that is obvious. But again in respect of happiness and wretchedness, is your estimate the same or different? And let us not be dazzledCf. 577 A, 591 D, 619 A ἀνέκπληκτος, Crat. 394 B, Gorg. 523 D, Protag. 355 B. Cf. also Epictet. iii. 22. 28 ὑπὸ τῆς φαντασίας περιλαμπομένοις, and Shelley, . . . accursed thing to gaze on prosperous tyrants with a dazzled eye. by fixing our eyes on that one man, the tyrant, or a few εἴ τινες: Cf. Gorg. 521 B ἐάν τι ἔχω. of his court, but let us enter into and survey the entire city, as is right, and declare our opinion only after we have so dived to its uttermost recesses and contemplated its life as a whole.

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That is a fair challenge,

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he said,

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and it is clear to everybody that there is no city more wretched than that in which a tyrant rules, and none more happy than that governed by a true king.For the contrast of tyranny and kingdom cf. 587 B, Polit. 276 E. It became a commonplace in later orations on the true king. Cf. Dümmler, Prolegomena, pp. 38-39.

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And would it not also be a fair challenge,

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said I,

9.577

to ask you to accept as the only proper judge of the two men the one who is able in thought to enter with understanding into the very soul and temper of a man, and who is not like a child viewing him from outside, overawed by the tyrants’ great attendance,The word προστάσεως is frequent in Polybius. Cf. also Boethius iv. chap. 2. Cf. 1Maccabees xv. 32, When he saw the glory of Simon, and the cupboard of gold and silver plate, and his great attendance [παράστασιν]. Cf. also Isoc. ii. 32 ὄψιν, and Shakes. Measure for MeasureII. ii. 59 ceremony that to great ones ’longs,Henry V.IV. i. 280 farced title running ’fore the king. and the pomp and circumstance which they assumeFor σχηματίζονται cf. Xen. Oecon. 2. 4. σὸν σχῆμα ὁ σὺ περιβέβλησαι, Dio Cass. iii. fr. 13. 2 σχηματίσας . . . ἑαυτόν and σχηματισμός, Rep. 425 B, 494 D. in the eyes of the world, but is able to see through it all? And what if I should assume, then, that the man to whom we ought all to listen is he who has this capacity of judgement and who has lived under the same roof with a tyrantIt is easy conjecture that Plato is thinking of himself and Dionysius I. Cf. Laws 711 A. and has witnessed his conduct in his own home and observed in person his dealings with his intimates in each instance where he would best be seen strippedCf. Thackeray on Ludovicus and Ludovicus rex, Hazlitt, Strip it of its externals and what is it but a jest? also Gory. 523 E, Xen. Hiero 2. 4, Lucian, Somnium seu Gallus 24 ἢν δὲ ὑποκύψας ἴδῃς τὰ γ’ ἔνδον . . . , Boethius, Cons. iii. chap. 8 (Loeb, p. 255), and for the thought Herod. i. 99. of his vesture of tragedy,Cf. Longinus, On the Sublime 7 τὸ ἔξωθεν προστραγῳδούμενον, and Dümmler, Akademika p. 5. and who had likewise observed his behavior in the hazards of his public life—and if we should ask the man who has seen all this to be the messenger to report on the happiness or misery of the tyrant as compared with other men?

9.577

That also would be a most just challenge,

9.577

he said.

9.577

Shall we, then, make believe,

9.577

said I,

9.577

that we are of those who are thus able to judge and who have ere now lived with tyrants, so that we may have someone to answer our questions?

9.577

By all means.

9.577

Come, then,

9.577

said I,

9.577

examine it thus. Recall the general likeness between the city and the man, and then observe in turn what happens to each of them.

9.577

What things?

9.577

he said.

9.577

In the first place,

9.577

said I,

9.577

will you call the state governed by a tyrant free or enslaved, speaking of it as a state?

9.577

Utterly enslaved,

9.577

he said.

9.577

And yet you see in it masters and freemen.

9.577

I see,

9.577

he said,

9.577

a small portion of such, but the entirety, so to speak, and the best part of it, is shamefully and wretchedly enslaved.In Menex. 238 E Plato says that other states are composed of slaves and master, but Athens of equals.

9.577

If, then,

9.577

I said,

9.577

the man resembles the state, must not the same proportionFor τάξιν cf. 618 B ψυχῆς δὲ τάξιν. obtain in him, and his soul teem γέμειν: cf. 544 C, 559 C, Gorg. 522 E, 525 A. with boundless servility and illiberality, the best and most reasonable parts of it being enslaved, while a small part, the worst and the most frenzied, plays the despot?

9.577

Inevitably,

9.577

he said.

9.577

Then will you say that such a soul is enslaved or free?

9.577

Enslaved, I should suppose.

9.577

Again, does not the enslaved and tyrannized city least of all do what it really wishesCf. 445 B, Gorg. 467 B, where a verbal distinction is drawn with which Plato does not trouble himself here. In Laws 661 B ἐπιθυμῇ is used. Cf. ibid. 688 B τἀναντία ταῖς βουλήσεσιν, and Herod. iii. 80.?

9.577

Decidedly so.

9.577

Then the tyrannized soul— to speak of the soul as a wholeCf. Cratyl. 392 C ὡς τὸ ὅλον εἰπεῖν γένος.—also will least of all do what it wishes, but being always perforce driven and drawn by the gadfly of desire it will be full of confusion and repentance.Cf. Julian, Or. ii. 50 C. In the Stoic philosophy the stultus repents, and omnis stultitia fastidio laborat sui. Cf. also Seneca, De benef. iv. 34 non mutat sapiens consilium . . . ideo numquam illum poenitentia subit, Von Arnim, Stoic. Vet. Frag. iii. 147. 21, 149. 20 and 33, Stob. Ec. ii. 113. 5, 102. 22, and my emendation of Eclogues ii. 104. 6 W. in Class. Phil. xi. p. 338.

9.577

Of course.

9.577

And must the tyrannized city be rich or poor?

9.577

Poor.

9.578

Then the tyrant soul also must of necessity always be needyCf. Laws 832 A πεινῶσι τὴν ψυχήν, Xen. Symp. 4. 36 πεινῶσι χρημάτων, Oecon. xiii. 9 πεινῶσι γὰρ τοῦ ἐπαίνου, Aristot. Pol. 1277 a 24 Jason said he was hungry when he was not a tyrant, Shakes. Tempest I. ii. 112 so dry he was for sway. Cf. Novotny, p. 1902, on Epist. vii. 335 B, also Max. Tyr. Diss. iv. 4 τί γὰρ ἂν εἴη πενέστερον ἀνδρὸς ἐπιθυμοῦντος διηνεκῶς . . . ; Julian, Or. ii. 85 B, Teles (Hense), pp. 32-33. for the thought see also Gorg. 493-494. cf. also 521 A with 416 E, Phaedr. 279 C, and Epist. 355 C. and suffer from unfulfilled desire.

9.578

So it is,

9.578

he said.

9.578

And again, must not such a city, as well as such a man, be full of terrors and alarms?

9.578

It must indeed.

9.578

And do you think you will find more lamentations and groans and wailing and anguish in any other city?

9.578

By no means.

9.578

And so of man, do you think these things will more abound in any other than in this tyrant type, that is maddened by its desires and passions?

9.578

How could it be so?

9.578

he said.

9.578

In view of all these and other like considerations, then, I take it, you judged that this city is the most miserable of cities.

9.578

And was I not right?

9.578

he said.

9.578

Yes, indeed,

9.578

said I.

9.578

But of the tyrant man, what have you to say in view of these same things?

9.578

That he is far and away the most miserable of all,

9.578

he said.

9.578

I cannot admit,

9.578

said I,

9.578

that you are right in that too.

9.578

How so?

9.578

said he.

9.578

This one,

9.578

said I,

9.578

I take it, has not yet attained the acme of misery.Cf. on 508 E, p. 104, note c.

9.578

Then who has?

9.578

Perhaps you will regard the one I am about to name as still more wretched.

9.578

What one?

9.578

The one,

9.578

said I,

9.578

who, being of tyrannical temper, does not live outCf. Protag. 355 A, Alc. I. 104 E, 579 C. his life in private stationStallbaum quotes Plut. De virtut. et vit. p. 101 D, Lucian, Herm. 67 ἰδιώτην βίον ζῆν, Philo, Vit. Mos. 3. but is so unfortunate that by some unhappy chance he is enabled to become an actual tyrant.

9.578

I infer from what has already been said,

9.578

he replied,

9.578

that you speak truly.

9.578

Yes,

9.578

said I,

9.578

but it is not enough to suppose such things. We must examine them thoroughly by reason and an argument such as this.Adam ad loc. emends τῷ τοιούτῳ to τῶ τοιοῦτω, insisting that the MS. reading cannot be satisfactorily explained. For our inquiry concerns the greatest of all things,Cf. Vol. I. p. 71, note f on 344 D-E, and What Plato Said, p. 484, on Laches 185 A. the good life or the bad life.

9.578

Quite right,

9.578

he replied.

9.578

Consider, then, if there is anything in what I say. For I think we must get a notion of the matter from these examples.

9.578

From which?

9.578

From individual wealthy private citizens in our states who possess many slaves. For these resemble the tyrant in being rulers over many, only the tyrant’s numbers are greater.Cf. Polit. 259 B. But Plato is not concerned with the question of size or numbers here.

