History of the Peloponnesian War

Thucydides

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1.1.1

Thucydides, an Athenian, wrote the history of the war waged by the Peloponnesians and the Athenians against one another. He began the task at the very outset of the war, in the belief that it would be great and noteworthy above all the wars that had gone before, inferring this from the fact that both powers were then at their best in preparedness for war in every way, and seeing the rest of the Hellenic race taking sides with one state or the other, some at once, others planning to do so.

1.1.2

For this was the greatest movement that had ever stirred the Hellenes, extending also to some of the Barbarians, one might say even to a very large part of mankind.

1.1.3

Indeed, as to the events of the period just preceding this, and those of a still earlier date, it was impossible to get clear information on account of lapse of time; but from evidence which, on pushing my inquiries to the furthest point, I find that I can trust, I think that they were not really great either as regards the wars then waged or in other particulars.

1.2.1

For it is plain that what is now called Hellas was not of old settled with fixed habitations, but that migrations were frequent in former times, each tribe readily leaving its own land whenever they were forced to do so by any people that was more numerous.

1.2.2

For there was no mercantile traffic and the people did not mingle with one another without fear, either on land or by sea, and they each tilled their own land only enough to obtain a livelihood from it, having no surplus of wealth and not planting orchards, since it was uncertain, especially as they were yet without walls, when some invader might come and despoil them. And so, thinking that they could obtain anywhere the sustenance required for their daily needs, they found it easy to change their abodes, and for this reason were not strong as regards either the size of their cities or their resources in general.

1.2.3

And it was always the best of the land that was most subject to these changes of inhabitants—the districts now called Thessaly and Boeotia, most of the Peloponnesus except Arcadia, and the most fertile regions in the rest of Hellas.

1.2.4

For the greater power that accrued to some communities on account of the fertility of their land occasioned internal quarrels whereby they were ruined, and at the same time these were more exposed to plots from outside tribes.

1.2.5

Attica, at any rate, was free from internal quarrels from the earliest times by reason of the thinness of its soil, and therefore was inhabited by the same people always.

1.2.6

And here is an excellent illustration of the truth of my statement that it was owing to these migrations that the other parts of Hellas did not increase in the same way as Attica; for the most influential men of the other parts of Hellas, when they were driven out of their own countries by war or sedition, resorted to Athens as being a firmly settled community, and, becoming citizens, from the very earliest times made the city still greater in the number of its inhabitants; so that Attica proved too small to hold them, and therefore the Athenians eventually sent out colonies even to Ionia.

1.3.1

The weakness of the olden times is further proved to me chiefly by this circumstance, that before the Trojan war, Hellas, as it appears, engaged in no enterprise in common.

1.3.2

Indeed, it seems to me that as a whole it did not yet have this name, either, but that before the time of Hellen, son of Deucalion, this title did not even exist, and that the several tribes, the Pelasgian most extensively, gave their own names to the several districts; but when Hellen and his sons became strong in Phthiotis and were called in to the aid of the other cities, the clans thenceforth came more and more, by reason of this intercourse, to be called Hellenes, though it was a long time before the name could prevail among them all. The best evidence of this is given by Homer;

1.3.3

for, though his time was much later even than the Trojan war, he nowhere uses this name of all, or indeed of any of them except the followers of Achilles of Phthiotis, who were in fact the first Hellenes, but designates them in his poems as Danaans and Argives and Achaeans. And he has not used the term Barbarians, either, for the reason, as it seems to me, that the Hellenes on their part had not yet been separated off so as to acquire one common name by way of contrast.

1.3.4

However this may be, those who then received the name of Hellenes, whether severally and in succession, city by city, according as they understood one another's speech, or in a body at a later time, engaged together in no enterprise before the Trojan war, on account of weakness and lack of intercourse with one another. And they united even for this expedition only when they were now making considerable use of the sea.

1.4.1

Minos is the earliest of all those known to us by tradition who acquired a navy. He made himself master of a very great part of what is now called the Hellenic Sea, and became lord of the Cyclades islands and first colonizer of most of them, driving out the Carians and establishing his own sons in them as governors. Piracy, too, he naturally tried to clear from the sea, as far as he could, desiring that his revenues should come to him more readily.

1.5.1

It should be explained that in early times both the Hellenes and the Barbarians who dwell on the mainland near the sea,

1.5.1

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1.5.1

as well as those on the islands, when once they began more frequently to cross over in ships to one another, turned to piracy, under the lead of their most powerful men, whose motive was their own private gain and the support of their weaker followers, and falling upon cities that were unprovided with walls and consisted of groups of villages, they pillaged them and got most of their living from that source.

1.5.1

For this occupation did not as yet involve disgrace, but rather conferred something even of glory.

1.5.2

This is shown by the practice, even at the present day, of some of the peoples on the mainland, who still hold it an honour to be successful in this business, as well as by the words of the early poets, who invariably ask the question of all who put in to shore, whether they are pirates,

1.5.2

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1.5.2

the inference being that neither those whom they ask ever disavow that occupation, nor those ever censure it who are concerned to have the information.

1.5.3

On the mainland also men plundered one another; and even to-day in many parts of Hellas life goes on under the old conditions, as in the region of the Ozolian Locrians, Aetolians, Acarnanians, and the mainland thereabout. And these mainlanders' habit of carrying arms is a survival of their old freebooting life.

1.6.1

Indeed, all the Hellenes used to carry arms because the places where they dwelt were unprotected, and intercourse with each other was unsafe; and in their everyday life they regularly went armed just as the Barbarians did.

1.6.2

And the fact that these districts of Hellas still retain this custom is an evidence that at one time similar modes of life prevailed everywhere.

1.6.3

But the Athenians were among the very first to lay aside their arms and, adopting an easier mode of life, to change to more luxurious ways.

1.6.3

And indeed, owing to this fastidiousness, it was only recently that their older men of the wealthier class gave up wearing tunics of linen and fastening up their hair in a knot held by a golden grasshopper as a brooch ;

1.6.3

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1.6.3

and this same dress obtained for a long time among the elderly men of the Ionians also, owing to their kinship with the Athenians.

1.6.4

An unpretentious costume after the present fashion was first adopted by the Lacedaemonians, and in general their wealthier men took up a style of living that brought them as far as possible into equality with the masses.

1.6.5

And they were the first to bare their bodies and, after stripping openly, to anoint themselves with oil when they engaged in athletic exercise; for in early times, even in the Olympic games, the athletes wore girdles about their loins in the contests, and it is not many years since the practice has ceased. Indeed, even now among some of the Barbarians, especially those of Asia, where prizes for wrestling and boxing are offered, the contestants wear loin-cloths.

1.6.6

And one could show that the early Hellenes had many other customs similar to those of the Barbarians of the present day.

1.7.1

However, the cities which were founded in more recent times, when navigation had at length become safer, and were consequently beginning to have surplus resources, were built right on the seashore, and the isthmuses

1.7.1

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1.7.1

were occupied and walled off with a view to commerce and to the protection of the several peoples against their neighbours.

1.7.1

But the older cities, both on the islands and on the mainland, were built more at a distance from the sea on account of the piracy that long prevailed—for the pirates were wont to plunder not only one another, but also any others who dwelt on the coast but were not sea-faring folk—and even to the present day they lie inland.

1.8.1

Still more addicted to piracy were the islanders.

1.8.1

These included Carians as well as Phoenicians, for Carians inhabited most of the islands, as may be inferred from the fact that, when Delos was purified by the Athenians in this war

1.8.1

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1.8.1

and the graves of all who had ever died on the island were removed, over half were discovered to be Carians, being recognized by the fashion of the armour found buried with them, and by the mode of burial, which is that still in use among them.

1.8.2

But when the navy of Minos had been established, navigation between various peoples became saferfor the evil-doers on the islands were expelled by him, and then he proceeded to colonize most of them—and the dwellers on the sea-coast now began to acquire property more than before and to become more settled in their homes, and some, seeing that they were growing richer than before, began also to put walls around their cities.

1.8.3

Their more settled life was due to their desire for gain; actuated by this, the weaker citizens were willing to submit to dependence on the stronger, and the more powerful men, with their enlarged resources, were able to make the lesser cities their subjects.

1.8.4

And later on, when they had at length more completely reached this condition of affairs, they made the expedition against Troy.

1.9.1

And it was, as I think, because Agamemnon surpassed in power the princes of his time that he was able to assemble his fleet, and not so much because Helen's suitors, whom he led, were bound by oath to Tyndareus.

1.9.1

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1.9.2

It is said, furthermore, by those of the Peloponnesians who have received the clearest traditional accounts from men of former times, that it was by means of the great wealth which he brought with him from Asia into the midst of a poor people that Pelops first acquired power, and, consequently, stranger though he was, gave his name to the country, and that yet greater things fell to the lot of his descendants.

1.9.2

For when Eurystheus set out on the expedition that resulted in his death in Attica at the hands of the Heracleidae, Atreus, his mother's brother, who chanced to have been banished by his father for the death of Chrysippus,

1.9.2

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1.9.2

was intrusted by Eurystheus with Mycenae and the sovereignty because he was a kinsman;

1.9.2

and when Eurystheus did not return, Atreus, in accordance with the wish of the Mycenaeans, who feared the Heracleidae, and because he seemed to be a man of power and had won the favour of the multitude, received the sovereignty over the Mycenaeans and all who were under the sway of Eurystheus.

1.9.2

And so the house of Pelops became greater than the house of Perseus.

1.9.3

And it was, I think, because Agamemnon had inherited all this, and at the same time had become strong in naval power beyond the rest, that he was able to collect his armament, not so much by favour as by fear, and so to make the expedition.

1.9.4

For it is clear that he himself brought the greatest number of ships, and that he had others with which to supply the Arcadians,

1.9.4

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1.9.4

as Homer testifies, if he is sufficient witness for anyone.

1.9.4

And he says, in the account of the delivery of the sceptre,

1.9.4

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1.9.4

that Agamemnon "ruled over many islands and all Argos."

1.9.4

Now, if he had not had something of a fleet, he could not, as he lived on the mainland, have been lord of any islands except those on the coast, and these would not be "many."

1.9.4

And it is from this expedition that we must judge by conjecture what the situation was before that time.

1.10.1

And because Mycenae was only a small place, or if any particular town of that time seems now to be insignificant, it would not be right for me to treat this as an exact piece of evidence and refuse to believe that the expedition against Troy was as great as the poets have asserted and as tradition still maintains.

1.10.2

For if the city of the Lacedaemonians should be deserted, and nothing should be left of it but its temples and the foundations of its other buildings, posterity would, I think, after a long lapse of time, be very loath to believe that their power was as great as their renown. (And yet they occupy two-fifths of the Peloponnesus and have the hegemony of the whole, as well as of tleir many allies outside ; but still, as Sparta is not compactly built as a city and has not provided itself with costly temples and other edifices, but is inhabited village-fashion in the old Hellenic style, its power would appear less than it is.) Whereas, if Athens should suffer the same fate, its power would, I think, from what appeared of the city s ruins, be conjectured double what it is.

1.10.3

The reasonable course, therefore, is not to be incredulous or to regard the appearance of cities rather than their power, but to believe that expedition to have been greater than any that preceded it, though falling below those of the present time, if here again one may put any trust in the poetry of Homer; for though it is natural to suppose that he as a poet adorned and magnified the expedition, still even on his showing it was evidently comparatively small.

1.10.4

For in the fleet of twelve hundred vessels he has represented the ships of the Boeotians as having one hundred and twenty men each, and those of Philoctetes as having fifty,

1.10.4

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1.10.4

indicating, it seems to me, the largest and the smallest ships;

1.10.4

at any rate, no mention as to the size of any others is made in the Catalogue of Ships.

1.10.4

But that all on board were at once rowers and fighting men he has shown in the case of the ships of Philoctetes;

1.10.4

for he represents all the oarsmen as archers.

1.10.4

And it is not likely that many supernumeraries sailed with the expedition, apart from the kings and those highest in office, especially as they were to cross the open sea with all the equipment of war, and, furthermore, had boats which were not provided with decks, but were built after the early style, more like pirate-boats.

1.10.5

In any event, if one takes the mean between the largest ships and the smallest, it is clear that not a large number of men went on the expedition, considering that they were sent out from all Hellas in common.

1.10.5

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1.11.1

The cause was not so much lack of men as lack of money. For it was a want of supplies that caused them to take out a comparatively small force, only so large as could be expected to live on the country while at war. And when they arrived and had prevailed in battle—as evidently they did, for otherwise they could not have built the defence around their camp—even then they seem not to have used their whole force, but to have resorted to farming in the Chersonese and to pillaging, through lack of supplies. Wherefore, since they were scattered, the Trojans found it easier to hold the field against them during those ten years, being a match for those who from time to time were left in camp.

1.11.2

But if they had taken with them an abundant supply of food, and, in a body, without resorting to foraging and agriculture, had carried on the war continuously, they would easily have prevailed in battle and taken the city, since even with their forces not united, but with only such part as was from time to time on the spot, they yet held out; whereas, if they could have sat down and laid siege to Troy, they would have taken it in less time and with less trouble. But because of lack of money not only were the undertakings before the Trojan war insignificant, but even this expedition itself, though far more noteworthy than any before, is shown by the facts to have been inferior to its fame and to the tradition about it that now, through the influence of the poets, obtains.

1.12.1

Indeed, even after the Trojan war Hellas was still subject to migrations and in process of settlement, and hence did not get rest and wax stronger.

1.12.2

For not only did the return of the Hellenes from Ilium, occurring as it did after a long time, cause many changes; but factions also began to spring up very generally in the cities, and, in consequence of these, men were driven into exile and founded new cities.

1.12.3

The present Boeotians, for example, were driven from Arne by the Thessalians in the sixtieth year after the capture of Ilium and settled in the district now called Boeotia, but formerly CadmeYs; only a portion of these had been in that land before, and it was some of these who took part in the expedition against Ilium. The Dorians, too, in the eightieth year after the war, together with the Heracleidae occupied the Peloponnesus.

1.12.4

And so when painfully and after a long course of time Hellas became permanently tranquil and its population was no longer subject to expulsion from their homes, it began to send out colonies. The Athenians colonized lonia and most of the islands; the Peloponnesians, the greater part of Italy and Sicily and some portions of the rest of Hellas. And all these colonies were planted after the Trojan war.

1.13.1

As Hellas grew more powerful and continued to acquire still more wealth than before, along with the increase of their revenue tyrannies began to be established in most of the cities, whereas before that there had been hereditary kingships based on fixed prerogatives. The Hellenes began to fit out navies, too, and to apply themselves more to the sea.

1.13.2

And the Corinthians are said to have been the first of all to adopt what was very nearly the modern plan as regards ships and shipping,

1.13.2

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1.13.2

and Corinth was the first place in all Hellas, we are told, where triremes were built.

1.13.3

And it appears that Ameinocles, a Corinthian shipwright, built four ships for the Samians, also;

1.13.3

and it was about three hundred years before the end of the Peloponnesian war that Ameinocles came to the Samians.

1.13.3

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1.13.4

The earliest sea-fight, too, of which we know, was fought by the Corinthians against the Corcyraeans;

1.13.4

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1.13.4

and this was two hundred and sixty years before the same date.

1.13.5

For as the Corinthians had their city on the Isthmus, from the very earliest times they maintained there a market for the exchange of goods, because the Hellenes within and without the Peloponnesus, in olden times communicating with one another more by land than by sea, had to pass through their territory;

1.13.5

and so they were powerful and rich, as has been shown even by the early poets, who called the place “

1.13.5

Wealthy Corinth”.

1.13.5

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And when navigation grew more prevalent among the Hellenes, the Corinthians acquired ships and swept the sea of piracy, and offering a market by sea as well as by land, raised their city to great power by means of their revenues.

1.13.6

The Ionians, too, acquired a powerful navy later, in the time of Cyrus,

1.13.6

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1.13.6

the first king of the Persians, and of Cambyses his son;

1.13.6

and waging war with Cyrus they maintained control of the sea about their own coasts for some time.

1.13.6

Polycrates, also, who was tyrant of Samos in the time of Cambyses,

1.13.6

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1.13.6

was strong in sea-power and subdued a number of the islands, Rhenea among them, which he captured and consecrated to the Delian Apollo.

1.13.6

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1.13.6

Finally the Phocaeans, when they were colonizing Massalia,

1.13.6

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1.13.6

conquered the Carthaginians in a sea-fight.

1.14.1

These were the most powerful of the fleets;

1.14.1

and even these, we learn, though they were formed many generations later than the Trojan war, were provided with only a few triremes, but were still fitted out with fifty-oared galleys and the ordinary long boats,

1.14.1

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1.14.1

like the navies of that earlier time.

1.14.2

Indeed, it was only a little before the Persian war and the death of Darius,

1.14.2

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1.14.2

who became king of the Persians after Cambyses, that triremes were acquired in large numbers, namely by the tyrants in various parts of Sicily and by the Corcyraeans;

1.14.2

and these were the last navies worthy of note that were established in Hellas before the expedition of Xerxes.

1.14.3

As for the Athenians and Aeginetans and any other maritime powers, the fleets they had acquired were inconsiderable, consisting mostly of fifty-oared galleys;

1.14.3

and it was only quite recently that the Athenians, when they were at war with the Aeginetans and were also expecting the Barbarians,

1.14.3

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1.14.3

built their fleet, at the instance of Themistocles—the very ships with which they fought at Salamis.

1.14.3

And these vessels were still without decks throughout their length.

1.15.1

Such were the navies of the Hellenes, both those of early and those of later times; nevertheless those who gave attention to such matters acquired not a little strength by reason both of revenue of money and of sway over others. For they—and especially the peoples whose own territory was insufficient—made expeditions against the islands and subjugated them.

1.15.2

But by land no wars arose from which any considerable accession of power resulted; on the contrary, all that did occur were border wars with their several neighbours, and foreign expeditions far from their own country for the subjugation of others were not undertaken by the Hellenes. For they had not yet been brought into union as subjects of the most powerful states, nor, on the other hand, did they of their own accord make expeditions in common as equal allies; it was rather against one another that the neighbouring peoples severally made war.

1.15.3

But it was chiefly in the war that arose a long time ago between the Chalcidians and the Eretrians,

1.15.3

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1.15.3

that all the rest of Hellas took sides in alliance with the one side or the other.

1.16.1

But different Hellenic peoples in different localities met with obstacles to their continuous growth;

1.16.1

for example, after the Ionians had attained great prosperity, Cyrus and the Persian empire, after subduing Croesus

1.16.1

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1.16.1

and all the territory between the river Halys and the sea, made war against them and enslaved the cities on the mainland, and later on Darius, strong in the possession of the Phoenician fleet, enslaved the islands also.

1.16.1

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1.17.1

The tyrants, moreover—whenever there were tyrants in the Hellenic cities—since they had regard for their own interests only,both as to the safety of their own persons and as to the aggrandizement of their own families, in the administration of their cities made security, so far as they possibly could, their chief aim, and so no achievement worthy ot mention was accomplished by them, except perchance by individuals in conflict with their own neighbours. So on all sides Hellas was for a long time kept from carrying out in common any notable undertaking, and also its several states from being more enterprising.

1.18.1

But finally the tyrants, not only of Athens but also of the rest of Hellas (which, for a long time before Athens, had been dominated by tyrants)-at least most of them and the last that ever ruled, if we except tlose in Sicily—were put down by the Lacedaemonians.

1.18.1

For although Lacedaemon, after the settlement there of the Dorians who now inhabit it, was, for the longest period of all the places of which we know, in a state of sedition, still it obtained good laws at an earlier time than any other land, and has always been free from tyrants;

1.18.1

for the period during which the Lacedaemonians have been enjoying the same constitution

1.18.1

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1.18.1

covers about four hundred years or a little more down to the end of the Peloponnesian war.

1.18.1

And it is for this reason that they became powerful and regulated the affairs of other states as well.

1.18.1

Not many years after the overthrow of the tyrants in Hellas by the Lacedaemonians the battle of Marathon

1.18.1

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1.18.1

was fought between the Athenians and the Persians;

1.18.2

and ten years after that the Barbarian came again with his great host against Hellas to enslave it. In the face of the great danger that threatened, the Lacedaemonians, because they were the most powerful, assumed the leadership of the Hellenes that joined in the war; and the Athenians, when the Persians came on, resolved to abandon their city, and packing up their goods embarked on their ships, and so became sailors. By a common effort the Barbarian was repelled; but not long afterwards the other Hellenes, both those who had revolted from the King and those who had joined the first confederacy against him, parted company and aligned themselves with either the Athenians or the Lacedaemonians; for these states had shown themselves the most powerful, the one strong by land and the other on the sea.

1.18.3

The defensive alliance lasted only a little while; then the Lacedaemonians and the Athenians quarrelled and, with their respective allies, made war upon one another, and any of the rest of the Hellenes, if they chanced to be at variance, from now on resorted to one or the other. So that from the Persian invasion continually, to this present war, making peace at one time, at another time fighting with each other or with their own revolted allies, these two states prepared themselves well in matters of war, and became more experienced, taking their training amid actual dangers.

