History of the Peloponnesian War

Thucydides

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3.1.1

During the following summer, when the grain

3.1.1

1

3.1.1

was ripening, the Peloponnesians and their allies made an expedition into Attica under the leadership of Archidamus son of Zeuxidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians, and settling in camp proceeded to ravage

3.1.2

the land. And sallies were made as usual by the Athenian cavalry wherever opportunity offered, thus preventing the great mass of the enemy's light-armed troops from going beyond their watch-posts and laying waste the districts near

3.1.3

the city. The invaders remained as long as their provisions lasted, then withdrew and dispersed to their several cities.

3.2.1

Directly after the invasion of the Peloponnesians, all Lesbos,

3.2.1

1

3.2.1

except Methymna, revolted from Athens. The Lesbians had wished to do this even before the war, but the Lacedaemonians had not taken them into their alliance, and even in this instance they were forced to revolt sooner than they had intended.

3.2.2

For they were waiting until the work should be finished of blocking their harbours, building walls, and constructing ships, and until the arrival of what they needed from the Pontus—archers and grain, and whatever else they were sending for.

3.2.3

But the people of Tenedos, who were at variance with them, and of Methymna, and some of the Mytilenaeans themselves, men in private station who were

3.2.3

proxeni

3.2.3

1

3.2.3

of the Athenians, were moved by partisanship to turn informers and notify the Athenians that the Mytilenaeans were attempting to bring all Lesbos into a political union centred in Mytilene; that all their preparations were being hurried forward, in concert with the Lacedaemonians and with their kinsmen the Boeotians, with the purpose of revolting; and that unless someone should forestall them forthwith, Lesbos would be lost to Athens.

3.3.1

But the Athenians, distressed by the plague as well as by the war, which had recently broken out and was now at its height, thought it a serious matter to make a new enemy of Lesbos, which had a fleet and power unimpaired; and so at first they would not listen to the charges, giving greater weight to the wish that they might not be true. When, however, the envoys whom they sent could not persuade the Mytilenaeans to stop their measures for political union and their preparations, they became alarmed and wished to forestall them.

3.3.2

So they suddenly despatched forty ships, which happened to be ready for a cruise around the Peloponnesus, under the command of Cleïppides son of Deinias and two others;

3.3.3

for word had come to them that there was a festival of Apollo Maloeis

3.3.3

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3.3.3

outside Mytilene at which the whole populace kept holiday, and that they might hope to take them by surprise if they should make haste. And if the attempt succeeded, well and good; but if not, the generals were to order the Mytilenaeans to deliver up their ships and pull down their walls, and if they disobeyed, to go to war.

3.3.4

So the ships set off; and as there happened to be at Athens at the time ten Mytilenaean triremes serving as auxiliaries in accordance with the terms of their alliance, the Athenians detained them, placing their crews in custody.

3.3.5

But the Mytilenaeans got word of the expedition through a man who crossed over from Athens to Euboea, went thence by land to Geraestus, and, chancing there upon a merchantman that was putting to sea, took ship and on the third day after leaving Athens reached Mytilene. The Mytilenaeans, accordingly, not only did not go out to the temple of Apollo Maloeis, but barricaded the half-finished portions of the walls and harbours and kept guard.

3.3.5

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3.4.1

When not long afterwards the Athenians arrived and saw the state of affairs, their generals delivered their orders, and then, as the Mytilenaeans did not hearken to them, began hostilities.

3.4.2

But the Mytilenaeans, being unprepared for war and forced to enter upon it without warning, merely sailed out a short distance beyond their harbour, as though offering battle; then, when they had been chased to shore by the Athenian ships, they made overtures to the generals, wishing, if possible, to secure some sort of reasonable terms and thus to get rid of the fleet for the present.

3.4.3

The Athenian commanders accepted their proposals, being themselves afraid that they were not strong enough to make war against all Lesbos.

3.4.4

So the Mytilenaeans, having concluded an armistice, sent envoys to Athens, among whom was one of the informers who was by now repentant, in the hope that they might persuade them to recall their fleet, on the understanding that they themselves would not start a revolution.

3.4.5

Meanwhile they also sent envoys to Lacedaemon in a trireme, which eluded the Athenian fleet lying at anchor at Malea north of the town; for they had no confidence in the success of their negotiations with the Athenians.

3.4.6

These envoys, arriving at Lacedaemon after a hard voyage through the open sea, began negotiating for some aid for their countrymen.

3.5.1

But when the envoys to Athens returned without having accomplished anything, the people of Mytilene and the rest of Lesbos, except Methymna, began war; the Methymnaeans, however, supported the Athenians, as did also the Imbrians, Lemnians, and a few of the other allies.

3.5.2

The Mytilenaeans made a sortie in full force against the camp of the Athenians, and a battle occurred in which the Mytilenaeans had the advantage; nevertheless they did not have enough confidence in themselves to bivouack on the field, but withdrew. From this time on they kept quiet, being unwilling to risk an engagement without reinforcements from Peloponnesus and elsewhere. Such reinforcements they expected, for there had come to them Meleas a Laconian and Hermaeondas a Theban, who had been sent out before the revolt, but being unable to arrive before the Athenian expedition, had sailed in secretly after the battle in a trireme, and now advised them to send a second trireme and some envoys to accompany them. And this the Mytilenaeans did.

3.6.1

Meanwhile the Athenians, much encouraged by the inactivity of the Mytilenaeans, summoned their allies, who put in an appearance the more quickly as they saw that no energetic measures were being taken by the Lesbians. They also placed their ships at anchor round the southern part of the town, and established a blockade against both harbours.

3.6.2

Thus they excluded the Mytilenaeans from the use of the sea; but as for the land, the Mytilenaeans and the other Lesbians, who had now come to their aid, dominated all the island, except the small strip held by the Athenians in the neighbourhood of their camps, and it was Malea rather than their camps that they used as a station for boats and supplies. Such was the course of the war at Mytilene.

3.7.1

About the same time during this summer the Athenians sent also on a cruise round the Peloponnesus thirty ships with Asopius son of Phormio as commander; for the Acarnanians had requested them to send them as commander either a son or some other kinsman of Phormio's.

3.7.2

And the ships as they sailed past ravaged the coast of Laconia.

3.7.3

Afterwards Asopius sent most of the ships back home, but had twelve with him when he reached Naupactus. Then later, having called out all the forces of the Acarnanians, he made an expedition against Oeniadae, sailing with the ships up the Achelous, while his army on land ravaged the country.

3.7.4

As, however, the inhabitants would not come over to him, he dismissed his army, but himself sailed to Leucas and made a descent upon Nericus. On his way back from Nericus he and part of his army were slain by the people of that place, who rallied to its defence, and by a few guards.

3.7.4

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3.7.5

The Athenians first stood out to sea and then later recovered their dead from the Leucadians under a truce.

3.8.1

Meanwhile the Mytilenaean envoys who had been sent on the first ship, having been told by the Lacedaemonians to present themselves at Olympia, in order that the other members of the alliance also might hear them and take counsel, came to Olympia. It was the Olympiad in which Dorieus

3.8.1

1

3.8.1

the Rhodian won his second victory.

3.8.2

After the festival the Peloponnesians met in council, and the envoys spoke as follows:

3.9.1

"We are not unaware, men of Lacedaemon and members of the alliance, of the traditional feeling of the Hellenes towards men who revolt in time of war and abandon their former alliance: those who accept them as allies are indeed pleased with them in so far as they derive advantage, but they regard them as traitors to their former friends and therefore think the worse of them.

3.9.2

And this estimate is not unjust, provided that those who revolt and those from whom they secede held the same political views and were actuated by the same feeling of good will toward one another, and were evenly matched in preparation for war and in power, and provided also that there were no reasonable excuse for their revolt. But these conditions did not obtain between us and the Athenians;

3.9.3

therefore, let no one think the worse of us on the ground that we were honoured by them in time of peace and now revolt from them in time of danger.

3.10.1

"We will first discuss the question of justice and rectitude, especially as we are seeking an alliance, for we know that neither does friendship between men prove lasting, nor does a league between states come to aught, unless they comport themselves with transparent honesty of purpose towards one another and in general are of like character and way of thinking;

3.10.2

for differences in men's actions arise from the diversity of their convictions. "Now between us and the Athenians an alliance was first made when you withdrew from the Persian war but they remained to finish the work.

3.10.3

We became allies, however, not to the Athenians for the enslavement of the Hellenes, but to the Hellenes for their emancipation from the Persians. And as long as they maintained their hegemony on terms of equality we heartily followed their lead;

3.10.4

but when we saw them relaxing their hostility to the Persians and eager for the enslavement of the allies, we were no longer without alarm. And the allies, being unable, on account of the number of those who had votes, to unite for self-defence, were all enslaved except ourselves and the Chians;

3.10.5

while we shared their campaigns as presumably “independent” and enjoying at least the name of freedom. And we could no longer regard the Athenians as trustworthy leaders, taking as warning examples the events of the past;

3.10.6

for it was not likely that they, after subjugating those with whom they had entered into treaty relations together with us, would not do the same to those who were left, if ever they should possibly have the power.

3.11.1

"Again if we had all remained independent we should have had better assurance that they would make no violent change in our status; having, however, the majority under their hands, while still associating with us on an equal footing, they would naturally find it more irksome that our state alone still maintained its equality as compared with the majority that had already yielded, especially since they were becoming more powerful in proportion as we became more isolated.

3.11.2

Indeed it is only the fear that arises from equality of power that constitutes a firm basis for an alliance; for he that would transgress is deterred by the feeling that he has no superiority wherewith to make an attack.

3.11.3

And we were left independent for no other reason than because they clearly saw that with a view to empire they must get control of affairs by fair-seeming words and by attacks of policy rather than of force.

3.11.4

For, on the one hand, they had as evidence in their favour that surely those who have an equal voice with themselves would never have taken part in their campaigns had not those whom they attacked been guilty of some wrong; and on the other hand, they also brought the united strength of the strongest states against the less powerful first, and leaving the former to the last they counted upon finding them weaker when all the rest had been removed from around them.

3.11.5

But if they had begun with us, while the whole body of allies were not only still strong in their own strength, but also had a leader to rally to, they would not have got the mastery so easily.

3.11.6

Besides, our navy caused them some fear, lest it should some day be augmented by being united either with yours or another's and thus become a menace to themselves.

3.11.7

To some extent also we owe our salvation to the court we paid to the Athenian people and to the political leaders of the day.

3.11.8

But we could not have expected to be able to survive for long, if we may judge by their conduct toward the other allies, unless this war had broken out.

3.12.1

"Was this then a friendship or a freedom to put faith in, where we violated our real feelings whenever we treated each other as friends? They courted us in time of war only because they were afraid of us, while we acted in the same manner toward them in time of peace; and good faith, which in most cases is made steadfast by good will, was in our case made secure by fear, and it was fear rather than friendship that held us both to the alliance; and whichever of us should soonest gain boldness through a feeling of security was bound to be the first to commit some act of transgression also.

3.12.2

If, therefore, anyone thinks that, just because they postponed the measures we dread, we do wrong in revolting first, without having waited on our side until we were (quite sure that any of our suspicions would come true, he is in error.

3.12.3

For if we were in a position to meet their plotting by counter-measures on equal terms with them, it was indeed incumbent upon us on our part to postpone likewise our offensive against them; but since the power of attack is always in their hands, the right of acting betimes in our own defence must necessarily be in ours.

3.13.1

"Such were the motives and reasons, Lacedaemonians and allies, which led us to revolt, and they are clear enough to convince all who hear them that we had good grounds for our action, and cogent enough to alarm us and impel us to seek some means of safety. This we long ago wished to do while you were still at peace, when we sent envoys to you suggesting that we should revolt, but were prevented from doing so because you would not receive us. But now, when the Boeotians invited

3.13.1

1

3.13.1

us we responded promptly. It was our intention to make at once a double withdrawal—from the Hellenes

3.13.1

2

3.13.1

and thus aid in liberating them instead of joining the Athenians to do them wrong; and from the Athenians, and thus destroy them first instead of being ourselves destroyed by them afterwards.

3.13.2

Our revolt, however, has been made prematurely and without preparation; wherefore it is the more incumbent upon you to receive us as allies and quickly send us aid, in order that all men may see that you protect those whom you ought to protect and at the same time harm your enemies. And it is an opportunity such as never has been before.

3.13.3

For the Athenians have been ruined by pestilence as well as by heavy expenses. Part of their fleet is cruising about your coasts,

3.13.3

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3.13.3

part is arrayed against us; so that it is not likely that they have any ships to spare if you attack them this coming summer a second time, by sea as well as by land;

3.13.4

but they will either not resist you when you sail against them, or else they will have to withdraw their fleets both from our waters and from yours. And let no one think that he will be incurring a risk of his own for the country of another.

3.13.5

For though Lesbos seems to him to be a long way off, the help she will bring him will be close at hand. For the war will not be in Attica,

3.13.5

1

3.13.5

as some think, but in those countries from which Athens derives its support. The revenues of Athens come from her allies, and they will be still greater if they shall subdue us;

3.13.6

for not only will no one else revolt, but our resources will be added to hers, and we should be treated with greater rigour

3.13.6

1

3.13.6

than those who have long been slaves.

3.13.7

But if you give us your hearty support, you will add to your league a state that has a large navy, a thing of which you still stand most in need, and you will find it easier to overthrow the Athenians by gradually drawing their allies away from them—for every one will be emboldened to come over to your side—and you will free yourselves of the reproach under which you have heretofore laboured, of refusing

3.13.7

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3.13.7

to aid those who revolt from the Athenians. But if you openly play the part of liberators,

3.13.7

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3.13.7

the more certain will be your victory in the war.

3.14.1

“Reverencing, then, not only the hopes which the Hellenes place in you, but also that Olympian Zeus in whose temple we are even as suppliants, succour the Mytilenaeans by entering on this alliance; and do not abandon us when we are hazarding our lives in a risk all our own, but shall bring to all a general benefit if we succeed—and a still more general injury if through your refusal we shall fail.

3.14.2

Prove yourselves, therefore, men such as the Hellenes account you and our fears would have you be.”