9.578

Yes, they are.

9.578

You are aware, then, that they are unafraid and do not fear their slaves?

9.578

What should they fear?

9.578

Nothing,

9.578

I said;

9.578

but do you perceive the reason why?

9.578

Yes, because the entire state is ready to defend each citizen.

9.578

You are right,

9.578

I said.

9.578

But now suppose some god should catch up a man who has fifty or more slavesPlato’s imaginary illustration is one of his many anticipations of later history, and suggests to an American many analogies. and waft him with his wife and children away from the city and set him down with his other possessions and his slaves in a solitude where no freeman could come to his rescue. What and how great would be his fear,Cf. Critias, fr. 37 Diels ii.3 p. 324, on Sparta’s fear of her slaves. do you suppose, lest he and his wife and children be destroyed by the slaves?

9.578

The greatest in the world,For ἐν παντί cf. 579 B, Symp. 194 A ἐν παντὶ εἴης, Euthyd. 301 A ἐν παντὶ ἐγενόμην ὑπὸ ἀπορίας, Xen. Hell. v. 4. 29, Thucyd. vii. 55, Isoc. xiii. 20 ἐν πᾶσιν . . κακοῖς. Cf. παντοῖος εἶναι (γίννεσθαι) Herod. ix. 109, vii. 10. 3, iii. 124, Lucian, Pro lapsu 1.

9.578

he said,

9.578

if you ask me.

9.579

And would he not forthwith find it necessary to fawn upon some of the slaves and make them many promises and emancipate them, though nothing would be further from his wishFor the idiom οὐδὲν δεόμενος cf. 581 E, 367 A-B, 410 B, 405 C, Prot. 331 C, and Shorey in Class. Journ. ii. p. 171.? And so he would turn out to be the flatterer of his own servants.

9.579

He would certainly have to,

9.579

he said,

9.579

or else perish.

9.579

But now suppose,

9.579

said I,

9.579

that god established round about him numerous neighbors who would not tolerate the claim of one man to be master of another,For ancient denials of the justice of slavery cf. Newman, Aristot. Pol. i. pp. 140 ff., Philemon, fr. 95 (Kock ii. p. 508)κἂν δοῦλος ἐστί, σάρκα τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει, φύσει γὰρ οὐδεὶς δοῦλος ἐγενήθη ποτέ. ἡ δ’ αὖ τύχη τὸ σῶμα κατεδουλώσατο, and Anth. Pal. vii. 553 with Mackail’s note, p. 415. but would inflict the utmost penalties on any such person on whom they could lay their hands.

9.579

I think,

9.579

he said,

9.579

that his plight would be still more desperate, encompassed by nothing but enemies.

9.579

And is not that the sort of prison-house in which the tyrant is pent, being of a nature such as we have described and filled with multitudinous and manifold terrors and appetites? Yet greedyCf. p. 360, note a. For the tyrant’s terrors cf. Menander,Ἀσπίς (fr. 74, Kock iii p. 24), Tacitus, Ann. vi. 6, 579 E and Xen. Hiero 6.8. The tyrant sees enemies everywhere. and avid of spirit as he is, he only of the citizens may not travel abroad or view any of the sacred festivalsCf. Xen. Hiero 1. 12 οἱ δὲ τύραννοι οὐ μάλα ἀμφὶ θεωρίας ἔχουσιν· οὔτε γὰρ ἰέναι αὐτοῖς ἀσφαλές. Cf. Crito 52 B ἐπὶ θεωρίαν. that other freemen yearn to see, but he must live for the most part cowering in the recesses of his house like a woman,Cf. Laws 781 C, Gorg. 485 D. envying among the other citizens anyone who goes abroad and sees any good thing.

9.579

Most certainly,

9.579

he said.

9.579

And does not such a harvest of ills τοῖς τοιούτοις κακοῖς is the measure of the excess of the unhappiness of the actual tyrant over that of the tyrannical soul in private life. Cf. my review of Jowett, A.J.P. xiii. p. 366. measure the difference between the man who is merely ill-governed in his own soul, the man of tyrannical temper, whom you just now judged to be most miserable, and the man who, having this disposition, does not live out his life in private station but is constrained by some ill hap to become an actual tyrant, and while unable to control himselfCf. 580 C and What Plato Said, p. 506, on Gorg. 491 D. attempts to rule over others, as if a man with a sick and incontinent bodyFor the analogy of soul and body cf. 591 B and on 564 D, p. 313, note g. should not live the private life but should be compelled to pass his days in contention and strife with other persons?

9.579

Your analogy is most apt and true,Cf. Soph. 252 C ὅμοιόν τε καὶ ἀληθές. Socrates,

9.579

he said.

9.579

Is not that then, dear Glaucon,

9.579

said I,

9.579

a most unhappy experience in every way? And is not the tyrant’s life still worse than that which was judged by you to be the worst?

9.579

Precisely so,

9.579

he said.

9.579

Then it is the truth, though some may deny it,Cf. on 576 C, p. 354, note b. that the real tyrant is really enslaved to cringings and servitudes beyond compare, a flatterer of the basest men, and that, so far from finding even the least satisfaction for his desires, he is in need of most things, and is a poor man in very truth, as is apparent if one knows how to observe a soul in its entirety; and throughout his life he teems with terrors and is full of convulsions and pains, if in fact he resembles the condition of the city which he rules; and he is like it, is he not?

9.579

Yes, indeed,

9.579

he said.

9.580

And in addition, shall we not further attribute to him all that we spoke of before, and say that he must needs be, and, by reason of his rule, come to be still more than he was,Cf. 576 B-C. envious, faithless, unjust, friendless, impious, a vessel and nurse πανδοκεύς is a host or inn-keeper; Cf. Laws 918 B.Here the word is used figuratively. Cf. Aristoph. Wasps 35 φάλαινα πανδοκεύτρια, an all-receptive grampus (Rogers). of all iniquity, and so in consequence be himself most unhappyOn the wretched lot of the tyrant cf. Xen. Hiero passim, e.g. 4. 11, 6. 4, 8, 15. the Hiero is Xenophon’s rendering of the Socratico-Platonic conception of the unhappy tyrant. Cf. 1. 2-3. See too Gerhard Heintzeler, Das Bild des Tyrannen bei Platon, esp. pp. 43 ff. and 76 f.; Cic. De amicit. 15, Isoc. Nic. 4-5, Peace 112, Hel. 32 ff. But in Euag. 40 Isocrates says all men would admit that tyranny is the greatest and noblest and most coveted of all good things, both human and divine. In Epist. 6. 11. ff. he agrees with Plato that the life of a private citizen is better than the tyrant’s But in 2. 4 he treats this as a thesis which many maintain. Cf. further Gorg. 473 E, Alc. I. 135 B, Phaedr. 248 E, Symp. 182 C, Eurip. Ion 621 ff., Suppl. 429 ff., Medea 119 ff., I.A. 449-450, Herodotus iii. 80, Soph. Ajax 1350 not easy for a tyrant to be pious; also Dio Chrys. Or. iii. 58 f., Anon. Iambl. fr. 7. 12, Diels ii.3 p. 333, J. A. K. Thomson, Greek and Barbarian, pp. 111 ff., Dümmler, Prolegomena, p. 31, Baudrillart, J. Bodin et son temps, p. 292-293 Bodin semble . . . se souvenir de Platon flétrissant le tyran. . . . make all about him so?

9.580

No man of sense will gainsay that,

9.580

he said.

9.580

Come then,

9.580

said I,

9.580

now at last, even as the judge of last instanceAdam has an exhaustive technical note on this. pronounces, so do you declare who in your opinion is first in happiness and who second, and similarly judge the others, all five in succession, the royal, the timocratic, the oligarchic, the democratic, and the tyrannical man.

9.580

Nay,

9.580

he said,

9.580

the decision is easy. For as if they were choruses I judge them in the order of their entrance, and so rank them in respect of virtue and vice, happiness and its contrary.

9.580

Shall we hire a herald,Cf. Phileb. 66 A ὑπό τε ἀγγέλων πέμπων, etc., Eurip. Alc. 737 κηρύκων ὕπο. Grote and other liberals are offended by the intensity of Plato’s moral conviction. See What Plato Said, p. 364, Laws 662-663, Unity of Plato’s Thought, p.25. then,

9.580

said I,

9.580

or shall I myself make proclamation that the son of Ariston pronounced the best manPlato puns on the name Ariston. For other such puns Cf. Gorg. 463 E, 481 D, 513 B, Rep. 600 B, 614 B, Symp. 174 B, 185 C, 198 C. and the most righteous to be the happiest,Cf. Laws 664 B-C. and that he is the one who is the most kingly and a king over himself;Cf. on 570 C, p. 367, note a. and declared that the most evil and most unjust is the most unhappy, who again is the man who, having the most of the tyrannical temper in himself, become, most of a tyrant over himself and over the state?

9.580

Let it have been so proclaimed by you,

9.580

he said.

9.580

Shall I add the clause alike whether their character is known to all men and gods or is not knownCf. 367 E, 427 D, 445 A, 612 B.?

9.580

Add that to the proclamation,

9.580

he said.

9.580

Very good,

9.580

said I;

9.580

this, then, would be one of our proofs, but examine this second one and see if there is anything in it.

9.580

What is it?