1.19.1

The Lacedaemonians maintained their hegemony without keeping their allies tributary to them, but took care that these should have an oligarchical form of government conformably to the sole interest of Sparta;

1.19.1

the Athenians, on the other hand, maintained theirs by taking over in course of time the ships of the allied cities, with the exception of Chios

1.19.1

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1.19.1

and Lesbos,

1.19.1

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and by imposing on them all a tax of money.

1.19.1

And so the individual resources of the Athenians available for this war became greater than those of themselves and their allies when that alliance was still unimpaired and strongest.

1.20.1

Now the state of affairs in early times I have found to have been such as I have described, although it is difficult in such matters to credit any and every piece of testimony.

1.20.1

For men accept from one another hearsay reports of former events, neglecting to test them just the same,

1.20.1

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1.20.1

even though these events belong to the history of their own country.

1.20.2

Take the Athenians, for example;

1.20.2

most of them think that Hipparchus was tyrant when he was slain by Harmodius and Aristogeiton.

1.20.2

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1.20.2

They do not know that it was Hippias, as the eldest of the sons of Peisistratus, who was ruler, and that Hipparchus and Thessalus were merely his brothers;

1.20.2

further, that Harmodius and Aristogeiton, suspecting, on that very day and at the very moment of executing their plan, that information had been conveyed to Hippias by one of their fellow-conspirators, held off from him as forewarned, but wishing to do something before they were seized and then take their chances, fell in with Hipparchus, who was marshalling the Panathenaic procession near the sanctuary called Leocorium,

1.20.2

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and killed him.

1.20.3

There are many other matters, too, belonging to the present and not forgotten through lapse of time, regarding which the other Hellenes

1.20.3

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1.20.3

as well hold mistaken opinions, for example, that at Lacedaemon the kings cast not one but two votes each, and that the Lacedaemonians have the " Pitana company" in their army, which never at any time existed.

1.20.3

So averse to taking pains are most men in the search for the truth, and so prone are they to turn to what lies ready at hand.

1.21.1

Still, from the evidence that has been given, any one would not err who should hold the view that the state of affairs in antiquity was pretty nearly such as I have described it, not giving greater credence to the accounts, on the one hand, which the poets have put into song, adorning and amplifying their theme, and, on the other, which the chroniclers have composed with a view rather of pleasing the ear

1.21.1

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1.21.1

than of telling the truth, since their stories cannot be tested and most of them have from lapse of time won their way into the region of the fabulous so as to be incredible.

1.21.1

He should regard the facts as having been made out with sufficient accuracy, on the basis of the clearest indications, considering that they have to do with early times.

1.21.2

And so, even though men are always inclined, while they are engaged in a war, to judge the present one the greatest, but when it is over to regard ancient events with greater wonder, yet this war will prove, for men who judge from the actual facts, to have been more important than any that went before.

1.22.1

As to the speeches that were made by different men, either when they were about to begin the war or when they were already engaged therein, it has been difficult to recall with strict accuracy the words actually spoken, both for me as regards that which I myself heard, and for those who from various other sources have brought me reports. Therefore the speeches are given in the language in which, as it seemed to me, the several speakers would express, on the subjects under consideration, the sentiments most befitting the occasion, though at the same time I have adhered as closely as possible to the general sense of what was actually said.

1.22.2

But as to the facts of the occurrences of the war, I have thought it my duty to give them, not as ascertained from any chance informant nor as seemed to me probable, but only after investigating with the greatest possible accuracy each detail, in the case both of the events in which I myself participated and of those regarding which I got my information from others.

1.22.3

And the endeavour to ascertain these facts was a laborious task, because those who were eye-witnesses of the several events did not give the same reports about the same things, but reports varying according to their championship of one side or the other, or according to their recollection.

1.22.4

And it may well be that the absence of the fabulous from my narrative will seem less pleasing to the ear; but whoever shall wish to have a clear view both of the events which have happened and of those which will some day, in all human probability, happen again in the same or a similar way—for these to adjudge my history profitable will be enough for me. And, indeed, it has been composed, not as a prize-essay to be heard for the moment, but as a possession for all time.

1.23.1

The greatest achievement of former times was the Persian war, and yet this was quickly decided in two sea-fights

1.23.1

1

1.23.1

and two land-battles.

1.23.1

2

1.23.1

But the Peloponnesian war was protracted to a great length, and in the course of it disasters befell Hellas the like of which had never occurred in any equal space of time.

1.23.2

Never had so many cities been taken and left desolate, some by the Barbarians,

1.23.2

1

1.23.2

and others by Hellenes

1.23.2

2

1.23.2

themselves warring against one another;

1.23.2

while several, after their capture, underwent a change of inhabitants.

1.23.2

3

1.23.2

Never had so many human beings been exiled, or so much human blood been shed, whether in the course of the war itself or as the result of civil dissensions.

1.23.3

And so the stories of former times, handed down by oral tradition, but very rarely confirmed by fact, ceased to be incredible: about earthquakes, for instance, for they prevailed over a very large part of the earth and were likewise of the greatest violence; eclipses of the sun, which occurred at more frequent intervals than we find recorded of all former times; great droughts also in some quarters with resultant famines; and lastly- the disaster which wrought most harm to Hellas and destroyed a considerable part of the people—the noisome pestilence. For all these disasters fell upon them simultaneously with this war.

1.23.4

And the war began when the Athenians and Peloponnesians broke the thirty years' truce,

1.23.4

1

1.23.4

concluded between them after the capture of Euboea.

1.23.5

The reasons why they broke it and the grounds of their quarrel I have first set forth, that no one may ever have to inquire for what cause the Hellenes became involved in so great a war.

1.23.6

The truest explanation, although it has been the least often advanced, I believe to have been the growth of the Athenians to greatness, which brought fear to the Lacedaemonians and forced them to war. But the reasons publicly alleged on either side which led them to break the truce and involved them in the war were as follows.

1.24.1

There is a city called Epidamnus on the right hand as one sails into the Ionian gulf, and its next-door neighbours are a barbarian tribe, the Taulantians, of Illyrian race.

1.24.2

The city was colonized by the Corcyraeans, and its founder was Phalius, son of Eratocleides, of Corinthian stock and a descendant of Heracles, who was invited from the mother-city according to the ancient custom;

1.24.3

but some Corinthians and other Dorians joined the Corcyraeans in establishing the colony. As time passed the city of the Epidamnians became great and populous;

1.24.4

but civil wars ensued, lasting, it is said, for many years, and in consequence of a war with the neighbouring barbarians they were crippled and stripped of most of their power.

1.24.5

Finally, just before the Peloponnesian war, the populace expelled the aristocrats, and they, making common cause with the barbarians and attacking Epidamnus, plundered those who were in the city both by land and sea.

1.24.6

These, when they were being hard pressed, sent envoys to Corcyra, as being their mother-city, beg g them not to look on and see them destroyed, but to reconcile them with the exiles and to put a stop to the war with the barbarians.

1.24.7

This petition they made, sitting as suppliants in the temple of Hera. But the Corcyraeans denied their supplication, and sent them back unsuccessful.

1.25.1

The Epidannians, recognizing that no aid was to be had from Corcyra, were at a loss how to settle their present difficulty; so they sent to Delphi and asked the god whether they should deliver up their city to the Corinthians as founders and try to procure some aid from them. The god answered that they should deliver it up to them and make them leaders.

1.25.2

So the Epidamnians went to Corinth and

1.25.2

1

1.25.2

delivered up the city as Corinthian colony, in accordance with the oracle, showing that their founder was from Corinth and stating the response of the oracle;

1.25.2

and they begged the Corinthians not to look on and see them utterly destroyed, but to come to on

1.25.3

and sce. The Corinthians undertook the task, partly on the ground of right, because they considered that the colony belonged to them quite as much as to the Corcyraeans, partly also through hatred of the Corcyraeans, for the reason that these, though Corinthian colonists, neglected

1.25.4

the mother-city.

1.25.4

For neither at their common festival gatherings 1 would they concede the customary privileges to Corinthians, nor would they begin with a representative of Corinth the initial rites at sacrifices,

1.25.4

1

1.25.4

as the rest of the colonies did, but they treated them with contempt For at that time they were in point of wealth equal to the richest of the Hellenes, and in preparation for war even stronger, while in sea-power they sometimes boasted that they were greatly superior, because of the former occupation of the island by the Phaeacians,

1.25.4

2

1.25.4

whose glory was in their ships.

1.25.4

It was for this reason that they kept on developing their navy, and they were in fact powerful;

1.25.4

for they had on hand one hundred and twenty triremes when the war began.

1.26.1

So the Corinthians, having all these grounds of complaint, gladly sent the desired aid to Epidamnus, inviting whoever wished to go along as settlers and despatching as a garrison some Ambraciots and Leucadians and a detachment of themselves.

1.26.2

They proceeded to Apollonia, a colony of the Corinthians going by land through fear of the Corcyraeans, lest they might be prevented by them if they should attempt to cross the sea.

1.26.3

But when the Corcyraeans perceived that the settlers and the garrison had arrived at Epidamnus, and that their colony had been given up to the Corinthians, they were indignant So they sailed immediately with twenty-five shps, and later with a second fleet, and insolently bade the Epidamnians dismiss the garrison sent by the Corinthians and the settlers, and also receive back their exiles; for the exiled Epidamnians had gone to Corcyra, and pointing to the sepulchres of common ancestors and invoking the tie of kinship had begged the Corcyraeans to restore them.

1.26.4

As the Epidamnians paid no heed to them the Corcyraeans proceeded against them with forty ships, accompanied by the exiles whom they intended to restore, and taking along the Illyrians also.

1.26.5

And sitting down before the city they proclaimed that the foreigners and any Epidamnians who wished might go away in safety; otherwise they would treat them as enemies. But when the Epidamnians would not comply, the Corcyraeans laid siege to the city, which is connected with the shore by an isthmus.

1.27.1

But the Corinthians, when messengers came from Epidamnus announcing the siege, prepared an expedition and proclaimed at the same time a colony to Epidamnus, saying that any who wished might go there on a basis of equal rights for all, and that if anyone was not inclined to sail at once, but wished to have part in the colony, he might make a deposit of fifty Corinthian drachmae

1.27.1

1

1.27.1

and remain at home.

1.27.1

The number that sailed was large, as also of those who deposited the money.

1.27.2

Request was also made of the Megarians to convoy them with ships, in case an attempt should be made by the Corcyraeans to prevent their sailing; and these were preparing to accompany them with eight ships, and the Paleans, from Cephallenia, with four. The Epidaurians, of whom a like request was made, furnished five ships, the Hermionians one, the Troezenians two, the Leucadians ten, and the Ambraciots eight. Upon the Thebans and the Phliasians a demand was made for money, and upon the Eleans for unmanned ships as well as for money. And the Corinthians themselves, for their part, made ready thirty ships and three thousand hoplites.

1.28.1

When the Corevraeans learned of these preparations they went to Corinth, with Lacedaemonian and Sicyonian envoys whom they took with them, and bade the Corinthians withdraw the garrison and settlers at Epidamnus, on the ground that they had no part in Epidamnus.

1.28.2

But if they made any claim to it they were willing, they said, to submit the matter for arbitration to any states in the Peloponnesus that both should agree upon, and to whichever party the colony should be adjudged to belong, these should have it; and they were willing also to submit the matter to the oracle at Delphi.

1.28.3

War, however, they warned them not to bring on;

1.28.3

but if it must be, they too would be compelled, if the Corinthians forced the issue, to make friends with those for whom they had no wish, others beyond their present ones, in order to secure assistance.

1.28.3

1

1.28.4

The Corinthians answered that if the Corcyraeans would withdraw their ships and the barbarians from Epidamnus they would consider the matter, but that meanwhile it was not proper for them

1.28.4

1

1.28.4

to be discussing arbitration while the Epidamnians were undergoing siege.

1.28.5

Whereupon the Corcyraeans replied that they would do this if the Corinthians on their part would withdraw their forces at Epidamnus;

1.28.5

but they were also ready to arbitrate on condition that both parties should remain where they were and that they should make a truce until the decision should be given.

1.28.5

1

1.29.1

The Corinthians, however, would not listen to any of these proposals, but, as soon as their ships were manned and their allies were at hand, they sent a herald in advance to declare war against the

1.29.1

1

1.29.1

Corcyraeans;

1.29.1

then, setting off with seventy-five ships and two thousand hoplites, they sailed for Epidamnus to give battle to

1.29.2

the Corcyraeans. Their ships were under the command of Aristeus son of Pellichus, Callicrates son of Callias, and Timanor son of Timantles; the infantry under that of Archetimus son of Eurytimus and Isarchidas son

1.29.3

of Isarchus. But when they reached Actium in the territory of Anactorium, where is the sanctuary of Apollo at the mouth of the Ambracian gulf, the Corcyraeans sent out a herald in a small boat to forbid their advance, and at the same time proceeded to man their ships, having previously strengthened the old vessels with cross-beams so as to make them seaworthy, and having put the rest

1.29.4

in repair. When their herald brought back no message of peace from the Corinthians and their ships were now fully manned, being eighty in number (for forty were besieging Epidamnus), they sailed out against the enemy and, drawing up in line, engaged

1.29.5

in battle;

1.29.5

and they won a complete victory and destroyed fifteen ships of the Corinthians.

1.29.5

On the same day it happened that their troops which were engaged in the siege of Epidamnus forced it to a capitulation, on condition that the other immigrants

1.29.5

1

1.29.5

should be sold into slavery but the Corinthians kept in bonds until something else should be agreed upon.

1.30.1

After the sea-fight the Corcyraeans set up a trophy of their victory at Leucimne, a promontory in the territory of Corcyra, and put to death the prisoners they had taken, with the exception of the Corinthians, whom they kept in fetters.

1.30.2

But afterwards, when the Corinthians and their allies had gone back home with their ships after their defeat, the Corcyraeans were masters of the whole sea in that quarter, and sailing to Leucas, the colony of the Corinthians, they ravaged the country and burned Cyllene, the naval arsenal of the Eleans, because they had furnished ships and money to the Corinthians.

1.30.3

And so for most of the time after the sea-fight they had control over the sea; and sailing against the allies of the Corinthians they kept harrying them, until the Corinthians, as the summer was drawing to an end,' seeing that their allies were suffering, sent ships and an army and encamped at Actium and near the promontory of Cheimerium in Thesprotis, as a protection for Leucas and the other cities that were friendly to themselves.

1.30.4

And the Corcyraeans encamped on the opposite coast at Leucimne with both ships and infantry. Neither side sailed against the other, but they faced each other for the rest of this summer; it was not until winter had come that they each went back home.

1.31.1

During the whole year after the sea-fight and the next year the Corinthians, being angrily indignant about their war with the Corcyraeans, kept building ships and preparing a naval armament with all their might, and collected oarsmen from both the Peloponnesus and the rest of Hellas by the inducement of pay.

1.31.2

The Corcyraeans, on the other hand, were alarmed when they learned of their preparations, and since they were without an ally among the Hellenes and had not enrolled themselves in the alliance either of the Athenians or of the Lacedaemonians, they decided to go to the Athenians, become their allies, and try to procure some aid from them.

1.31.3

But the Corinthians also, hearing of this, themselves sent envoys to Athens to prevent the accession of the Athenian fleet to that of the Corcyraeans, as this would hamper them in settling the war as they wished.

1.31.4

And when an assembly Q38. was held opposing speeches were made, and the Corcyraeans spoke as follows:

1.32.1

"It is but fair, citizens of Athens, that those who, without any previous claim on the score of important service rendered or of an existing alliance, come to their neighbours to ask aid, as we do now, should show in the first place, if possible, that what they ask is advantageous, or at least that it is not hurtful, and, in the second place, that their gratitude can be depended on; but in case they establish neither of these things clearly, they should not be angry if unsuccessful.

1.32.2

Now the Corcyraeans have sent us to ask for an alliance, and in full confidence that they will be able to give you guarantees on just these points.

1.32.3

But it so happens that our policy has been at one and the same time inconsistent, as it must seem to you, with our petition, and is also disadvantageous under present circumstances to ourselves;

1.32.4

for although heretofore we have freely chosen to be allies of no one, we have now come to ask others for an alliance, and at the same time, in the face of the present war with the Corinthians, we are, because of this very policy, isolated. And so what was formerly fondly imagined to be wise discretion on our part—to enter into no foreign alliance, with the possibility of having to take our share of the danger of our neighbour's policy—has now, in the event, proved want of wisdom and a source of weakness.

1.32.5

It is true that, in the sea-fight we have had, we repulsed the Corinthians single-handed; but now that they have set out to attack us with a greater force, drawn from the Peloponnesus and the rest of Hellas, and we see that we are unable to prevail with our own strength alone, and since, further, our peril will be serious if we come into their power, we are constrained to ask help of you and of everyone else; and it is pardonable if we now, actuated by no baseness, but rather acknowledging an error of judgment, venture upon a course that runs counter to our former policy of avoiding foreign entanglements.

1.33.1

" For yourselves, if you concede what we ask, by a happy concurrence of events Athens can get both honour and advantage in many ways: first, you will be giving your aid to those who are wronged and not to those who injure others; next, by taking into alliance men whose most vital interests are at stake, you will lay up for yourselves a claim for gratitude with a record which will abide in our memories for ever;

1.33.2

and, lastly, we have a navy greater than any but your own. Think of it now, what good fortune could be rarer, more vexatious to your foes, than this—that the power which you would have accounted it worth much money and gratitude to acquire should become yours unbidden, offering itself to you without danger or expense, and bringing you, besides, a good name before the world, gratitude from those wio are to receive your help, and enhanced strength for yourselves? To few in all history have such opportunities fallen all at the same time, and few are they who, when they beg for an alliance, come offering to those to whom they make their appeal as large a degree of security and honour as they expect to receive. "

1.33.3

Now as to the war which would give us occasion to be of service, if anyone of you thinks it will not occur he errs in judgment, and fails to perceive that the Lacedaemonians, through fear of you, are eager for war, and that the Corinthians, who have great influence with them and are enemies of yours,

1.33.3

1

1.33.3

are making a beginning with us now

1.33.3

2

1.33.3

with a view to a subsequent attack upon you, in order that we may not be led by our common hatred to take our stand together against them, and that they may not fail, before we unite, to attain their two objects—to harm us and to strengthen themselves.

1.33.4

It is our business, on the other hand, to get the start of them—we offering and you accepting the alliance—and to forestall their schemes rather than to counteract them.

1.34.1

" But if they say that it is not right for you to receive their colonists, let them know that while every colony honours the mother-city so long as it is well treated, yet that if wronged it becomes alienated; for colonists are not sent out to be slaves to those who are left behind, but to be their equals.

1.34.2

And that they were in the wrong is manifest; for when challenged to arbitrate the case of Epidamnus they preferred to prosecute their charges by war rather than by equity.

1.34.3

And let their present treatment of us, who are their kinsmen, be a warning to you, that you be not misled by their deceit, or, if they seek aid from you directly, that you may refuse it. For whoever finds fewest occasions to regret doing favours to his opponents will ever remain most secure.

1.35.1

" Neither will you be breaking your treaty with the Lacedaemonians by receiving us, who are allies of neither party.

1.35.2

For in this treaty it is stipulated that if any of the Hellenic cities is a member of no alliance, it is at liberty to join whichever side it pleases.

1.35.3

And it is monstrous if they are to be allowed to recruit their navy, not only from their own allies, but also from the rest of Hellas besides, and particularly from your subjects, but are to debar us from the alliance that should naturally be open to us as well as from aid from any other quarter, and then shall count it a crime if you are persuaded to concede what we ask. Far more shall we hold you at fault if we fail to win your consent;

1.35.4

for you will be repulsing us who are in peril and are not your enemies, while as regards these men, who are enemies and aggressors, you will not only not be thwarting them, but will even be allowing them to get fresh forces from your own dominions. To that they have no right; but it is right that you should either prevent them from raising mercenaries in places under your control, or else send aid to us also, on whatever terms you may be induced to make; but it would be best of all for you openly to receive and help us.

1.35.5

And many, as we suggested at the outset,

1.35.5

1

1.35.5

are the advantages which we can show you, and the most important of all is this, that the enemies of both of us are, as we see,

1.35.5

2

1.35.5

the same—which is the surest guarantee of fidelity—and these are not weak, but able to injure those who withdraw from them.

1.35.5

And furthermore, when the alliance that is offered is with a maritime and not with a continental power, the alienation of such an ally is not a matter of indifference;

1.35.5

on the contrary, you should

1.35.5

3

1.35.5

by all means, if possible, permit no one else to possess ships;

1.35.5

but if that is impossible, you should have as your friend him who is strongest therein.

1.36.1

" If anyone thinks that this course is indeed expedient, but fears that if he yields to this consideration he will be breaking off the truce,

1.36.1

1

1.36.1

he should understand that his fear, if backed by strength, will make his enemies more afraid;

1.36.1

2

1.36.1

whereas, if he reject our alliance, his confidence

1.36.1

3

1.36.1

will be unsupported by might and will therefore be less formidable against enemies that are strong.