3.15.1

Thus spoke the Mytilenaeans. The Lacedaemonians and their allies, after they had heard them, accepted their proposals, and received the Lesbians as allies. Those allies who were there present were directed to assemble with all speed at the Isthmus with two-thirds

3.15.1

1

3.15.1

of their forces for the purpose of making the proposed invasion of Attica; and the Lacedaemonians themselves arrived first and proceeded to construct on the Isthmus hauling-machines with which to transfer the ships from Corinth to the sea on the Athenian side, in order to attack Athens both by sea and by land.

3.15.2

They set to work zealously at these things, but the rest of the allies collected slowly, since they were busy gathering in their harvest and were in no mood for campaigning.

3.16.1

Meanwhile the Athenians, perceiving that the enemy, in making their preparations, were acting upon a conviction of their own weakness, and wishing to show that they were mistaken in their judgment, and that without moving the fleet at Lesbos they could easily ward off the new force coming from the Peloponnesus, manned one hundred ships, the citizens,

3.16.1

1

3.16.1

—except the knights and the highest class—embarking as well as the resident aliens. Then putting out to sea they displayed their strength along the coast of the Isthmus and made descents upon the Peloponnesus wherever they pleased.

3.16.2

As for the Lacedaemonians, when they saw how greatly they liad miscalculated, they concluded that the reports of the Lesbians

3.16.2

1

3.16.2

were untrue, and regarding the expedition as impracticable, since their allies had not yet arrived, and, besides, word had come to them that the thirty

3.16.2

2

3.16.2

ships which were cruising around the Peloponnese were ravaging their own country districts, they went back home.

3.16.3

Later,

3.16.3

1

3.16.3

however, they prepared a fleet which was to be dispatched to Lesbos and sent orders to the allied states for forty ships, appointing Alcidas who was to sail as admiral of this fleet.

3.16.4

And when the Athenians saw that the enemy had withdrawn, they also returned home with their hundred ships.

3.17.1

At the time when these ships were at sea about the largest number the Athenians ever had at once were on active service, though there were as many or even more at the beginning of the war.

3.17.2

For one hundred ships were guarding Attica, Euboea and Salamis, and another hundred were cruising off the Peloponnesus, besides those at Potidaea and in other places, so that the number in service at the same time in a single summer was all told two hundred and fifty. It was this effort, together with Potidaea, that chiefly exhausted their resources of money.

3.17.3

For in the siege of Potidaea the hoplite received a wage of two drachmas a day, one for himself and one for his attendant;

3.17.4

and there were at first three thousand of these, and the number was not less than this throughout the siege, besides sixteen hundred who came with Phormio, but went away before the siege was over; and the sailors on the ships all drew the same pay as the soldiers. It was in this way, then, that their money was exhausted at first, and this was the largest number of ships manned by them.

3.18.1

While the Lacedaemonians were at the Isthmus, the Mytilenaeans and their auxiliaries

3.18.1

1

3.18.1

marched with their army against Methymna, which they supposed was being betrayed into their hands; and they assaulted the city, but when their attempt did not succeed as they had expected, they went off to Antissa, Pyrrha and Eresus, and after establishing their interests in these cities on a firmer basis and strengthening the walls, went home in haste.

3.18.2

As soon, however, as they had withdrawn, the Methymnaeans in their turn made an expedition against Antissa; but a sortie was made by the inhabitants of Antissa and the auxiliary troops in which the Methymnaeans were defeated and many of them slain, whereupon the rest withdrew in haste.

3.18.3

Now when the Athenians learned that the Mytilenaeans were masters of the country and that their own soldiers were not numerous enough to keep them within their walls, about the beginning of autumn they sent Paches son of Epicurus in command of a thousand Athenian hoplites, who also served as rowers.

3.18.3

1

3.18.4

When they arrived at Mytilene, they encircled it with a single wall, in which forts were built at a number of strong positions.

3.18.5

Mytilene was thus at last completely cut off both by sea and land just as the winter set in.

3.19.1

Now the Athenians, finding themselves in need of additional funds for the siege, having then for the first time resorted to a property tax

3.19.1

1

3.19.1

upon themselves to the amount of two hundred talents, also sent to the allies twelve ships under the command of Lysicles and four others, to collect money from them.

3.19.2

He cruised about and collected money at various places; but on his way inland from Myus in Caria through the plain of the Meander, after he had reached the hill of Sandius, he was attacked by the Carians and the Anaeitans and slain, together with many of his army.

3.20.1

During the same winter the Plataeans, who were still

3.20.1

1

3.20.1

being besieged by the Peloponnesians and the Boeotians, began to be distressed by failure of their supply of food, and since there was no hope of aid from Athens nor any other means of safety in sight, they and the Athenians who were besieged with them planned to leave the city and climb over the enemy's walls, in the hope that they might be able to force a passage. The attempt was suggested to them by Theaenetus son of Tolmides, a soothsayer, and Eupompidas son of Daïmachus, who was one of the generals.

3.20.2

At first all were to take part, but afterwards half of them somehow lost heart, thinking the risk too great, and only about two hundred and twenty voluntarily persisted in making the sortie, which was carried out in the following way.

3.20.3

They made ladders equal in height to the enemy's wall, getting the measure by counting the layers of bricks at a point where the enemy's wall on the side facing Plataea happened not to have been plastered over. Many counted the layers at the same time, and while some were sure to make a mistake, the majority were likely to hit the true count, especially since they counted time and again, and, besides, were at no great distance, and the part of the wall they wished to see was easily visible.

3.20.4

The measurement of the ladders, then, they got at in this way, reckoning the measure from the thickness of the bricks.

3.21.1

The wall of the Peloponnesians was built in the following fashion. It had two encircling lines, the inner looking towards Plataea, the outer to guard against attack from the direction of Athens, and the two circuits were distant about sixteen feet from one another.

3.21.2

This interval of sixteen feet had in building been divided up into rooms assigned to the guards; and the whole structure was continuous

3.21.2

1

3.21.2

, so as to appear to be a single thick wall furnished with battlements on both sides.

3.21.3

And at every tenth battlement there were high towers of the same width as the wall, extending both to the inner and outer faces of it, so that there was no passage left at the sides of the towers, but the guards had to go through the middle of them.

3.21.4

Now at night when the weather was rainy the guards left the battlements and kept watch from the towers, which were not far apart and were roofed overhead. Such, then, was the wall by which the Plataeans were beleaguered.

3.22.1

After the Plataeans had finished their preparations, they waited for a night that was stormy with rain and wind and at the same time moonless, and then went forth. They were led by the men who were the authors of the enterprise. First they crossed the ditch which surrounded the town, then reached the foot of the enemy's wall unobserved by the guards, who in the all-pervading darkness could not see ahead and could not hear because the clatter of the wind drowned the noise of their approach;

3.22.2

and, besides, they kept a good distance apart as they advanced, in order that their arms might not rattle against each other and cause detection. And they were not only lightly armed but also had only the left foot sandalled, for security against slipping in the mud.

3.22.3

So they came up to the battlements at a space between two towers, knowing that the battlements were deserted. First came the men with the ladders, who set them against the wall; next came twelve light-armed men, with dagger and corslet only, who mounted the ladders. These were led by Ammeas son of Coroebus, who was the first to ascend, and after him his followers ascended, six men going against each of the adjoining towers. Next after these came other light troops armed with short spears, their shields being borne by another group which followed, that the former might advance more easily; and their shields were to be handed them when they were close to the enemy.

3.22.4

Now when several had got up, the sentinels on the towers became aware of their presence; for one of the Plataeans in laying hold of the battlements threw down a tile, which fell with a thud.

3.22.5

And immediately there was an outcry, and the garrison rushed to the wall; for they did not know what the danger was, as the night was dark and stormy, and at the same time the Plataeans who had been left behind in the town went out and attacked the wall of the Peloponnesians on the side opposite that over which their men were climbing, to distract attention from them as far as possible.

3.22.6

Now the sentinels remained at their posts, though in a state of excitement, no one daring to leave his station and lend aid, but all being at a loss to conjecture what was going on.

3.22.7

Furthermore, the three hundred, who had been appointed to bring aid wherever it was needed, proceeded outside of the wall in the direction of the outcry, and beacon fires indicating danger from the enemy were flashed towards Thebes.

3.22.8

But the Plataeans in the town at the same time raised from their wall many deacons, which had been prepared beforehand for this very purpose, that the enemy's beacon signals might be rendered unintelligible and that the Thebans, thinking that the situation was different from what it really was, might defer bringing aid until the Plataeans who were leaving should have made good their escape and reached safety.

3.23.1

Meanwhile, when the foremost of the Plataeans who were scaling the walls had mounted, slain the guards, and got possession of the two towers, they themselves took position inside the towers and guarded the passageways, that no one might come through these against them. Then from the top of the wall they placed ladders against the towers, got up a number of men, and kept all assailants away from the towers, shooting at them from below and above.

3.23.1

1

3.23.1

Meanwhile the others, the main body, had put up a large number of ladders and thrown down the battlements, and were climbing over through the space between the towers.

3.23.2

And as each one got over he halted on the edge of the ditch; and from there they shot arrows and hurled javelins at any enemy who tried to approach along the wall and interfere with their crossing.

3.23.3

And when all these had reached the other side, the men who had held the towers, the last of whom descended with difficulty, advanced toward the ditch; and at the same time the three hundred bore down upon them, carrying torches.

3.23.4

Now the Plataeans, as they stood on the edge of the ditch, saw them better out of the darkness, and kept launching arrows and javelins at their uncovered sides, while they themselves, being in the shadow, were rendered less visible by the enemy's torches. Consequently even the last of the Plataeans got safely across the ditch, though only with difficulty and after a hard struggle;

3.23.5

for in the ditch ice had formed that was not firm enough to walk on but mushy, such as is formed when the wind is east instead of north; and since the night, the wind being from that quarter, was somewhat snowy, the water in the ditch had become so deep that they could scarcely keep their heads above it as they crossed. It was, however, chiefly the violence of the storm that enabled them to escape at all.

3.24.1

Starting from the ditch, the Plataeans advanced in a body along the road toward Thebes, having on their right the shrine of the hero Androcrates; for they thought that no one would ever suspect them of having taken this road, which led towards their enemies; besides, they saw the Peloponnesians, torches in hand, taking in pursuit the road toward Cithaeron and Dryoscephalae, which is the road to Athens.

3.24.2

And for six or seven stadia the Plataeans proceeded on the road toward Thebes, then turned and followed that leading towards Erythrae and Hysiae, and reaching the mountains escaped to Athens. They were only two hundred and twelve men out of a larger number; for some had turned back to the town without trying to climb the wall, and one man, an archer, had been taken at the outer ditch. The Peloponnesians, then, desisted from the pursuit and returned to their post.

3.24.3

But the Plataeans in the town, knowing nothing of what had really happened, but informed by those who had turned back that no one survived, sent a herald at daybreak and asked for a truce that they might take up their dead; on learning the truth however, they desisted. So these Plataeans got over the wall in the manner described and reached safety.

3.24.3

1

3.25.1

Toward the close of the same winter, Salae-

3.25.1

1

3.25.1

thus the Lacedaemonian was sent in a trireme from Lacedaemon to Mytilene. Landing at Pyrrha and proceeding thence on foot, he followed the bed of a ravine, where the circuit-wall could be crossed, and came undetected into Mytilene. He told the magistrates that there would be an invasion of Attica and that simultaneously the forty ships

3.25.1

2

3.25.1

which were to come to their aid would arrive, adding that he himself had been sent ahead to make these announcements and also to take charge of matters

3.25.2

in general. Accordingly the Mytilenaeans were encouraged and were less inclined than ever to make terms with the Athenians. So this winter ended, and with it the fourth year of this war of which Thucydides wrote the history.

3.26.1

During the following summer the Peloponnesians

3.26.1

1

3.26.1

first despatched the forty ships which they had promised to Mytilene, appointing in command of them Alcidas, who was the Lacedaemonian admiral, and then invaded Attica, themselves and their allies, in order that the Athenians, threatened on both sea and land, might be deterred from sending a force to attack the fleet that was on its

3.26.2

way to Mytilene. The leader of this invasion was Cleomenes, regent for his nephew Pausanias son of Pleistoanax, who was king but

3.26.3

still a minor. And they ravaged the parts of Attica that had been laid waste before, wherever any new growth had sprung up, as well as those that had been left untouched in the former invasions. And this invasion proved more grievous to the Athenians than any

3.26.4

except the second;

3.26.4

1

3.26.4

for the enemy, who were momentarily expecting to hear from Lesbos of some achievement of their fleet, which they supposed had already got across, went on and on, ravaging most of the country. But when they found that nothing turned out as they expected and their food was exhausted, they withdrew and dispersed to their several cities.

3.26.4

2

3.27.1

Meanwhile the Mytilenaeans, seeing that the fleet had not arrived from the Peloponnesus but was loitering on the way, and that their food was exhausted, were compelled to make terms with the Athenians by the following circumstances.

3.27.2

Salaethus, who himself no longer expected the fleet to come, equipped the commons with heavy armour,

3.27.2

1

3.27.2

instead of their former light arms, intending to attack the Athenians;

3.27.3

but the commons, as soon as they had got arms, would no longer obey their commanders, but gathered in groups and ordered the aristocrats to bring out whatever food there was and distribute it to all; otherwise, they said, they would come to terms with the Athenians independently and deliver up the city.

3.28.1

Thereupon the men in authority, realizing that they could not prevent this and that they would be in peril if excluded from the capitulation, joined the commons in making an agreement with Paches and his army. The conditions were that the Athenian state should have the power to decide as they pleased about the fate of the Mytileneans and that the besieging army should be admitted into the city; but it was conceded that the Mytilenaeans might send an embassy to Athens to treat for terms, Paches, meanwhile, until the return of the embassy, agreeing not to imprison or enslave or put to death any Mytilenaean. Such was the agreement.

3.28.2

But those of the Mytilenaeans who had been most involved in the intrigue with the Lacedaemonians were in great terror when the army entered the town, and could not keep quiet, but notwithstanding the agreement took refuge at the altars. Paches, however, induced them to leave the altars, promising to do them no injury, and placed them for safe keeping in Tenedos until the Athenians should reach a decision.