9.580

Since,

9.580

said I,

9.580

corresponding to the three types in the city, the soul also is tripartite,Cf. 435 B-C ff. it will admit,Practically all editors reject τὸ λογιστικόν. But Apelt, p. 525, insists that δέξεται cannot be used without a subject on the analogy of 453 D ἔοικεν, 497 C δηλώσει and δείξει, hence we must retain λογιστικόν, in the sense of ability to reckon, and he compares Charm. 174 B and the double sense of λογιστικόν in Rep. 525 B, 587 D, 602 E. He says it is a mild mathematical joke, like Polit. 257 A. I think, of another demonstration also.

9.580

What is that?

9.580

The following: The three parts have also, it appears to me, three kinds of pleasure, one peculiar to each, and similarly three appetites and controls.

9.580

What do you mean?

9.580

he said.

9.580

One part, we say, is that with which a man learns, one is that with which he feels anger. But the third part, owing to its manifold forms,Cf. Phileb. 26 C τὸ . . . πλῆθος. Cf. Friedländer, Platon, ii. p. 492, n. 2. we could not easily designate by any one distinctive name,Here again the concept is implied (Cf. on 564 B, p. 313, note e and Introd. pp. x-xi). Cf. Parmen. 132 C, 135 B, Phileb. 16 D, 18 C-D, 23 E, 25 C, Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1130 b 2 ἑνὶ ὀνόματι περιλαβεῖν, and εἰς ἓν κεφάλαιον ἀπερειδοίμεθα, 581 A, Schleiermacher’s interpretation of which, so würden wir uns in der Erklärung doch auf ein Hauptstück stützen, approved by Stallbaum, misses the point. For the point that there is no one name for it Cf. What Plato Said, p. 596, on Soph. 267 D. but gave it the name of its chief and strongest element;

9.581

for we called it the appetitive partVol. I. 439 D. because of the intensity of its appetites concerned with food and drink and love and their accompaniments, and likewise the money-loving part,Cf. Vol. I. p. 380, note b. because money is the chief instrument for the gratification of such desires.

9.581

And rightly,

9.581

he said.

9.581

And if we should also say that its pleasure and its love were for gain or profit, should we not thus best bring it together under one headSince there is no one specific name for the manifold forms of this part (580 D-E), a makeshift term is to be used for convenience’s sake. See also p. 371, note e. in our discourse so as to understand each other when we speak of this part of the soul, and justify our calling it the money-loving and gain-loving part?

9.581

I, at any rate, think so,

9.581

he said.

9.581

And, again, of the high-spirited element, do we not say that it is wholly set on predominance and victory and good repute?

9.581

Yes, indeed.

9.581

And might we not appropriately designate it as the ambitious part and that which is covetous of honor?

9.581

Most appropriately.

9.581

But surely it is obvious to everyone that all the endeavor of the part by which we learn is ever towardsOr is bent on, τέταται. Cf. 499 A ζητεῖν . . . τὸ ἀληθὲς συντεταμένως, Symp. 222 A and Bury ad loc., Symp. 186 B ἐπὶ πᾶν ὁ θεὸς τείνει. For the thought cf. also Phileb. 58 D. knowledge of the truth of things, and that it least of the three is concerned for wealth and reputation.

9.581

Much the least.

9.581

Lover of learningCf. Phaedo 67 B τοὺς ὀρθῶς φιλομαθεῖς. and lover of wisdom would be suitable designations for that.

9.581

Quite so,

9.581

he said.

9.581

Is it not also true,

9.581

I said,

9.581

that the ruling principleCf. 338 D, 342 C. of men’s souls is in some cases this faculty and in others one of the other two, as it may happen?

9.581

That is so,

9.581

he said.

9.581

And that is why we say that the primary classesCf. my review of Jowett in A.J.P. xiii. p. 366, which Adam quotes and follows and Jowett and Campbell (Republic) adopt. For the three types of men cf. also Phaedo 68 C, 82 C. Stewart, Aristot. Eth. Nic. p. 60 (1095 b 17), says, The three lives mentioned by Aristotle here answer to the three classes of men distinguished by Plato (Rep. 581). . . . Michelet and Grant point out that this threefold division occurs in a metaphor attributed to Pythagoras by Heracleides Ponticus (apud Cic. Tusc. v. 3). . . . Cf. Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1097 a-b (i. 5. 1), also Diog. L. vii. 130 on Stoics, Plutarch, De liber. educ. x. (8 A), Renan, Avenir de Ia science, p. 8. Isoc. Antid. 217 characteristically recognizes only the three motives, pleasure, gain, and honor. For the entire argument cf. Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1176 a 31, 1177 a 10, and ibid, Introd. pp. liv-lv. of men also are three, the philosopher or lover of wisdom, the lover of victory and the lover of gain.

9.581

Precisely so

9.581

And also that there are three forms of pleasure, corresponding respectively to each?

9.581

By all means.

9.581

Are you aware, then

9.581

said I,

9.581

that if you should choose to ask men of these three classes, each in turn,For ἐν μέρει cf. 468 B, 520 C and D, 577 C, 615 A, Gorg. 496 B, Laws 876 B, 943 A, 947 C, Polit. 265 A; Contrasted with ἐν τῷ μέρει, Meno 92 E, Gorg. 462 A, 474 A. The two expressions, similar in appearance, illustrate how a slight change alters an idiom. So e.g. καινὸν οὐδέν (Gorg. 448 A) has nothing to do with the idiom οὐδὲν καινόν (Phaedo 100 B);τοῦ λόγου ἕνεκα (Rep. 612 C) is different from λόγου ἕνεκα (Theaet. 191 C—dicis causa);πάντα τἀγαθά (Laws 631 B) has no connection with the idiomatic πάντ’ ἀγαθά (Rep. 471 C, Cf. supra ad loc.); nor Pindar’s πόλλ’ ἄνω τὰ δ’ αὖ κάτω (Ol. xii. 6) with ἄνω κάτω as used in Phaedo 96 B, Gorg. 481 D, etc. Cf. also ἐν τέχνῃ Prot. 319 C with ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ317 C,νῷ ἔχειν Rep. 490 A with ἐν νῷ ἔχειν344 D, etc.,τοῦ παντὸς ἡμάρτηκεν Phaedr. 235 E with παντὸς ἁμαρτάνειν237 C. The same is true of words—to confuse καλλίχορος with καλλίχοιρος would be unfortunate; and the medieval debates about ὁμοουσία and ὁμοιουσία were perhaps not quite as ridiculous as they are generally considered. which is the most pleasurable of these lives, each will chiefly commend his ownCf. Laws 658 on judging different kinds of literature.? The financier will affirm that in comparison with profit the pleasures of honor or of learning area of no value except in so far as they produce money.

9.581

True,

9.581

he said.

9.581

And what of the lover of honorCf. p. 255, note f, on 549 A. Xenophon is the typical φιλότιμος. In Mem. iii. 3. 13 he says that the Athenians excel others in love of honor, which is the strongest incentive to deeds of honor and renown (Marchant, Loeb tr.). Cf. Epist. 320 A, Symp. 178 D, and also Xen. Cyrop. i. 2. 1, Mem. iii. i. 10.?

9.581

I said;

9.581

does he not regard the pleasure that comes from money as vulgarCf. Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1095 b 16, and on 528 E. and low, and again that of learning, save in so far as the knowledge confers honor, mere fumeCf. Blaydes on Aristoph. Clouds 920, and Turgeniev’s novel, Smoke. and moonshine?

9.581

It is so,

9.581

he said.

9.581

And what,

9.581

said I,

9.581

are we to suppose the philosopher thinks of the other pleasures compared with the delight of knowing the truthCf. Phileb. 58 C on dialectic. and the reality, and being always occupied with that while he learns? Will he not think them far removed from true pleasure,Cf. 598 B, Epist. iii. 315 C, Marc. Aurel. viii. 1 πόρρω φιλοσοφίας. Hermann’s text or something like it is the only idiomatic one, and τῆς ἡδονῆς οὐ πάνυ πόρρω must express the philosopher’s opinion of the pleasurableness of the lower pleasures as compared with the higher. Cf. A.J.P. xiii. p. 366. and callFor the infinitive cf. 492 C καὶ φήσειν, 530 B καὶ ζητεῖν. them literally τῷ ὄντι marks the etymological use of ἀναγκαίας. Cf. on 511 B and 551 E, p. 266, note a. the pleasures of necessity,Cf. 558 D f. since he would have no use for them if necessity were not laid upon him?

9.582

We may be sure of that,

9.582

he said.

9.582

Since, then, there is contention between the several types of pleasure and the lives themselves, not merely as to which is the more honorable or the more base, or the worse or the better, but which is actually the more pleasurableThis anticipates Laws 663 A, 733 A-B, 734 A-B. or free from pain, how could we determine which of them speaks most truly?

9.582

In faith, I cannot tell,

9.582

he said.

9.582

Well, consider it thus: By what are things to be judged, if they are to be judgedi.e. what is the criterion? Cf. 582 D δι’ οὗ, Sext. Empir. Bekker, p. 60 (Pyrrh. Hypotyp. ii. 13-14) and p. 197 (Adv. Math. vii. 335). Cf. Diog. L. Prologue 21, and Laches 184 E. For the idea that the better judge cf. also Laws 663 C, Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1176 a 16-19. rightly? Is it not by experience, intelligence and discussionCf. 582 D, On Virtue 373 D, Xen. Mem. iii. 3. 11.? Or could anyone name a better criterion than these?