1.36.1

He should understand, furthermore, that he is deliberating upon the interests, not so much of Corcyra, as of Athens, and that he is not making the best provision for her when, in the face of the war that is impending and all but present, he hesitates, through cautious consideration of the immediate chances, to attach to himself a country which is not made a friend or a foe except with the most momentous consequences.

1.36.2

For Corcyra is favourably situated for a coasting voyage either to Italy or Sicily,

1.36.2

1

1.36.2

so that you could prevent a fleet from coming thence to join the Peloponnesians, or could convoy thither a fleet from here;

1.36.3

and in other respects it is a most advantageous place. And by one briefest concluding word, which embraces both the whole issue and all separate facts, you will be convinced that you should not abandon us: The Hellenes have only three fleets that are worthy of mention, yours, ours, and that of the Corinthians; if, now, the Corinthians shall seize us first and you thus let two of these fleets become united, you will have to fight on the sea against both Corcyraeans and Peloponnesians at once; but if you accept us, you will be able to contend against them with your navy augmented by our own.

1.36.4

Thus spoke the Corcyraeans, and after them the Corinthians as follows:

1.37.1

" Since these Corcyraeans have not confined themselves to the question of their admission into your alliance, but have gone further and urged that we are the wrong-doers and they are unfairly attacked, we too must of necessity touch upon both these points before we proceed to our general argument, in order that you may be more definitely forewarned of the nature of tle demand we have to make, and may have good grounds for rejecting their petition. "They say that 'a wise discretion' has hitherto kept them from accepting an alliance with anyone;

1.37.2

but the fact is that they adopted this policy with a view to villainy and not from virtuous motives, and because they wished in their misdeeds not to have any ally as witness, or to be put to shame if they invited his presence.

1.37.3

Moreover, the insular and independent position of this state causes them to be arbitrary judges of the injuries they do to others instead of being judges appointed by mutual agreement; owing to the fact that they resort very little to the ports of their neighbours, but to a very large extent receive into their ports others who are compelled to put in there.

1.37.4

And meanwhile they have used as a cloak their specious policy of avoiding alliances, adopted not in order to avoid joining others in wrong-doing, but that they may do wrong all alone; that wherever they have power they may use violence, and wherever they can escape detection they may overreach someone; and if, perchance, they can steal a march on anyone, that they may brazen it out.

1.37.5

And yet, if they were really honest men, as they pretend to be, the less liable they were to attack by their neighbours the more clearly they might have demonstrated their virtuous motives by offering and accepting proposals of arbitration.

1.38.1

"But neither toward others nor toward us have they shown themselves honest men; on the contrary, although they are colonists of ours, they have constantly stood aloof from us, and now they are at war with us, claiming that they were not sent out to be ill treated.

1.38.2

But neither did we colonize them to be insulted by them, but to be their leaders and to receive from them all due reverence.

1.38.3

The rest of our colonies, at any rate, honour us, and by our colonists we are beloved more than is any other mother-city.

1.38.4

And it is clear that, if we are acceptable to the majority, it cannot be on good grounds that we are unacceptable to these alone; nor are we making war upon them in a way so unusual without being also signally wronged.

1.38.5

And even if we were at fault, the honourable course for them would have been to make allowance for our temper, in which case it would have been shameful for us to outrage their moderation; but in the insolence and arrogance of wealth they have wronged us in many other ways, and particularly in the case of Epidamnus, our colony, which they made no claim to when it was in distress, but seized by force the moment we came to its relief, and continue to hold.

1.39.1

"They pretend, forsooth, that they were the first to agree to an arbitration of the issue; but surely it is not the proposals of the one who has the advantage, and occupies a safe position when he invites arbitration, that ought to have weight, but rather those of the one who has made his actions tally with his professions before appealing to arms.

1.39.2

These men, however, bring forward their specious offer of a court of arbitration, not before laying siege to the place, but only after they had concluded that we would not permit it. And now, not satisfied with the blunders they have committed themselves at Epidamnus, they have come here demanding that you too at this juncture, shall be, not their allies, but their accomplices in crime, and that you shall receive them, now that they are at variance with us.

1.39.3

But they ought to have come to you when they were in no peril at all, and not at a time when we are victims of their injustice and they are consequently in danger, nor when you, without having had the benefit of their power before, will now have to give them a share of your aid, and, though you had nothing to do with their blunders, will have to bear an equal part of the blame we shall bestow. For only if you from the first had shared their power ought you to share the consequences also now of their acts.

1.40.1

" Now it has been clearly shown that we have come with proper grounds of complaint against them and that they are violent and overreaching; but you have still to learn that you have no right to receive them into your alliance.

1.40.2

For even though it is stipulated in the treaty that any unenrolled city may join whichever party it pleases, the provision is not intended for those who apply to one side for admission with a view to the injury of the other, but for any one who, without defrauding another state of his services, asks for protection, and any one who to those who received him will not—if they are prudent—bring war instead of peace.

1.40.2

1

1.40.2

But this is precisely what will be your fate if you do not listen to us.

1.40.3

For you will not merely become allies to them, but also enemies to us instead of being at truce with us. For it will be necessary for us, if you go with them, to include you when we proceed to take vengeance upon them.

1.40.4

And yet the right course for you would be, preferably, to stand aloof from us both,—or else to go with us against them, remembering that you are under treaty with the Corinthians, but have never had with the Corcyraeans even an arrangement to refrain from hostilities for a time,—and not to establish the precedent of admitting into your alliance those who revolt from the other side.

1.40.5

Why, when the Samians

1.40.5

1

1.40.5

revolted from you, and the other Peloponnesians were divided in their votes on the question of aiding them, we on our part did not vote against you;

1.40.6

on the contrary, we openly maintained that each one should discipline his own allies without interference. If you receive and assist evil-doers, you will surely find that full as many of your allies will come over to us, and the precedent you establish will be against yourselves rather than against us.

1.41.1

" These, then, are the considerations of right which we urge upon you—and they are adequate according to the institutions of the Hellenes; but we have also to remind you of a favour and to urge a claim based upon it;

1.41.2

and since we are not your enemies so as to want to injure you, nor yet your friends so that we could make use of you, we think this favour should be repaid us at the present time. It is this: when once, before the Persian war, you were deficient in battle-ships for the war you were waging with the Aeginetans, you borrowed twenty from the Corinthians. And this service and that we rendered in connection with the Samians—our preventing the Peloponnesians from aiding themenabled you to prevail over the Aeginetans and to chastise the Samians.

1.41.3

Both incidents happened, too, at a critical time, when men, engaged in assailing their enemies, are most indifferent to everyconsideration except victory, regarding any one who assists them as a friend, even if he was an enemy before, and any one who stands in their way as an enemy, even if he happen to be a friend; for they even mismanage their own interests in the eager rivalry of the moment.

1.42.1

"Bearing these favours in mind—let every young man here be told of them by one who is older—do you consider it your duty to requite us with the like. And do not think that this course is indeed equitable to urge in a speech, but that another course is advantageous if you come to war.

1.42.2

For advantage is most likely to result when one errs least, and the contingency of the war, with which the Corcyraeans would frighten you into wrongdoing, is still uncertain;

1.42.2

and it is not worth while for you to be so carried away by it as to acquire an enmity with the Corinthians that will be from that moment on a manifest fact and no longer a contingency.

1.42.2

It would be, rather, the prudent course to remove something of the suspicion which has heretofore existed on account of the Megarians

1.42.2

1

1.42.2

;

1.42.3

for the favour which comes last, if conferred at the right moment, even though a small one, can cancel a greater offence.

1.42.4

Nor ought you to be tempted by their offer of a great naval alliance; for to refrain from wronging equals is a surer strength than to be carried away by present appearances and seek an advantage by incurring dangers.

1.43.1

"But we, since events have brought us under the rule which we ourselves proclaimed at Sparta, that each should discipline his own allies, now claim from you in return the same treatment—that you who were then aided by our vote should not injure us by yours.

1.43.2

Pay back like with like, determining that this is the supreme moment when assistance is cne truest friendship—opposition the worst hostility.

1.43.3

We beg you neither to accept the Corcyraeans as your allies in despite of us, nor to aid them in their wrong-doing.

1.43.4

And if you do this, you will not only be taking the fitting course, but will also be consulting your own best interests."

1.44.1

Thus spoke the Corinthians. And the Athenians, having heard both sides, held a second session of the Ecclesia; and although at the earlier one they were rather inclined to agree with the words of the Corinthians, on the second day they changed their minds in favour of the Corcyraeans, and decided, not, indeed, to make an offensive and defensive alliance with them, for in that case, if the Corcyraeans then asked them to join in an expedition against Corinth, they would have to break, on their own responsibility, the treaty with the Lacedaemoniansbut they made a defensive alliance, namely to aid one another in case anyone should attack Corcyra or Athens or the allies of either.

1.44.2

For they believed that in any event the war with the Peloponnesians would have to be faced, and they did not wish to give up Corcyra, which had so large a fleet, to the Corinthians, but hoped to wear them out upon one another as much as possible, in order that the Corinthians as well as other naval powers

1.44.2

1

1.44.2

might be found weaker in case they had to go to war with them.

1.44.3

Besides, the island seemed to them admirably situated for a coasting voyage to Italy and Sicily.

1.44.3

1

1.45.1

With these motives the Athenians received the Corcyraeans into alliance and sent to their aid, soon after the departure of the Corinthians,

1.45.2

ten ships commanded by Lacedaemonius son of Cimon, Diotimus son of Strombichus, and Proteas son of Epicles.

1.45.3

Orders were given to these not to engage with the Corinthians, unless they should sail against Corcyra and attempt to land there, or to some place belonging to the Corcyraeans; but in that case they were to thwart them if possible. The object of these orders was to avoid breaking the treaty.

1.46.1

These ships arrived at Corcyra, and the Corinthians, when their preparations had been made, sailed against Corcyra with one hundred and fifty ships. Of these ten belonged to the Eleans, twelve to the Megarians, ten to the Leucadians, twenty seven to the Ambraciots, one to the Anactorians, and ninety to the Corinthians themselves.

1.46.2

The several cities had each its own general, but Xenocleides son of Euthycles and four others commanded the Corinthians.

1.46.3

They sailed from Leucas, and when they drew near the mainland over against Corcyra, anchored at Cheimerium in the territory of Thesprotia.

1.46.4

It is a harbour, and above it lies a city away from the sea in the Eleatic district of Thesprotia, Ephyra by name. Near it is the outlet into the sea of the Acherusian lake; and the river Acheron runs through Thesprotia and empties into the lake, to which it gives its name. There is also the river Thyamis, which separates Thesprotia and Cestrine, and between these rivers rises the promontory of Cheimerium.

1.46.5

It was at this point of the mainland then that the Corinthians cast anchor and made a camp.

1.47.1

The Corcyraeans, when they became aware of their approach, manned a hundred and ten ships under the command of Miciades, Aesimides, and Eurybatus, and encamped on one of the islands which are called Sybota, the ten Attic ships being also present.

1.47.2

Their land-forces were at the promontory of Leucimne, and also a thousand hoplites of the Zacynthians who had come to aid the Corcyraeans.

1.47.3

The Corinthians, also, had the aid of many barbarians who had assembled on the mainland adjacent; for the dwellers on the mainland in that region have always been friendly to them.

1.48.1

When their preparations had been made, the Corinthians, taking provisions for three days, put off by night from Cheimerium with the intention of giving battle,

1.48.2

and at daybreak as they sailed along they descried the ships of the Corcyraeans out at sea and sailing to meet them.

1.48.3

And as soon as they saw one another, they drew up in opposing battle lines, the Attic ships on the right wing of the Corcyraeans, who themselves held the rest of the line forming three divisions, each under the command of one of the three generals.

1.48.4

So the Corcyraeans arrayed themselves; but the right wing of the Corinthian fleet was held by the Megarian ships and the Ambracian, in the centre were the other allies with their several contingents, while the left was held by the Corinthians themselves with their best sailing ships, opposed to the Athenians and the right wing of the Corcyraeans.

1.49.1

When the standards were raised on either side they joined battle and fought, both having many hoplites on the decks as well as many archers and javelin-men, for they were still equipped rather rudely in the ancient fashion.

1.49.2

And so the sea-fight was hotly contested, not so much by reason of the skill displayed as because it was more like a battle on land.

1.49.3

For when they dashed against one another they could not easily get clear, partly by reason of the number and throng of the ships, still more because they trusted for victory to the hoplites on the decks, who stood and fought while the ships remained motionless;

1.49.3

and there was no cutting of the line,

1.49.3

1

1.49.3

but they fought with fury and brute strength rather than with skill.

1.49.4

Accordingly there was everywhere much tumult and confusion in the sea-fight. The Attic ships, if they saw the Corcyraeans pressed at any point, came up and kept the enemy in awe; but their generals would not begin fighting, fearing to disobey the instructions of the Athenians.

1.49.5

The right wing of the Corinthians suffered most; for the Corcyraeans with twenty ships routed them and pursued them in disorder to the mainland, and then, sailing right up to their camp and disembarking, burned the deserted tents and plundered their property. In that quarter, then, the Corinthians and their allies were worsted, and the Corcyraeans prevailed;

1.49.6

but on the left wing where the Corinthians themselves were, they were decidedly superior, for the Corcyraeans, whose numbers were fewer to begin with, had the twenty ships away in the pursuit.

1.49.7

But the moment the Athenians saw that the Corcvraeans were being hard pressed, they began to help them more unreservedly, and though they at first refrained from actually attacking an enemy ship, yet when it was conspicuously clear that they were being put to flight and the Corinthians were close in pursuit, then at length every man put his hand to work, and fine distinctions were no longer made; matters had come to such a pass that Corinthians and Athenians of necessity had to attack one another.

1.50.1

After the rout of the Corcyraeans the Corinthians did not take in tow and haul off the hulls of the ships which had been disabled, but turned their attention to the men, cruising up and down and killing them in preference to taking them alive; and they unwittingly slew their own friends, not being aware that their right wing had been worsted.

1.50.2

For since the ships or the two fleets were many and covered a great stretch of sea, it was not easy, when they joined in combat, for the Corinthians to determine just who were conquering and who were being conquered;

1.50.2

for this sea-fight was in number of ships engaged greater than any that Hellenes had ever before fought against Hellenes.

1.50.2

1

1.50.3

But as soon as the Corinthians had chased the Corcyraeans to the shore, they turned to the wrecks and their own dead,

1.50.3

1

1.50.3

and they were able to recover most of them and to fetch them to Sybota, an unused harbour of Thesprotia, whither the land forces of the barbarians had come to their aid.

1.50.3

When they had accomplished this, they got their forces together and sailed once more against the Corcyraeans.

1.50.4

And they, with such of their vessels as were seaworthy and all the rest that had not been engaged, together with the Attic ships, on their part also sailed to meet them, fearing that they would attempt to disembark on their territory.

1.50.5

It was now late and the paean had been sounded for the onset, when the Corinthians suddenly began to back water; for they sighted twenty Attic ships approaching, which the Athenians had sent out after the ten as a reinforcement, fearing just what happened, namely that the Corcyraeans would be defeated and their own ten ships would be too few to help them.

1.51.1

So when the Corinthians sighted these ships before the Corcyraeans did, suspecting that they were from Athens and that there were more of them than they saw, they began to withdraw.

1.51.2

For the Corcyraeans, however, the Athenian ships were sailing up more out of view and could not be seen by them, and so they wondered that the Corinthians were backing water, until some of them caught sight of the ships and said, " Yonder are ships sailing up."

1.51.3

Then they too retreated—for it was already getting dark; whereupon the Corinthians put their ships about and broke offthe action.

1.51.4

Thus they separated, the sea-fight ending at nightfall. And while the Corcyraeans were encamping at Leucimne, the twenty ships from Athens, under the command of Glaucon son of Leagrus and Andocides son of Leogoras, having made their way through the corpses and the wrecks, sailed down to the camp not long after they were sighted.

1.51.5

And the Corcyraeans—for it was night—were afraid they were enemies; but afterwards they recognized them and the ships came to anchor.

1.52.1

On the next day the thirty Attic ships and as many of the Corcyraean as were seaworthy put to sea and advanced against the harbour at Sybota, where the Corinthians lay at anchor, wishing to see whether they would fight.

1.52.2

But the Corinthians, although they put out from shore and drew up in line in the open sea, kept quiet: for they had no thought of beginning a fight if they could avoid it as they saw that fresh ships had arrived from Athens and that they themselves were involved in many perplexities, both as regards guarding the captives whom they had in their ships and the impossibility of refitting their ships in a desert place.

1.52.3

What they were more concerned about was the voyage home, how they should get back, for they were afraid that the Athenians would consider that the treaty had been broken, since they had come to blows, and would not let them sail away.

1.53.1

Accordingly they determined to put some men, without a herald's wand,

1.53.1

1

1.53.1

into a boat and send them to the Athenians, to test their intentions.

1.53.2

And these men bore the following message: " You do wrong, men of Athens, to begin war and break a treaty; for by taking up arms against us you interfere with us when we are but punishing our enemies. But if it is your intention to hinder us from sailing against Corcyra or anywhere else we may wish, and you thus break the treaty, first take us who are here and treat us as enemies."

1.53.3

Thus they spoke; and all the host of the Corcyraeans that was within hearing shouted: "Take them and kill them !" But the Athenians made answer as follows: "

1.53.4

We are not beginning war, men of the Peloponnesus, nor are we breaking the treaty, but we have come to aid the Corcyraeans here, who are our allies. If, then, you wish to sail anywhere else, we do not hinder you; but if you ever sail against Corcyra or any place of theirs, we shall not permit it, if we are able to prevent it."

1.54.1

When the Athenians had given this answer the Corinthians began preparations for the voyage homeward and set up a trophy at Sybota on the mainland;

1.54.1

and the Corcyraeans took up the wrecks and dead bodies

1.54.1

1

1.54.1

that had been carried in their direction by the current and by the wind, which had arisen in the night and scattered them in every direction, and set up, as being the victors, a rival trophy at Sybota on the island.

1.54.1

Each side claimed the victory on the following grounds:

1.54.2

The Corinthians set up a trophy because they had prevailed in the sea-fight up to nightfall, and had thus been able to carry off a greater number of wrecks and dead bodies, and because they held as prisoners not less than a thousand men and had disabled about seventy ships; and the Corcyraeans, because they had destroyed about thirty ships, and, after the Athenians came, had taken up the wrecks that came their way and the dead bodies, whereas the Corinthians on the day before had backed water and retreated at sight of the Attic ships, and after the Athenians came would not sail out from Sybota and give battlefor these reasons set up a trophy. So each side claimed the victory.

1.55.1

The Corinthians, as they sailed homeward, took by stratagem Anactorium, which is at the mouth of the Ambracian Gulf, a place held by the Corcyraeans and themselves in common, and establishing there some Corinthian colonists returned home. Of their Corcyraean prisoners they sold eight hundred who were slaves, but two hundred and fifty they kept in custody and treated them with much consideration, their motive being that when they returned to Corcyra they might win it over to their side;1 and it so happened that most of these were among the most influential men of the city.

1.55.2

In this way, then, Corcyra had the advantage in the war with the Corinthians, and the ships of the Athenians withdrew from it. And this was the first ground which the Corinthians had for the war against the Athenians, because they had fought with the Corcyraeans against them in time of truce.

1.56.1

Immediately after this the following events also occurred, which caused differences between the Athenians and the Peloponnesians and led to the war.

1.56.2

While the Corinthians were devising how they should take vengeance on the Athenians, the latter, suspecting their enmity, required of the Potidaeans (who dwell on the isthmus of Pallene and are colonists of the Corinthians but tributary allies of the Athenians), to pull down their wall on the side of Pallene and give hostages, and, furthermore, to send away and not receive in the future the magistrates whom the Corinthians were accustomed to send every year. For they were afraid that the Potidaeans, persuaded by Perdiccas' and the Corinthians, would revolt and cause the rest of the allies in Thrace to revolt with them.

1.57.1

These precautions the Athenians took with regard to the Potidaeans immediately after the seafight at Corcyra;

1.57.2

for the Corinthians were now openly at variance with them, and Perdiccas son of Alexander, king of the Macedonians, who had before been an ally and friend, had now become hostile.

1.57.3

And he had become hostile because the Athenians had made an alliance with his brother Philip and with Derdas, who were making common cause against himself.

1.57.4

Alarmed at this he kept sending envoys to Lacedaemon, trying to bring about a war between Athens and the Peloponnesians. He sought also to win over the Corinthians, with a view to the revolt of Potidaea;

1.57.5

and, furthermore, he made overtures to the Chalcidians of Thrace and the Bottiaeans to join in the revolt, thinking that if he had as allies these countries, which bordered on his own, it would be easier, in conjunction with them, to carry on the war.