3.28.3

He also sent triremes to Antissa and took possession of it, and made such other dispositions with reference to the army as seemed best to him.

3.29.1

Meanwhile the Peloponnesians in the forty ships, who ought to have arrived speedily at Mytilene, wasted time on their voyage round the Peloponnesus and on the rest of the way proceeded leisurely. They were unobserved by the Athenian home fleet until they reached Delos; but when after leaving Delos they touched at Icaros and Myconos they received the first tidings that Mytilene had been taken.

3.29.2

Wishing however to know the exact situation they sailed to Embatum in Erythraea; and it was about seven days after the capture of Mytilene that they came to Embatum. Now that they had learned the truth, they took counsel in view of the present emergency, and Teutiaplus, an Elean, spoke to them as follows:

3.30.1

“Alcidas, and you who, like myself, are present here as commanders of the Peloponnesian forces, it seems to me that we should sail to Mytilene before our approach becomes known, without a moment's delay.

3.30.2

For in all probability we shall find that men who have but lately come into possession of a city are very much off their guard. At sea, indeed, they will be altogether so, where they have no expectation of any possible hostile attack and our role is chiefly to act on the defensive;

3.30.2

1

3.30.2

and on land also their forces are probably scattered among the houses all the more carelessly because they believe that they are victors.

3.30.3

If, then, we should fall upon them suddenly and at night, I believe that, in concert with our supporters inside, if any are left, we should find ourselves masters of the situation.

3.30.4

And let us not shrink from the danger, remembering that the element of surprise in warfare is precisely of this nature.

3.30.4

1

3.30.4

And if a general guards against such surprises in his own case, and, whenever he sees an opportunity to employ them in the case of the enemy, makes the attempt, he will win the greatest success.”

3.31.1

Thus he spoke, but could not win Alcidas to his plan. Then some others, exiles from Ionia, and the Lesbians

3.31.1

1

3.31.1

who were with the fleet, advised him, since he feared the risk of this enterprise, to seize one of the cities in Ionia, or Cyme in Aeolia, in order that they might have a city as their base and bring Ionia to revolt (and that there was a prospect of success, seeing that everyone welcomed his coming) and might thus steal from the Athenians this the greatest source of their revenue, and at the same time the Athenians might be put to expense, in case they should attempt to blockade their base. They thought, moreover, that they could persuade Pissuthnes to join them in the war.

3.31.2

Alcidas, however, would not accept these proposals, either, but his chief concern, now that he was too late for Mytilene, was to get back to Peloponnesus as quickly as possible.

3.32.1

So he set sail from Embatum and skirted the coast; and putting in at Myonnesus in the country of the Teians he butchered most of the captives whom he had taken on the voyage.

3.32.2

Then he anchored at Ephesus, where he was visited by envoys of the Samians who were settled at Anaea,

3.32.2

1

3.32.2

who said that it was an ill way he had of freeing Hellas, to destroy men who were not lifting their hands against him and were not enemies, but were merely allies of the Athenians under compulsion; and unless he abandoned this course he would win few enemies over into friendship and would turn far more friends into enemies.

3.32.3

Alcidas was persuaded, and set free all the Chians whom he still held and some of the others. It should be explained that the people of the coast,

3.32.3

1

3.32.3

when they saw the Peloponnesian ships, made no attempt to flee, but came near, supposing that they were Athenian ships; and they had not the slightest expectation that while the Athenians dominated the sea the Peloponnesian fleet would ever venture over to Ionia.

3.33.1

From Ephesus Alcidas sailed in haste and took to flight; for while still at anchor near Clarus

3.33.1

1

3.33.1

he had been sighted by the Salaminia and Paralus,

3.33.1

2

3.33.1

which happened to be on a voyage from Athens, and in fear of pursuit he sailed through the open sea, determined that he would not, unless obliged to do so, put into land anywhere except in the Peloponnesus.

3.33.2

Reports of him had been brought from Erythraea to Paches and the Athenians, and now kept coming from all quarters. For since Ionia was unfortified, a great alarm arose everywhere lest the Peloponnesians, while following the coast—even if, under the circumstances,

3.33.2

1

3.33.2

they had no intention of remaining—might in passing fall upon their cities and plunder them. And finally the Paralus and the Salaminia brought the news that they had themselves seen him at Clarus. So Paches eagerly undertook the pursuit;

3.33.3

and he followed him as far as the island of Patmos, but when it was clear that Alcidas could no longer be overtaken he turned back again. And since he had not come up with the Peloponnesian fleet in the open sea, he considered it a piece of good fortune that they had not been overtaken in some port and compelled to set up a camp there, thus giving the Athenian fleet the trouble of watching and blockading them.

3.33.3

1

3.34.1

On the way back as he sailed along the coast he put in at Notium, the port of the Colophonians, where the Colophonians had settled when the upper town had been taken by Itamenes and the barbarians,

3.34.1

1

3.34.1

who had been called in on account of party discord by one of the factions. And this place had been taken about the time when the second Peloponnesian invasion of Attica was made.

3.34.1

2

3.34.2

Now those who had fled for refuge to Notium and settled there again fell into sedition. One party called in mercenaries, both Arcadian and barbarian, whom they had obtained from Pissuthnes, and kept them in a space walled off from the rest of the city, and the Colophonians from the upper town who were in sympathy with the Persians joined them there and were admitted to citizenship;

3.34.3

the other party had secretly made their escape, and, being now in exile, called in Paches. And he summoned Hippias, the commander of the Arcadians in the fortified quarter, to a conference, on condition that if his proposals were unsatisfactory he would restore him safe and sound to the fortress. But when Hippias came out to him, he kept him under guard but unfettered while he himself made a sudden and unexpected attack upon the fortress, captured it, and put to death all the Arcadians and barbarians that were in it. As for Hippias, he afterward took him into the fortress just as he had agreed to do, and as soon as he was inside seized him and shot him down.

3.34.4

He then delivered Notium to the Colophonians, excepting, however, the Persian sympathizers. The Athenians afterwards sent a commission and recolonized Notium, giving it their own institutions, after they had first brought together all the Colophonians from cities where any of them were to be found.

3.35.1

After returning to Mytilene Paches re-

3.35.1

1

3.35.1

duced Pyrrha and Eresus, and having caught Salaethus the Lacedaemonian in hiding in the town sent him off to Athens, as also the Mytilenaean men whom he had placed for safe-keeping in Tenedos, and any others who seemed to him to blame for the revolt. He also sent back most of

3.35.2

his army; with the rest he remained, and proceeded to settle the affairs of Mytilene and of Lesbos in general as seemed best to him.

3.36.1

When Salaethus and the others arrived at Athens, the Athenians at once put Salaethus to death, although he offered among other things to induce the Peloponnesians to abandon Plataea, which was still under siege;

3.36.2

as to the others they held a debate, and under the impulse of anger finally determined to put to death, not only the Mytilenaeans who were there in Athens, but also all who were of adult age, and to enslave their women and children. The general charge which they brought against them was that they had made this revolt in spite of the fact that they were not held in subjection like the other allies; and what contributed not least to their fury was that the Peloponnesian fleet had dared to venture over to Ionia to their support; for from this they thought the revolt had been made after long deliberation.

3.36.3

Accordingly they sent a trireme to Paches to announce what had been determined upon, and bidding him to despatch the Mytilenaeans with all haste;

3.36.4

but on the very next day a feeling of repentance came over them and they began to reflect that the design which they had formed was cruel and monstrous, to destroy a whole city instead of merely those who were guilty.

3.36.5

And when this became known to the Mytilenaean

3.36.5

1

3.36.5

envoys who were present and their Athenian supporters, they induced those in authority to bring the question before the people again; and they found less difficulty in persuading them because it was evident to them also that the greater part of the citizens wished that another opportunity should be given them to consider the matter.

3.36.6

A meeting of the assembly was held immediately, at which various opinions were expressed by the several speakers. One of these was Cleon son of Cleaenetus, who had been successful in carrying the earlier motion to put the Mytilenaeans to death. He was not only the most violent of the citizens, but at that time had by far the greatest influence with the people. He now came forward a second time and spoke as follows:

3.37.1

"On many other occasions in the past I have realized that a democracy is incompetent to govern others, but more than ever to-day, when I observe your change of heart concerning the Mytilenaeans.

3.37.2

The fact is that, because your daily life is unaffected by fear and intrigue in your relations to each other,

3.37.2

1

3.37.2

you have the same attitude towards your allies also, and you forget that whenever you are led into error by their representations or yield out of pity, your weakness involves you in danger and does not win the gratitude of your allies. For you do not reflect that the empire you hold is a despotism

3.37.2

2

3.37.2

imposed upon subjects who, for their part, do intrigue against you and submit to your rule against their will, who render obedience, not because of any kindnesses you may do them to your own hurt, but because of such superiority as you may have established by reason of your strength rather than of their goodwill.

3.37.3

But quite the most alarming thing is, if nothing we have resolved upon shall be settled once for all, and if we shall refuse to recognize that a state which has inferior laws that are inviolable is stronger than one whose laws are good but without authority; that ignorance combined with selfrestraint is more serviceable than cleverness combined with recklessness;

3.37.4

and that simpler people for the most part make better citizens than the more shrewd. The latter always want to show that they are wiser than the laws, and to dominate all public discussions, as if there could never be weightier questions on which to declare their opinions, and as a consequence of such conduct they generally bring their states to ruin; the former, on the contrary, mistrusting their own insight, are content to be less enlightened than the laws and less competent than others to criticise the words of an able speaker, but being impartial judges rather than interested contestants they generally prosper.

3.37.5

Thus, then, we ought to act and not be so excited by eloquence and combat of wits as to advise the Athenian people contrary to our own judgment.

3.38.1

"As for me, I have not changed my opinion, and I wonder at those who propose to debate again the question of the Mytilenaeans and thus interpose delay, which is in the interest of those who have done the wrong; for thus the edge of the victim's wrath is duller when he proceeds against the offender, whereas the vengeance that follows upon the very heels of the outrage exacts a punishment that most nearly matches the offence. And I wonder, too, who will answer me and undertake to prove that the wrong-doings of the Mytilenaeans are beneficial to us but that our misfortunes prove injurious to our allies.

3.38.2

Manifestly he must either have such confidence in his powers of speech as to undertake to show that what is universally accepted as true has not been established,

3.38.2

1

3.38.2

or else, incited by gain, will by an elaborate display of specious oratory attempt to mislead you.

3.38.3

But in contests of that kind the city bestows the prizes upon others, while she herself undergoes all the risks. And you are yourselves to blame, for your management of these contests is wrong.

3.38.4

It is your wont to be spectators of words and hearers of deeds, forming your judgment of future enterprises according as able speakers represent them to be feasible, but as regards accomplished facts, not counting what has been done more credible, because you have seen it, than what you have heard, you are swayed in judgment by those who have made an eloquent invective.

3.38.5

You are adepts not only at being deceived by novel proposals but also at refusing to follow approved advice, slaves as you are of each new paradox and scorners of what is familiar.

3.38.6

Each of you wishes above all to be an orator himself, or, failing that, to vie with those dealers in paradox by seeming not to lag behind them in wit but to applaud a smart saying before it is out of the speaker's mouth; you are as quick to forestall what is said as you are slow to foresee what will come of it.

3.38.7

You seek, one might say, a world quite unlike that in which we live, but give too little heed to that which is at hand. In a word, you are in thrall to the pleasures of the ear and are more like men who sit as spectators at exhibitions of sophists than men who take counsel for the welfare of the state.

3.39.1

"And it is from these ways that I seek to turn you when I attempt to prove that Mytilene has done you more injury than any single state.

3.39.2

I can make allowance for men who resorted to revolt because they were unable to bear your rule or because they were compelled by your enemies to do so; but men who inhabited a fortified island and had no fear of our enemies except by sea, and even there were not without the protection of a force of their own triremes, who moreover were independent and were treated by us with the highest consideration, when these men have acted thus, what else is it but conspiracy and rebellion rather than revolt—for revolt is the work of those who suffer oppression—and a deliberate attempt by taking their stand on the side of our bitterest enemies to bring about our destruction? And yet this is assuredly a more heinous thing than if they had gone to war against us by themselves for the acquisition of power.

3.39.3

The calamities of their neighbours who had already revolted from us and been subdued proved no warning to them; nor did the good fortune which they enjoyed make them hesitate to take the perilous step; on the contrary, becoming over-confident as to the future, and conceiving hopes which, though greater than their powers, were less than their ambition, they took up arms, presuming to put might before right; for the moment they thought they should prove superior they attacked us unprovoked.

3.39.4

And indeed it is the rule, that such states as come to unexpected prosperity most fully and most suddenly, do turn to insolence, whereas men generally find success less precarious when it comes in accordance with reasonable calculations than when it surpasses expectation, and more easily, as it seems, they repel adversity than maintain prosperity.

3.39.5

But the Mytilenaeans from the first ought never to have been treated by us with any more consideration than our other allies, and then they would not have broken out into such insolence;

3.39.6

for it is human nature in any case to be contemptuous of those who pay court but to admire those who will not yield. "Let them be punished, therefore, even now, in a manner befitting their crime, and do not put the blame upon the aristocrats and exonerate the common people. For they all alike attacked you, even the commons, who, if they had taken our side, might now have been reinstated in their city; but they thought there was less risk in sharing the dangers of the oligarchs, and so joined them in the revolt.

3.39.7

Consider, moreover, your allies: if you inflict upon those who wilfully revolt no greater punishment than upon those who revolt under compulsion from our foes, which of them, think you, will not revolt on a slight pretext, when the alternatives are liberty if he succeeds or a fate not irreparable if he fails?

3.39.8

We, on the other hand, shall have to risk our money and our lives against each separate state, and when we succeed we shall recover a ruined state and be deprived for the future of its revenue, the source of our strength, whereas if we fail we shall be adding fresh enemies to those we have already, and when we should be resisting our present foes we shall be fighting our own allies.