9.582

How could he?

9.582

he said.

9.582

Observe, then. Of our three types of men, which has had the most experience of all the pleasures we mentioned? Do you think that the lover of gain by study of the very nature of truth has more experience of the pleasure that knowledge yields than the philosopher has of that which results from gain?

9.582

There is a vast difference,

9.582

he said;

9.582

for the one, the philosopher, must needs taste of the other two kinds of pleasure from childhood; but the lover of gain is not only under no necessity of tasting or experiencing the sweetness of the pleasure of learning the true natures of things,The force of οὐ extends through the sentence. Cf. Class. Phil. vi. (1911) p. 218, and my note on Tim. 77 a in A.J.P. p. 74. Cf. Il. v. 408, xxii, 283, Pindar, Nem. iii. 15, Hymn Dem. 157. but he cannot easily do so even if he desires and is eager for it.

9.582

The lover of wisdom, then,

9.582

said I,

9.582

far surpasses the lover of gain in experience of both kinds of pleasure.

9.582

Yes, far.

9.582

And how does he compare with the lover of honor? Is he more unacquainted with the pleasure of being honored than that other with that which comes from knowledge?

9.582

Nay, honor,

9.582

he said,

9.582

if they achieve their several objects, attends them all; for the rich man is honored by many and the brave man and the wise, so that all are acquainted with the kind of pleasure that honor brings; but it is impossible for anyone except the lover of wisdom to have savored the delight that the contemplation of true being and reality brings.

9.582

Then,

9.582

said I,

9.582

so far as experience goes, he is the best judge of the three.

9.582

By far.

9.582

And again, he is the only one whose experience will have been accompaniedFor the periphrasis γεγονὼς ἔσται Cf. Charm. 174 D ἀπολελοιπὸς ἔσται. by intelligence.

9.582

Surely.

9.582

And yet again, that which is the instrument, or ὄργανον, of judgementCf. 508 B, 518 C, 527 D. is the instrument, not of the lover of gain or of the lover of honor, but of the lover of wisdom.

9.582

What is that?

9.582

It was by means of words and discussionCf. on 582 A, p. 376, note d. that we said the judgement must be reached; was it not?

9.582

Yes.

9.582

And they are the instrument mainly of the philosopher.

9.582

Of course.

9.582

Now if wealth and profit were the best criteria by which things are judged, the things praised and censured by the lover of gain would necessarily be truest and most real.

9.582

Quite necessarily.

9.582

And if honor, victory and courage, would it not be the things praised by the lover of honor and victory?

9.582

Obviously.

9.582

But since the tests are experience and wisdom and discussion, what follows?

9.582

Of necessity,

9.582

he said,

9.582

that the things approved by the lover of wisdom and discussion are most valid and true.

9.583

There being, then, three kinds of pleasure, the pleasure of that part of the soul whereby we learn is the sweetest, and the life of the man in whom that part dominates is the most pleasurable.

9.583

How could it be otherwise?

9.583

he said.

9.583

At any rate the man of intelligence speaks with authority when he commends his own life.

9.583

And to what life and to what pleasure,

9.583

I said,

9.583

does the judge assign the second place?

9.583

Obviously to that of the warrior and honor-loving type, for it is nearer to the first than is the life of the money-maker.

9.583

And so the last place belongs to the lover of gain, as it seems.

9.583

Surely,

9.583

said he.

9.583

That, then, would be two points in succession and two victories for the just man over the unjust. And now for the third in the Olympian fashion to the saviourThe third cup of wine was always dedicated to Zeus the Saviour, and τρίτος σωτήρ became proverbial. Cf. Charm. 167 A, Phileb. 66 D, Laws 692 A, 960 C, Epist. vii. 334 D, 340 A. Cf. Hesychius s. v. τρίτος κρατήρ. Brochard, La Morale de Platon, missing the point, says, Voici enfin un troisième argument qui paraît à Platon le plus décisif puisqu’il l’appelle une vicoire vraiment olympique. For the idea of a contest Cf. Phileb. passim. and to Olympian Zeus—observe that other pleasure than that of the intelligence is not altogether even realCf. Phileb. 36 C, 44 D ἡδοναὶ ἀληθεῖς. For the unreality of the lower pleasures Cf. Phileb. 36 A ff. and esp. 44 C-D, Unity of Plato’s Thought, pp. 23-25, What Plato Said, pp. 322-323 and 609-610, Introd. pp. lvi-lix, Rodier, Remarques sur le Philèbe, p. 281. or pure,Cf. Phileb. 52 C καθαρὰς ἡδονάς, and 53 C καθαρὰ λύπης. but is a kind of scene-painting,Cf. Laws 663 C, Phaedo 69 B, 365 C, 523 B, 602 D, 586 B, Wilamowitz, Platon, ii. p. 266. as I seem to have heard from some wise manOne of Plato’s evasions. Cf. What Plato Said, p. 513, on Meno 81 A, Phileb. 44 B. Wilamowitz, Platon, ii. p. 266 misses the point and says that by the wise man Plato means himself.; and yetFor this rhetorical καίτοι cf. 360 C, 376 B, 433 B, 440 D, Gorg. 452 E, Laws 663 E, 690 C. this would be the greatest and most decisive overthrow.Cf. Phileb. 22 E, Aesch. Prom. 919, Soph. Antig. 1046.

9.583

Much the greatest. But what do you mean?

9.583

I shall discover it,

9.583

I said,

9.583

if you will answer my questions while I seek.

9.583

Ask, then,

9.583

he said.

9.583

Tell me, then,

9.583

said I,

9.583

do we not say that pain is the opposite of pleasure?

9.583

We certainly do.

9.583

And is there not such a thing as a neutral stateIf any inference could he drawn from the fact that in the Philebus 42 D ff. and 32 E the reality of the neutral state has to be proved, it would be that the Philebus is earlier, which it is not.

9.583

There is.

9.583

Is it not intermediate between them, and in the mean,For ἐν μέσῳ Cf. Phileb. 35 E. being a kind of quietude of the soul in these respects? Or is not that your notion of it?

9.583

It is that,

9.583

said he.

9.583

Do you not recall the things men say in sickness?

9.583

What sort of things?

9.583

Why, that after all there is nothing sweeter than to be well,Cf. perhaps Phileb. 45 B, Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1095 a 24, and Heracleit. fr. 111, Diels i.3 p. 99 νοῦσος ὑγιείην ἐποίησεν ἡδύ. though they were not aware that it is the highest pleasure before they were Ill.

9.583

I remember,

9.583

he said.

9.583

And do you not hear men afflicted with severe pain saying that there is no greater pleasure than the cessation of this suffering?

9.583

I do.

9.583

And you perceive, I presume, many similar conditions in which men while suffering pain praise freedom from pain and relief from that as the highest pleasure, and not positive delight.

9.583

Yes,

9.583

he said,

9.583

for this in such cases is perhaps what is felt as pleasurable and acceptable—peace.

9.583

And so,

9.583

I said,

9.583

when a man’s delight comes to an end, the cessation of pleasure will be painful.

9.583

It may be so,

9.583

he said.

9.583

What, then,we just now described as the intermediate state between the two—this quietude—will sometimes be both pain and pleasure.

9.583

It seems so

9.583

Is it really possible for that which is neither to become bothCf. Phileb. 43 E, Hipp. Maj. 300 B f.?

9.583

I think not.

9.583

And further, both pleasure and pain arising in the soul are a kind of motion,Aristotle attacks this doctrine with captious dialectic in his Topics and De anima. are they not?

9.583

Yes.

9.584

And did we not just now see that to feel neither pain nor pleasure is a quietude of the soul and an intermediate state between the two?

9.584

Yes, we did.

9.584

How, then, can it be right to think the absence of pain pleasure, or the absence of joy painful?

9.584

In no way.

9.584

This is not a reality, then, but an illusion,

9.584

said I;

9.584

in such case the quietude in juxtapositionCf. 586 C, and Phileb. 42 B and 41 E. with the pain appears pleasure, and in juxtaposition with the pleasure pain. And these illusions have no real bearingFor οὐδὲν ὑγιές in this sense cf. on 523 B. on the truth of pleasure, but are a kind of jugglery.Cf. Phileb. 44 C-D, Xen. Oecon. 1. 20 προσποιούμεναι ἡδοναὶ εἶναι, etc.

9.584

So at any rate our argument signifies,

9.584

he said.

9.584

Take a look, then,

9.584

said I,

9.584

at pleasures which do not follow on pain, so that you may not haply suppose for the present that it is the nature of pleasure to be a cessation from pain and pain from pleasure.

9.584

Where shall I look,

9.584

he said,

9.584

and what pleasures do you mean?

9.584

There are many others,

9.584

I said,

9.584

and especially, if you please to note them, the pleasures connected with smell.For the idea that smells are not conditioned by pain Cf. Tim. 65 A, Phileb. 51 B and E, and Siebeck, Platon als Kritiker Aristotelischer Ansichten, p. 161. For these with no antecedent painCf. Gorg. 493-494, Phileb. 42 C ff., and Phaedr. 258 E, which Wilamowitz, Platon, ii. p. 267 overlooks. suddenly attain an indescribable intensity, and their cessation leaves no pain after them.

9.584

Most true,

9.584

he said.

9.584

Let us not believe, then, that the riddance of pain is pure pleasure or that of pleasure pain.