1.57.6

But the Athenians became aware of these designs, and wishing to forestall the revolt of the cities, ordered the commanders of their fleet (since they happened to be sending against the country of Perdiccas thirty ships and a thousand hoplites under the command of Archestratus son of Lycomedes and four others) to take hostages of the Potidaeans and pull down their wall, and also to keep a watch upon the neighbouring towns and prevent them from revolting.

1.58.1

The Potidaeans, on the other hand, sent envoys to Atlens, to see if they could persuade them not to take any harsh measures with reference to themselves;

1.58.1

but envoys of theirs went also to Lacedaemon in the company of the Corinthians, with the object of having assistance ready to hand in case of need.

1.58.1

From the Athenians, with whom they carried on protracted negotiation, they obtained no satisfactory result, but on the contrary the ships destined to attack Macedonia proceeded to sail against themselves as well, whereas the magistrates of the Lacedaemonians promised them to invade Attica if the Athenians went against Potidaea;

1.58.1

so they seized this opportunity and revolted. entering into a formal alliance with the Chalcidians

1.58.1

1

1.58.1

and Bottiaeans.

1.58.2

Perdiccas at the same time per suaded the Chalcidians to abandon and pull dowr their cities on the sea-coast and settle inland at Olynthus, making there a single strong city; and he gave them, when they abandoned their cities, a part of his own territory of Mygdonia around Lake Bolbe to cultivate as long as they should be at war with the Athenians. And so they proceeded to dismantle their cities, move inland, and prepare for war.

1.59.1

But when the thirty ships of the Athenians reached the coast of Thrace, they found Potidaea and the other places already in revolt.

1.59.2

Whereupon the generals, thinking it impossible with their present force to wage war with both Perdiccas and the places which had revolted, turned their attention to Macedonia, which was their destination at the start, and when they had got a foothold carried on war in concert with Philip and the brothers of Derdas, who had already invaded Macedonia from the interior with an army.

1.60.1

Thereupon the Corinthians, seeing that Potidaea had revolted and the Attic ships were in the neighbourhood of Macedonia, were alarmed about the place and thinking that the danger came home to them, dispatched volunteers of their own and such other Peloponnesians as they induced by pay, in all sixteen hundred hoplites and four hundred light-armed troops. The general in command was Aristeus son of Adimantus;

1.60.2

and it was chiefly because of friendship for him that most of the soldiers from Corinth went along as volunteers; for he had always been on friendly terms with the Potidaeans.

1.60.3

And they arrived on the coast of Thrace on the fortieth day after the revolt of Potidaea.

1.61.1

The news of the revolt of the cities quickly reached the Athenians also; and when they learned that troops under Aristeus were also on the way to support the rebels, they sent against the places in revolt two thousand of their own hoplites and forty ships, under Callias son of Calliades with four other generals.

1.61.2

These first came to Macedonia and found that the former thousand had just taken Therme and were besieging Pydna;

1.61.3

so they also took part in the siege of Pydna. But afterwards they concluded an agreement and an alliance with Perdiccas, being forced thereto by the situation of Potidaea and tie arrival of Aristeus, which compelled them to hasten, and then they withdrew from Macedonia.

1.61.4

On their way they came to Beroea and thence to Strepsa,

1.61.4

1

1.61.4

and after an unsuccessful attempt upon this place proceeded overland to Potidaea with three thousand hoplites of their own and with many of their allies besides, and with six hundred Macedonian cavalry, who were under the command of Philip and Pausanias;

1.61.4

and at the same time their ships, seventy in number, sailed along the coast.

1.61.5

And marching leisurely they arrived on the third day at Gigonus, and went into camp.

1.62.1

The Potidaeans and the Peloponnesians under Aristeus were awaiting the Athenians, encamped on the Olynthian side of the isthmus; and they had established a market outside of the city.

1.62.2

The allies had chosen Aristeus general of all the infantry, and Perdiccas of the cavalry;

1.62.2

for Perdiccas had immediately deserted the Athenians again

1.62.2

1

1.62.2

and was now in alliance with the Potidaeans, having appointed Iolaus as his administrator at home.

1.62.3

The plan of Aristeus was as follows: he was to hold his own army on the isthmus and watch for the approach of the Athenians, while the Chalcidians and the other allies from outside of the isthmus

1.62.3

1

1.62.3

and the two hundred horse furnished by Perdiccas were to remain at Olynthus;

1.62.3

then when the Athenians should move against the forces of Aristeus, the others were to come up and attack them in the rear, and thus place the enemy between their two divisions.

1.62.4

But Callias, the commander of the Athenians, and his colleagues sent the Macedonian cavalry and a few of the allies toward Olynthus, to shut off aid from that quarter, while they themselves broke camp and advanced against Potidaea.

1.62.5

And when they arrived at the isthmus and saw the enemy preparing for battle, they took up their position facing them and soon the two sides joined battle.

1.62.6

And the wing led by Aristeus himself, which included the picked Corinthian and other troops, routed the forces opposed to them and pressed on a long distance in pursuit; but the rest of the army of the Potidaeans and the Peloponnesians was worsted by the Athenians and took refuge within the walls of Potidaea.

1.63.1

When Aristeus returned from the pursuit and saw that the rest of the army was defeated, he was at a loss whether he should try to fight his way through towards Olynthus or into Potidaea. He determined, however, to bring his own troops together into as compact a body as possible and to force his way into Potidaea on a run. And he succeeded in getting in by way of the breakwater through the sea, with difficulty, indeed, and harassed by missiles; but though he lost a few men, he saved the greater number of them.

1.63.2

Now when the battle began and the standards had been raised,l the auxiliaries of the Potidaeans in Olynthus—which is only about sixty stadia distant and can be seen from Potidaeaadvanced a short distance to give aid, and the Macedonian cavalry drew up in line against them to prevent it.

1.63.2

But since the Athenians were soon proving the victors and the standards were pulled down, the auxiliaries retired again within the walls of Olynthus and the Macedonians rejoined the Athenians.

1.63.2

And so no cavalry got into action on either side.

1.63.2

1

1.63.3

After the battle the Athenians set up a trophy and gave up their dead under a truce to the Potidaeans.

1.63.3

There were slain, of the Potidaeans and their allies a little less than three hundred, and of the Athenians alone

1.63.3

1

1.63.3

about a hundred and fifty, and also their general Callias.

1.64.1

The city wall on the isthmus side

1.64.1

1

1.64.1

the Athenians immediately cut off by a transverse wall and set a guard there, but the wall toward Pallene was not shut off.

1.64.1

2

1.64.1

For they thought their numbers were insufficient to maintain a garrison on the isthmus and also to cross over to Pallene and build a wall there too, fearing that, if they divided their forces, the Potidaeans and their allies would attack them.

1.64.2

Afterwards, when the Athenians at home learned that Pallene was not blockaded, they sent sixteen hundred of their own hoplites under the command of Phormio son of Asopius; and he, when he arrived at Pallene, making Aphytis his base, brought his army to Potidaea, marching leisurely and ravaging the country at the same time. And as no one came out against him to give battle he built a wall to blockade the Pallene wall.

1.64.3

And so Potidaea was at length in a state of siege, which was prosecuted vigorously on both sides of it as well as by sea, where a fleet blockaded it.

1.65.1

As for Aristeus, now that Potidaea was cut off by the blockade and he had no hope of saving it unless help should come from the Peloponnesus or something else should happen beyond his expectation, he advised all the garrison except five hundred men to wait for a wind and sail out of the harbour, that the food might hold out longer, and he himself was ready to be one of those who should remain. But since he could not gain their consent, wishing to do the next best thing and to provide that their affairs outside should be put into the best possible condition, he sailed out, unobserved by the Athenian guard.

1.65.2

He then remained among the Chalcidians, whom he assisted generally in carrying on the war, and especially by destroying a large force of Sermylians, whom he ambushed near their city; and meanwhile he kept up negotiations with the Peloponnesians to see if some aid could not be obtained. Phormio, however, after the investment of Potidaea was complete, took his sixteen hundred troops and ravaged Chalcidice and Bottice; and he also captured some towns.

1.66.1

As between the Athenians and the Peloponnesians, then, these additional grounds of complaint had arisen on either side, the Corinthians being aggrieved because the Athenians were besieging Potidaea, a colony of theirs with men in it from Corinth and the Peloponnesus, the Athenians, because the Peloponnesians had brought about the revolt of a city that was an ally and tributary of theirs, and then had come and openly fought with the Potidaeans against themselves. As yet, however, the war had not openly broken out, but there was still a truce for in these things the Corinthians had acted only on their own authority.

1.67.1

But when siege was laid to Potidaea they did not take it quietly, not only because Corinthians were in the town, but also because they were in fear about the place; and they immediately summoned the allies to Lacedaemon and, once there, they proceeded to inveigh against the Athenians on the ground that they had broken the treaty and were wronging the Peloponnesus.

1.67.2

The Aeginetans also sent delegates—not openly, to be sure, for they feared the Athenians, but secretly—and, acting with the Corinthians, took a leading part in fomenting the war, saying that they were not autonomous as stipulated in the treaty.

1.67.3

Then the Lacedaemonians sent out a summons to all the other allies who claimed to have suffered any wrong at the hands of the Athenians, and calling their own customary assembly bade them speak.

1.67.4

Others came forward and stated their several complaints, and particularly the Megarians, who presented a great many other grievances, and chiefly this, that they were excluded from the harbours throughout the Athenian dominions and from the Athenian market, contrary to the treaty.

1.67.5

Lastly the Corinthians, after they had first allowed the others to exasperate the Lacedaemonians, spoke as follows:

1.68.1

"That spirit of trust which marks your domestic policy, O Lacedaemonians, and your relations with one another, renders you more mistrustful if we bring any charge against others, and thus while this quality gives you sobriety, yet because of it you betray a want of understanding in dealing with affairs abroad.

1.68.2

For example, although we warned you time and again of the injury the Athenians were intending to do us, you refused to accept the information we kept giving you, but preferred to direct your suspicions against the speakers, feeling that they were actuated by their own private interests. And this is the reason why you did not act before we got into trouble, but it is only when we are in the midst of it that you have summoned these allies, among whom it is especially fitting that we should speak, inasmuch as we have the gravest accusations to bring, insulted as we have long been by the Athenians and neglected by you.

1.68.3

And if they were wronging Hellas in some underhand way, you might have needed additional information on the ground of your ignorance;

1.68.3

but as the case stands, what need is there of a long harangue, when you see that they have enslaved some of us

1.68.3

1

1.68.3

and are plotting against others, notably against your own allies, and that they have long been making their preparations with a view to the contingency of war?

1.68.4

For otherwise they would not have purloined Corcyra, which they still hold in despite of us, and would not be besieging Potidaea—one of these being a most strategic point for operations on the Thracian coast, while the other would have furnished a very large fleet to the Peloponnesians.

1.69.1

"And the blame for all this belongs to you, for you permitted them in the first instance to strengthen their city after the Persian war,

1.69.1

1

1.69.1

and afterwards to build their Long Walls,

1.69.1

2

1.69.1

while up to this very hour you are perpetually defrauding of their freedom not only those who have been enslaved by them, but now even your own allies also.

1.69.1

For the state which has reduced others to slavery does not in a more real fashion enslave them than the state which has power to prevent it, and yet looks carelessly on, although claiming as its preeminent distinction that it is the liberator of Hellas.

1.69.2

And now at last we have with difficulty managed to come together, though even now without a clearly defined purpose. For we ought no longer to be considering whether we are wronged, but how we are to avenge our wrongs. For where men are men of action, it is with resolved plans against those who have come to no decision, it is at once and without waiting, that they advance.

1.69.3

We know too by what method the Athenians move against their neighbours—that it is here a little and there a little. And as long as they think that, owing to your want of perception, they are undetected, they are less bold; but once let them learn that you are aware but complaisant, and they will press on with vigour.

1.69.4

For indeed, O Lacedaemonians, you alone of the Hellenes pursue a passive policy, defending yourselves against aggression, not by the use of your power, but by your intention to use it;

1.69.5

and you alone propose to destroy your enemies' power, not at its inception, but when it is doubling itself.

1.69.5

1

1.69.5

And yet you had the reputation of running no risks;

1.69.5

but with you, it would seem, repute goes beyond reality.

1.69.5

For example, the Persian, as we ourselves know, came from the ends of the earth as far as the Peloponnesus before your forces went forth to withstand him in a manner worthy of your power;

1.69.5

and now you regard with indifference the Athenians who are not afar off, as the Persian was, but near at hand, and instead of attacking them yourselves, you prefer to ward them off when they attack, and incur hazard by joining in a struggle with opponents who have become far more powerful.

1.69.5

Yet you know that the Barbarian failed mostly by his own fault, and that in our struggles with the Athenians themselves we have so far often owed our successes rather to their own errors than to any aid received from you;

1.69.5

indeed, it is the hopes they have placed in you that have already ruined more than one state that was unprepared just because of trust in you.

1.69.6

And let no one of you think that these things are said more out of hostile feeling than by way of complaint; for complaint is against friends that err, but accusation against enemies that have inflicted an injury.

1.70.1

" And besides, we have the right, we think, if any men have, to find fault with our neighbours, especially since the interests at stake for us are important. To these interests it seems to us at least that you are insensible, and that you have never even fully considered what sort of men the Athenians are with whom you will have to fight, and how very, how utterly, different they are from you.

1.70.2

For they are given to innovation and quick to form plans and to put their decisions into execution, whereas you are disposed merely to keep what you have, to devise nothing new, and, when you do take action, not to carry to completion even what is indispensable.

1.70.3

Again, they are bold beyond their strength, venturesome beyond their better judgment, and sanguine in the face of dangers; while your way is to do less than your strength warrants, to distrust even what your judgment is sure of, and when dangers come to despair of deliverance. Nay more, they are prompt in decision, while you are dilatory;

1.70.4

they stir abroad, while you are perfect stay-at-homes; for they expect by absence from home to gain something, while you are afraid that, if you go out after something, you may imperil even what you have. If victorious over their enemies, they pursue their advantage to the utmost;

1.70.5

if beaten, they fall back as little as possible.

1.70.6

Moreover, they use their bodies in the service of their country as though they were the bodies of quite other men, but their minds as though they were wholly their own, so as to accomplish anything on her behalf.

1.70.7

And whenever they have conceived a plan but fail to carry it to fulfilment, they think themselves robbed of a possession of their own; and whenever they go after a thing and obtain it, they consider that they have accomplished but little in comparison with what the future has in store for them ; but if it so happens that they try a thing and fail, they form new hopes instead and thus make up the loss.

1.70.8

For with them alone is it the same thing to hope for and to attain when once they conceive a plan, for the reason that they swiftly undertake whatever they determine upon. In this way they toil, with hardships and dangers, all their life long; and least of all men they enjoy what they have because they are always seeking more, because they think their only holiday is to do their duty, and because they regard untroubled peace as a far greater calamity than laborious activity.

1.70.9

Therefore if a man should sum up and say that they were born neither to have peace themselves nor to let other men have it, he would simply speak the truth.

1.71.1

"And yet, although you have such a state ranged against you, O Lacedaemonians, you go on delaying and forget that a peaceful policy suffices long only for those who, while they employ their military strength only for just ends, yet by their spirit show plainly that they will not put up with it if they are treated with injustice; whereas you practise fair dealing on the principle of neither giving offence to others nor exposing yourselves to injury in self-defence.l But it would be difficult to carry out such a policy successfully if you had as neighbour a state just like yourselves;

1.71.2

whereas now, as we have just shown, your practices are old-fashioned as compared with theirs.

1.71.3

But in politics, as in the arts, the new must always prevail over the old. It is true that when a state is at peace the established practices are best left unmodified, but when men are compelled to enter into many undertakings there is need of much improvement in method. It is for this reason that the government of the Athenians, because they have undertaken many things, has undergone greater change than yours.

1.71.4

"Here, then, let your dilatoriness end; at this moment succour both the Potidaeans and the rest of your allies, as you promised to do, by invading Attica without delay, that you may not betray your friends and kinsmen to their bitterest enemies, and drive the rest of us in despair to seek some other alliance.

1.71.5

If we took such a course we should be committing no wrong either in the sight of the gods we have sworn by or of men of understanding; for treaties are broken not by those who when left unsupported join others, but by those who fail to succour allies they have sworn to aid. But if you mean to be zealous allies we will stay;

1.71.6

for in that case we should be guilty of impiety if we changed our friends, nor should we find others more congenial.

1.71.7

In view of these things, be well advised, and make it your endeavour that the Peloponnesian league shall be no weaker under your leadership than when you inherited it from your fathers."

1.72.1

Thus spoke the Corinthians. But there happened to be present at Lacedaemon an embassy of the Athenians that had come on other business, and when they heard the various speeches they deemed it advisable to appear before the Lacedaemonians, not indeed to make any defence on the charges brought by the cities, but to make clear with regard to the whole question at issue that the Lacedaemonians should not decide it hastily but should take more time to consider it. At the same time they wished to show how great was the power of their own city, reminding the older men of what they already knew, and recounting to the younger things of which they were ignorant, in the belief that under the influence of their arguments the Lacedaemonians would be inclined to peace rather than war.

1.72.2

Accordingly they approached the Lacedaemonians and said that they also wished, if there was nothing to hinder, to address their assembly. The Lacedaemonians invited them to present themselves, and the Athenians came forward and spoke as follows:

1.73.1

"Our embassy did not come here to enter into a dispute with your allies, but on the business for which our city sent us.

1.73.1

Perceiving, however, that no small outcry is being made against us, we have come forward, not to answer the charges of the cities (for it can hardly be that either they or we are addressing you as judges), but in order that you may not, yielding to the persuasion of your allies, lightly make a wrong decision about matters of great importance.

1.73.1

And at the same time we wish, as regards the whole outcry that has been raised against us, to show that we are rightfully in possession of what we have acquired, and that our city is not to be despised.

1.73.1

"Now, what need is there to speak about matters quite remote,

1.73.1

1

1.73.1

whose only witnesses are the stories men hear rather than the eyes of those who will hear them told?

1.73.2

But concerning the Persian War and all the other events of which you have personal knowledge, we needs must speak, even though it will be rather irksome to mention them, since they are always being paraded. For when we were performing those deeds the risk was taken for a common benefit, and since you got a share of the actual results of that benefit, we should not be wholly deprived of the credit, if there is any benefit in that.

1.73.3

And our aim in the recital of the facts will be, not so much to deprecate censure, as to show by evidence with what sort of city you will be involved in war if you are not well advised.

1.73.4

"For we affirm that at Marathon we alone bore the first brunt of the Barbarian's attack, and that when he came again, not being able to defend ourselves by land, we embarked in a body on our ships and joined in the sea-fight at Salamis. This prevented his sailing against you city by city and ravaging the Peloponnesus, for you would have been unable to aid one another against a fleet so numerous.

1.73.5

And the weightiest testimony to the truth of what we say was afforded by the enemy himself; for when his fleet was defeated, as if aware that his power was no longer a match for that of the Hellenes, he hastily withdrew with the greater part of his army.

1.74.1

"Such, then, was the issue of that battle, and clear proof was given thereby that the salvation of the Hellenes depended upon their ships.

1.74.1

To that issue we contributed the three most serviceable elements, namely, the largest number of ships, the shrewdest general, and the most unfaltering zeal.

1.74.1

Of the four hundred

1.74.1

1

1.74.1

ships our quota was a little less than two-thirds.

1.74.1

The commander was Themistocles, who more than any other was responsible for our fighting the battle in the strait, which most surely was our salvation;

1.74.1

and on this account you yourselves honoured him above any stranger who ever visited you.

1.74.1

2

1.74.2

And the zeal we displayed was that of utmost daring, for when there was no one to help us on land, since all the rest up to our very borders were already slaves, we resolved to abandon our city and sacrifice all our possessions; yet not even in that extremity to desert the common cause of the allies who remained, or by dispersing to render ourselves useless to them, but to embark on our ships and fight, and not to be angry because you failed to help us earlier. We therefore maintain that we on our part conferred upon you a benefit at least as great as we received;

1.74.3

for whereas the population of the cities from which you brought aid was still undisturbed and you could hope to possess them in the future, and your motive was fear for yourselves rather than for us—at any rate you did not come near so long as we were still unharmed—we on our part, setting forth from a city that was no more,

1.74.3

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1.74.3

and risking our lives in behalf of one whose future hung upon but a slender hope, bore our part in saving both you and ourselves.

1.74.4

But if we had acted as others did, and through fear of losing our territory had gone over to the Persians earlier in the war, or afterwards had lacked the courage to embark on our ships, in the conviction that we were already ruined, it would from that moment have been useless for you, with your inadequate fleet, to fight at sea, but the Persian's plans would have moved on quietly just as he wished.

1.75.1

"Considering, then, Lacedaemonians, the zeal and sagacity of judgment which we displayed at that time, do we deserve to be regarded with this excessive jealousy by the Hellenes just on account of the empire we possess ?

1.75.2

And indeed we did not acquire this empire by force, but only after you had refused to continue to oppose what was left of the barbarian forces, and the allies came to us and of their own accord asked us to assume the leadership.