3.40.1

"We must not, therefore, hold out to them any hope, either to be secured by eloquence or purchased by money, that they will be excused on the plea that their error was human. For their act was no unintentional injury but a deliberate plot;

3.40.2

and it is that which is unintentional which is excusable. Therefore, I still protest, as I have from the first,

3.40.2

1

3.40.2

that you should not reverse your former decision or be led into error by pity, delight in eloquence, or clemency, the three influences most prejudicial to a ruling state.

3.40.3

For compassion may rightly be bestowed upon those who are likewise compassionate and not upon those who will show no pity in return but of necessity are always enemies. As to the orators who charm by their eloquence, they will have other opportunities of display in matters of less importance, and not where the city for a brief pleasure will pay a heavy penalty while they themselves get a fine fee for their fine speaking. And clemency would better be reserved for those who will afterwards be faithful allies than be shown to those who remain just what they were before and no whit the less our enemies. "I can sum up what I have to say in a word.

3.40.4

If you take my advice, you will do not only what is just to the Mytilenaeans but also at the same time what is expedient for us; but if you decide otherwise, you will not win their gratitude but will rather bring a just condemnation upon yourselves; for if these people had a right to secede, it would follow that you are wrong in exercising dominion. But if, right or wrong, you are still resolved to maintain it, then you must punish these people in defiance of equity as your interests require; or else you must give up your empire and in discreet safety practise the fine virtues you preach.

3.40.4

1

3.40.5

Resolve also to punish them with the same penalty that has already been voted,

3.40.5

1

3.40.5

and that those who have escaped the plot shall not appear to have less feeling than those who framed it, bearing in mind what they would probably have done to you had they won the victory, especially since they were the aggressors.

3.40.6

Indeed it is generally those who wrong another without cause that follow him up to destroy him utterly, perceiving the danger that threatens from an enemy who is left alive;

3.40.7

for one who has been needlessly injured is more dangerous if he escape than an avowed enemy who expects to give and take. “Do not, then, be traitors to your own cause, but recalling as nearly as possible how you felt when they made you suffer and how you would then have given anything to crush them, now pay them back. Do not become tender-hearted at the sight of their present distress, nor unmindful of the danger that so lately hung over you, but chastise them as they deserve, and give to your other allies plain warning that whoever revolts shall be punished with death. For if they realise this, the less will you have to neglect your enemies and fight against your own allies.”

3.41.1

Such was Cleon's speech. After him Diodotus son of Eucrates, who in the earlier meeting had been the principal speaker against putting the Mytilenaeans to death, came forward now also and stroke as follows:

3.42.1

"I have no fault to find with those who have proposed a reconsideration of the question of the Mytilenaeans, nor do I commend those who object to repeated deliberation on matters of the greatest moment; on the contrary, I believe the two things most opposed to good counsel are haste and passion, of which the one is wont to keep company with folly, the other with an undisciplined and shallow mind.

3.42.2

As for words, whoever contends

3.42.2

1

3.42.2

that they are not to be guides of our actions is either dull of wit or has some private interest at stake—dull, if he thinks it possible by any other means to throw light on that which still belongs to the dim and distant future; self-interested, if, wishing to put through a discreditable measure, he realizes that while he cannot speak well in a bad cause, he can at least slander well and thus intimidate both his opponents and his hearers. Most dangerous of all, however, are precisely those who

3.42.2

2

3.42.2

charge a speaker beforehand with being bribed to make a display of rhetoric.

3.42.3

For if they merely imputed ignorance, the speaker who failed to carry his audience might go his way with the repute of being dull but not dishonest; when, however, the charge is dishonesty, the speaker who succeeds becomes an object of suspicion, whereas if he fails he is regarded as not only dull but dishonest as well.

3.42.4

And all this is a detriment to the state, which is thus robbed of its counsellors through fear. Indeed it would prosper most if its citizens of this stamp had no eloquence at all, for then the people would be least likely to blunder through their influence.

3.42.5

But the good citizen ought to show himself a better speaker, not by trying to browbeat those who will oppose him, but by fair argument; and while the wise city should not indeed confer fresh honours upon the man whose advice is most often salutary, it certainly should not detract from those which he already has, and as for him whose suggestion does not meet with approval, so far from punishing him, it should not even treat him with disrespect.

3.42.6

For then it would be least likely that a successful speaker, with a view to being counted worthy of still greater honours, would speak insincerely and for the purpose of winning favour and that the unsuccessful speaker would employ the same means, by courting favour in his turn in an effort to win the multitude to himself.

3.43.1

But we pursue the opposite course, and, moreover, if a man be even suspected of corruption, albeit he give the best counsel, we conceive a grudge against him because of the dubious surmise that he is corrupt and thus deprive the state of an indubitable advantage.

3.43.2

And it has come to such a pass that good advice frankly given is regarded with just as much suspicion as the bad, and that, in consequence, a speaker who wants to carry the most dangerous measures must resort to deceit in order to win the people to his views, precisely as the man whose proposals are good must lie in order to be believed.

3.43.3

And because of this excessive cleverness Athens is the only state where a man cannot do a good service to his country openly and without deceiving it; for whenever he openly offers you something good you requite him by suspecting that in some way he will secretly profit by it.

3.43.4

Yet even so, in view of the very great interests at stake, and in so grave a matter, we who advise must regard it as our duty to look somewhat further ahead than you who give matters only a brief consideration, especially since we are responsible advisers,

3.43.4

1

3.43.4

while you are irresponsible listeners.

3.43.5

Indeed, if not only those who gave advice but also those who followed it had to suffer alike, you would show greater prudence in your decisions; but as it is, whenever you meet with a reverse you give way to your first impulse and punish your adviser for his single error of judgment instead of yourselves, the multitude who shared in the error.

3.44.1

"But I have come forward neither as an advocate of the Mytilenaeans in opposition to Cleon nor as their accuser. For the question for us to consider, if we are sensible, is not what wrong they have done, but what is the wise course for us.

3.44.2

For no matter how guilty I show them to be, I shall not on that account bid you to put them to death, unless it is to our advantage; and if I show that they have some claim for forgiveness, I shall not on that account advise you to spare their lives, if this should prove clearly not to be for the good of the state.

3.44.3

In my opinion we are deliberating about the future rather than the present. And as for the point which Cleon especially maintains, that it will be to our future advantage to inflict the penalty of death, to the end that revolts may be less frequent, I also in the interest of our future prosperity emphatically maintain the contrary.

3.44.4

And I beg you not to be led by the speciousness of his argument to reject the practical advantages in mine. For embittered as you are toward the Mytilenaeans, you may perhaps be attracted by his argument, based as it is on the more legal aspects of the case; we are, however, not engaged in a law-suit with them, so as to be concerned about the question of right and wrong; but we are deliberating about them, to determine what policy will make them useful to us.

3.45.1

"Now the death-penalty has been prescribed in various states for many offences which are not so serious as this is, nay, for minor ones; but nevertheless men are so inspired by hope as to take the risk; indeed, no one ever yet has entered upon a perilous enterprise with the conviction that his plot was condemned to failure.

3.45.2

And as to states, what one that was meditating revolt ever took the decisive step in the belief that the resources at hand, whether its own or contributed by its allies, were inadequate for success?

3.45.3

All men are by nature prone to err, both in private and in public life, and there is no law which will prevent them; in fact, mankind has run the whole gamut of penalties, making them more and more severe, in the hope that the transgressions of evil-doers might be abated. It is probable that in ancient times the penalties prescribed for the greatest offences were relatively mild, but as transgressions still occurred, in course of time the penalty was seldom less than death.

3.45.4

But even so there is still transgression. Either, then, some terror more dreadful than death must be discovered, or we must own that death at least is no prevention. Nay, men are lured into hazardous enterprises by the constraint of poverty, which makes them bold, by the insolence and pride of affluence, which makes them greedy, and by the various passions engendered in the other conditions of human life as these are severally mastered by some mighty and irresistible impulse.

3.45.5

Then, too, Hope and Desire are everywhere; Desire leads, Hope attends; Desire contrives the plan, Hope suggests the facility of fortune; the two passions are most baneful, and being unseen phantoms prevail over seen dangers.

3.45.6

Besides these, fortune contributes in no less degree to urge men on; for she sometimes presents herself unexpectedly and thus tempts men to take risks even when their resources are inadequate, and states even more than men, inasmuch as the stake is the greatest of all—their own freedom or empire over others—and the individual, when supported by the whole people, unreasonably overestimates his own strength.

3.45.7

In a word, it is impossible, and a mark of extreme simplicity, for anyone to imagine that when human nature is wholeheartedly bent on any undertaking it can be diverted from it by rigorous laws or by any other terror.

3.46.1

"We must not, therefore, so pin our faith to the penalty of death as a guarantee against revolt as to make the wrong decision, or lead our rebellious subjects to believe that there will be no chance for them to repent and in the briefest time possible put an end to their error.

3.46.2

Consider now: according to your present policy

3.46.2

1

3.46.2

if a city has revolted and then realizes that it will fail, it may come to terms while still able to pay the indemnity and to keep up its tribute in the future; but, in the other case, what city, think you, will not prepare itself more thoroughly than now, and hold out in siege to the last extremity, if it makes no difference whether it capitulates quickly or at its leisure?

3.46.3

And as for us, how can we fail to suffer loss, incurring the expense of besieging a city because it will not surrender, and, if—we capture it, recovering one that is ruined, and losing thereafter the revenue from it— the source of our strength against our enemies?

3.46.4

We must not, therefore, be such rigorous judges of the delinquents as to suffer harm ourselves, but we must rather see how for the time to come, by punishing moderately, we may have at our service dependent cities that are strong in material resources; and we must deem it proper to protect ourselves against revolts, not by the terror of our laws, but rather by the vigilance of our administration. At present we do just the opposite:

3.46.5

whenever a free people that is forced into subjection revolts, as it naturally will, in order to recover its independence, we think that, as soon as we have subdued it, we must punish it severely.

3.46.6

We ought, on the contrary, instead of rigorously chastising free peoples when they revolt, to watch them rigorously before they revolt, and thus forestall their even thinking of such a thing; and when we have subdued a revolt, we ought to put the blame on as few as possible.

3.46.6

1

3.47.1

"And do you consider, too, how great a mistake you would make in another point also by following Cleon's advice.

3.47.2

At the present time the populace of all the cities is well disposed to you, and either does not join with the aristocrats in revolting, or, if forced to do so, is hostile from the beginning to those who stirred up the revolt; and so, when you go to war, you have the populace of the rebellious city as your allies.

3.47.3

If, however, you destroy the populace in Mytilene, which took no part in the revolt, and which voluntarily put the city into your hands as soon as it got hold of arms, in the first place you will be guilty of killing your benefactors, and, in the second place, you will bring about what the influential men most wish: the next time they instigate a revolt among our allies they will at once have the populace on their side, because you will have published it abroad that the same punishment is ordained for the innocent and for the guilty.

3.47.4

Why, even if they were guilty, you should pretend not to know it, to the end that the only class that is still friendly to us may not become hostile.

3.47.5

And it is, I think, far more conducive to the maintenance of our dominion, that we should willingly submit to be wronged, than that we should destroy, however justly, those whom we ought not to destroy. And whereas Cleon claims

3.47.5

1

3.47.5

that this punishment combines justice and expediency, it appears that in such a policy the two cannot be combined.

3.48.1

“Do you, then, recognize that mine is the better course, and without being unduly swayed by either pity or clemency—for neither would I have you influenced by such motives—but simply weighing the considerations I have urged, accede to my proposal: pass sentence at your leisure upon the Mytilenaeans whom Paches sent here as guilty,

3.48.1

1

3.48.1

but let the rest dwell in peace.

3.48.2

Such a course will be best for the future, and will cause alarm among our enemies at once; for he who is wise in counsel is stronger against the foe than he who recklessly rushes on with brute force.”

3.49.1

Such was the speech of Diodotus. And after these opinions had been maintained with nearly equal force, the one against the other, the Athenians, in spite of the reaction, experienced such a conflict of opinion that in the show of hands they were about equally divided; but the view of Diodotus prevailed.

3.49.2

They then immediately despatched a second trireme with all haste, hoping that the first trireme, which had the start by about a day and a night, might not arrive first and the city be found destroyed.

3.49.3

The Mytilenaean envoys provided wine and barley for the crew and promised a large reward if they should arrive in time; and such was their haste on the voyage that they kept on rowing as they ate their barley-cakes, kneaded with wine and oil,

3.49.3

1

3.49.3

and took turns at sleeping and rowing.

3.49.3

2

3.49.4

And since by good fortune no contrary wind arose, and the earlier ship was sailing in no hurry on so horrible a business, while the second pressed on in the manner described, although the former did in fact arrive first, so that Paches had just time enough to read the decree and was about to execute the orders, the second put in close after it and prevented the destruction of the city. By just so much did Mytilene escape its peril.

3.50.1

The rest of the men, however, whom Paches

3.50.1

1

3.50.1

had sent to Athens as chief authors of the revolt, numbering somewhat more than a thousand,

3.50.1

2

3.50.1

were put to death by the Athenians on the motion of Cleon. They also pulled down the walls of Mytilene and took possession of the Mytilenaean fleet.

3.50.2

Afterawards, instead of imposing a tribute upon the Lesbians, they divided all the land except that of the Methymnaeans into three thousand allotments, and reserving three hundred of these as sacred to the gods they sent out Athenian colonists, chosen by lot. to occupy the rest. With these the Lesbians made an arrangement to pay a rental of two minas a year

3.50.2

1

3.50.2

for each lot, they themselves to cultivate the land.

3.50.3

The Athenians also took possession of all the towns on the mainland which the Mytilenaeans controlled,

3.50.3

1

3.50.3

and these were thereafter subject to the Athenians. Such was the course of events at Lesbos.

3.51.1

In the same summer, after the capture of Lesbos, the Athenians, under the command of Nicias son of Niceratus, made an expedition against the island of Minoa, which lies in front of Megara and was used as a garrison-station by the Megarians, who had built a tower upon it.

3.51.2

But Nicias was desirous that the watch which the Athenians kept should be maintained at that point, which would be at closer range for them, instead of at Budorum in Salamis, the purpose of the watch being to prevent the Peloponnesians from using the harbour of Megara as a base from which to send out unobserved either triremes, as they had done once before,

3.51.2

1

3.51.2

or expeditions of privateers, and at the same time to see to it that nothing was brought in by sea for the Megarians.