9.584

No, we must not.

9.584

Yet, surely,

9.584

said I,

9.584

the affections that find their way through the bodyCf. Phaedo 65 A, Phaedr. 258 E, Vol. I. p. 8, note a, on 328 D, and p. 8, note b. to the soulCf. Tim. 45 D (of sensations)μέχρι τῆς ψυχῆς, Laws 673 A, Rep. 462 C πρὸς τὴν ψυχὴν τεταμένη. Cf. also Phileb. 33 D-E, 34, 43 B-C, and What Plato Said, p. 608. and are called pleasures are, we may say, the most and the greatest of them, of this type, in some sort releases from pain.Cf. Phileb. 44 B, 44 C λυπῶν . . . ἀποφυγάς, Protag. 354 B.?

9.584

Yes, they are.

9.584

And is not this also the character of the anticipatory pleasures and pains that precede them and arise from the expectation of them?

9.584

It is.

9.584

Do you know, then, what their quality is and what they most resemble?

9.584

What?

9.584

he said.

9.584

Do you think that there is such a thing in natureFor ἐν τῇ φύσει Cf. Parmen. 132 D. as up and down and in the middle?

9.584

I do.

9.584

Do you suppose, then, that anyone who is transported from below to the center would have any other opinion than that he was moving upwardFor the purposes of his illustration Plato takes the popular view of up and down, which is corrected in Tim. 62 C-D and perhaps by the ironical δή in Phaedo 112 C. Cf. Zeller, Aristotle(Eng.)i. p. 428.? And if he took his stand at the center and looked in the direction from which he had been transported, do you think he would suppose himself to be anywhere but above, never having seen that which is really above?

9.584

No, by Zeus,

9.584

he said,

9.584

I do not think that such a person would have any other notion.

9.584

And if he were borne back,

9.584

I said,

9.584

he would both think himself to be moving downward and would think truly.

9.584

Of course.

9.584

And would not all this happen to him because of his non-acquaintance with the true and real up and down and middle?

9.584

Obviously.

9.585

Would it surprise you, then,

9.585

said I,

9.585

if similarly men without experience of truth and reality hold unsound opinions about many other matters, and are so disposed towards pleasure and pain and the intermediate neutral condition that, when they are moved in the direction of the painful, they truly think themselves to be, and really are, in a state of pain, but, when they move from pain to the middle and neutral state, they intensely believe that they are approaching fulfillment and pleasure, and just as if, in ignorance of white, they were comparing grey with black,Cf. Aristot. Met. 1011 b 30-31 and Eth. Nic. 1154 a 30 διὰ τὸ παρὰ τὸ ἐναντίον φαίνεσθαι. so, being inexperienced in true pleasure, they are deceived by viewing painlessness in its relation to pain?

9.585

No, by Zeus,

9.585

he said,

9.585

it would not surprise me, but far rather if it were not so.

9.585

In this way, then, consider it.The argument from the parallel of body and mind here belongs to what we have called confirmation. Cf. What Plato Said, p. 528, on Phaedo 78 B, The figurative use of repletion and nutrition is not to be pressed in proof of contradictions with the Philebus or Gorgias. Cf. Matthew v. 6 Hunger and thirst after righteousness. Are not hunger and thirst and similar states inanitions or emptinessesFor κενώσεις Cf. Phileb. 35 B, 42 C-D, Tim. 65 A. of the bodily habit?

9.585

Surely.

9.585

And is not ignorance and folly in turn a kind of emptiness of the habit of the soul?

9.585

It is indeed.

9.585

And he who partakes of nourishmentFor the figure of nourishment of the soul Cf. Protag. 313 D, Phaedr. 248 B, and Soph. 223 E. and he who gets, wisdom fills the void and is filled?

9.585

Of course.

9.585

And which is the truer filling and fulfillment, that of the less or of the more real being?

9.585

Evidently that of the more real.

9.585

And which of the two groups or kinds do you think has a greater part in pure essence, the class of foods, drinks, and relishes and nourishment generally, or the kind of true opinion,Cf. What Plato Said, p. 517, on Meno 98 A-B. knowledge and reason,Different kinds of intelligence are treated as synonyms because for the present purpose their distinctions are irrelevant. Cf. 511 A, C, and D διάνοια. Cf. Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 43 and p. 47, n. 339. Plato does not distinguish synonyms nor virtual synonyms for their own sake as Prodicus did. Cf. Protag. 358 A-B. and, in sum, all the things that are more excellentCf. Symp. 209 A φρόνησίν τε καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετήν.? Form your judgement thus. Which do you think more truly is, that which clings to what is ever like itself and immortal and to the truth, and that which is itself of such a nature and is born in a thing of that nature, or that which clings to what is mortal and never the same and is itself such and is born in such a thing?

9.585

That which cleaves to what is ever the same far surpasses,

9.585

he said.

9.585

Does the essence of that which never abides the same partake of real essence any more than of knowledge?

9.585

By no means.

9.585

Or of truth and reality?

9.585

Not of that, either.

9.585

And if a thing has less of truth has it not also less of real essence or existence?

9.585

Necessarily.

9.585

And is it not generally true that the kinds concerned with the service of the body partake less of truth and reality than those that serve the soul?

9.585

Much less.

9.585

And do you not think that the same holds of the body itself in comparison with the soul?

9.585

I do.

9.585

Then is not that which is fulfilled of what more truly is, and which itself more truly is, more truly filled and satisfied than that which being itself less real is filled with more unreal things?

9.585

Of course.

9.585

If, then, to be filled with what befits nature is pleasure, then that which is more really filled with real things would more really and truly cause us to enjoy a true pleasure, while that which partakes of the less truly existent would be less truly and surely filled and would partake of a less trustworthy and less true pleasure.

9.585

Most inevitably,

9.585

he said.

9.586

Then those who have no experience of wisdom and virtue but are ever devoted toFor ξυνόντες see Blaydes on Aristoph. Clouds 1404. feastings and that sort of thing are swept downward, it seems, and back again to the center, and so sway and roamCf. What Plato Said, p. 528, on Phaedo 79 C for πλανάω of error in thought. This is rather the errare of Lucretius ii. 10 and the post-Aristotelian schools. to and fro throughout their lives, but they have never transcended all this and turned their eyes to the true upper region nor been wafted there, nor ever been really filled with real things, nor ever tastedCf. on 576 A ἄγευστος, and for the thought of the whole sentence cf. Dio Chrys. Or. xiii., Teubner, vol. i. p. 240. stable and pure pleasure, but with eyes ever bent upon the earthCf. Milton, Comus, Ne’er looks to heaven amid its gorgeous feast, Rossetti, Nineveh, in fine, That set gaze never on the sky, etc. Cf. S. O. Dickermann, De Argumentis quibusdam ap. Xenophontem, Platonem, Aristotelem obviis e structura hominis et animalium petitis, Halle, 1909, who lists Plato’s Symp. 190 A, Rep. 586 A, Cratyl. 396 B, 409 C, Tim. 90 A, 91 E, and many other passages. and heads bowed down over their tables they feast like cattle,Cf. Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1095 b 20 βοσκημάτων βίον. Cf. What Plato Said, p. 611, on Phileb., in fine. grazing and copulating, ever greedy for more of these delights; and in their greedCf. 373 E, Phaedo 66 C ff., Berkeley, Siris 330 For these things men fight, cheat, and scramble. kicking and butting one another with horns and hooves of iron they slay one another in sateless avidity, because they are vainly striving to satisfy with things that are not real the unreal and incontinent part τὸ στέγον: Cf. Gorg. 493 B, Laws 714 A. of their souls.

9.586

You describe in quite oracular style,Plato laughs at himself. Cf. 509 C and 540 B-C. The picturesque, allegorical style of oracles was proverbial. For χρησμῳδεῖν Cf. Crat. 396 D, Apol. 39 C, Laws 712 A. Socrates,

9.586

said Glaucon,

9.586

the life of the multitude.

9.586

And are not the pleasures with which they dwell inevitably commingled with pains, phantoms of true pleasure, illusions of scene-painting, so colored by contrary juxtapositionCf. on 584 A, p. 384, note a. as to seem intense in either kind, and to beget mad loves of themselves in senseless souls, and to be fought for,For περιμαχήτους cf. Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1168 b 19, Eth. Eud. 1248 b 27, and on 521 A, p. 145, note e. as Stesichorus says the wraith of HelenFor the Stesichorean legend that the real Helen remained in Egypt while only her phantom went to Troy Cf. Phaedr. 243 A-B, Eurip. Hel. 605 ff., Elect. 1282-1283, Isoc. Hel. 64, and Philologus 55, pp. 634 ff. Dümmler, Akademika p. 55, thinks this passage a criticism of Isoc. Helena 40. Cf. also Teichmüller, Lit. Fehden, i. pp. 113 ff. So Milton, Reason of Church Government, A lawny resemblance of her like that air-born Helena in the fables. For the ethical symbolism Cf. 520 C-D. was fought for at Troy through ignorance of the truth?

9.586

It is quite inevitable,

9.586

he said,

9.586

that it should be so.

9.586

So, again, must not the like hold of the high-spirited element, whenever a man succeeds in satisfying that part of his nature—his covetousness of honor by envy, his love of victory by violence, his ill-temper by indulgence in anger, pursuing these ends without regard to consideration and reason?