1.75.3

It was under the compulsion of circumstances that we were driven at first to advance our empire to its present state, influenced chiefly by fear, then by honour also, and lastly by self-interest as well;

1.75.4

and after we had once incurred the hatred of most of our allies, and several of them had already revolted and been reduced to subjection, and when you were no longer friendly as before but suspicious and at variance with us, it no longer seemed safe to risk relaxing our hold. For all seceders would have gone over to you.

1.75.5

And no man is to be blamed for making the most of his advantages when it is a question of the gravest dangers.

1.76.1

"At any rate you, Lacedaemonians, in the exercise of your leadership over the Peloponnesian states regulate their politiesl according to your own advantage; and if in the Persian war you had held out to the end in the hegemony and had become unpopular in its exercise, as we did, you would certainly have become not less obnoxious to the allies than we are, and would have been compelled either to rule them with a strong hand or yourselves to risk losing the hegemony.

1.76.2

Thus there is nothing remarkable or inconsistent with human nature in what we also have done,just because we accepted an empire when it was offered us, and then, yielding to the strongest motives—honour, fear, and self-interest—declined to give it up. Nor, again, are we the first who have entered upon such a course, but it has ever been an established rule that the weaker is kept down by the stronger. And at the same time we thought we were worthy to rule, and used to be so regarded by you also, until you fell to calculating what your interests were and resorted as you do now, to the plea of justice—which no one, when opportunity offered of securing something by main strength, ever yet put before force and abstained from taking advantage.

1.76.3

And they are to be commended who, yielding to the instinct of human nature to rule over others, have been more observant of justice than they might have been, considering their power.

1.76.4

At least, if others should seize our power, they would, we think, exhibit the best proof that we show some moderation; but in our case the result of our very reasonableness is, perversely enough, obloquy rather than commendation.

1.77.1

"For although we are at a disadvantage in suits

1.77.1

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1.77.1

with our allies arising out of commercial agreements, and although in our own courts in Athens, where we have established tribunals, the same laws apply to us as to them, we are thought to insist too much upon our legal rights.

1.77.2

And none of our allies observes why it is that those who hold dominion elsewhere, and are less moderate than we are toward their subjects, are not reproached on this account. It is because those who may use might have no need to appeal to right.

1.77.3

But if ever our allies, accustomed as they are to associate with us on the basis of equality, come off second best in any matter, however trivial, contrary to their own notion that it ought to be otherwise, whether their discomfiture is due to a legal decision or to the exercise of our imperial power, instead of being grateful that they have not been deprived of what is of greater moment,

1.77.3

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1.77.3

they are more deeply offended because of their trifling inequality than if we had from the first put aside all legal restraints and had openly sought our own advantage.

1.77.4

In that case even they would not be setting up the claim that the weaker should not have to yield to the stronger. Men, it seems, are more resentful of injustice than of violence;

1.77.5

for the former, they feel, is overreaching by an equal, whereas the latter is coercion by a superior. At any rate, they submitted to more grievous wrongs than these at the hands of the Persians, while our rule is hard to bear, as they think;

1.77.6

and no wonder, for the present yoke is always heavy to subjects.

1.77.6

Certainly you, should you overthrow us and obtain supremacy, would soon lose the good will which you have gained through fear of usif indeed you mean again to show such temper as you gave a glimpse of at that time when for a little while you had the hegemony against the Persian.

1.77.6

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1.77.6

For the institutions that prevail among you at home are incompatible with those of other peoples, and, besides, each one of you when he goes abroad uses neither these nor those which the rest of Greece is accustomed to.

1.78.1

"Be slow, then, in your deliberations, for no slight matters are at stake; and do not, influenced by the opinions and accusations of others, burden yourselves needlessly with trouble of your own. Realise before you get into it how great are the chances of miscalculation in war.

1.78.2

For when it is long drawn out, it is wont generally to resolve itself into a mere matter of chance; and over chance both sides equally have no control, and what the outcome will be is unknown and precarious.

1.78.3

Most men rush into war and proceed to blows first, although that ought to be the last resort, and then, when they are in distress, at length have recourse to words.

1.78.4

But since we ourselves are not as yet involved in any such error and see that you are not, we urge you, while wise counsels are still a matter of free choice to both of us, not to violate the treaty or transgress your oaths, but to let our differences be settled by arbitration according to the agreement. But if you refuse, we shall invoke as witnesses the gods by whom our oaths were sworn, and shall endeavour to make reprisals on those who begin the war, following that path in which you have led the way."

1.79.1

Thus the Athenians spoke. And when the Lacedaemonians had heard the charges brought by the allies against the Athenians, and what the latter said in reply, they caused all others to withdraw and deliberated by themselves on the situation before them.

1.79.2

And the opinions of the majority tended to the same conclusion, namely, that the Athenians were already guilty of injustice, and that they must go to war without delay. But Archidamus their king, a man reputed to be both sagacious and prudent, came forward and spoke as follows:

1.80.1

" I have both myself, Lacedaemonians, had experience in my day of many wars, and I see men among you who are as old as I am; no one of them, therefore, is eager for war through lack of experience, as would be the case with most men, nor because he thinks it a good or a safe thing.

1.80.2

And you would find that this war about which you are now deliberating is likely to prove no trifling matter, if one should reflect upon it soberly.

1.80.3

For in a contest with the Peloponnesians or the neighbouring states

1.80.3

1

1.80.3

our power is of the same type with theirs

1.80.3

2

1.80.3

and we can be upon them quickly at every point;

1.80.3

but when opposed to men whose territory is far away, who besides are beyond all others experienced in seamanship and are best equipped in all other respects, with wealth both private and public, ships, horses, arms and a larger population than is to be found in anyother single district in Hellas, who have, moreover, numerous allies subject to tribute—against such men why should we lightly take up arms ?

1.80.3

In what do we place our trust that we should attack them unprepared ?

1.80.3

In our ships?

1.80.3

But there we are inferior;

1.80.4

and if we train and make ourselves ready to encounter them, that will take time.

1.80.4

In our wealth then ?

1.80.4

But in that respect we are still more deficient, neither having money in the treasury of the state nor finding it easy to raise money from our private resources by taxation.

1.80.4

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1.81.1

" Perhaps some of us are emboldened by our superiority in arms and numbers, which enables us freely to invade and lay waste their territory.

1.81.2

But there is other territory in plenty over which they hold sway, and they will import by sea whatever they need.

1.81.3

And if, on the other hand, we try to induce their allies to revolt, we shall have in addition to protect them with a fleet, since they are chiefly islanders.

1.81.4

What then will be the character of the war we shall be waging? Unless we can either win the mastery on the sea or cut off the revenues by which they support their navy, we shall get the worst of it.

1.81.5

And, if it comes to that, we can no longer even conclude an honourable peace, especially if it is believed that we rather than they began the quarrel.

1.81.6

For we assuredly must not be buoyed up by any such hope as that the war will soon be over if we but ravage their territory. I fear rather that we shall even bequeath it to our children, so improbable it is that the Athenians, high spirited as they are, will either make themselves vassals to their land, or, like novices, become panic-stricken at the war.

1.82.1

"Yet assuredly I do not advise you that you should blindly suffer them to injure our allies and allow their plotting to go undetected, but rather that you should adopt the following course: Do not take up arms yet, but send envoys to them and make complaints, without indicating too clearly whether we shall go to war or put up with their conduct; also in the meantime, let us proceed with our own preparations, in the first place by winning allies to our side, Barbarians as well as Hellenes, in the hope of obtaining from some quarter or other additional resources in ships or money (for those who, like ourselves, are plotted against by the Athenians are not to be blamed if they procure their salvation by gaining the aid, not of Hellenes only, but even of Barbarians);

1.82.2

and let us at the same time be developing our resources at home. And if they give any heed to our envoys, there could be nothing better;

1.82.3

but if not, then, after the lapse of two or three years, we shall at length be better equipped to go against them, if we decide to do so. Or perhaps when they see our preparations, and that our words correspond thereto, they will be more inclined to yield, for they will both have their land still unravaged and their deliberations will concern goods that are still theirs and as yet not ruined.

1.82.4

For do not regard their land as anything but a hostage for us to hold, and a better hostage the better it is cultivated. You should therefore spare it as long as possible, instead of making them desperate and thus having a more intractable foe to deal with.

1.82.5

For if, without adequate preparation, egged on by the complaints of our allies, we shall ravage their territory, beware lest we adopt a course which might rather

1.82.5

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1.82.5

result in disgrace and difficulties for the Peloponnesus.

1.82.6

For complaints, indeed, whether brought by states, or by individuals, may possibly be adjusted; but when a whole confederacy, for the sake of individual interests, undertakes a war of which no man can foresee the issue, it is not easy to end it with honour.

1.83.1

"And let no man think it pusillanimous that many states should hesitate to attack a single city.

1.83.2

For they also have allies not less numerous than ours who pay tribute; and war is a matter not so much of arms as of money, for it is money alone that makes arms serviceable, especially when an inland opposes a maritime power.

1.83.3

Let us therefore provide ourselves with money first, instead of being carried away prematurely by the eloquence of our allies; and, just as it is we who shall bear the greater part of the responsibility for the consequences, whether for good or evil, so let it be our task also calmly to get some forecast of them.

1.84.1

"And so be not ashamed of the slowness and dilatoriness for which they censure us most; for speed in beginning may mean delay in ending, because you went into the war without preparation, and, moreover, in consequence of our policy we have ever inhabited a city at once free and of fairest fame.

1.84.2

And, after all, this trait in us may well be in the truest sense intelligent self-control, for by reason of it we alone do not become insolent in prosperity or succumb to adversity as much as others do; and when men try to goad us by praise into dangerous enterprises against our better judgment, we are not carried away by their flattery, or, if anyone goes so far as to attempt to provoke us to action by invective, we are none the more moved to compliance through vexation.

1.84.3

Indeed, it is because of our orderly temper

1.84.3

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1.84.3

that we are brave in war and wise in counsel—brave in war, because self-control is the chief element in self-respect, and respect of self, in turn, is the chief element in courage;

1.84.3

and wise in counsel, because we are educated too rudely to despise the laws and with too much severity of discipline to disobey them, and not to be so ultraclever in useless accomplishments

1.84.3

2

1.84.3

as to disparage our enemy's military preparations in brave words and then fail to go through with the business with corresponding deeds, but rather to consider that the designs of our neighbours are very much like our own and that what may befall from fortune

1.84.3

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1.84.3

cannot be determined by speeches.

1.84.4

But it is our way always to make our preparations'by deeds, on the presumption that we go against opponents who are wise in counsel;

1.84.4

and we ought never to build our hopes on the chance that they are going to make mistakes, but on the belief that we ourselves are taking safe precautions.

1.84.4

And we must not believe that man differs much from man,

1.84.4

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1.84.4

but that he is best who is trained in the severest discipline.

1.85.1

"These are the practices which our fathers bequeathed to us and we ourselves have maintained fiom the beginning to our profit; let us not abandon them, nor allow ourselves in a small portion of one day to be hurried into a decision which involves many lives, much money, many cities and a good name; but let us deliberate at our leisure.

1.85.2

And this course is permitted to us more than to the supporters of the other view because of our strength.

1.85.2

And send envoys to the Athenians to take up the question of Potidaea, and also to take up the matters wherein our allies claim that they are wronged.

1.85.2

The chief reason for this is that they are ready

1.85.2

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1.85.2

to submit to arbitration, and it is not lawful to proceed forthwith against one who offers arbitration as though against a wrong-doer.

1.85.2

But all the while prepare yourselves for the war.

1.85.3

This decision will be best for yourselves and will inspire most fear in your foes." Thus spoke Archidamus, and finally Sthenelaidas, one of the ephors at that time, came forward and addressed the Lacedaemonians as follows:

1.86.1

"The long speeches of the Athenians I cannot understand; for though they indulged in much praise of themselves, they nowhere denied that they are wronging our allies and the Peloponnesus. And yet, if they conducted themselves well against the Persians in former times but are now conducting themselves ill toward us, they deserve two-fold punishment, because they used to be good and have become bad.

1.86.2

But we are the same now as we were then, and if we are in our right minds, we shall not permit our allies to be wronged or even put off avenging their wrongs, since they cannot longer put off suffering them.

1.86.3

Others, indeed, may have money in abundance and ships and horses,

1.86.3

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1.86.3

but we have brave allies, and they must not be delivered over to the Athenians;

1.86.3

nor must we seek redress by means of legal processes and words when it is not in word only that we ourselves are being injured, but we must avenge them speedily and with all our might.

1.86.4

And let no man tell us that it befits us to deliberate when a wrong is being done us; nay, it befits rather those who intend to do us a wrong to deliberate a long time.

1.86.5

Vote, therefore, Lacedaemonians, for the war as beseems the dignity of Sparta, and do not permit the Athenians to become too great; and let us not prove false to our allies, but let us with the favour of the gods go against the wrong-doer."

1.87.1

When Sthenelaidas had thus spoken, he himself, since he was an ephor, put the vote to the assembly of the Lacedaemonians.

1.87.2

Now in their voting they usually decide by shout and not by ballot, but Sthenelaidas said that he could not distinguish which shout was the louder, and wishing to make the assembly more eager for war by a clear demonstration of their sentiment, he said: "Whoever of you, Lacedaemonians, thinks that the treaty has been broken and the Athenians are doing wrong, let him rise and go to yonder spot (pointing to a certain spot), and whoever thinks otherwise, to the other side." Then they rose and divided,

1.87.3

and those who thought the treaty had been broken were found to be in a large majority.

1.87.4

Then they called in the allies and told them that, in their opinion, the Athenians were doing wrong, but that they wished to summon the whole body of the allies

1.87.4

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1.87.4

and put the vote to them, in order that they might all deliberate together and together undertake the war, if it should be so decided.

1.87.5

And so the allies who were there went back home, having brought these matters to a settlement, and so did the Athenian envoys later, after they had finished the business on which they had come.

1.87.6

This decision of the assembly, that the treaty had been broken, was made in the fourteenth year

1.87.6

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1.87.6

from the beginning of the thirty years' truce, which was made after the Euboean war.

1.87.6

2

1.88.1

And the vote of the Lacedaemonians that the treaty had been broken and tliat they must go to war was determined, not so much by the influence of the speeches of their allies, as by fear of the Athenians, lest they become too powerful, seeing that the greater part of Hellas was already subject to them.

1.89.1

For it was in the following manner that the Athenians found themselves face to face with those circumstances in dealing with which they rose to greatness.

1.89.2

When the Persians had retreated from Europe, defeated on both sea and land by the Hellenes,

1.89.2

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1.89.2

and those of them who with their ships had taken refuge at Mycale had perished there, Leotychides, king of the Lacedaemonians, wh1o was commander of the Hellenes at Mycale, went home with the allies from the Peloponnesus.

1.89.2

But the Athenians, together with the allies fiom Ionia and the Hellespont,

1.89.2

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1.89.2

who were already in revolt from the King, remained at their task and besieged Sestos, which was held by the Persians;

1.89.2

and passing the winter there they took it, as it had been deserted by the Barbarians;

1.89.2

and after that the contingents of the several cities sailed away from the Hellespont.

1.89.3

But the Athenian people, when the Barbarians had departed from their territory, straightway began to fetch back their wives and their children and the remnant of their household goods from where they had placed them for safety,

1.89.3

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1.89.3

and to rebuild the city and the walls;

1.89.3

for of the encircling wall only small portions were left standing, and most of the houses were in ruins, only a few remaining in which the chief men of the Persians had themselves taken quarters.

1.90.1

But the Lacedaemonians, perceiving what was in prospect, came on an embassy, partly because they themselves would have preferred to see neither the Athenians nor anyone else have a wall, but more because their allies urged them on through apprehension, not only of the size of the Athenian navy, which had hitherto not been large, but also of the daring they had shown in the Persian war.

1.90.2

So they requested them not to rebuild their walls, but rather to join with them in razing the walls of whatsoever towns outside the Peloponnesus had them standing, giving no indication of their real purpose or of their suspicion with regard to the Athenians, but representing that the Barbarian, if he should attack them again, would not have any stronghold to make his base of operations, as lately he had made Thebes; the Peloponnesus, they added, was large enough for all, both as a retreat and as a base of operations.

1.90.3

To these proposals of the Lacedaemonians, the Athenians, by the advice of Themistocles, replied that they would send ambassadors to Sparta to discuss these matters, and so got rid of them without delay. Themistocles then proposed that they should send himself as speedily as possible to Lacedaemon; that they should then choose other ambassadors in addition, but, instead of sending them immediately, should wait until they should have raised the wall to such a height as was absolutely necessary for defence; and that the whole population of the city, men, women, and children, should take part in the wallbuilding, sparing neither private nor public edifice that would in any way help to further the work, but demolishing them all.

1.90.4

After he had given these instructions, and an intimation that, for the rest, he would himself look after matters at Sparta, he departed.

1.90.5

And when he came to Lacedaemon he did not present himself to the magistrates, but kept putting it off and making excuses; and whenever any one of those in authority asked why he did not come before the people, he said that he was waiting for his colleagues, who had stayed behind on account of some urgent business; he expected them however to come soon, and wondered that they were not already there.

1.91.1

And the Lacedaemonian magistrates were disposed to be content with this reply by reason of their friendship for Themistocles; but when everybody who came from Athens declared quite positively that the wall was going up and was already attaining height, they did not know how to discredit it.

1.91.2

Themistocles, however, when he perceived this bade them not to be misled by reports, but rather to send some trustworthy men of their own number who would see for themselves and bring back a faithful report.

1.91.3

They did so, and Themistocles sent word secretly to the Athenians to detain the envoys as covertly as possible and not to let them go until they themselves returned—for by this time his colleagues, Habronichus son of Lysicles and Aristides son of Lysimachus, had joined him, with the news that the wall was high enough—the reason for his precaution being that he was afraid the Lacedaemonians, when they heard the truth, would then refuse to let them go.

1.91.4

Accordingly the Athenians detained the envoys as they were directed, and Themistocles, appearing before the Lacedaemonians, at length told them frankly that the city was now walled and therefore in a position to protect its inhabitants, and that if the Lacedaemonians or their allies cared to negotiate any matter with them they must hereafter come to them with the understanding that they were dealing with men who were fully aware of what was for their own and the general interest.

1.91.5

For when they thought it best to abandon their city and embark on their ships, they had resolved, said the ambassadors, upon this bold step without the advice of the Lacedaemonians, and again in all matters in which the Athenans took counsel with the Lacedaemonians they had shown themselves inferior to none in judgment.

1.91.6

Accordingly in the present instance also it seemed to them best that their city should have a wall, and that this course would be of great advantage both to themselves in particular, and to the whole body of the allies;

1.91.7

for it was impossible for tlemn, he added, to have equal or similar weight in the general councils of the alliance except on the basis of a military strength that was a match for theirs. Therefore, he concluded, the members of the alliance should either dispense with their walls one and all, or regard this act of the Athenians as justified.

1.92.1

On hearing this, the Lacedaemonians did not openly show any resentment against the Athenians; for they had sent their embassy to Athens, not to stop the work, but to offer, as they professed, a suggestion in the common interest, and besides, they entertained at that time the most friendly feelings for the Athenians on account of their zeal in opposing the Persians; since, however, they liad failed in their purpose, they were secretly vexed. So the envoys on either side returned home without making any formal complaint.

1.93.1

It was in this manner that the Athenians got their wall built in so short a time, and even to-day the structure shows that it was put together in haste.

1.93.1

1

1.93.2

For the lower courses consist of all sorts of stones, in some cases not even hewn to fit but just as they were when the several workers brought them, and many columns from grave monuments and stones wrought for other purposes were built in. For the circuit-wall of the city was extended in every direction, and on this account they laid hands upon everything alike in their haste.

1.93.3

Themistocles, moreover, persuaded them also to finish the walls of the Peiraeus, a beginning of which had been made during the year in which he was archon of the Athenians;

1.93.3

for he considered that the Peiraeus with its three natural harbours

1.93.3

1

1.93.3

was a fine site to develop and that to have become a nation of seamen would be a great advantage to the Athenians themselves, with a view to their acquisition of power—

1.93.4

indeed it was he who first dared declare that they must apply themselves to the sea—and so he immediately took the first steps in this undertaking.

1.93.4

1

1.93.5

And following his advice they built the wall round the Peiraeus of the thickness that may still be observed; for two wagons carrying the stones could meet and pass each other. Inside, moreover, there was neither rubble nor mortar, but stones of large size hewn square were closely laid together, bound to one another on the outside with iron clamps and lead.

1.93.6

But the wall was completed to only about half of the height he originally intended, for what he wished was to be able to repel the assaults of the enemy by the very height and thickness of the wall, and he thought that a few men, and these the least effective, would suffice to guard it, while all the rest might man the ships.