3.51.3

Accordingly, by an attack from the sea he took by means of engines of war two projecting towers—first that on the island opposite Nisaea—and when he had thus cleared the way into the channel between the island and the mainland he walled off also the point on the side toward the mainland, where by a bridge across a morass aid could be brought to the island, which is not far distant from the mainland.

3.51.3

1

3.51.4

And when, after a few days, this work was completed, Nicias built a fort on the island also, left a garrison in it, and then withdrew his army to Athens.

3.52.1

During this summer and about the same time, the Plataeans,

3.52.1

1

3.52.1

who were now without food and could endure the siege no longer, surrendered to the Peloponnesians. It happened in the following manner.

3.52.2

An assault was in progress upon their wall and they were unable to repel it. The Lacedaemonian commander recognised their weakness; but he did not wish to take Plataea by storm, for he had received orders to this effect from Sparta, to the end that, if ever a treaty of peace should be made with the Athenians and the Lacedaemonians should consent that all the places each had taken in war should be given back, Plataea might not have to be given up, on the ground that its inhabitants had gone over to Sparta voluntarily. So he sent a herald to them to say that if they would of their own accord deliver their city into the hands of the Lacedaemonians and submit to their decisions they would punish the guilty, but none contrary to justice.

3.52.3

The herald made this proposal, and they, since they were now in the last stage of weakness, surrendered the city. And the Peloponnesians fed the Plataeans for some days, until the judges, five in number, arrived from Lacedaemon.

3.52.4

When they came no accusation was brought against the Plataeans, but they were summoned by the judges and asked this single question:

3.52.5

“Have you rendered any good service to the Lacedaemonians and their allies in the present war?” The Plataeans, however, begged to be allowed to speak at greater length, and appointed as their spokesmen Astymachus son of Asopolaus and Lacon son of Aeimnestus, who was a proxenus of the Lacedaemonians.

3.52.5

1

3.52.5

These men came forward and spoke as follows:

3.53.1

"When we surrendered our city, Lacedaemonians, trusting in your good faith, we had no thought that we should have to undergo a trial like this, but supposed it would be a more regular procedure; and when we consented to be on trial before you and you alone as judges, as we now are, we believed that we should be most likely to obtain fair treatment.

3.53.2

But now we fear that we have been disappointed in both expectations; for we have good reason to suspect, not only that the issues involved in the trial are of the gravest nature

3.53.2

1

3.53.2

but also that you will not prove to be impartial judges. These inferences we draw from the fact that no accusation was first brought against us requiring a plea in defence, but we have had to ask leave to speak, and that the question which is put to us is so curt that a truthful answer to it is against our interests, while a false one can be exposed at once.

3.53.3

But beset as we are with perplexities on every hand, we are forced, as indeed seems to be the safer course, to say something and take the risk; for to men in our condition not to have spoken would cause us afterwards to reproach ourselves with the thought that, had the word been spoken, it would have saved us.

3.53.4

A further difficulty in our position is the task of convincing you. For if we were strangers to each other, we might find it to our advantage to introduce evidence on matters with which you were unacquainted; but as it is, anything that we shall say is already known to you, and what we fear is, not that you have already judged our virtues

3.53.4

1

3.53.4

to be inferior to your own and now make that a charge against us, but that in order to gratify others

3.53.4

2

3.53.4

we are to appear before a court that has already decided against us.

3.54.1

"Nevertheless, we shall present whatever just claims we have, both as regards our quarrel with the Thebans and as touching you and the rest of the Hellenes, and thus, by reminding you of our public services, shall try to persuade you.

3.54.2

In reply to the curt inquiry of yours, whether we have rendered any good service to the Lacedaemonians and their allies in this war, if you ask us as enemies, we say that you are not wronged if you did not receive benefit at our hands; but if in asking it you regard us as friends, we reply that you yourselves rather than we are at fault, in that you made war upon us.

3.54.3

But in the war against the Persians and during the peace which followed we have proved ourselves good and true men; we have not now been the first to break the peace, and then we were the only Boeotians

3.54.3

1

3.54.3

who rallied to defend the freedom of Hellas.

3.54.4

For though we are an inland people, we took part in the sea-fight at Artemisium; in the battle that was fought here in our own land

3.54.4

1

3.54.4

we stood side by side with you and Pausanias; and whatever perils arose to threaten the Hellenes in those days, we bore our part in them all beyond our strength.

3.54.5

And to you in particular, Lacedaemonians, at that critical moment when after the earthquake Sparta was encompassed by a mighty terror owing to the revolt of the Helots and their occupation of Ithome, we sent a third part of our citizens to bring aid. These are things you ought not to forget.

3.55.1

"Such was the part we were proud to play in the great actions of the past. It was not until later that we became your enemies, and for this you yourselves were to blame; for when the Thebans oppressed us and we sought alliance with you, you rebuffed us and bade us apply to the Athenians, because they were near, whereas you lived far away.

3.55.2

In the course of this war, however, you have neither suffered, nor were ever in danger of suffering, any extraordinary harm at our hands.

3.55.3

And if we refused to revolt from the Athenians at your bidding, we were not in the wrong; for they helped us against the Thebans when you held back. After that it would not have been honourable for us to desert them, above all when we were their debtors and when at our own request we had been admitted to their alliance and had shared the rights of citizenship with them. On the contrary, there was every reason why we should heartily obey their commands.

3.55.4

And whatever measures either you or they have initiated for your allies, it is not the followers who are to blame for any wrong that has been done, but those who have led them into evil courses.

3.56.1

"As for the Thebans, they have done us many wrongs in the past, and you yourselves are well aware of this crowning outrage, which has brought us into our present plight.

3.56.2

They attempted to seize our city in time of peace, and furthermore on a day of festival; therefore we were justified in punishing them in accordance with the law which has universal sanction, that it is right to repel him who comes against you as an enemy;

3.56.3

and now we cannot reasonably be made to suffer on their account. For if you shall decide the question of justice by such considerations as your immediate advantage and their hostility, you will show yourselves to be, not true judges of what is right, but rather to be mere slaves of expediency.

3.56.4

And yet if the Thebans seem serviceable to you now, we and the rest of the Hellenes were of far greater service to you when you were in greater danger. For now you are attacking others and are a menace to them, but in that crisis, when the barbarian was threatening us all with slavery, these men were on his side.

3.56.5

And it is only fair that you should set our present error, if error there has been, over against the zeal we showed then; if you do, you will find, not only that the zeal outweighs the offence, but also that it was shown at a time when it was a rare thing for Hellenes to oppose their courage to the power of Xerxes. At that time the greater praise was given to those who, instead of intriguing in security for their own advantage with reference to the invasion,

3.56.5

1

3.56.5

were ready to hazard the noblest course though fraught with danger.

3.56.6

With these we took our stand and were honoured among the foremost; but now, for the same conduct, we fear lest we are to be destroyed, in that we have chosen the Athenians from regard to right rather than you for profit.

3.56.7

And yet you ought to show yourselves consistent, giving the same judgment concerning the same things, and to consider your true advantage to be only this—to cherish an ever-enduring gratitude toward the best of your allies for their valour, while also securing what may be to your advantage at the present moment.

3.57.1

"Consider, too, that you are now regarded by most of the Hellenes as an example of uprightness; but if the verdict you give concerning us shall be inequitable, beware (since the case you are deciding here is not obscure, but you the judges are the object of men's praise and we the defendants are of no mean repute), beware, I say, lest men repudiate an unseemly sentence passed upon good men by men still better and resent the dedication in the common temples of spoils taken from us, the benefactors of Hellas.

3.57.2

Monstrous will it seem that the Lacedaemonians should sack Plataea, and that you, whose fathers inscribed the name of our city on the tripod at Delphi in commemoration of her valour, should blot her out, house and home, from the map of Hellas—to please the Thebans!

3.57.3

For to this depth of misfortune have we come, we who, when the Persians prevailed, were on the verge of ruin,

3.57.3

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3.57.3

and now when we plead before you, formerly our closest friends, we are beaten by Thebans; and we have had to face two supreme dangers, at that time of perishing by starvation if we had not surrendered our city, and now of standing trial for our lives.

3.57.4

And we have been thrust aside by all, we men of Plataea, who were zealous toward the Hellenes beyond our strength, and are now desolate and undefended. No one of our former allies now aids us, and as for you, Lacedaemonians, our only hope, we fear that you are not steadfast.

3.58.1

"And yet we adjure you, for the sake of the gods who of old sanctioned our alliance and for our good service in the cause of the Hellenes, to relent and change your minds, if you have been in any way won over by the Thebans,

3.58.1

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3.58.1

and in your turn to ask of them the boon not to put to death those whom it ill becomes you to slay, that you may thus receive an honest instead of a shameful gratitude, and may not in giving pleasure to others get in return ignominy for yourselves.

3.58.2

It is a simple matter to take our lives, but a grievous task to blot out the infamy of it;

3.58.3

for we are not enemies whom you would have a right to punish, but good friends who were forced into war with you. You would, therefore, render a righteous judgment if you guaranteed us security of life and if you bore in mind, before it is too late, that it was in voluntary surrender and with outstretched hands that you received us (and the usage of the Hellenes forbids the slaying of suppliants);

3.58.4

and, moreover, that we have always been your benefactors. Turn your eyes upon the sepulchres of your fathers, slain by the Persians and buried in our land, whom we have honoured year by year with a public offering of raiment

3.58.4

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3.58.4

and other customary gifts; the first fruits, too, of all that the earth each year has produced have been brought them, the tribute of kindly hands from a friendly land and of allies to those who were once their companions in arms.

3.58.5

All this you would reverse by an unjust verdict. Reflect: when Pausanias buried them he thought he was laying them in a friendly land and among friends; but you, if you put us to death and make the territory of Plataea a Theban province, will you not be leaving them in a hostile land and among their murderers

3.58.5

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3.58.5

—these your fathers and kinsmen—and dispossessed of the honours they now enjoy? Nay more, you will be enslaving the very land in which the Hellenes gained their liberty; you will be bringing desolation upon the temples of the gods to whom they prayed when they conquered the Persians; and you will be robbing of their hereditary sacrifices the people who founded and established them.

3.59.1

“These things are not consistent with your honour, Lacedaemonians, nor can it be so to offend against the common usage of the Hellenes and against your ancestors, or to put us, your benefactors, to death because of the enmity of others, when you have not been wronged yourselves. Nay, your good name demands that you should spare us and be softened in heart, regarding us with a dispassionate pity and bearing in mind, not only how terrible will be our fate, but who we are that must suffer, and how uncertain is fortune, whose strokes sometimes fall even upon the innocent.

3.59.2

And we, as befits our condition and as our sore need demands, entreat you in the name of the common gods of the Hellenic race whom we invoke, gods worshipped by us all at the same altars, to listen to our prayers; and at the same time, appealing to the oaths wherein your fathers swore that they would never forget us, we become suppliants before your ancestral tombs and call upon the departed not to suffer us to come into the power of Thebans or permit us, who were their dearest friends, to be delivered into the hands of their bitterest foes. We also remind you of that day on which we shared with them in the most brilliant deeds, we who now on this day are on the brink of the most awful fate.

3.59.3

And now, bringing our plea to an end—and this must be, howbeit for men in our condition it is the hardest thing of all, seeing that with its ending our mortal peril also draws near—we say that we did not surrender our city to the Thebans—in preference to that our choice would have been to die of starvation, the most horrible of deaths—but capitulated to you because we trusted you. And it is but right, if we fail in our plea, that you should restore us to our former position and let us choose for ourselves the danger that shall confront us.

3.59.4

And we likewise adjure you, Plataeans that we are, people who were most zealous for the cause of Hellas, and are now your suppliants, O Lacedaemonians, not to deliver us out of your hands and your good faith to the Thebans, our bitterest foes, but to become our saviours, and not, while liberating the rest of the Hellenes, to bring utter destruction upon us.”

3.60.1

Thus the Plataeans spoke. And the Thebans, fearing lest the Lacedaemonians might be so moved by their plea as to yield somewhat, came forward and said that they, too, wished to speak, since, against their own judgment, the Plataeans had been granted leave to speak at greater length than the answer to the question required. And when the judges assented, they spoke as follows:

3.61.1

"We should not have asked permission to make this speech, if the Plataeans had briefly answered the question, and had not turned upon us and accused us, at the same time setting up a long defence of themselves on matters foreign to the issue and on which no charge whatever had been made against them, and praising themselves where nobody had blamed them. But as it is, we must answer their charges and expose their self-praise, in order that neither our baseness nor their good repute may help them, but that you may hear the truth about us both before you decide. "The quarrel we had with them began in this way:

3.61.2

after we had settled the rest of Boeotia and had occupied Plataea and other places of which we got possession by driving out a mixed population,

3.61.2

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3.61.2

these Plataeans disdained to submit to our leadership, as had been agreed upon at first, and separating themselves from the rest of the Boeotians and breaking away from the traditions of our fathers went over to the Athenians as soon as an attempt was made to force them into obedience, and in conjunction with the Athenians did us much harm, for which they also suffered in return.

3.62.1

Again, they say that when the barbarians came against Hellas they were the only Boeotians who did not medize, and for this especially they plume themselves and abuse us.

3.62.2

We say, however, that the only reason they did not medize was because the Athenians also did not, and that, moreover, on the same principle, when the Athenians afterwards assailed all Hellas, they were the only Boeotians who atticized.

3.62.2

1

3.62.2

And yet consider the circumstances under which we each acted as we did.

3.62.3

For the constitution of our city at that time was, as it happened, neither an oligarchy under equal laws

3.62.3

1

3.62.3

nor yet a democracy; but its affairs were in the hands of a small group of powerful men—the form which is most opposed to law and the best regulated polity, and most allied to a tyranny.

3.62.4

These men, hoping to win still greater power for themselves if the fortunes of the Persian should prevail, forcibly kept the people down and brought him in. The city as a whole was not in control of its own actions when Thebes took the course it did, nor is it fair to reproach it for the mistakes it made when not under the rule of law.