9.586

The same sort of thing,

9.586

he said,

9.586

must necessarily happen in this case too.

9.586

Then,

9.586

said I,

9.586

may we not confidently declare that in both the gain-loving and the contentious part of our nature all the desires that wait upon knowledge and reason, and, pursuing their pleasures in conjunction with them,Cf. Phaedo 69 B, and Theaet. 176 B μετὰ φρονήσεως. take only those pleasures which reason approves, ἐξηγῆται has a religious tone. See on ἐξηγητής427 C. Cf. 604 B. will, since they follow truth, enjoy the truestCf. on 583 B, p. 380, note b. pleasures, so far as that is possible for them, and also the pleasures that are proper to them and their own, if for everything that which is best may be said to be most its ownCf. What Plato Said, p. 491, on Lysis 221 E.?

9.586

But indeed,

9.586

he said,

9.586

it is most truly its very own.

9.587

Then when the entire soul accepts the guidance of the wisdom-loving part and is not filled with inner dissension,Cf. 352 A, 440 B and E, 442 D, 560 A, Phaedr. 237 E. the result for each part is that it in all other respects keeps to its own taskCf. What Plato Said, p. 480 on Charm. 161 B. and is just, and likewise that each enjoys its own proper pleasures and the best pleasures and, so far as such a thing is possible,For εἰς τὸ δυνατόν cf. 500 D, 381 C, Laws 795 D, 830 B, 862 B, 900 C. the truest.

9.587

Precisely so.

9.587

And so when one of the other two gets the mastery the result for it is that it does not find its own proper pleasure and constrains the others to pursue an alien pleasure and not the true.

9.587

That is so,

9.587

he said.

9.587

And would not that which is furthest removed from philosophy and reason be most likely to produce this effectWhat follows (587 B-588 A) is not to be taken too seriously. It illustrates the method of procedure by minute links, the satisfaction of Plato’s feelings by confirmations and analogies, and his willingness to play with mathematical symbolism. Cf. 546 B f. and William Temple, Plato and Christianity, p. 55: Finally the whole thing is a satire on the humbug of mystical number, but I need not add that the German commentators are seriously exercised. . . . See however A. G. Laird in Class. Phil. xi. (1916) pp. 465-468.?

9.587

Quite so,

9.587

he said.

9.587

And is not that furthest removed from reason which is furthest from law and order?

9.587

Obviously.

9.587

And was it not made plain that the furthest removed are the erotic and tyrannical appetites?

9.587

Quite so.

9.587

And least so the royal and orderly?

9.587

Yes.

9.587

Then the tyrant’s place, I think, will be fixed at the furthest removeCf. Polit. 257 B ἀφεστᾶσιν from true and proper pleasure, and the king’s at the least.

9.587

Necessarily.

9.587

Then the tyrant’s life will be least pleasurable and the king’s most.

9.587

There is every necessity of that.

9.587

Do you know, then,

9.587

said I,

9.587

how much less pleasurably the tyrant lives than the king?

9.587

I’ll know if you tell me,Cf. Vil. I. p. 282, note a, on 408 D and p. 344, note b, on 573 D.

9.587

he said.

9.587

There being as it appears three pleasures, one genuine and two spurious, the tyrant in his flight from law and reason crosses the border beyondFor εἰς τὸ ἐπέκεινα Cf. Phaedo 112 B and 509 B. the spurious, cohabits with certain slavish, mercenary pleasures, and the measure of his inferiority is not easy to express except perhaps thus.

9.587

How?

9.587

he said.

9.587

The tyrant, I believe, we found at the third remove from the oligarch, for the democrat came between.

9.587

Yes.

9.587

And would he not also dwell with a phantom of pleasure in respect of reality three stages removed from that other, if all that we have said is true?

9.587

That is so.

9.587

And the oligarch in turn is at the third remove from the royal man if we assume the identity of the aristocrat and the king.Cf. Vol. I. p. 422, note b, on 445 D and Menex. 238 D.

9.587

Yes, the third.

9.587

Three times three, then, by numerical measure is the interval that separates the tyrant from true pleasure.

9.587

Apparently.

9.587

The phantomCf. Phaedo 66 C εἰδώλων, where Olympiodorus (Norvin, p. 36) takes it of the unreality of the lower pleasures. of the tyrant’s pleasure is then by longitudinal mensuration a plane number.

9.587

Quite so.

9.587

But by squaring and cubing it is clear what the interval of this separation becomes.

9.587

It is clear,

9.587

he said,

9.587

to a reckoner.

9.587

Then taking it the other way about, if one tries to express the extent of the interval between the king and the tyrant in respect of true pleasure he will find on completion of the multiplication that he lives 729 times as happily and that the tyrant’s life is more painful by the same distance.Cf. Spencer, Data of Ethics, p. 14 Hence estimating life by multiplying its length into its breadth. For the mathematical jest Cf. Polit. 257 A-B.

9.588

An overwhelmingHumorous as in 509 C ὑπερβολῆς. and baffling calculation,

9.588

he said,

9.588

of the differenceCf. Phileb. 13 A, 14 A, Parmen. 141 C, Theaet. 209 A and D. between the just and the unjust man in respect of pleasure and pain!

9.588

And what is more, it is a true number and pertinent to the lives of men if days and nights and months and years pertain to them.

9.588

They certainly do,

9.588

he said.

9.588

Then if in point of pleasure the victory of the good and just man over the bad and unjust is so great as this, he will surpass him inconceivably in decency and beauty of life and virtue.

9.588

Inconceivably indeed, by Zeus,

9.588

he said.

9.588

Very good,

9.588

said I.

9.588

And now that we have come to this point in the argument, let us take up again the statement with which we began and that has brought us to this pass.Plato keeps to the point. Cf. 472 B, Phileb. 27 C, and p. 339 note e, on 572 B. It was, I believe, averred that injustice is profitable to the completely unjustCf. 348 B, 361 A. man who is reputed just. Was not that the proposition?

9.588

Yes, that.

9.588

Let us, then, reason with its proponent now that we have agreed on the essential nature of injustice and just conduct.

9.588

How?

9.588

he said.

9.588

By fashioning in our discourse a symbolic image of the soul, that the maintainer of that proposition may see precisely what it is that he was saying.

9.588

What sort of an image?

9.588

he said.

9.588

One of those natures that the ancient fables tell of,

9.588

said I,

9.588

as that of the ChimaeraCf. Homer, Il. vi. 179-182, Phaedr. 229 D. or Scylla Od. xii. 85 ff. or Cerberus,Hesiod, Theog. 311-312. and the numerous other examples that are told of many forms grown together in one.

9.588

Yes, they do tell of them.

9.588

Mould, then, a single shape of a manifold and many-headed beastStallbaum ad loc. gives a long list of writers who imitated this passage. Hesiod, Theog. 823 f., portrays a similar monster in Typhoeus, who had a hundred serpent-heads. For the animal in man c. Tim. 70 E, Charm. 155 D-E, Phaedr. 230 A, 246 A ff., Boethius, Cons. iv. 2-3, Horace Epist. i. 1. 76, Iamblichus, Protrept. chap. iii. that has a ring of heads of tame and wild beasts and can change them and cause to spring forth from itself all such growths.

9.588

It is the task of a cunning artist,Cf. 596 C.

9.588

he said,

9.588

but nevertheless, since speech is more plastic than waxCf. Cic. De or. iii. 45 sicut mollissimam ceram . . . fingimus. Otto, 80, says it is a proverb. For the development of this figure cf. Pliny, Epist. vii. 9 ut laus est cerae, mollis cedensque sequatur. For the idea that word is more precise or easy than deed Cf. 473 A, Phaedo 99 E, Laws 636 A, 736 B, Tim. 19 E. and other such media, assume that it has been so fashioned.

9.588

Then fashion one other form of a lion and one of a man and let the first be far the largestCf. 442 A. and the second second in size.

9.588

That is easier,

9.588

he said,

9.588

and is done.

9.588

Join the three in one, then, so as in some sort to grow together.

9.588

They are so united,

9.588

he said.

9.588

Then mould about them outside the likeness of one, that of the man, so that to anyone who is unable to look withinCf. 577 A. but who can see only the external sheath it appears to be one living creature, the man.

9.588

The sheath is made fast about him,

9.588

he said.

9.589

Let us, then say to the speaker who avers that it pays this man to be unjust, and that to do justice is not for his advantage, that he is affirming nothing else than that it profits him to feast and make strong the multifarious beast and the lion and all that pertains to the lion, but to starve the manThe whole passage illustrates the psychology of 440 B ff. and so enfeeble him that he can be pulled aboutCf. Protag. 352 C περιελκομένης, with Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1145 b 24. whithersoever either of the others drag him, and not to familiarize or reconcile with one another the two creatures but suffer them to bite and fight and devour one another.Perhaps a latent allusion to Hesiod, Works and Days 278.

9.589

Yes,

9.589

he said,

9.589

that is precisely what the panegyrist of injustice will be found to say.

9.589

And on the other hand he who says that justice is the more profitable affirms that all our actions and words should tend to give the man within usCf. the inward man, Romans vii. 22, 2 Cor. iv. 16, Ephes. iii. 16. complete dominationCf. Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, p. 10 Religion says: The kingdom of God is within you; and culture, in like manner, places human perfection in an internal condition, in the growth and predominance of our humanity proper, as distinguished from our animality. over the entire man and make him take chargeCf. Gorg. 516 A-B. of the many-headed beast—like a farmerCf. Theaet. 167 B-C, and What Plato Said, p. 456, on Euthyphro 2 D. who cherishes and trains the cultivated plants but checks the growth of the wild—and he will make an allyCf. 441 A. of the lion’s nature, and caring for all the beasts alike will first make them friendly to one another and to himself, and so foster their growth.