1.93.7

For Themistocles devoted himself particularly to the navy, because, as it seems to me, he had observed that the approach of the King's forces was easier by sea than by land; and he thought that the Peiraeus would prove more serviceable than the upper city, and often advised the Athenians, if ever they were hard pressed on land, to go down to the Peiraeus, and resist all their opponents with their fleet.

1.93.8

It was in this way, then, that the Athenians got their walls built, and came to be engaged upon their other fortifications, immediately after the withdrawal of the Persians.

1.94.1

Meanwhile Pausanias son of Cleombrotus was sent out from Lacedaemon in command of the Hellenes with twenty ships from Peloponnesus, accompanied by thirty Athenian ships and a multitude of other allies.

1.94.2

They nmade also an expedition against Cyprus, subduing most of it, and afterwards, at the time of Pausanias' leadership, besieged Byzantium, which the Persians then field, and took it.

1.95.1

But, since he had already become headstrong,

1.95.1

1

1.95.1

the rest of the Hellenes became disaffected, especially the Ionians and all who had been recently emancipated from the King.

1.95.1

So they waited upon the Athenians and begged them in the name of their kinship

1.95.1

2

1.95.1

to become their leaders, and to resist Pausanias if he should attempt to coerce them.

1.95.1

3

1.95.2

The Athenians accepted their proposals and gave full attention to the matter with the determination to endure Pausanias' conduct no longer and to settle all other matters as should seem best to themselves.

1.95.3

Meanwhile the Lacedaemonians recalled Pausanias in order to interrogate him about reports they were hearing, for much wrongdoing was charged against him by the Hellenes who came to Sparta, and his behaviour seemed an aping of despotic power rather than the conduct of a general.

1.95.4

And it so happened that he was cited before the court at the very time that the allies in vexation at him had gone over to the side of the Athenians, all except the soldiers from the Peloponnesus.

1.95.5

And although, on his return to Lacedaemon, Pausanias was held to account for any personal wrongs he had committed against individuals, yet on the principal charges he was acquitted of misconduct; for he was accused most of all of treasonable relations with the Persians, and it seemed to be a very clear case.

1.95.6

And they did not again send him out as commander, but Dorcis, together with some others, with an inconsiderable force; but the allies did not entrust these with the chief command.

1.95.7

And they, being now aware of the situation, went back home; and the Lacedaemonians sent out no other commanders thereafter, fearing that any who went out might be corrupted, as they saw had happened in the case of Pausanias; they also wanted to be rid of the Persian war, and thought that the Athenians were competent to take the leadership and were friendly to themselves at the time.

1.96.1

After the Athenians had succeeded in this way to the leadership over the allies, who freely chose them on account of their hatred of Pausanias, they assessed the amount of their contributions, both for the states which were to furnish money for the war against the Barbarians and for those which were to furnish ships, the avowed object being to avenge themselves for what they had suffered by ravaging the King's territory.

1.96.2

And it was then

1.96.2

1

1.96.2

that the Athenians first established the office of Hellenic treasurers, who received the tribute;

1.96.2

for so the contribution of money was termed.

1.96.2

The amount of the tribute first assessed was four hundred and sixty talents, and the treasury of the allies was Delos, where the meetings were held in the temple.

1.97.1

Exercising then what was at first a leadership over allies who were autonomous and took part in tle deliberations of common assemblies, the Athenians, in the interval between this war and the Persian, undertook, both in war and in the administration of public affairs, the enterprises now to be related, which were directed against the Barbarian, against their own allies when they attempted revolution, and against such of the Peloponnesians as from time to time came into conflict with them in the course of each attempt.

1.97.2

And I have made a digression to write of these matters for the reason that this period has been omitted by all my predecessors, wlo have confined their narratives either to Hellenic affairs before the Persian War or to the Persian War itself; and Hellanicus, the only one of these who has ever touched upon this period, has in his Attic History treated of it briefly, and with inaccuracy as regards his chronology. And at the same time the narrative of these events serves to explain how the empire of Athens was established.

1.98.1

Iirst, then, under the leadership of Cimon son of Miltiades, they took by siege Eion on the Strymon, which the Persians held, and enslaved its inhabitants

1.98.1

1

1.98.1

;

1.98.2

then they enslaved Scyros, the island in the Aegean inhabited by Dolopians, and colonised it themselves.

1.98.3

And a war arose between them and the Carystians, the other Euboeans taking no part in it, and after a time terms of capitulation were agreed upon.

1.98.4

After this they waged war upon the Naxians,

1.98.4

1

1.98.4

who had revolted, and reduced them by siege.

1.98.4

And this was the first allied city to be enslaved in violation of the established rule;

1.98.4

but afterwards the others also were enslaved as it happened in each case.

1.99.1

Now while there were other causes of revolts, the principal ones were the failures in bringing in the tribute or their quota of ships and, in some cases, refusal of military service; for the Athenians exacted the tribute strictly and gave offence by applying coercive measures to any who were unaccustomed or unwilling to bear the hardships of service.

1.99.2

And in some other respects, too, the Athenians were no longer equally agreeable as leaders; they would not take part in expeditions on terms of equality, and they found it easy to reduce those who revolted.

1.99.3

For all this the allies themselves were responsible; for most of them, on account of their aversion to military service, in order to avoid being away from home got themselves rated in sums of money instead of ships, which they should pay in as their proportionate contribution, and consequently the fleet of the Athenians was increased by the funds which they contributed, while they themselves, whenever they revolted, entered on the war without preparation and without experience.

1.100.1

After this occurred at the river Eurymedon in Pamphylia the land-battle and sea-fight of the Athenians

1.100.1

1

1.100.1

and their allies against the Persians;

1.100.1

and the Athenians were victorious in both on the same day under the command of Cimon son of Miltiades, and they took and destroyed triremes of the Phoenicians to the number of two hundred all told.

1.100.2

And some time afterwards it came to pass that the Thasians revolted from them,

1.100.2

1

1.100.2

a quarrel having arisen about the trading posts and the mine

1.100.2

2

1.100.2

on the opposite coast of Thrace, of which the Thasians enjoyed the profits.

1.100.2

Thereupon the Athenians sailed with their fleet against Thasos, and, after winning a battle at sea, disembarked on the island.

1.100.3

About the same time they sent to the river Strymon ten thousand colonists, consisting of Athenians and their allies, with a view to colonising the place, then called Nine Ways, but now Amphipolis; and though these colonists gained possession of Nine Ways, which was inhabited by Edoni, yet when they advanced into the interior of Thrace they were destroyed at Drabescus in Edonia by the united forces of the Thracians, to whom the settlement of the place was a menace.

1.101.1

As for the Thasians, who had been defeated in battle and were now besieged, they appealed to the Lacedaemonians and urged them to come to their aid by invading Attica.

1.101.2

This, unknown to the Athenians, they promised to do, and intended to keep their promise, but were prevented by the earthquake

1.101.2

1

1.101.2

which occurred at the time

1.101.2

2

1.101.2

when both their Helots and the Perioeci of Thuria and Aethaea revolted and went to Ithome.

1.101.2

3

1.101.2

Most of the Helots were the descendants of the early Messenians who had been enslaved of old,

1.101.2

4

1.101.2

and hence were all called Messenians.

1.101.3

The Lacedaemonians, then, were involved in war with the rebels on Ithome; and so the Thasians, who were in the third year of the siege, came to terms with the Athenians, pulling down their walls and delivering over their ships, agreeing to pay forthwith whatever sum of money should be required of them and to render tribute in future, and, finally, giving up both the mainland and the mine.

1.102.1

The Lacedaemonians, on the other hand, when their war with the rebels on Ithome proved a long affair, appealed to their allies in general and especially to the Athenians, who came with a considerable force under the command of Cimon.

1.102.2

The principal reason why an appeal was made to them was that they were reputed to be skilful in siege operations, whereas the long continuance of the siege showed their own deficiency in this respect; for otherwise they would have taken the place by assault.

1.102.3

And it was in consequence of this expedition that a lack of harmony in the relations of the Lacedaemonians and the Athenians first became manifest. For the Lacedaemonians, when they failed to take the place by storm, fearing the audacity and the fickleness of the Athenians, whom they regarded, besides, as men of another race, thought that, if they remained, they might be persuaded by the rebels on Ithome to change sides; they therefore dismissed them, alone of the allies, without giving any indication of their suspicion, but merely saying that they had no further need of them.

1.102.4

The Athenians, however, recognized that they were not being sent away on the more creditable ground, but because some suspicion had arisen; so because they felt indignant and considered that they had not deserved such treatment at the hands of the Lacedaemonians, the instant they returned home they gave up the alliance which they had made with the Lacedaemonians against the Persians and became allies of their enemies, the Argives. And an alliance at the same time, on the same terms and confirmed by the same oaths, was concluded by both the Athenians and the Argives with the Thessalians.

1.103.1

In the tenth year

1.103.1

1

1.103.1

the rebels on Ithome found that they could hold out no longer and surrendered to the Lacedaemonians on condition that they should leave the Peloponnesus under a truce and should never set foot in it again;

1.103.2

and if any of them should be caught there, he was to be a slave of his captor.

1.103.3

Moreover, before this time the Lacedaemonians also received a Pythian oracle, which bade them let go the suppliant of Ithomean Zeus. So the Messenians left the Peloponnesus, themselves and their children and wives; and the Athenians received them, in consequence of the enmity to the Lacedaemonians already existing, and settled them at Naupactus, which they happened to have lately taken from its possessors, the Ozolian Locrians.

1.103.4

And the Megarians also entered into alliance with the Athenians, revolting from the Lacedaemonians because the Corinthians were pressing them hard in a war about boundaries;

1.103.4

and thus the Athenians secured Megara and Pegae,

1.103.4

1

1.103.4

and they built for the Megarians the long walls which run from the city to Nisaea and held it with a garrison of their own troops.

1.103.4

And it was chiefly because of this act that the vehement hatred of the Corinthians for the Athenians first arose.

1.104.1

Meanwhile Inaros, son of Psammetichus, a Libyan and king of the Libyans who are adjacent to Egypt, setting out from Mareia, the city just north of Pharos, caused the greater part of Egypt to revolt from King Artaxerxes,

1.104.1

1

1.104.1

and then, when he had made himself ruler, he called in the Athenians.

1.104.2

And they left Cyprus,

1.104.2

1

1.104.2

where they happened to be on an expedition with two hundred ships of their own and of their allies, and went to Egypt, and when they had sailed up the Nile from the sea, finding themselves masters of the river and of twothirds of Memphis, they proceeded to attack the third part, which is called the White Fortress.

1.104.2

And in this fortress were some Persians and Medes who had taken refuge there, and such Egyptians as had not joined in the revolt.

1.105.1

The Athenians also made a descent with a fleet upon Halieis, where they had a battle with some Corinthians and Epidaurians, in which the Corinthians won. And afterwards the Athenians fought a sea-fight at Cecryphaleia with a Peloponnesian fleet, in which the Athenians won.

1.105.2

After this war broke out between the Athenians and the Aeginetans, and a great sea-fight occurred between the Athenians and the Aeginetans off Aegina, in which the allies of both sides were present. This the Athenians won and having taken seventy Aeginetan ships they descended upon their territory and laid siege to the city, Leocrates son of Stroebus, being in command.

1.105.3

Thereupon the Peloponnesians, wishing to aid the Aeginetans, sent into Aegina three hundred hoplites, who had previously been assisting the Corinthians and Epidaurians. Moreover, the Corinthians occupied the heights of Geraneia, and made a descent upon the territory of M egara in conjunction with their allies, thinking that the Athenians would be unable to aid the Megarians, since many of their troops were away in Aegina and in Egypt, or if they should attempt it that they would have to withdraw from Aegina.

1.105.4

The Athenians, however, did not disturb the army besieging Aegina, but with such forces as were left in the city, consisting of the oldest and the youngest men, marched into Megara, the general in command being Myronides.

1.105.5

An indecisive battle was fought with the Corinthians, whereupon they separated, each side thinking they had not got the worst of it in the action.

1.105.6

And the Athenians, who had in fact got rather the better of it, when the Corinthians withdrew, set up a trophy; but the Corinthians, being reproached by the older men in their city, made their preparations and about twelve days later came back and set up for themselves a rival trophy, as though they had won. Hereupon the Athenians made a sally from Megara, slew those who were setting up the trophy, and joining battle with the rest defeated them.

1.106.1

The vanquished party now retreated, and a not inconsiderable portion of them, being hard pressed, missed their way and rushed into a piece of land belonging to some private person, which was enclosed by a great ditch and had no exit.

1.106.2

And when the Athenians perceived this, they shut them in by barring the entrance with hoplites, and stationing light-armed troops all round stoned all who had entered. And this was a great calamity to the Corinthians; the main body of their army, however, returned home.

1.107.1

About this period

1.107.1

1

1.107.1

the Athenians began to build their long walls to the sea, one to Phalerum, the other to the Peiraeus.

1.107.1

And the Phocians made an expedition against the land of the Dorians, the mother-country of the Lacedaemonians, namely the towns of Boeum, Citinium, and Erineum, one of which they captured;

1.107.2

whereupon the Lacedaemonians, under the lead of Nicomedes son of Cleombrotus, acting for King Pleistoanax son of Pausanias, who was still a minor, sent to the aid of the Dorians a force of fifteen hundred hoplites of their own and ten thousand of their allies, and after they had forced the Phocians to make terms and restore the city they began their return homeward.

1.107.3

Now if they wished to take the sea-route and make their passage by way of the Crisaean Gulf, the Athenians were sure to take their fleet round the Peloponnesus and block their way; and to march over the Geranaean pass appeared to them hazardous, since the Athenians held Megara and Pegae. Besides, the Geranaean pass was not easy to traverse and was at all times guarded by the Athenians, and at this present time, as the Lacedaemonians perceived, they intended to block their way. So they decided to wait in Boeotia and consider how they might most safely cross over to the Peloponnesus.

1.107.4

To this course they were partly influenced by some Athenians, who were secretly inviting them into their country, in the hope of putting an end to the democracy and to the building of the long walls.

1.107.5

But the Athenians went out against the Lacedaemonians with their whole force and with one thousand Argives and contingents of the several allies, the whole body amounting to fourteen thousand men.

1.107.6

And they undertook the expedition against them because they believed that they were at a loss how to get through, and partly too on a suspicion of a plot to overthrow the democracy.

1.107.7

The forces of the Athenians were strengthened by some Thessalian cavalry, who came in accordance with the terms of the alliance, but they deserted to the Lacedaemonians in the course of the action.

1.108.1

The battle took place

1.108.1

1

1.108.1

at Tanagra in Boeotia, and in it the Lacedaemonians and their allies were victorious, and there was much slaughter on both sides.

1.108.2

The Lacedaemonians then entered the Megaiian territory, cut down the trees, and went back home by way of Geraneia and the Isthmus.

1.108.3

But on the sixty-second day after the battle, the Athenians, having made an expedition into Boeotia under Myronides, defeated the Boeotians at Oenophyta, got control of Boeotia and Phocis, pulled down the walls of Tanagra, and took one hundred of the wealthiest men of the Opuntian Locrians as hostages.

1.108.4

Meanwhile they completed their own long walls.

1.108.4

After this the Aeginetans also capitulated to the Athenians, pulling down their walls, delivering up their ships, and agreeing to pay tribute in future.

1.108.4

1

1.108.5

And the Athenians, under the command of Tolmides son of Tolmaeus, sailed round the Peloponnesus, bullned the dock-yard

1.108.5

1

1.108.5

of the Lacedaemonians, took Chalcis, a city of the Corinthians, and making a descent upon the territory of the Sicyonians defeated them in battle.

1.109.1

Meanwhile the Athenians and their allies stayed on in Egypt and the war took on many forms.

1.109.2

At first the Athenians had the mastery in Egypt, and the King sent to Lacedaemon Megabazus a Persian with a supply of money, in order that the Lacedaemonians might be induced to invade Attica and the Athenians thus be drawn away from Egypt.

1.109.3

But when he found that matters did not advance and the money was being spent in vain, Megabazus betook himself back to Asia with the money that was left, and Megabyzus son of Zopyrus,

1.109.3

1

1.109.3

a Persian, was despatched with a large army.

1.109.3

2

1.109.4

He marched thither by land, and defeated the Egyptians and their allies in battle, drove the Hellenes out of Memphis, and finally shut them up in the island of Prosopitis, where he besieged them for a year and six months, then finally, by diverting the water into another course, drained the canal and left the ships high and dry, converting the greater part of the island into mainland; then he crossed over dry-shod and took the island.

1.110.1

Thus this undertaking of the Hellenes came to naught after a war of six years;

1.110.1

1

1.110.1

and but few out of many, making their way through Libya into Cyrene, escaped with their lives;

1.110.2

the most of them perished.

1.110.2

And all Egypt again came under the King's dominion, except Amyrtaeus, the king of the marshes

1.110.2

1

1.110.2

;

1.110.2

for the Persians were unable to capture him, both on account of the extent of the marsh and because the marsh people are the best fighters among the Egyptians.

1.110.3

Inaros, however, the king of the Libyans, who had been the originator of the whole movement in Egypt, was taken by treachery and impaled.

1.110.4

And when fifty triremes, which sailed to Egypt from Athens and the rest of the confederacy to relieve the fleet there, put in at the Mendesian mouth of the Nile, quite unaware of what had happened, the infantry fell upon them from the shore and a Phoenician fleet from the sea and destroyed most of the ships, a small number only escaping. So ended the great expedition against Egypt of the Athenians and their allies.

1.111.1

And now Orestes son of Echecratidas, king of the Thessalians, who was exiled from Thessaly, persuaded the Athenians to restore him. And they, taking along some Boeotians and Phocians who were allies, made an expedition against Pharsalus in Thessaly. And though they made themselves masters of the land, so far as this was possible without going far from their camp—for the Thessalian cavalry hemmed them in—they failed to capture the city and indeed none of the other objects of their expedition was attained, so they went back home again unsuccessful, having Orestes with them.

1.111.2

Not long after this

1.111.2

1

1.111.2

one thousand Athenians, embarking on the ships at Pegae, which was now in their possession,

1.111.2

2

1.111.2

sailed along the coast to Sicyon under the command of Pericles son of Xanthippus, and disembarking defeated in battle the Sicyonians who came out against them.

1.111.3

Immediately thereafter, taking along some Achaeans and sailing across the gulf, they made an expedition against Oeniadae in Acarnania and laid siege to it; but failing to take it they went back home.

1.112.1

Three years afterwards

1.112.1

1

1.112.1

a truce was made between the Peloponnesians and Athenians, to last five years.

1.112.2

And the Athenians did abstain from warfare against Hellenes, but they made an expedition against Cyprus with two hundred ships of their own and of their allies, under the command of Cimon.

1.112.3

Sixty of these ships sailed to Egypt on the summons of Amyrtaeus, the king in the marshes, while the others laid siege to Citium.

1.112.4

But Cimon died and a famine arose, and so they withdrew from Citium ;

1.112.4

1

1.112.4

and on their way home, when off Salamis in Cyprus, they fought the Phoenicians, Cyprians and Cilicians by sea and on land.

1.112.4

Gaining the victory in both battles they went back home, and with them returned the ships that had been in Egypt.

1.112.5

After this the Lacedaemonians undertook the so-called sacred war, and getting possession of the temple at Delphi, delivered it to the Delphians; and afterwards, when they had withdrawn, the Athenians made an expedition, got possession of it, and delivered it again to the Phocians.

1.113.1

Some time after this

1.113.1

1

1.113.1

the Athenians under the command of Tolmides son of Tolmaeus, with one thousand hoplites of their own and the respective quotas of their allies, made an expedition against Orchomenus and Chaeroneia and some other places in Boeotia, which were in the possession of the Boeotian exiles and therefore hostile.

1.113.1

And after taking Chaeroneia and selling its inhabitants into slavery, they placed a garrison in it and departed.

1.113.2

But while they were on the march they were attacked at Coronea by the Boeotian exiles from (rchomenus, together with some Locrians and Euboean exiles and others who held the same political views, and were defeated, some of the Athenians being slain and others taken alive.

1.113.3

Accordingly the Athenians evacuated the whole of Boeotia, making a treaty upon the stipulation that they should receive back their prisoners.

1.113.4

And so the Boeotian exiles were restored, and they as well as all the rest of the Boeotians again became autonomous.

1.114.1

Not long after this

1.114.1

1

1.114.1

Euboea revolted from Athens;

1.114.1

and Pericles had just crossed over to the island with an Athenian army when word was brought to him that Megara had revolted, that the Peloponnesians were about to invade Attica, and that all the Athenian garrison had been destroyed by the Megarians except such as had escaped to Nisaea.

1.114.1

The Megarians had effected this revolt by bringing Corinthians, Sicyonians and Epidaurians to their aid.

1.114.1

So Pericles in haste brought his army back again from Euboea.

1.114.2

After this the Peloponnesians, under the command of Pleistoanax son of Pausanias, king of the Lacedaemonians, advanced into Attica as far as Eleusis and Thria, ravaging the country; but without going further they returned home.