3.62.5

At any rate, after the Persian departed and Thebes obtained its lawful government, and when subsequently the Athenians became aggressive and were trying to bring not only the rest of Hellas but also our country under their own sway and, owing to factions amongst us, were already in possession of most of it,

3.62.5

1

3.62.5

pray observe whether we fought and defeated them at Coronea

3.62.5

2

3.62.5

and thus liberated Boeotia, and whether we are now zealously helping

3.62.5

3

3.62.5

to liberate the other peoples, furnishing more cavalry and munitions of war than any of the other allies. Such is our defence against the charge of medism.

3.63.1

"We will now try to show that you Plataeans have wronged the Hellenes more than we and are more deserving of any punishment, however severe. You became allies and citizens of Athens that you might, as you claim,

3.63.1

1

3.63.1

obtain protection against us.

3.63.2

In that case you ought only to have invoked their aid against us, instead of assisting them in their aggressions against others; such a course was certainly open to you, in case you were ever being led on by the Athenians against your will, since the alliance of the Lacedaemonians here had already been organized against the Persians—the alliance of which you are always reminding us.

3.63.2

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3.63.2

That would have been enough to keep us from interfering with you, and, what is more important, to enable you to take your own counsel without fear. Nay, it was willingly and not now under compulsion that you embraced the Athenian cause.

3.63.3

You say, however, that it would have been dishonourable to betray your benefactors; but it was far more dishonourable and wicked to betray to their destruction all the Hellenes, with whom you had sworn alliance, than merely the Athenians, when they were endeavouring to enslave Hellas, the others to liberate her.

3.63.4

And the recompense you made them is not equal, nor indeed free from dishonour. For you were being wronged, as you claim, when you invoked their aid, but they were wronging others when you became their helpers. And yet, surely, not to repay favours with like favours is dishonourable; but it is not so when, though the debt was incurred in a just matter, it can only be repaid by wrong-doing.

3.63.4

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3.64.1

"You have, therefore, made it clear that even then it was not for the sake of the Hellenes that you alone of the Boeotians refused to medize, but merely because the Athenians also refused while we did not, and you preferred to act with the one party and against the other.

3.64.2

And now you expect to be rewarded for the virtuous conduct that was due to the inspiration of others! But that is unreasonable; as you chose the Athenians, continue to fight on their side. And do not keep reminding us of the alliance you made then, and claim that it ought to save you now.

3.64.3

For you have abandoned it and in violation of its principles have constantly aided, instead of trying to prevent, the enslavement of the Aeginetans

3.64.3

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3.64.3

and other members of the alliance; and that, too, not against your will, since you then enjoyed the laws under which you have lived till now and were not, like us, under compulsion by another.

3.64.4

Moreover, you refused to accept the last proposal we made you before Plataea was invested

3.64.4

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3.64.4

—to leave you unmolested if you would aid neither side. Who, then, would more justly be hated by all the Hellenes than you, who displayed your virtue in order to compass their injury? Furthermore, those noble qualities which, as you claim, you once displayed you have now made plain were not properly yours, but your natural longings have been put to the proof and shown in their reality;

3.64.5

for you have followed the Athenians when they walked in the way of iniquity. Such, then, is our affirmation regarding our unwilling medism and your willing atticism.

3.65.1

"As to your last charge of wrong-doing on our part—that we unlawfully attacked your city in time of peace and on a day of festival—we do not think that in this matter, either, we are more at fault than you.

3.65.2

If it was of our own motion that we went to your city, fought you, and ravaged your land as enemies, we are in the wrong; but if some of your countrymen, the leading men in both wealth and family,

3.65.2

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3.65.2

wishing to put an end to your alliance with an outsider and to restore you to the traditions of our fathers which are common to all the Boeotians, of their own free will invoked our aid, of what wrong are we guilty? For it is those who lead that break the laws rather than those who follow.

3.65.2

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3.65.3

But in my judgment neither they nor we did wrong. They, who are just as much citizens as you and had more at stake, opened their gates and conducted into their own city friends, not enemies, because they wished that the baser sort among you should not become still worse, and that the better sort should have their deserts, being the censors of your political principles

3.65.3

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3.65.3

and not seeking to deprive the state of your persons, but rather bringing you back into a natural union with your kindred, and that without making you an enemy of anyone but restoring you to peace with all alike.

3.66.1

"The proof that we acted in no hostile spirit is that we wronged nobody, and made a proclamation that anyone who wished to be a citizen according to the hereditary ways of all the Boeotians should come over to us.

3.66.2

And you came gladly, and entering into an agreement with us you kept quiet at first; but afterwards, when you became aware that we were few in number—even supposing we might seem to have acted somewhat inconsiderately in entering your town without the consent of the popular party—you did not repay us in kind, resorting to no act of violence but endeavouring by arguments to induce us to withdraw, but you assailed us in violation of your agreement. Now as to those whom you killed in hand-to-hand conflict we are not so much grieved—for they suffered, we grant you, by a kind of law—but as regards those whom you spared when they stretched out their hands to you, and then, though you afterwards promised us that you would not kill them, lawlessly butchered—was not that an abominable deed?

3.66.3

And after committing these three wrongs within a short space of time—the violation of your agreement, the subsequent murder of our men, and the breaking of your promise to us not to kill them if we spared your property in the fields—you nevertheless assert that we were the transgressors, and claim exemption from punishment for yourselves! No, not if these judges decide aright; but for all these crimes you must be chastised.

3.67.1

“We have discussed these matters at length, Lacedaemonians, both for your sakes and our own, in order that you, for your part, may know that you will justly condemn them, and we that we have still more righteously exacted vengeance.

3.67.2

And let not your hearts be softened when you hear them speak of their ancient virtues, if indeed they ever had any; for virtues might well be a succour to the victims of wrong, but should bring a two-fold penalty upon the authors of a shameful deed, because their offence is out of keeping with their character. And let not their lamentation and pitiful wailing avail them, nor their appeals to the sepulchres of your fathers and their own desolate state.

3.67.3

For in answer we too would point out that a far more dreadful fate befell our young men who were butchered by them, of whose fathers some died at Coronea

3.67.3

1

3.67.3

trying to win Boeotia to your cause, while others, left desolate at home in their old age, with far greater justice make supplication to you to take vengeance upon these men.

3.67.4

Pity is more worthily bestowed upon those who suffer an unseemly fate, but those who, like these Plataeans, deserve their fate afford on the contrary a subject for rejoicing.

3.67.5

As for their present desolation, that also is their own fault; for of their own free will they rejected the better alliance. They acted unlawfully without having received provocation at our hands, but through hatred rather than according to a just judgment, and they could not possibly pay now a penalty equal to their guilt, for they will suffer a lawful sentence; and they are not, as they claim,

3.67.5

1

3.67.5

stretching out suppliant hands on the field of battle, but have delivered themselves up to justice under formal agreement.

3.67.6

Vindicate, therefore, Lacedaemonians, the law of the Hellenes which has been transgressed by these men, and render to us who have suffered by their lawlessness a just recompense for the services we have zealously given, and let us not because of their words be thrust aside when we plead before you,

3.67.6

1

3.67.6

but make it plain to the Hellenes by an example that the trials you institute will be of deeds, not words, and that, if the deeds are good, a brief recital of them suffices, but if they are wrong, speeches decked out with phrases are but veils to hide the truth.

3.67.7

Nay, if all leaders, like you in the present instance, should first state the facts briefly for all concerned,

3.67.7

1

3.67.7

and then pass sentence, there will be less seeking of fair words after foul deeds.”

3.68.1

Such was the speech of the Thebans. And the Lacedaemonian judges decided that their question, whether they had received any benefit from the Plataeans in the war, would be a fair one for them to put; for they had at all other times urged them, they claimed, to maintain neutrality in accordance with the old covenant which they had made with Pausanias after the Persian defeat; and when afterwards, before the investment of Plataea was undertaken, their proposal to the Plataeans that they remain neutral in accordance with the earlier agreement had not been accepted,

3.68.1

1

3.68.1

they thought themselves thenceforth released from all obligations of the treaty because their own intentions had been honourable, and considered that they had been wronged by the Plataeans. So they caused them to come forward again, one at a time, and asked them the same question, whether they had rendered any good service to the Lacedaemonians and their allies in the war, and when they said “no” they led them off and slew them, exempting no one.

3.68.2

The number of the Plataeans that perished was not less than two hundred, and of the Athenians who had taken part in the siege twenty-five;

3.68.3

and the women were sold as slaves. As for the city itself, they gave occupation of it for about a year to some men of Megara who had been driven out in consequence of a sedition, and also to such of the surviving Plataeans as favoured the Lacedaemonian cause. Afterwards, however, they razed it entirely

3.68.3

1

3.68.3

to the ground, and built, in the neighbourhood of the sanctuary of Hera, an inn two hundred feet square, with rooms all around, above and below, using for this purpose the roofs and doors of the Plataeans; and with the rest of the material inside the walls, articles of copper and iron, they fashioned couches, which they dedicated to Hera; and they also built for her a stone temple one hundred feet long.

3.68.4

But the land they confiscated and leased for ten years, and the Thebans occupied it. Indeed it was almost wholly for the sake of the Thebans that the Lacedaemonians in all their dealings with the Plataeans showed themselves so thoroughly hostile to them, thinking that the Thebans would be serviceable in the war then just beginning.

3.68.5

Such was the fate of Plataea, in the ninety-third year after they became allies of Athens.

3.68.5

1

3.69.1

Meanwhile

3.69.1

1

3.69.1

the forty Peloponnesian ships, which had gone to the relief of the Lesbians and were at that time traversing the open sea in flight, after they had first been pursued by the Athenians and had been caught in a storm off Crete, had come straggling back to the Peloponnesus, where they found, at Cyllene, thirteen Leucadian and Ambraciot triremes and Brasidas son of Tellis, who had come as adviser to Alcidas.

3.69.2

For after they had failed to capture Lesbos the Lacedaemonians wished to strengthen their fleet and to sail to Corcyra, which was in the throes of a revolution. The Athenians had a fleet of only twelve ships at Naupactus, and the Lacedaemonians desired to reach Corcyra before a larger fleet could come from Athens to re-enforce them. It was with this end in view that Brasidas and Alcidas set about making their preparations.

3.70.1

The Corcyraeans had been in a state of revolution ever since the home-coming of the captives who had been taken in the two sea-fights off Epidamnus

3.70.1

1

3.70.1

and had been released by the Corinthians. They had nominally been set free on bail in the sum of eight hundred talents

3.70.1

2

3.70.1

pledged by their proxeni, but in fact they had been bribed to bring Corcyra over to the Corinthian side.

3.70.2

And these men had been going from citizen to citizen and intriguing with them, with a view to inducing the city to revolt from Athens. And on the arrival of an Attic and Corinthian ship bringing envoys, and after the envoys had held conferences with them, the Corcyraeans voted to continue to be allies to the Athenians according to their agreement,

3.70.2

1

3.70.2

but on the other hand to renew their former friendship with the Peloponnesians.

3.70.3

Thereupon the returned prisoners brought Peithias, a volunteer proxenus of the Athenians and leader of the popular party, to trial, charging him with trying to bring Corcyra into servitude to Athens.

3.70.4

But he, being acquitted, brought suits in turn against the five wealthiest men of their number, alleging that they were cutting vine-poles from the sacred precincts of Zeus and Alcinous, an offence for which a fine of a stater

3.70.4

1

3.70.4

for each stake was fixed by law.

3.70.5

When they had been convicted and because of the excessive amount of the fine took refuge at the temples as suppliants, that they might arrange for the payment of the fine by instalments, Peithias persuaded the senate, of which he was also a member, to let the law take its course.

3.70.6

The condemned men, seeing that they were debarred by the law from carrying out their proposal and at the same time learning that Peithias, so long as he continued to be a member of the senate, would persist in his attempt to persuade the populace to conclude an offensive and defensive alliance with the Athenians, banded together and suddenly rushing into the senate with daggers in their hands killed Peithias and others, both senators and private persons, to the number of sixty. A few, however, who held the same political views as Peithias, took refuge in the Attic trireme that was still in the harbour.

3.71.1

After they had taken these measures the conspirators called the Corcyraeans together and told them that it was all for the best, and that now they would be least likely to be enslaved by the Athenians; and in future they should remain neutral and receive neither party if they came with more than one ship, regarding any larger number as hostile. Having thus spoken they compelled the people to ratify their proposal.

3.71.2

They also sent at once to Athens envoys to explain recent events at Corcyra, showing how these were for the interests of Athens, and to persuade those who had taken refuge there to do nothing prejudicial to them, in order that there might not be a reaction against Corcyra.

3.71.2

1

3.72.1

But when the envoys arrived, the Athenians arrested them as revolutionists, and deposited them in Aegina,

3.72.2

Btogether with such of the fugitives as they had won over. Meanwhile the dominant party at Corcyra, on the arrival of a Corinthian trireme with Lacedaemonian envoys, attacked the people and were victorious in the fight.

3.72.3

But when night came on the people fled for refuge to the acropolis and the high places of the city, and getting together in a body established themselves there. They held also the Hyllaïc harbour,

3.72.3

1

3.72.3

while the other party seized the quarter of the market-place where most of them lived, and the harbour

3.72.3

2

3.72.3

adjacent to it which faces the mainland.

3.73.1

On the next day they skirmished a little, and both parties sent messengers round into the fields, calling upon the slaves and offering them freedom; and a majority of the slaves made common cause with the people, while the other party gained the support of eight hundred mercenaries from the mainland.

3.74.1

After a day's interval another battle occurred, and the people won, as they had the advantage in the strength of their position as well as in numbers. The women also boldly took part with them in the fight, hurling tiles from the houses and enduring the uproar with a courage beyond their sex.

3.74.2

But about twilight, when their forces had been routed, the oligarchs, fearing lest the people, if they came on, might at the first onset get possession of the arsenal and put them to the sword, set fire to the dwelling-houses around the marketplace and to the tenements,

3.74.2

1

3.74.2

in order to prevent an assault, sparing neither their own houses nor those of others. The result was that much merchandise was burned up and that the whole city was in imminent danger of being entirely destroyed if a wind blowing toward the city had sprung up to reinforce the flames.