9.589

Yes, that in turn is precisely the meaning of the man who commends justice.

9.589

From every point of view, then, the panegyrist of justice speaks truly and the panegyrist of injustice falsely. For whether we consider pleasure, reputation, or profit, he who commends justice speaks the truth, while there is no soundness or real knowledge of what he censures in him who disparages it.

9.589

None whatever, I think,

9.589

said he.

9.589

Shall we, then, try to persuade him gently, πράως: cf. the use of ἠρέμα476 E, 494 D. for he does not willingly err,Plato always maintains that wrong-doing is involuntary and due to ignorance. Cf. What Plato Said, p. 640 on Laws 860 D. by questioning him thus: Dear friend, should we not also say that the things which law and custom deem fair or foul have been accounted so for a like reason— the fair and honorable things being those that subject the brutish part of our nature to that which is human in us, or rather, it may be, to that which is divine,Cf. 501 B, Tennyson, Locksley Hall Sixty Years after, in fine, The highest Human Nature is divine. while the foul and base are the things that enslave the gentle nature to the wild? Will he assent or not?

9.589

He will if he is counselled by me.

9.589

Can it profit any man in the light of this thought to accept gold unjustly if the result is to be that by the acceptance he enslaves the best part of himself to the worst? Or is it conceivable that, while, if the taking of the gold enslaved his son or daughter and that too to fierce and evil men, it would not profit him,Cf. Matt. xvi.26, Mark viii. 36, What shall it profit a man if he shall gain the whole world and lose his own soul? A typical argumentum ex contrario. Cf. 445 A-B and Vol. I. p. 40, note c. On the supreme value of the soul Cf. Laws 726-728, 743 E, 697 B, 913 B, 959 A-B. Cf. 585 D. no matter how large the sum, yet that, if the result is to be the ruthless enslavement of the divinest part of himself to the most despicable and godless part, he is not to be deemed wretched and is not taking the golden bribe much more disastrously than EriphyleCf. Od. xi. 326, Frazer on Apollodorus iii. 6. 2 (Loeb). Stallbaum refers also to Pindar, Nem. ix. 37 ff, and Pausan. x. 29. 7. did when she received the necklace as the priceFor ἐπί in this sense cf. Thompson on Meno 90 D. Cf. Apol. 41 A ἐπὶ πόσῳ, Demosth. xlv. 66. of her husband’s life?

9.590

Far more,

9.590

said Glaucon,

9.590

for I will answer you in his behalf.

9.590

And do you not think that the reason for the old objection to licentiousness is similarly because that sort of thing emancipates that dread,See Adam ad loc. on the asyndeton. that huge and manifold beast overmuch?

9.590

Obviously,

9.590

he said.

9.590

And do we not censure self-will αὐθάδεια: Cf. 548 E. and irascibility when they foster and intensify disproportionately the element of the lion and the snakeNot mentioned before, but, as Schleiermacher says, might be included in τὰ περὶ τὸν λέοντα. Cf. Adam ad loc. Or Plato may be thinking of the chimaera (Il. vi. 181 ). in us?

9.590

By all means.

9.590

And do we not reprobate luxury and effeminacy for their loosening and relaxation of this same element when they engender cowardice in it?

9.590

Surely.

9.590

And flattery and illiberality when they reduce this same high-spirited element under the rule of the mob-like beast and habituate it for the sake of wealth and the unbridled lusts of the beast to endure all manner of contumely from youth up and become an apeCf. 620 C. instead of a lion?

9.590

Yes, indeed,

9.590

he said.

9.590

And why do you suppose that base mechanicCf. p. 49, note e. handicraft is a term of reproach? Shall we not say that it is solely when the best part is naturally weak in a man so that it cannot govern and control the brood of beasts within him but can only serve them and can learn nothing but the ways of flattering them?

9.590

So it seems,

9.590

he said.

9.590

Then is it not in order that such an one may have a like government with the best man that we say he ought to be the slave of that best manFor the idea that it is better to be ruled by a better man Cf. Alc. I. 135 B-C, Polit. 296 B-C, Democr. fr. 75 (Diels ii.3 p. 77), Xen. Mem. i. 5. 5 δουλεύοντα δὲ ταῖς τοιαύταις ἡδοναῖς ἱκετευτέον τοὺς θεοὺς δεσποτῶν ἀγαθῶν τυχεῖν, Xen. Cyr. viii. 1. 40 βελτίονας εἶναι. Cf. also Laws 713 D-714 A, 627 E, Phaedo 62 D-E, and Laws 684 C. Cf. Ruskin, Queen of the Air, p. 210 (Brantwood ed., 1891): The first duty of every man in the world is to find his true master, and, for his own good, submit to him; and to find his true inferior, and, for that inferior’s good, conquer him. Inge, Christian Ethics, p. 252: It is ordained in the eternal constitution of things, that men of intemperate minds cannot be free. Carlyle (apud M. Barton and O. Sitwell, Victoriana): Surely of all the rights of man the right of the ignorant man to be guided by the wiser, to be gently or forcibly held in the true course by him, is the indisputablest. Plato’s idea is perhaps a source of Aristotle’s theory of slavery, though differently expressed. Cf. Aristot. Pol. 1254 b 16 f., Newman i. pp. 109-110, 144 f., 378-379, ii. p. 107. Cf. also Polit. 309 A f., Epist. vii. 335 D, and Gomperz, Greek Thinkers, iii. p. 106. who has within himself the divine governing principle, not because we suppose, as ThrasymachusCf. 343 B-C. did in the case of subjects, that the slave should be governed for his own harm, but on the ground that it is better for everyone to be governed by the divine and the intelligent, preferably indwelling and his own, but in default of that imposed from without, in order that we all so far as possible may be akin and friendly because our governance and guidance are the same?

9.590

Yes, and rightly so,

9.590

he said.

9.590

And it is plain,

9.590

I said,

9.590

that this is the purpose of the law, which is the ally of all classes in the state,

9.591

and this is the aim of our control of children,Cf. Lysis 207 E f., Laws 808 D, Isoc.xv. 290, Antiphon, fr. 61 (Diels ii.3 p. 303). our not leaving them free before we have established, so to speak, a constitutional government within themCf. on 591 E, p. 412, note d. and, by fostering the best element in them with the aid of the like in ourselves, have set up in its place a similar guardian and ruler in the child, and then, and then only, we leave it free.

9.591

Yes, that is plain,

9.591

he said.

9.591

In what way,Cf. on 501 D, p. 74, note a. then, Glaucon, and on what principle, shall we say that it profits a man to be unjust or licentious or do any shameful thing that will make him a worse man, but otherwise will bring him more wealth or power?

9.591

In no way,

9.591

he said.

9.591

And how that it pays him to escape detection in wrongdoing and not pay the penaltyThe paradoxes of the Gorgias are here seriously reaffirmed. Cf. especially Gorg. 472 E ff., 480 A-B, 505 A-B, 509 A f. Cf. also Vol. I. p. 187, 380 B οἱ δὲ ὠνίναντο κολαζόμενοι, and Laws 728 C; and for the purpose of punishment, What Plato Said, p. 495, on Protag. 324 A-B.? Or is it not true that he who evades detection becomes a still worse man, while in the one who is discovered and chastened the brutish part is lulled and tamed and the gentle part liberated, and the entire soul, returning to its nature at the best, attains to a much more precious condition in acquiring sobriety and righteousness together with wisdom, than the bodyThe a fortiori argument from health of body to health of soul is one of the chief refutations of the immoralists. Cf. 445 D-E f., Gorg. 479 B, Crito 47 D-E. For the supreme importance of the soul cf. on 589 E. does when it gains strength and beauty conjoined with health, even as the soul is more precious than the body?

9.591

Most assuredly,

9.591

he said.

9.591

Then the wise man will bend all his endeavorsCf. Gorg. 507 D, Isoc. Epist. vi. 9, Xen. Ages. 7. 1. to this end throughout his life; he will, to begin with, prize the studies that will give this quality to his soul and disprize the others.

9.591

Clearly,

9.591

he said.