1.114.3

Thereupon the Athenians again crossed over into Euboea under the command of Pericles and subdued the whole of it;

1.114.3

the rest of the island they settled

1.114.3

1

1.114.3

by agreement, but expelled the Hestiaeans from their homes and themselves occupied their territory.

1.115.1

Withdrawing their troops from Euboea not long afterwards they made a truce with the Lacedaemonians and their allies which was to last for thirty years, restoring Nisaea, Pegae, Troezen, and Achaea; for these were the places belonging to the Peloponnesians which the Athenians then held.

1.115.2

Six years later a war arose between the Samians and the Milesians about the possession of Priene, and the Milesians, who were being worsted in the war, went to Athens and cried out against the Samians. They were seconded in their complaint by some private citizens from Samos itself who wished to revolutionize the government.

1.115.3

So the Athenians sailed to Samos with forty ships and set up a democracy, taking as hostages of the Samians fifty boys and as many men, whom they deposited in Lemnos;

1.115.4

then they withdrew from Samos, leaving a garrison behind. Some of the Samians, however, did not stay, but fled to the mainland, first making an alliance with the most influential men who remained in the city and with Pissuthnes son of Hystaspes, then satrap of Sardis; and collecting mercenary troops to the number of seven hundred they crossed over by night to Samos.

1.115.5

First they attacked the popular party and got most of them into their power; then they secretly got their hostages out of Lemnos and revolted from Athens, handing over to Pissuthnes the Athenian officers and garrison that were on the island, and at once set about preparing an expedition against Miletus. And the Byzantines also joined in their revolt.

1.116.1

But when the Athenians heard of this they sailed for Samos with sixty ships.

1.116.1

Sixteen of these, however, they did not make use of on this enterprise, for these had already gone, some toward Caria to keep watch upon the Phoenician ships, others towards Chios and Lesbos to summon aid;

1.116.1

but with forty-four ships, under the command of Pericles and nine others,

1.116.1

1

1.116.1

they fought a sea-fight at the island of Tragia against seventy ships of the Samians, of which twenty were transport—ships, the whole fleet being on the way back from Miletus;

1.116.1

and the Athenians were victorious.

1.116.2

Later, having received a reinforcement from Athens of forty ships and from the Chians and Lesbians of twenty-five, they disembarked, and being superior to the Samians with their infantry proceeded to invest the city with three walls, at the same time blockading it by sea as well.

1.116.3

But Pericles took sixty ships away from the blockading fleet and departed in haste towards Caunus in Caria, a report having come that a Phoenician fleet was sailing against his forces; for Stesagoras and others had gone from Samos with five vessels to fetch the Phoenician ships.

1.117.1

Meanwhile the Samians suddenly made a sally and fell upon the Athenian naval station, which was unprotected by a stockade, destroying the guardships and defeating in a sea-fight the ships that put out against them. And for about fourteen days they were masters of the sea off their coast, bringing in and carrying out whatever they wished;

1.117.2

but when Pericles came they were again blockaded by sea.

1.117.2

And afterwards a reinforcement came from Athens of forty ships under the command of Thucydides,

1.117.2

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1.117.2

Hagnon and Phormio, twenty under Tlepolemus and Anticles, and thirty from Chios and Lesbos.

1.117.3

Now the Samians did indeed put up a sea-fight for a short time, but they were unable to hold out, and in the ninth month

1.117.3

1

1.117.3

were reduced by siege and agreed to a capitulation, pulling down their walls, giving hostages, delivering over their ships, and consenting to pay back by instalments the money spent upon the siege.

1.117.3

The Byzantines too came to terms, agreeing to be subjects as before.

1.118.1

It was not many years

1.118.1

1

1.118.1

after this that the events already narrated occurred, namely the Corcyraean affair,

1.118.1

2

1.118.1

the Potidaean,

1.118.1

3

1.118.1

and all the other incidents

1.118.1

4

1.118.1

that furnished an occasion for this war.

1.118.2

And all these operations of the Hellenes, against one another and against the Barbarian, took place in the interval of about fifty years between the retreat of Xerxes and the beginning of this war.

1.118.2

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1.118.2

It was in this period that the Athenians established their rule more firmly and themselves advanced to great power.

1.118.2

And the Lacedaemonians, though aware of their growing power, made no attempt to check it, except to a trifling extent, remaining indifferent the greater part of the time, since they had never been quick to go to war except under compulsion, and in this case were in some degree precluded from interference by wars of their own.

1.118.2

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1.118.2

But at last the power of the Athenians began clearly to exalt itself and they were laying hands upon their allies.

1.118.2

Then the Lacedaemonians could bear it no longer, but determined that they must attack the Athenian power with all zeal and overthrow it, if they could, by undertaking this war.

1.118.2

The Lacedaemonians themselves, then,

1.118.2

3

1.118.2

had decided that the treaty had been broken and that the Athenians were in the wrong, and sending to Delphi they asked the god if it would be advisable for them to go to war.

1.118.3

The god answered them, as it is said, that if they warred with all their might, victory would be theirs, and said that he himself would help them, whether invoked or uninvoked.

1.119.1

But they wished to summon their allies again and put

1.119.1

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1.119.1

to them the question whether they should go to war.

1.119.1

And when the envoys from the allies had come and an assembly was held, the others said what they wished, most of them complaining of the Athenians and demanding that the war should be entered upon, and especially the Corinthians.

1.119.1

They had already, before the meeting, privately begged the allies city by city to vote for the war, fearing lest Potidaea would be destroyed before help came, and now, being also present at this meeting, they came forward last of all and spoke as follows:

1.120.1

" Men of the allies, we can no longer complain of the Lacedaemonians that they have not both themselves voted for the war and also brought us together for this object. And that is right; for it is the duty of leaders, while equitably considering their particular interests, to have special regard for the general weal, just as in other matters they are honoured above all.

1.120.2

Now those of us who have had dealings with the Athenians in the past do not need to be taught to be on our guard against them. But those who dwell more in the interior and away from any trade-route should be warned that, if they do not aid those who are on the seaboard, they will find it more difficult to bring the products of the land down to the sea and to get in return what the sea gives to the mainland; and that they should not be careless judges of what is said here, as though it were no concern of theirs, but should expect that, if they abandon the seacoast to its fate, the danger may possibly some day reach them, and that they are deliberating upon their own interests no less than upon ours.

1.120.3

They ought not, therefore, to hesitate a moment to adopt war in place of peace. For though it is the part of men of discretion to remain tranquil should they not be wronged, it behooves brave men, when wronged, to go from peace to war, but when a favourable opportunity offers to abandon war and resume peace again, allowing themselves neither to be elated by success in war nor to be so enamoured of the quiet of peace as to submit to wrong.

1.120.4

For he who for the sake of his comfort shrinks from war is likely, should he remain tranquil, very speedily to forfeit the delights of ease which caused him to shrink; and he who presumes upon his success in war has failed to reflect how treacherous is the confidence which elates him.

1.120.5

For many enterprises which were ill-planned have succeeded because the adversary has proved to be still worse advised, and yet more, which to all appearances were well advised, have turned out the opposite way and brought disgrace. For no one ever carries out a plan with the same confidence with which he conceives it; on the contrary we form our fond schemes with a feeling of security, but when it comes to their execution, we are possessed by fear and fall short of success.

1.121.1

" And so now in our own case, it is because we are suffering wrongs and have ample grounds for complaint that we are stirring up this war, and as soon as we have avenged our wrongs upon the Athenians we will bring the war to an end when occasion offers.

1.121.2

And for many reasons we are likely to prevail: first, because we are superior in point of numbers and in military experience ;

1.121.3

secondly, because we all with one accord obey the word of command;

1.121.3

and, thirdly, on the sea, where their strength lies, we shall be able to equip a fleet, not only with the means which we severally possess, but also with the funds stored up at Delphi and Olympia.

1.121.3

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1.121.3

For by contracting a loan we can use the inducement of higher pay to entice away from them their mercenary sailors;

1.121.3

for the forces of the Athenians are made up of hirelings rather than of their own citizens, whereas ours, whose strength lies more in the quality of the men than in the pay they get, would be less subject to such defection.

1.121.4

And so, if we win a single victory at sea, in all probability they are defeated.

1.121.4

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1.121.4

If, however, they should still hold out, we on our part shall have more time for practice in seamanship, and asp soon as we have brought our skill to a parity with theirs, in courage, assuredly, we shall be superior.

1.121.4

For the excellence that nature has given us cannot become theirs through instruction, whereas the advantage they have in skill can be acquired by us through practice.

1.121.5

And as to the money we need to accomplish all this,we shall provide it by contributions; or strange were it, if their allies should never fail to pay tribute to ensure their own slavery, but we, to secure at once vengeance upon our enemies and safety for ourselves, shall prove unwilling to spend money, aye, and that we may not be robbed of that very wealth and withal have it used to our destruction.

1.122.1

" But we have other ways also of waging war—inducing their allies to revolt, which is the best means of depriving them of the revenues in which their strength consists, the planting of forts in their territory, and all the other measures which one cannot now foresee.

1.122.1

For war least of all conforms to fixed rules, but itself in most cases has to form its plans to suit the occasion as its own resources allow;

1.122.1

when, therefore, a man keeps his temper cool while dealing with war, he is more likely to be safe, while he who loses his temper over it

1.122.1

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1.122.1

makes more blunders.

1.122.1

"

1.122.2

And let us reflect also that, if we individually were involved in a dispute about mere boundary-lines with an enemy who was no more than our equal, that might be borne; but as the case stands, the Athenians are quite a match for us all together, and still more powerful against us city by city. Hence, unless all of us together, every nation and town, with one accord resist them, they will easily overpower us because we shall be divided. And as to defeat—even though this is terrible to hear, let it be well understood that it brings nothing else than downright slavery.

1.122.3

That such an outcome should even be spoken of as a possibility, or that so many cities might suffer ill at the hands of one, is a disgrace to the Peloponnesus. In such a case men would say of us, either that we deserved our fate, or that through cowardice we submitted to it, and that we were clearly degenerate sons of our fathers, who liberated Hellas, whereas we, so far from making this liberty secure, should be allowing a city to be established as a tyrant in our midst, though we claim the reputation of deposing the monarchs in single states.

1.122.4

We know not how such a course can be acquitted of one of the three gravest errors, stupidity or cowardice, or carelessness.

1.122.4

For I cannot suppose that, escaping those errors, you have reached that most fatal spirit of proud disdain

1.122.4

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1.122.4

which has ruined so many men that it has taken on a new name, that of despicable folly.

1.123.1

"With regard, however, to what is past and done, what need is there to find fault at length, except in so far as that is profitable for what is present?

1.123.1

But with a view to what shall be hereafter, we should devote every effort to the task in hand—for to win virtue

1.123.1

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1.123.1

by toils is our heritage—and make no change of custom because you now have a slight superiority in wealth and power;

1.123.1

for it is not right that attributes which have been won through poverty should be lost through prosperity.

1.123.1

Nay, you should go into the war with confidence, and for many reasons: the god has spoken through his oracle and promised that he himself will help you;

1.123.1

all the rest of Hellas will join you in the struggle, partly through fear and partly through self-interest;

1.123.2

and, finally, you will not be the ones to break the treaty, inasmuch as the god, in bidding you go to war, considers it to have been transgressed already, but you will be going to the defence of a treaty that has been violated. For it is not those who fight in self-defence that break a treaty, but those who attack others unprovoked.

1.124.1

"So then, since from every quarter a favourable opportunity offers itself to you to go to war, and since we recommend this course in the common interest—if it be true that identity of interest' is the surest policy for states and individuals to follow—make haste to succour the Potidaeans, who are Dorians and besieged by Ionians—the reverse of what used to be—and to recover the liberty of the rest; since it will no longer do for us to wait, when some are already being injured, and others, if it shall become known that we have had a meeting and dare not defend ourselves, will soon suffer the same fate.

1.124.2

On the contrary, men of the allies, recognize that we are now facing the inevitable, and at the same time that this proposal is for the best; and vote for the war, not fearing the immediate danger, but coveting the more enduring peace which will result from the war. For peace is more firmly established when it follows war, but to refuse to go to war from a desire for tranquillity is by no means so free from danger.

1.124.3

And so, in the conviction that the state which has set itself up as a tyrant in Hellas is a menace to all alike, ruling over some already and designing to rule over others, let us attack and reduce it, and henceforth dwell in security ourselves and set free those Hellenes who are already enslaved."

1.125.1

Thus spoke the Corinthians. And the Lacedaemonians when they had heard the opinions of all, put the vote in succession to all the allied states which were present, both great and small; and the majority voted for war.

1.125.2

But though the decision was made it was impossible for them to take up arms at once, as they were unprepared; it was determined, however, that the several states should make the fitting preparations and that there should be no delay. Nevertheless, in providing themselves with what was needed there was spent, not indeed a full year, but somewhat less, before they invaded Attica and took up the war openly.

1.126.1

During this interval they kept sending embassies to the Athenians and making complaints, that they might have as good a pretext as possible for making war, in case the Athenians should refuse to consider them.

1.126.2

And first the Lacedaemonian envoys bade the Athenians drive out the "curse of the goddess." The curse was as follows:

1.126.3

There was an Athenian in days of old named Cylon, a victor at Olympia, of noble birth and powerful; and he had married a daughter of Theagenes, a Megarian, who was at that time tyrant of Megara.

1.126.4

Now Cylon consulted the oracle at Delphi, and the god in answer told him to seize the Acropolis of Athens "at the greatest festival of Zeus."

1.126.5

So he obtained a force from Theagenes and, persuading his friends to help, when the Olympic festival in the Peloponnesus came on he seized the Acropolis with a view to making himself tyrant;

1.126.5

for he thought that the Olympic festival was not only the greatest festival of Zeus, but also in a manner was connected with him as having won an Olympic victory.

1.126.5

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1.126.6

But whether the oracle meant the greatest festival in Attica or somewhere else he did not go on to consider, and the oracle did not make it clear.

1.126.6

For, in fact, the Athenians also have a festival in honour of Zeus Meilichius, the Diasia, as it is called, a very great festival celebrated outside the city, whereat all the people offer sacrifices, many making offerings

1.126.6

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1.126.6

peculiar to the country instead of victims.

1.126.6

But Cylon, thinking that he was right in his opinion, made his attempt.

1.126.7

And the Athenians, when they were aware of it, came in a body from the fields against them and sitting down before the Acropolis laid siege to it.

1.126.8

But as time passed the Athenians grew weary of the siege and most of them went away, committing the task of guarding to the nine Archons, to whom they also gave full power to settle the whole matter as they might determine to be best;

1.126.9

for at that time

1.126.9

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1.126.9

the nine Arclons transacted most of the public business.

1.126.10

But Cylon and those who were being besieged with him were in hard straits through lack of food and water.

1.126.10

So Cylon and his brother escaped;

1.126.10

but the rest, when they were in great distress and some of them were even dying of hunger, sat down as suppliants at the altar

1.126.10

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1.126.10

on the Acropolis.

1.126.11

And the Athenians who had been charged with guarding them, when they saw them dying in the temple, caused them to arise on promise of doing them no harm, and leading them away put them to death;

1.126.11

and some who in passing by took refuge at the altar of the Awful Goddesses

1.126.11

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1.126.11

they dispatched even there.

1.126.11

For this act both they and their descendants

1.126.11

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1.126.11

were called accursed and sinners against the Goddess.

1.126.12

Accordingly the accursed persons were driven out not only by the Athenians but also at a later time by Cleomenes the Lacedaemonian, with the help of a faction of the Athenians, during a civil strife, when they drove out the living and disinterred and cast out the bones of the dead. Afterwards, however, they were restored, and their descendants are still in the city.

1.127.1

It was this "curse " that the Lacedaemonians now bade the Athenians drive out, principally, as they pretended, to avenge the honour of the gods, but in fact because they knew that Pericles son of Xanthippus was implicated in the curse on his mother's side,

1.127.1

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1.127.1

and thinking that, if he were banished, they would find it easier to get from the Athenians the concessions they hoped for.

1.127.2

They did not, however, so much expect that he would suffer banishment, as that they would discredit him with his fellow-citizens, who would feel that to some extent his misfortune

1.127.2

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1.127.2

would be the cause of the war.

1.127.3

For being the most powerful man of his time and the leader of the state, he was opposed to the Lacedaemonians in all things, and would not let the Athenians make concessions, but kept urging them on to the war.

1.128.1

The Athenians answered with the demand that the Lacedaemonians should drive out the curse of Taenarus.

1.128.1

For the Lacedaemonians had on one occasion caused some suppliant Helots to leave their refuge in the temple of Poseidon at Taenarus, then had led them off and put them to death;

1.128.1

and the Lacedaemonians believe that it was because of this sacrilege that the great earthquake

1.128.1

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1.128.1

befell them at Sparta.

1.128.2

And the Athenians also bade them drive out the curse of Athena of the Brazen House.

1.128.2

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1.128.2

And this is the way it was incurred.

1.128.3

After Pausanias the Lacedaemonian had been recalled by the Spartans, on the first occasion,

1.128.3

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1.128.3

from his command on the Hellespont, and on trial had been acquitted of wrong-doing, he was never again sent out in a public capacity, but privately and on his own account he took a trireme of Hermione without authority of the Lacedaemonians and came to the Hellespont, to take part, as he pretended, in the Persian war, but in reality to carry on an intrigue with the Great King—an enterprise to which he had set his hand in the first instance also, his aim being to become master of all Hellas.

1.128.4

He had namely first laid up for himself with the King a store of gratitude in the following circumstances, and thus had begun the whole affair.

1.128.5

When he was in that quarter before, after the return of the Hellenic fleet from Cyprus,

1.128.5

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1.128.5

he had taken Byzantium, then in the possession of the Persians, and certain connections and kinsmen of the King were captured in the place when the city fell.

1.128.5

These prisoners he sent back to the King without the knowledge of the allies in general, whom he gave to understand that they had escaped from him.

1.128.6

And he was carrying on this intrigue in concert with Gongylus the Eretrian, the very man whom he had placed in charge of Byzantium and the captives. And he also sent a letter by Gongylus to the King, in which the following was written, as was afterwards discovered:

1.128.7

"Pausanias, the Spartan commander, wishing to do you a favour, sends you back these men whom he took with the spear. And I make the proposal, if it seems good to you also, to marry your daughter and to make Sparta and the rest of Hellas subject to you. And I am able, I think, to accomplish these things with the help of your counsel. If any of these things pleases you, send a trusty man to the sea, and through him we shall in future confer." So much the letter disclosed.

1.129.1

Xerxes was pleased with the letter, and sent Artabazus son of Pharnaces to the sea, commanding him to take over the satrapy of Dascylium, superseding Megabates, who was governor before; and he charged him with a letter in reply to Pausanias, bidding him transmit it to him in Byzantium as quickly as possible and to show him the seal, and if Pausanias should give him any direction about the King's affairs, to execute it with all care and fidelity.

1.129.2

And he on his arrival did other things as he was told and transmitted the letter. And this reply of the King ran as follows:

1.129.3

" Thus saith King Xerxes to Pausanias: As touching the men whom thou didst save for me out of Byzantium beyond the sea, a store of gratitude is laid up for thee, of record, in our house forever, and with thy words also I am pleased. And let neither night nor day stay thee to make thee remiss in performing aught of what thou dost promise mee; and let nothing hinder thee, either expense of gold and silver or number of troops, if there be need of their presence anywhere; but with Artabazus, a good man, whom I have sent to thee, transact with confidence my business and thine as shall be most honourable and best for both of us."

1.130.1

When Pausanias received this letter, although even before this he had been held in high consideration by the Hellenes because he had led them at Plataea, he was then far more elated and could no longer bring himself to live in the usual manner of his people, but clad himself in Persian apparel whenever he went forth from Byzantium, and when he travelled through Thrace a body-guard of Medes and Egyptians attended him; he had his table served in Persian style, and indeed could not conceal his real purpose, but by such trifling acts showed plainly what greater designs he purposed in his heart to accomplish thereafter.

1.130.2

And so he made himself difficult of access, and indulged in such a violent temper towards everybody that no one could come near him; and this was one of the chief reasons why the allies went over to the Athenians.

1.131.1

Now it was just this conduct that had caused the Lacedaemonians in the first instance to recall Pausanias, when they learned of it;

1.131.1

and when this second time, on his sailing away in the ship of Hermione without their authority, it was evident that he was acting in the very same manner—when, after being forcibly dislodged from Byzantium by the Athenians, instead of returning to Sparta, he settled at Colonae in the Troad and was reported to the ephors to be intriguing with the Barbarians and tarrying there for no good purpose—then at length they held back no longer, but sent a herald with a skytale-dispatch,

1.131.1

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1.131.1

in which they told him not to lag behind the herald, or the Spartans would declare war upon him.

1.131.2

And he, wishing to avoid suspicion as far as possible, and confident that he could dispose of the charge by the use of money, returned the second time to Sparta. And at first he was thrown into prison by the ephors, who have the power to do this in the case of the king himself; then, having contrived after a time to get out, he offered himself for trial to any who might wish to examine into his case.