3.74.3

And during the night, after they had desisted from battle, both parties rested but remained on the alert; and now that the people had got the upper hand the Corinthian ship slipped out to sea, and most of the mercenaries were secretly conveyed over to the mainland.

3.75.1

On the following day Nicostratus son of Diitrephes, general of the Athenians, came to their assistance from Naupactus with twelve ships and five hundred Messenian hoplites. He tried to negotiate a settlement between the factions, and succeeded in persuading them to come to a mutual agreement: that the twelve men who were chiefly to blame should be brought to trial (whereupon they fled at once) and that the rest should make peace with each other and dwell together, and enter into an offensive and defensive alliance with the Athenians.

3.75.2

When he had accomplished this, he was about to sail away; but the leaders of the people persuaded him to leave them five of his ships, that their opponents might be somewhat less inclined to disturbance, agreeing on their part to man and send with him an equal number of their own ships.

3.75.3

He agreed, and they began to tell off their personal enemies as crews for the ships. But these, fearing that they might be sent off to Athens, sat down as suppliants in the temple of the Dioscuri.

3.75.4

Nicostratus, however, urged them to rise and tried to reassure them. But when he could not induce them to rise, the people took this pretext to arm themselves, interpreting their distrustand refusal to sail with Nicostratus as proof that their intentions were anything but good. Accordingly they took arms from their houses, and would have slain some of the oligarchs whom they chanced to meet, if Nicostratus had not prevented them.

3.75.5

The rest, seeing what was going on, sat down as suppliants in the temple of Hera, and they were not less than four hundred in number. But the people, fearing that they might start a revolution, persuaded them to rise and conveyed them over to the island which lies in front of the temple of Hera; and provisions were regularly sent to them there.

3.76.1

At this stage of the revolution, on the fourth or fifth day after the transfer of the men to the island, the Peloponnesian ships arrived

3.76.1

1

3.76.1

from Cyllene, where they had been lying at anchor since their voyage from lonia, being fifty-three in number; and Alcidas was in command of them as before, with Brasidas on board as his adviser. They came to anchor first at Sybota, a harbour of the mainland, and then at daybreak sailed for Corcyra.

3.77.1

But the Corcyraeans,

3.77.1

1

3.77.1

being in great confusion and thrown into a panic by the state of affairs in the city as well as by the approaching fleet, proceeded to equip sixty ships and at the same time to send them out against the enemy as fast as they were manned, although the Athenians urged that they themselves be permitted to sail out first, and that the Corcyraeans should come out afterwards with all their ships in a body.

3.77.2

But when their ships were near—the enemy, scattered here and there, two of them deserted immediately, while in others the crews were fighting one another;

3.77.3

and there was no order in anything they did. And when the Peloponnesians saw their confusion they arrayed only twenty ships against the Corcyraeans, and all the rest against the twelve Athenian ships, among which were the two sacred ships, the Salaminia and the Paralos.

3.78.1

Now the Corcyraeans, since they were attacking in disorder and with few ships at a time, were having trouble in their part of the battle; and the Athenians, fearing the enemy's superior numbers and seeing the danger of being surrounded, did not attack the whole body together nor the centre of the ships that were arrayed against them, but charged upon one of the wings and sank a single ship.

3.78.2

And then, when the Peloponnesians after this move formed their ships in a circle, they kept sailing round the Peloponnesian fleet, trying to throw it into confusion. But those who were facing the Corcyraeans, perceiving this manoeuvre and fearing a repetition of what happened at Naupactus,

3.78.2

1

3.78.2

came to the rescue, and the whole fleet, now united, advanced simultaneously upon the Athenians.

3.78.3

Thereupon the Athenians began to retire, backing water,

3.78.3

1

3.78.3

hoping at the same time that the Corcyraean ships might as far as possible escape into harbour,

3.78.3

2

3.78.3

as they themselves retired slowly and the enemy's attacks were directed only against them.

3.78.4

Such then was the course of the battle, which lasted till sunset.

3.79.1

The Corcyraeans, fearing that the enemy, confident of victory, might sail against the city and either take on board the prisoners on the island or commit some other act of violence, transferred these prisoners once more to the temple of Hera and then took measures to protect the city.

3.79.2

The Peloponnesians, however, although they were the victors in the naval battle, did not venture to attack the city, but with thirteen Corcyraean ships which they had taken sailed back to the harbour on the mainland from which they had set out.

3.79.3

On the next day they were no more inclined to attack the city, though the inhabitants were in a state of great confusion and fear, and though Brasidas, it is said, urged Alcidas to do so, but did not have equal authority with him. Instead, they merely landed on the promontory of Leucimne and ravaged the fields.

3.80.1

Meanwhile the people of Corcyra, becoming alarmed lest the ships should attack them, conferred with the suppliants and also with the other members of the opposite faction on the best means of saving the city. And some of them they persuaded to go on board the ships; for in spite of all the Corcyraeans had manned thirty ships.

3.80.2

But the Peloponnesians, after ravaging the land till midday, sailed away, and toward night a signal was flashed to them that sixty Athenian ships were approaching from Leucas. These ships had been sent by the Athenians, under the command of Eurymedon son of Thucles, when they learned of the revolution at Corcyra and that the fleet under Alcidas was about to sail thither.

3.81.1

The Peloponnesians accordingly set sail that very night for home, going with all speed and keeping close to the shore; and hauling their ships across the Leucadian isthmus,

3.81.1

1

3.81.1

in order to avoid being seen, as they would be if they sailed around, they got away.

3.81.2

Now the Corcyraeans had no sooner perceived that the Athenian fleet was approaching and that the enemy's fleet had gone than they secretly brought the Messenians,

3.81.2

1

3.81.2

who had till then been outside the walls, into the city, and ordered the ships which they had manned to sail round into the Hyllaic harbour

3.81.2

2

3.81.2

; then while these were on their way thither they slew any of their personal enemies whom they could lay hands upon. They also put ashore and despatched all those on board the ships whom they had persuaded to go aboard, then went into the temple of Hera, persuaded about fifty of the suppliants there to submit to trial, and condemned them all to death.

3.81.3

But most of the suppliants, not having consented to be tried, when they saw what was happening set about destroying one another in the sacred precinct itself, while a few hanged themselves on trees, and still others made away with themselves as best they could.

3.81.4

And during the seven days that Eurymedon, after his arrival, stayed there with his sixty ships, the Corcyraeans continued slaughtering such of their fellow-citizens as they considered to be their personal enemies. The charge they brought was of conspiring to overthrow the democracy, but some were in fact put to death merely to satisfy private enmity, and others, because money was owing to them, were slain by those who had borrowed it.

3.81.5

Death in every form ensued, and whatever horrors are wont to be perpetrated at such times all happened then—aye, and even worse. For father slew son, men were dragged from the temples and slain near them, and some were even walled up in the temple of Dionysus and perished there.

3.82.1

To such excesses of savagery did the revolution go; and it seemed the more savage, because it was among the first that occurred; for afterwards practically the whole Hellenic world was convulsed, since in each state the leaders of the democratic factions were at variance with the oligarchs, the former seeking to bring in the Athenians, the latter the Lacedaemonians. And while in time of peace they would have had no pretext for asking their intervention, nor any inclination to do so, yet now that these two states were at war, either faction in the various cities, if it desired a revolution, found it easy to bring in allies also, for the discomfiture at one stroke of its opponents and the strengthening of its own cause.

3.82.2

And so there fell upon the cities on account of revolutions many grievous calamities, such as happen and always will happen while human nature is the same, but which are severer or milder, and different in their manifestations, according as the variations in circumstances present themselves in each case. For in peace and prosperity both states and individuals have gentler feelings, because men are not then forced to face conditions of dire necessity; but war, which robs men of the easy supply of their daily wants, is a rough schoolmaster and creates in most people a temper that matches their condition. And so the cities began to be disturbed by revolutions, and those that fell into this state later, on hearing of what had been done before, carried to still more extravagant lengths the invention of new devices, both by the extreme ingenuity of their attacks and the monstrousness of their revenges.

3.82.3

The ordinary acceptation of words in their relation to things was changed as men thought fit.

3.82.4

Reckless audacity came to be regarded as courageous loyalty to party, prudent hesitation as specious cowardice, moderation as a cloak for unmanly weakness, and to be clever in everything was to do naught in anything. Frantic impulsiveness was accounted a true man's part, but caution in deliberation a specious pretext for shirking. The hot-headed man was always trusted, his opponent suspected. He who succeeded in a plot was clever, and he who had detected one was still shrewder;

3.82.5

on the other hand, he who made it his aim to have no need of such things

3.82.5

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3.82.5

was a disrupter of party and scared of his opponents. In a word, both he that got ahead of another who intended to do something evil and he that prompted to evil one who had never thought of of it were alike commended. Furthermore, the tie of blood was weaker than the tie of party, because the partisan was more ready to dare without demur;

3.82.6

for such associations are not entered into for the public good in conformity with the prescribed laws, but for selfish aggrandisement contrary to the established laws. Their pledges to one another were confirmed not so much by divine law as by common transgression of the law. Fair words proffered by opponents, if these had the upper hand, were received with caution as to their actions and not in a generous spirit.

3.82.6

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3.82.6

To get revenge on some one was more valued than never to have suffered injury oneself.

3.82.7

And if in any case oaths of reconcilement were exchanged, for the moment only were they binding, since each side had given them merely to meet the emergency, having at the time no other resource; but he who, when the opportunity offered and he saw his enemy off his guard, was the first to pluck up courage, found his revenge sweeter because of the violated pledge than if he had openly attacked, and took into account not only the greater safety of such a course, but also that, by winning through deceit, he was gaining besides the prize of astuteness. And in general it is easier for rogues to get themselves called clever than for the stupid to be reputed good,

3.82.7

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3.82.7

and they are ashamed of the one but glory in the other.

3.82.7

The cause of all these evils was the desire to rule which greed and ambition inspire, and also, springing from them, that ardour

3.82.7

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3.82.7

which belongs to men who once have become engaged in factious rivalry.

3.82.8

For those who emerged as party leaders in the several cities, by assuming on either side a fair-sounding name, the one using as its catch-word “political equality for the masses under the law,” the other “temperate aristocracy,”

3.82.8

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3.82.8

while they pretended to be devoted to the common weal, in reality made it their prize; striving in every way to get the better of each other they dared the most awful deeds, and sought revenges still more awful, not pursuing these within the bounds of justice and the public weal, but limiting them, both parties alike, only by the moment's caprice; and they were ready, either by passing an unjust sentence of condemnation or by winning the upper hand through acts of violence, to glut the animosity of the moment. The result was that though neither had any regard for true piety, yet those who could carry through an odious deed under the cloak of a specious phrase received the higher praise. And citizens who belonged to neither party were continually destroyed by both, either because they would not make common cause with them, or through mere jealousy that they should survive.

3.83.1

So it was that every form of depravity showed itself in Hellas in consequence of its revolutions, and that simplicity, which is the chief element of a noble nature, was laughed to scorn and disappeared, while mutual antagonism of feeling, combined with mistrust, prevailed far and wide.

3.83.2

For there was no assurance binding enough, no oath terrible enough, to reconcile men; but always, if they were stronger,

3.83.2

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3.83.2

since they accounted all security hopeless, they were rather disposed to take precautions against being wronged than able to trust others.

3.83.3

And it was generally those of meaner intellect who won the day; for being afraid of their own defects and of their opponents' sagacity, in order that they might not be worsted in words, and, by reason of their opponents' intellectual versatility find themselves unawares victims of their plots, they boldly resorted to deeds.

3.83.4

Their opponents, on the other hand, contemptuously assuming that they would be aware in time and that there was no need to secure by deeds what they might have by wit, were taken off their guard and perished in greater numbers.

3.84.1

It was in Corcyra,

3.84.1

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3.84.1

then, that most of these atrocities were first committed—all the acts of retaliation which men who are governed with highhanded insolence rather than with moderation are likely to commit upon their rulers when these at last afford them opportunity for revenge; or such as men resolve upon contrary to justice when they seek release from their accustomed poverty, and in consequence of their sufferings are likely to be most eager for their neighbours' goods;

3.84.1

2

3.84.1

and assaults of pitiless cruelty, such as men make, not with a view to gain, but when, being on terms of complete equality with their foe, they are utterly carried away by uncontrollable passion.

3.84.2

At this crisis, when the life of the city had been thrown into utter confusion, human nature, now triumphant over the laws, and accustomed even in spite of the laws to do wrong, took delight in showing that its passions were ungovernable, that it was stronger than justice and an enemy to all superiority. For surely no man would have put revenge before religion, and gain before innocence of wrong, had not envy swayed him with her blighting power.

3.84.3

Indeed, men do not hesitate, when they seek to avenge themselves upon others, to abrogate in advance the common principles observed in such cases—those principles upon which depends every man's own hope of salvation should he himself be overtaken by misfortune—thus failing to leave them in force against the time when perchance a man in peril shall have need of some one of them.

3.85.1

Such then were the first outbreaks of passion which the Corcyraeans who remained at home indulged in toward each other; and Eurymedon sailed away with the Athenian fleet.

3.85.2

Later, however, the Corcyraean fugitives, of whom about five hundred

3.85.2

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3.85.2

had got safely across to the mainland, seized some forts there, and thus dominating the territory belonging to Corcyra on the opposite coast made it a base from which they plundered the people of the island and did them much harm, so that a severe famine arose in the city.

3.85.3

They also sent envoys to Lacedaemon and Corinth to negotiate for their restoration; but since nothing was accomplished by these they afterwards procured boats and mercenaries and crossed over to the island, about six hundred in all. They then burned their boats, in order that they might despair of success unless they dominated the country, and went up to Mt. Istone, and after building a fort there began to destroy the people in the city, exercising dominion over the country.

3.86.1

Toward the close of the same summer the Athenians sent twenty ships to Sicily under the command of Laches son of Melanopus and Charoeades son of Euphiletus.

3.86.2

For the Syracusans and the Leontines were now at war with each other. In alliance with the Syracusans were all the Dorian cities except Camarina—the cities which at the outbreak of the war had joined the Lacedaemonian alliance, although they had taken no active part in the war—while the Chalcidian cities and Camarina were allies of the Leontines. In Italy the Locrians allied themselves with the Syracusans, and the Rhegians with the Leontines, because they were kinsmen.