9.591

And then,

9.591

I said,

9.591

he not only will not abandon the habit and nurture of his body to the brutish and irrational pleasure and live with his face set in that direction, but he will not even make health his chief aim,Health in the familiar skolion (Cf. Gorg. 451 E, Laws 631 C, 661 A, 728 D-E, Euthydem. 279 A-B, Meno 87 E, Soph. frag. 356) is proverbially the highest of ordinary goods. Cf. Gorg. 452 A-B, Crito 47 D, Eryxias 393 C. In fact, for Plato as for modern scientific ethics, health in the higher sense—the health of the soul—may be said to be the ultimate sanction. Cf. Vol. I. Introd. pp. xvi and xxi, Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 26, Idea of Good in Plato’s Republic, pp. 192-194 f. But an idealistic ethics sometimes expresses itself in the paradox that not even health, highest of earthly goods, is of any value compared with the true interests of the soul. Cf. Laws 661 C-E ff., 728 D-E, 744 A, 960 D, Laches 195 C; and Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, p. 17 Bodily health and vigor . . . have a more real and essential value . . . but only as they are more intimately connected with a perfect spiritual condition than wealth and population are. This idea may be the source of the story from which the Christian Fathers and the Middle Ages derived much edification, that Plato intentionally chose an unhealthy site for the Academy in order to keep down the flesh. Cf. Aelian, Var. Hist. ix. 10, perhaps the first mention, Porphyry, De abstinentia i. 36, Zeller, Phil. d. Gr. ii. 1.4 416, n. 2; Camden on Cambridge, Gosse, Gossip in a Library, p. 23, and Himerius, Ecl. iii. 18 (Diels ii.3 p. 18)ἑκὼν δὲ ἐνόσει σῶμα Δημόκριτος, ἵνα ὑγιαίνῃ τὰ κρείττονα. nor give the first place to the ways of becoming strong or healthy or beautiful unless these things are likely to bring with them soberness of spirit, but he will always be found attuning the harmonies of his body for the sake of the concord in his soul.Cf. What Plato Said, p. 485, on Laches 188 D.

9.591

By all means,

9.591

he replied,

9.591

if he is to be a true musician.Cf. Phaedo 61 A.

9.591

And will he not deal likewise with the ordering and harmonizing of his possessions? He will not let himself be dazzledCf. p. 355, note d, on 576 D. by the felicitations of the multitude and pile up the mass ὄγκον: cf. Horace’s use of acervus, Shorey on Odes ii. 2. 24. of his wealth without measure,Cf. Vol. I. p. 163, note g, Newman i. p. 136. For the evils of wealth Cf. Laws 831 C ff., 870 B-C, Rep. 434 B, 550 D ff., etc. involving himself in measureless ills.

9.591

No, I think not,

9.591

he said.

9.591

He will rather,

9.591

I said,

9.591

keep his eyes fixed on the constitution in his soul,This analogy pervades the Republic. Cf. 570 C and p. 240, note b, on 544 D-E, Introd. Vol. I. p. xxxv. Cf. ὥσπερ ἐν πόλει 590 E, 605 B. For the subordination of everything to the moral life cf. also 443 D and p. 509, note d, on 618 C. and taking care and watching lest he disturb anything there either by excess or deficiency of wealth,As in the state, extremes of wealth and poverty are to be avoided. Cf. What Plato Said, p. 645, on Laws 915 B. will so steer his course and add to or detract from his wealth on this principle, so far as may be.

9.591

Precisely so,

9.591

he said.

9.592

And in the matter of honors and office too this will be his guiding principle: He will gladly take part in and enjoy those which he thinks will make him a better man, but in public and private life he will shun those that may overthrow the established habitAlmost Aristotle’s use of ἕξις. of his soul.

9.592

Then, if that is his chief concern,

9.592

he said,

9.592

he will not willingly take part in politics.Cf. pp. 52-55 on 496 D-E. The later schools debated the question whether the sage would take part in politics. Cf. Seneca, De otio. xxx. 2 f. and Von Arnim, Stoic Vet. Frag. i. p. 62. 22 f.: Zenon ait: accedet ad rempublicam (sapiens), nisi si quid impedierit; ibid. iii. p. 158. 31 ff.: consentaneum est huic naturae, ut sapiens velit gerere et administrare rempublicam atque, ut e natura vivat, uxorem adiungere et velle ex ea liberos; ibid. p. 174. 32: negant nostri sapientem ad quamlibet rempublicam accessurum; ibid. 37 ff.: praeterea, cum sapienti rempublicam ipso dignam dedimus, id est mundum, non est extra rempublicam, etiamsi recesserit; ibid. iii. p. 157. 40 ff. ἑπόμενον δὲ τούτοις ὑπάρχειν καὶ τὸ πολιτεύεσθαι τὸν σοφὸν καὶ μάλιστ’ ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις πολιτείαις ταῖς ἐμφαινούσαις τινὰ προκοπὴν πρὸς τὰς τελείας πολιτείας ibid. p. 172. 18 f. δεύτερον δὲ τὸν ἀπὸ τῆς πολιτείας, πολιτεύεσθαι γὰρ κατὰ τὸν προηγούμενον λόγον. . . ; ibid. 173. 19 ff. ἔφαμεν δ’ ὅτι καὶ πολιτεύεσθαι κατὰ τὸν προηγούμενον λόγον οἷον ἐστι. μὴ πολιτεύεσθαι δὲ ἐάν τι κωλύῃ καὶ μάλιστ’ ἂν μηδὲν ὠφφελεῖν μέλλη τὴν πατρίδα, κινδύνους δὲ παρακολουθεῖν ὑπολαμβάνῃ μεγάλους καὶ χαλεποὺς ἐκ τῆς πολιτείας; ibid. p. 175. 3 f. πολιτεύεσθαι φασὶ τὸν σοφὸν ἂν μή τι κωλύη, ὥς φησι Χρύσιππος ἐν πρώτῳ περὶ βίων; ibid. 6 ff. Χρύσιππος δὲ πάλιν ἐν τῷ Περὶ Ῥητορικῆς γράφων, οὕτω ῥντορεύσειν καὶ πολιτεύεσθαι τὸν σοφόν, ὡς καὶ τοῦ πλούτου ὄντος ἀγαθοῦ, καὶ τῆς δόξης καὶ τῆς ὑγείας

9.592

Yes, by the dog,Cf. on 399 E, Phaedr. 228 B, Gorg. 466 C, 461 A, 482 B, Phaedo 98 E, 567 E.

9.592

said I,

9.592

in his own city he certainly will, yet perhaps not in the city of his birth, except in some providential conjuncture. θεία . . . τύχη. So θεῖα μοῖρα is often used to account for an exception, e.g.493 A, Laws 875 C, 642 C, Meno 99 E, etc. Cf. θεῖον . . . ἐξαιρῶμεν λόγου 492 E.

9.592

I understand,

9.592

he said;

9.592

you mean the city whose establishment we have described, the city whose home is in the ideal;Lit. in words. This is one of the most famous passages in Plato, and a source of the idea of the City of God among both Stoics and Christians. Cf. Marc. Aurel. ix. 29 μηδὲ τὴν Πλάτωνος πολιτείαν ἔλπιζε, Justin Martyr’s επὶ γῆς διατρίβουσιν ἀλλ’ ἐν οὐρανῷ πολιτεύονται, which recalls Philippians iii. 20 ἡμῶν δὲ τὸ πολίτευμα ἐν οὐρανοῖς ὑπάρχει and also Heb. xii. 22, xi. 10 and 16, xiii. 14, Eph. ii. 19, Gal. iv. 26, Rev. iii. 12 and xxi. 2 ff. Ackermann, Das Christliche bei Platon, p. 24, compares Luke xvii. 21 the kingdom of God is within you. Cf. also John xviii. 36. Havet, Le Christianisme et ses origines, p. 207, says, Platon dit de sa République précisément ce qu’on a dit plus tard du royaume de Dieu, qu’elle n’est pas de ce monde. Cf. also Caird, Evolution of Theology in Greek Philosophy, ii. p. 170, Harnack, Hist. of Dogma(tr. Buchanan), vol. i. p. 332, ii. pp. 73-74 and 338, Proclus, Comm. 352 (Kroll i. 16); Pater, Marius the Epicurean, p. 212 Marcus Aurelius speaks often of that City on high, of which all other cities are but single habitations . . . , p. 213 . . . the vision of a reasonable, a divine order, not in nature, but in the condition of human affairs, that unseen Celestial City, Uranopolis, Callipolis . . . ;ibid. p. 158 thou hast been a citizen in this wide city, and pp. 192-193. Cf. further Inge, Christian Ethics, pp. 104-105, let us fly hence to our dear country, as the disciples of Plato have repeated one after another. There are a few people who are so well adjusted to their environment that they do not feel, or rarely feel, this nostalgia for the infinite . . . Somewhat different is the Stoic idea of a world state and of the sage as citizen of the world, e.g. Marc. Aurel. iv. 4, Sen. De otio 31, Cic. Nat. deor. ii. 62 (154). Cf. Newman, Aristot. Pol. i. p. 92; also ibid. pp. 87-88. For the identification of the πόλις with philosophy cf. Diog. Laert. vi. 15 and vii. 40, Lucian, Hermotim. 22, Sale of Lives 17, Ver. Hist. 17, Proclus i. 16 (Kroll). Diogenes Laertius, ii. 7, reports that, when Anaxagoras was reproached for not concerning himself with the affairs of his country, he replied, Indeed, I am greatly concerned with my country, and pointed to heaven. for I think that it can be found nowhere on earth.Cf. 499 C-D.

9.592

Well,

9.592

said I,

9.592

perhaps there is a patternCf. Theaet. 176 E, which Wilamowitz, Platon, ii. p. 179 says must refer to the Republic, Laws 739 D-E, 746 B, and What Plato Said, p. 458 on Euthyphro 6 E. of it laid up in heaven for him who wishes to contemplate it and so beholding to constitute himself its citizen. ἑαυτὸν κατοικίζειν: Adam found a city in himself. See his note ad loc. Cf. Jebb on Soph. Oed. Col. 1004. But it makes no difference whether it exists now or ever will come into being.Cf. 499 C-D, 472 B-E, and What Plato Said, p. 564. The politics of this city only will be his and of none other.

9.592

That seems probable,

9.592

he said.

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