1.132.1

There was, indeed, no clear proof in the possession of the Spartans, either his personal enemies or the state at large, on the strength of which they could with entire confidence proceed to punish a man who was of the royal family and held high office for the time being—for as cousin of Pleistarchus son of Leonidas, who was king and still a minor, he was acting as regent for him;

1.132.2

but he, by his disregard of propriety, and particularly by his aping of the Barbarians, gave them much ground for suspecting that he did not want to remain an equal in the present order of things at Sparta.

1.132.2

And they went back into his past and scrutinized all his other acts, to see if perchance he had in his mode of life departed from established customs, and they recalled especially that he had once presumed, on his own authority, to have inscribed on the tripod at Delphi,

1.132.2

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1.132.2

which the Hellenes dedicated as first fruits of the spoils they had won fiom the Persians, the following elegiac couplet:

1.132.3

"

1.132.3

When as captain of the Hellenes he had destroyed the Persian host, Pausanias dedicated this memorial to Phoebus.

1.132.3

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1.132.3

”

1.132.3

Now the Lacedaemonians had immediately chiselled off these verses and inscribed on the tripod by name all the cities which had had a part in overthrowing the Barbarians and had together set up this offering.

1.132.3

The act of Pausanias, however, was felt at the time to have been a transgression, and now that he had got into this further trouble, it stood out more clearly than ever as having been but a prelude to his present designs.

1.132.4

They were informed also that he was intriguing with the Helots; and it was even so, for he was promising them freedom and citizenship if they would join him in a revolt and help him accomplish his whole plan.

1.132.5

But not even then, nor relying on certain Helots who had turned informers, did they think it best to take harsh measures against him; they adhered to their usual method in dealing with men of their own class—not to be hasty, in the case of a Spartan, in adopting an irrevocable decision unless they had indisputable proofs. But at last, as it is said, the man who was to take to Artabazus Pausanias' last letter to the King, a man of Argilus who had once been a favourite of his and had hitherto been most loyal to him, turned informer. For he took fright when he called to mind that no previous messenger had ever come back again; and so, having made a counterfeit seal, in order that his act might not be discovered, in case he should be wrong in his suspicion or in case Pausanias should ask to make some alteration in the letter, he opened the letter and in fact found written therein, as he suspected he should find something of the sort to have been directed, an order for his own death.

1.133.1

At this point the ephors, when the man showed them the letter, were at last more nearly convinced, but they wished besides to hear with their own ears some word from Pausanias' own lips; so in accordance with a prearranged plan the man went as a suppliant to Taenarus and put up there a hut divided by a partition. In the inner room of the hut he concealed some of the ephors, and when Pausanias visited him and asked the reason of his taking the position of a suppliant, they heard clearly everything that was said: they heard the man accuse Pausanias of having written the order about himself, reveal the other items of the plot in detail, and protest that, though he had never yet compromised Pausanias in his errands to the King, the special honour awarded him was no better than that which the common run of his servants received—to be put to death; and they heard Pausanias acknowledge these same things, urge the man not to be angry with him this time, offer him a guarantee that he might leave the temple in safety, and finally request him to go on his way with all speed and not frustrate the negotiations.

1.134.1

When the ephors had heard all the details they went back home for the present, but inasmuch as they now had certain knowledge, they were planning to make the arrest in the city. And the story goes that when Pausanias was about to be arrested in the street, he saw the face of one of the ephors as he was approaching and realised for what purpose he was coming, and that another ephor out of friendship warned him by giving a covert nod, whereupon he set off on a run for the temple of Athena of the Brazen House, and reached the refuge first, as the sacred precinct was near by. Entering then into a building of no great size belonging to the temple, that he might not suffer from exposure under the open sky, he kept quiet.

1.134.2

For the moment then the ephors were distanced in their pursuit, but afterwards they took the roof off the building and, watching until he was inside and shutting off his retreat, walled up the doors; then they invested the place and starved him to death.

1.134.3

And when he was about to expire, imprisoned as he was in the building,

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they perceived his condition and brought him out of the temple still breathing;

1.134.3

but when he was brought out he died immediately.

1.134.4

It was their first intention to cast him into the Caeadas,

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where they throw malefactors;

1.134.4

but afterwards they decided to bury him somewhere near the city.

1.134.4

But the god at Delphi afterwards warned the Lacedaemonians by oracle to transfer him to the place where he died (and he now lies in the entrance to the precinct, as an inscription on some columns testifies), and that they should recompense Athena of the Brazen House with two bodies in place of one, since their act had brought a curse upon them.

1.134.4

So they had two bronze statues made and dedicated them to Athena to be a substitute for Pausanias.

1.135.1

Thus it was that the Athenians,

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in response to the demand of the Lacedaemonians, ordered them to drive out the curse of Taenarus, seeing that the god also declared it to be a curse.

1.135.2

But when Pausanias was thus convicted of treasonable dealings with Persia, the Lacedaemonians sent envoys to the Athenians and accused Themistocles also of complicity in the plot, in accordance with discoveries they had made in connection with their investigation about Pausanias;

1.135.3

and they demanded that he be punished in the same way. The Athenians agreed, but as he happened to have been ostracised, and, though living in Argos, frequently visited other parts of the Peloponnesus also, they sent some men, accompanied by the Lacedaemonians (who were quite ready to join in the pursuit), with instructions to arrest him wherever they chanced to find him.

1.136.1

But Themistocles, forewarned, fled from the Peloponnesus to Corcyra, since he was a benefactor

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of the Corcyraeans.

1.136.1

As they, however, alleged that they were afraid to keep him and thus incur the enmity of the Lacedaemonians and Athenians, he was conveyed by them across to the mainland opposite.

1.136.2

And being pursued by those who had been appointed to the task, according as they could learn the course he was taking, he was forced in some strait to take lodging with Admetus, king of the Molossians, who was not friendly to him.

1.136.3

Admetus happened not to be at home, but Themistocles approached his wife as a suppliant and was instructed by her to take their child and seat himself on the hearth.

1.136.4

And when Admetus returned after a short time, Themistocles declared who he was and urged that, if he had ever opposed any request Admetus had made to the Athenians, he ought not to take vengeance on him when a fugitive; for in his present plight he might come to harm at the hands of a far weaker man than Admetus, whereas the noble thing to do was to take vengeance on fair terms upon equals. Besides, he added, he had opposed Admetus merely in the matter of a petition and not of his personal safety; whereas Admetus, if he gave him up to his pursuers (telling who these were and what the charge against him), would deprive him of the salvation of his life.

1.137.1

Admetus, hearing this, raised him up, together with his own son, even as he still sat holding him, this being the most potent form of supplication.

1.137.1

And when, not long afterwards, the Athenians and Lacedaemonians came and made urgent demands for him, Admetus would not give him up, but, since he wished to go to the King, gave him an escort overland to Pydna on the other

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sea, the capital of Alexander.

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There he found a merchant vessel putting off for Ionia, and going on board was driven by a storm to the station of the Athenian fleet which was blockading Naxos. Themistocles became afraid and told the captain who he was (for he was unknown to those on board) and why he was in flight, adding that if he did not save him he would tell the Athenians that he had been bribed to give him passage; their only chance for safety, he explained, was that no one be allowed to leave the ship until the voyage could be resumed, and he promised that if he complied with his request he would make a fitting return for the favour. The captain did as he was bidden, and after riding out the gale for a day and a night just outside the Athenian station, duly arrived at Ephesus.

1.137.3

And Themistocles rewarded him handsomely with a gift of money (for he soon received from his friends in Athens and from Argos the funds which he had deposited for safekeeping); then proceeding into the interior with one of the Persians who dwelt on the coast, he sent on a letter to King Artaxerxes son of Xerxes, who had lately come to the throne.

1.137.4

And the letter ran as follows: " I, Themistocles, am come to you, who of all Hellenes did your house most harm so long as your father assailed me and I was constrained to defend myself, but still greater good by far when, his retreat being in progress, I was in security and he in dire peril.

1.137.4

And there is a kindness due to me (here he related the timely warning to retreat given at Salamis, and the failure of the Hellenic fleet to destroy the bridges at that time,

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which he falsely claimed to have been due to his own efforts), and now I am here, having it in my power to do you great good, being pursued by the Hellenes on account of my friendship to you;

1.137.4

and my desire is to wait a year and then in person explain to you that for which I am come."

1.138.1

The King, it is said, marvelled at his purpose

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and bade him do as he desired.

1.138.1

And Themistocles, in the interval of his waiting, made himself acquainted, as far as he could, with the Persian language and with the customs of the country;

1.138.2

but when the year was ended he came to the King and becme more influential with him than any of the Hellenes ever had been before, both because of the reputation he already enjoyed and of the hope which he kept suggesting to him that he would make all Hellas subject to him, but most of all in consequence of the insight he minifested, of which he gave repeated proofs.

1.138.3

I[cr indeed Themistocles was a man who had most convincingly demonstrated the strength of his natural sagacity, and was in the very highest degree worthy of admiration in that respect.

1.138.3

For by native insight, not reinforced by earlier or later study,

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he was beyond other men, with the briefest deliberation, both a shrewd judge of the immediate present and wise in forecasting what would happen in the most distant future.

1.138.3

Moreover, he had the ability to expound to others the enterprises he had in hand, and on those which he had not yet essayed he could yet without fail pass competent judgment;

1.138.3

and he could most clearly foresee the issue for better or worse that lay in the still dim future.

1.138.3

To sum up all in a word, by force of native sagacity and because of the brief preparation he required, he proved himself the ablest of all men instantly to hit upon the right expedient.

1.138.4

He died a natural death, an illness taking him off, though some say that he put an end to his own life by poison

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when he realised it to be impossible to fulfil his promises to the King.

1.138.5

There is a monument to him at Magnesia in Asia, in the marketplace; for he was governor of this country, the King having given him, for bread, Magnesia, which brought in a revenue of fifty talents a year, for wine, Lampsacus, reputed to be the best wine country of all places at that time;

1.138.6

and Myus for meat. But his bones, his relations say, were fetched home by his own command and buried in Attica unknown to the Athenians; for it was not lawful to bury him there, as he had been banished for treason. Such was the end of Pausanias the Lacedaemonian and of Themistocles the Athenian, the most distinguished of the Hellenes of their time.

1.139.1

The Lacedaemonians

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then had on the occasion of their first embassy directed the Athenians, and received a counter demand from them, to take such measures about the expulsion of the accursed.

1.139.1

Later, however, they frequently repaired to Athens and bade them withdraw from Potidaea, and give Aegina its independence, and above all they declared in the plainest terms that they could avoid war only by rescinding the decree about the Megarians,

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in which they were forbidden to use any of the ports in the Athenian empire or even the Athenian market.

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But the Athenians would pay no heed to their other demands and declined to rescind the decree, charging the Megarians with encroachment upon the sacred land and the border-land not marked by boundaries,

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and also with harbouring runaway slaves.

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But at last a final embassy came from Lacedaemon, consisting of Ramphias, Melesippus, and Agesander, who said nothing of the demands they had hitherto been wont to make, but only this: "The Lacedaemonians desire peace, and there will be peace if you give the Hellenes their independence." Whereupon the Athenians called an assembly and gave their citizens an opportunity to express their opinions; and it was resolved to consider the whole question and then give their answer once for all.

1.139.4

And many others came forward and spoke, in support of both sides of the question, some urging that war was necessary, others that the decree should not stand in the way of peace, but should be rescinded; and finally Pericles son of Xanthippus, the foremost man of the Athenians at that time, wielding greatest influence both in speech and in action, came forward and advised them as follows:

1.140.1

" I hold, men of Athens, to the same judgment as always, that we must not yield to the Peloponnesians, although I know that men are not as a rule moved by the same spirit when they are actually engaged in war as when they are being persuaded to undertake it, but change their judgments in accordance with events. And now also I see that I must give you the same or nearly the same advice as in the past, and I demand that those of you who are persuaded by what I shall say shall support the common decisions, even if we should in any way fail, or else, in case of success, claim no share in the good judgment shown. For it is just as possible for the course of events to move perversely as for the plans of men; and it is for that very reason that we commonly lay upon fortune the blame for whatever turns out contrary to our calculations.

1.140.2

"As for the Lacedaemonians, it was perfectly clear before that they were plotting against us, and it is now clearer than ever. For whereas it was expressly stipulated that we should submit our differences to arbitration, each side meanwhile keeping what it had, they have never yet asked for arbitration themselves nor do they accept it now when we make the offer. What they want is to redress their grievances by war rather than by discussion, and they are here dictating already and no longer expostulating.

1.140.3

For they order us to raise the siege of Potidaea, restore the independence of Aegina, and rescind the Megarian decree; and these men that are just come boldly proclaim that we must give all the Hellenes also their independence.

1.140.4

But let no one of you think that we shall be going to war for a trifling matter, if we should refuse to rescind the Megarian decree—the thing they especially insist upon, saying that there will be no war if it is rescinded—and do not let there remain in your minds any self-reproach that it was a small matter for which you went to war.

1.140.5

For this trifling thing involves nothing less than the vindication and proof of your political conviction. If you yield this point to them you will immediately be ordered to yield another and greater one, as having conceded this first point through fear; whereas by a downright refusal you will give them clearly to understand that they must be more disposed to deal with you on terms of equality.

1.141.1

So make up your minds, here and now, either to take their orders before any damage is done you, or, if we mean to go to war,—as to me at least seems best--do so with the determination not to yield on any pretext, great or small, and not to hold our possessions in fear. For it means enslavement just the same when either the greatest or the least claim is imposed by equals upon their neighbours, not by an appeal to justice but by dictation. "

1.141.2

But as regards the war and the resources of each side, make up your minds, as you hear the particulars fiom me, that our position will be fully as powerful as theirs.

1.141.3

For the Peloponnesians till their lands with their own hands; they have no wealth, either private or public; besides, they have had no experience in protracted or transmarine wars, because, owing to their poverty, they only wage brief campaigns separately against one another.

1.141.4

Now people so poor cannot be manning ships or frequently sending out expeditions by land, since they would thus have to be away fiom their properties and at the same time would be drawing upon their own resources for their expenses, and, besides, are barred from the sea as well.

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Again, it is accumulated wealth, and not taxes levied under stress, that sustains wars. Men, too, who till their own lands are more ready to risk their lives in war than their property; for they have confident hope of surviving the perils, but no assurance that they will not use up their funds before the war ends, especially if, as may well happen, the war is protracted beyond expectation.

1.141.6

Indeed, although in a single battle the Peloponnesians and their allies are strong enough to withstand all the Hellenes, yet they are not strong enough to maintain a war against a military organisation which is so different from theirs, seeing that they have no single general assembly, and therefore cannot promptly put into effect any emergency measure; and as they all have an equal vote and are of different races they each strive to advance their own interests. In such circumstances it usually happens that nothing is accomplished.

1.141.7

And indeed it could scarcely be otherwise, for what some of them want is the greatest possible vengeance upon a particular enemy, others the least possible damage to their own property. And when after many delays they do meet, they give but a scant portion of their time to the consideration of any matter of common concern, but the larger portion to their own individual interests. And each one thinks no harm will come from his own negligence, but that it is the business of somebody else to be provident on his behalf; and so, through all separately cherishing the same fancy, universal ruin comes unperceived upon the whole body.

1.142.1

And what is most important, they will be hampered by scarcity of money, seeing that providing it slowly they are subject to delays;

1.142.2

but the opportunities of war wait for no man.

1.142.2

"Moreover, neither the planting of forts in our territory

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need cause us to be afraid, nor yet their navy.

1.142.3

For as regards the first, it is a difficult matter even in time of peace to construct here a city that will be a match for ours, to say nothing of doing this in a hostile country and at a time when we have fortifications quite as strong to oppose them.

1.142.4

But suppose they do establish a fort; although they might injure a part of our territory by making raids and receiving our deserters, yet that will not be sufficient to prevent us from sailing to their land and building forts there, or making reprisals with our fleet, wherein our strength lies.

1.142.5

For we have gained more experience of operations on land from our career on the sea than they of naval operations from their career on land.

1.142.6

As for their acquiring the art of seamanship, that is an advantage they will not easily secure;

1.142.7

for even you, who began practising it immediately after the Persian war, have not yet brought it to perfection. How then could men do anything worth mention who are tillers of the soil and not seamen, especially since they will not even be permitted to practise, because we shall always be lying in wait for them with a large fleet?

1.142.8

For if they had to cope with only a small fleet lying in wait, they might perhaps risk an engagement, in their ignorance getting courage from their mere numbers; but if their way is blocked by a large fleet, they will remain inactive, their skill will deteriorate through lack of practice, and that in itself will make them more timid.

1.142.9

Seamanship, like any other skill, is a matter of art, and practice in it may not be left to odd times, as a by-work; on the contrary, no other pursuit may be carried on as a by-work to it.

1.143.1

"Then again, if they should lay hands upon the money at Olympia or Delphi and try to entice away the mercenaries among our sailors by the inducement of higher pay, that indeed might be a dangerous matter if we were not a match for them, assuming that both citizens and our resident aliens have manned our ships. But as a matter of fact we are a match for them, and, what is of the highest importance, we have citizens for pilots, and our crews in general are more numerous and better than those of all the rest of Hellas.

1.143.2

And no one of our mercenaries,

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when it came to facing the risk, would elect to be exiled from his own land and, with a lesser hope of victory at the same time, fight on their side because of the offer of a few days' high pay.

1.143.3

"Such, as it seems to me at least, or approximately such, is the situation as far as the Peloponnesians are concerned; as regards our own, I believe we are free from the defects I have remarked upon in them, and that we have in other respects advantages which more than counterbalance theirs.

1.143.4

If they march against our territory, we shall sail against theirs; and the devastation of a part of the Peloponnesus will be quite a different thing from that of tle whole of Attica. For they will be unable to get other territory in its place without fighting, while we leave an abundance of territory both in the islands and on the mainland.

1.143.5

A great thing, in truth, is the control of the sea. Just consider: if we were islanders, who would be more unassailable ? So, even now, we must, as near as may be, imagine ourselves such and relinquish our land and houses, but keep watch over the sea and the city; and we must not give way to resentment against the Peloponnesians on account of our losses and risk a decisive battle with them, far superior in numbers as they are. If we win we shall have to fight them again in undiminished number, and if we fail, our allies, the source of our strength, are lost to us as well; for they will not keep quiet when we are no longer able to proceed in arms against them. And we must not make lament for the loss of houses and land, but for men; for these things do not procure us men, but men these. Indeed, had I thought that I should persuade you, I should have urged you to go forth and lay them waste yourselves, and thus show the Peloponnesians that you will not, for the sake of such things, yield them obedience.

1.144.1

" Many other considerations also lead me to hope that we shall prove superior, if you will consent not to attempt to extend your empire while you are at war and not to burden yourselves needlessly with dangers of your own choosing; for I am more afraid of our own mistakes than of the enemy's plans.

1.144.2

But these matters will be explained to you on some later occasion when we are actually at war; at the present time let us send the envoys back with this answer: As to the Megarians, that we will permit them to use our markets and harbours, if the Lacedaemonians on their part will cease passing laws for the expulsion of aliens so far as concerns us or our allies (for nothing in the treaty forbids either our action or theirs; as to the states in our confederacy, that we will give them their independence if they were independent when we made the treaty, and as soon as they on their part grant the states in their alliance the right to exercise independence in a manner that conforms, not to the interest of the Lacedaemonians, but to the wishes of the individual states; and as to arbitration, that we are willing to submit to it in accordance with the treaty, and will not begin war, but will defend ourselves against those who do.

1.144.3

This answer is just and at the same time consistent with the dignity of the city. But we must realise that war is inevitable, and that the more willing we show ourselves to accept it, the less eager will our enemies be to attack us, and also that it is from the greatest dangers that the greatest honours accrue to a state as well as to an individual.

1.144.4

Our fathers, at any rate, withstood the Persians, although they had no such resources as ours, and abandoned even those which they possessed, and by their resolution more than by good fortune and with a courage greater than their strength beat back the Barbarian and advanced our fortunes to their present state. And we must not fall short of their example, but must defend ourselves against our enemies in every way, and must endeavour to hand down our empire undiminished to posterity."

1.145.1

Sucl were the words of Pericles: and the Athenians, thinking that he was advising them for the best, voted as he directed, and answered the Lacedaemonians according to his bidding, both as regards the particulars as he set them forth and on the whole question, to the effect that they would do nothing upon dictation, but were ready in accordance with the treaty to have all complaints adjusted by arbitration on a fair and equal basis. So the Lacedaemonian envoys went back home and thereafter came on no further missions.

1.146.1

These were the grounds of complaint and the causes of disagreement on both sides before the war, and they began to appear immediately after the affair of Epidamnus and Corcyra.

1.146.1

Nevertheless the two parties continued to have intercourse with one another during these recriminations and visited each other without heralds,

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though not without suspicion;

1.146.1

for the events which were taking place constituted an actual annulment of the treaty and furnished an occasion for war.

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