3.86.2

1

3.86.3

The Leontines and their allies sent an embassy

3.86.3

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3.86.3

to Athens and urged them, both on the ground of an earlier alliance

3.86.3

2

3.86.3

and because they were Ionians, to send them ships; for they were being excluded from both the land and the sea by the Syracusans.

3.86.4

And the Athenians sent the ships, professedly on the ground of their relationship, but really because they wished to prevent the importation of grain from Sicily into the Peloponnesus, and also to make a preliminary test whether the affairs of Sicily could be brought under their own control.

3.86.5

So they established themselves at Rhegium in Italy and proceeded to carry on the war in concert with their allies. And the summer ended.

3.87.1

In the course of the following winter

3.87.1

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3.87.1

the plague again

3.87.1

2

3.87.1

fell upon the Athenians; and indeed it had not died out at any time entirely, though there had been a period

3.87.2

of respite. And it continued the second time not less than a year, having run for two full years on the previous occasion, so that the Athenians were more distressed by it than by any other misfortune and their power

3.87.3

more crippled.

3.87.3

1

3.87.3

For no fewer than four thousand four hundred of those enrolled as hoplites died and also three hundred cavalry, and of the populace a number that could not

3.87.4

be ascertained. It was at this time also that the great number of earthquakes occurred at Athens, in Euboea, and in Boeotia, and especially at Orchomenus in Boeotia.

3.88.1

The same winter the Athenians in Sicily and the Rhegians made an expedition with thirty ships against the islands of Aeolus, as they are called; for it was impossible to invade them in the summer time on account of the lack of water there.

3.88.2

These islands are occupied by the Liparaeans, who are colonists of the Cnidians. They have their homes on one of the islands, which is not large, called Lipara, and from this go out and cultivate the rest, namely Didyme, Strongyle and Hiera.

3.88.2

1

3.88.3

The people of this region believe that Hephaestus has his forge in Hiera, because this island is seen to send up a great flame of fire at night and smoke by day. The islands lie over against the territory of the Sicels and the Messenians, and were in alliance with the Syracusans;

3.88.4

the Athenians, therefore, laid waste their land, but since the inhabitants would not come over to their side they sailed back to Rhegium. And the winter ended, and with it the fifth year of this war of which Thucydides wrote the history.

3.89.1

In the following summer the Peloponnesians

3.89.1

1

3.89.1

and their allies, led by Agis son of Archidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians, advanced as far as the Isthmus with the intention of invading Attica; but a great many earthquakes occurred, causing them to turn back again, and no invasion

3.89.2

took place. At about the same time, while the earthquakes prevailed, the sea at Orobiae in Euboea receded from what was then the shore-line, and then coming on in a great wave overran a portion of the city. One part of the flood subsided, but another engulfed the shore, so that what was land before is now sea; and it destroyed of the people as many as could not run up to the high ground

3.89.3

in time. In the neighbourhood also of the island of Atalante, which lies off the coast of Opuntian Locris, there was a similar inundation, which carried away a part of the Athenian fort there,

3.89.3

1

3.89.3

and wrecked one of two ships which had been drawn up on

3.89.4

the shore. At Peparethos likewise there was a recession of the waters, but no inundation; and there was an earthquake, which threw down a part of the wall as well as the prytaneum and a few

3.89.5

other houses. And the cause of such a phenomenon, in my own opinion, was this: at that point where the shock of the earthquake was greatest the sea was driven back, then, suddenly returning

3.89.5

1

3.89.5

with increased violence, made the inundation; but without an earthquake, it seems to me, such a thing would not have happened,

3.90.1

During the same summer war was being waged in Sicily, not only by other peoples as they each had occasion to do so, but also by the Siceliots themselves, who were campaigning against one another, and likewise by the Athenians in concert with their allies; but I shall mention only the most memorable things done by the Athenians in concert with their allies, or against the Athenians by their opponents.

3.90.2

After Charoeades, the Athenian general, had been slain in battle by the Syracusans, Laches, being now in sole command of the fleet, made an expedition with the allies against Mylae, a town belonging to the Messenians. It so happened that two divisions of the Messenians were in garrison at Mylae, and that these had laid an ambush against the men who had landed from the ships.

3.90.3

The Athenians and their allies, however, put to rout the ambushing troops, slaying many of them; then, assaulting the fortification, they compelled its defenders to surrender the acropolis by agreement and march with them against Messene.

3.90.4

After this, on the approach of the Athenians and their allies, the Messenians also submitted, giving hostages and offering the other customary pledges of good faith.

3.91.1

That same summer the Athenians sent thirty ships round the Peloponnesus under the command of Demosthenes son of Alcisthenes and Procles son of Theodorus, and sixty ships and two thousand hoplites under the command of Nicias son of Niceratus, to Melos.

3.91.2

For the Melians, although they were islanders,

3.91.2

1

3.91.2

were unwilling to be subject to Athens or even to join their alliance, and the Athenians wished to bring them over.

3.91.3

But when they would not submit, even after their land had been ravaged, the Athenians left Melos and sailed to Oropus in the territory of Graïa, and the hoplites, landing there at nightfall, proceeded at once by land to Tanagra in Boeotia.

3.91.4

There they were met by the Athenians from the city in full force, who, under the command of Hipponicus son of Callias and Eurymedon son of Thucles, came overland upon a concerted signal and joined them. And after they had made camp they spent that day in ravaging the territory of Tanagra, and also passed the night there.

3.91.5

On the next day they defeated in battle the men of Tanagra who came out against them, as well as some Thebans who had come to their aid, then taking possession of the arms of the fallen and setting up a trophy they returned, the one party to the city, the other to the ships.

3.91.6

And Nicias sailed along the coast with his sixty ships, ravaged the seaboard of Locris, and then returned home.

3.92.1

It was about this time that the Lacedaemonians established Heracleia, their colony in Trachinia, with the following object in view.

3.92.2

The people of Malia, considered as a whole, consist of three divisions, Paralians, Hiereans, and Trachinians. Of these the Trachinians, after they had been ruined in war by their neighbours the Oetaeans, at first intended to attach themselves to the Athenians, but, fearing that these might not be loyal, sent to Lacedaemon, choosing Teisamenus as their envoy.

3.92.3

And envoys from Doris, the mother city of the Lacedaemonians, also took part in the embassy, making the same request, for they too were being ruined by the Oetaeans.

3.92.4

After hearing their appeal, the Lacedaemonians were of the opinion that they should send out the colony, wishing to aid both the Trachinians and the Dorians. At the same time, the site of the proposed city seemed to them well adapted for carrying on the war against Athens; for a fleet could be equipped there for an attack upon Euboea and the crossing thus made from a short distance away, and the place would also be useful for expeditions along the coast towards Thrace. In short, they were eager to found the settlement.

3.92.5

They therefore first consulted the god at Delphi, and at his bidding sent out the colonists, consisting of both Spartans and Perioeci,

3.92.5

1

3.92.5

and they invited any other Hellenes who so desired to accompany them, except Ionians and Achaeans and certain other races. The founders of the colony in charge of the expedition were three Lacedaemonians, Leon, Alcidas, and Damagon.

3.92.6

When they had established themselves they built a new wall about the city, which is now called Heracleia, and is about forty stadia distant from Thermopylae and twenty from the sea. They then proceeded to build dockyards, and in order that the place might be easy to guard fenced off the approach on the side toward Thermopylae by a wall across the pass itself.

3.93.1

As for the Athenians, while the colonists were being gathered for this city, they at first became alarmed, thinking it was being established chiefly as a menace to Euboea, because it is only a short distance across from here to Cenaeum in Euboea. Afterwards, however, the matter turned out contrary to their expectations; for no harm came from the city.

3.93.2

And the reasons were as follows: the Thessalians, who were the paramount power in those regions and whose territory was being menaced by the settlement, fearing that their new neighbours might become very powerful, began to harry and make war continually upon the new settlers, until they finally wore them out, although they had at first been very numerous; for, since the Lacedaemonians were founding the colony, everybody came boldly, thinking the city secure. One of the principal causes, however, was that the governors sent out by the Lacedaemonians themselves ruined the undertaking and reduced the population to a handful, frightening most of the settlers away by their harsh and sometimes unjust administration, so that at length their neighbours more easily prevailed over them.

3.94.1

During the same summer, and at about the time when the Athenians were detained at Melos, the troops of the thirty Athenian ships that were cruising round the Peloponnesus first set an ambush at Ellomenus in Leucadia and killed some of the garrison, and then, later on, went against Leucas with a greater armament, which consisted of all the Acarnanians, who joined the expedition with their entire forces (with the exception of the people of Oeniadae), some Zacynthians and Cephallenians, and fifteen ships from Corcyra.

3.94.2

The Leucadians, finding themselves outnumbered, were obliged to remain quiet, although their lands were being ravaged both without and within the isthmus,

3.94.2

1

3.94.2

where stands Leucas and the temple of Apollo; but the Acarnanians tried to induce Demosthenes, the Athenian general, to shut them in by a wall, thinking they could easily reduce them by siege and thus rid themselves of a city that was always hostile to them.

3.94.3

But just at this time Demosthenes was persuaded by the Messenians that it was a fine opportunity for him, seeing that so large an army was collected, to attack the Aetolians, because they were hostile to Naupactus, and also because, if he defeated them, he would find it easy to bring the rest of the mainland in that region into subjection to the Athenians.

3.94.4

The Aetolians, they explained, were, it was true, a great and warlike people, but as they lived in unwalled villages, which, moreover, were widely separated, and as they used only light armour, they could be subdued without difficulty before they could unite for mutual defence.

3.94.5

And they advised him to attack the Apodotians first, then the Ophioneans, and after them the Eurytanians. These last constitute the largest division of the Aetolians, their speech is more unintelligible than that of the other Aetolians, and, according to report, they are eaters of raw flesh. If these tribes were subdued, they said, the rest would readily yield.

3.95.1

Demosthenes was induced to make this decision, not only by his desire to please the Messenians, but chiefly because he thought that, without help from Athens, he would be able with his allies from the mainland, once the Aetolians had joined him, to make an overland expedition against the Boeotians by passing through the country of the Ozolian Locrians to Cytinium in Doris, keeping Parnassus on the right, until he should descend into Phocian territory. The Phocians would presumably be eager to join the expedition in view of their traditional friendship with Athens, or else could be forced to do so; and Phocis is on the very borders of Boeotia. So he set sail from Leucas with his whole armament in spite of the unwillingness of the Acarnanians and went along the coast to Sollium.

3.95.2

There he made his plan known to the Acarnanians, but they would not agree to it because of his refusal to invest Leucas; he therefore set out upon his expedition against the Aetolians without them, taking the rest of his army, which consisted of Cephallenians, Messenians, Zacynthians, and three hundred Athenian marines from his own ships—for the fifteen Corcyraean ships had gone back home. The base from which he started was Oeneon in Locris.

3.95.3

The people of this country, Ozolian Locris, were allies, and they with their whole force were to meet the Athenians in the interior; for since they were neighbours of the Aetolians and used the same sort of arms, it was believed that their help would be of great service on the expedition on account of their knowledge both of the Aetolian manner of fighting and of the country.

3.96.1

He bivouacked with his army in the precinct of Nemean Zeus, where the poet Hesiod

3.96.1

1

3.96.1

is said to have been killed by the men of that region, an oracle having foretold to him that he should suffer this fate at Nemea; then he set out at daybreak for Aetolia.

3.96.2

On the first day he took Potidania, on the second Crocyleum, on the third Teichium. There he remained, sending his booty back to Eupalium in Locris; for his intention was to subdue the other places first, and then, in case the Ophioneans would not submit, to return to Naupactus and make a second expedition against them. But all these preparations did not escape the notice of the Aetolians, either when the design was first being formed or afterwards;

3.96.3

indeed his army had no sooner invaded their country than they all began to rally in great force, so that help came even from the remotest tribes of the Ophioneans, who stretch as far as the Maliac Gulf, and from the Bomians and Callians.

3.97.1

The Messenians, however, gave Demosthenes about the same advice as at first: informing him that the conquest of the Aetolians was easy, they urged him to proceed as quickly as possible against the villages, not waiting until they should all unite and array themselves against him, but trying to take the first village in his way.

3.97.2

Yielding to their advice and being hopeful because of his good fortune, since he was meeting with no opposition, he did not wait for the Locrians, who were to have brought him reinforcements—for he was greatly in need of lightarmed men that were javelin-throwers—but advanced against Aegitium and took it by storm at the first onset. For the inhabitants secretly fled and took post on the hills above the city, which stood on high ground about eighty stadia from the sea.

3.97.3

But the Aetolians, who by this time had come to the rescue of Aegitium, attacked the Athenians and their allies, running down from the hills on every side and showering javelins upon them, then retreating whenever the Athenian army advanced and advancing whenever they retreated. Indeed, the battle continued for a long time in this fashion, alternate pursuits and retreats, and in both the Athenians had the worst of it.

3.98.1

Now so long as their bowmen had arrows and were able to use them the Athenians held out, for the Aetolian troops were light-armed and so, while they were exposed to the arrows, they were constantly driven back. But when the captain of the archers had been killed and his men scattered, and the hoplites were worn out, since they had been engaged for a long time in the unremitting struggle and the Aetolians were pressing them hard and hurling javelins upon them, they at last turned and fled, and falling into ravines from which there was no way out and into places with which they were unacquainted, they perished;

3.98.2

for Chromon, the Messenian, who had been their guide on the way, had unfortunately been killed. The Aetolians kept plying their javelins, and being swift of foot and lightly equipped, following at their heels they caught many there in the rout and slew them; but the greater number missed the roads and got into the forest, from which there were no paths out, and the Aetolians brought fire and set the woods ablaze around them.

3.98.3

Then every manner of flight was essayed and every manner of destruction befell the army of the Athenians, and it was only with difficulty that the survivors escaped to the sea at Oeneon in Locris, whence they had set out.

3.98.4

Many of the allies were slain, and of the Athenians themselves about one hundred and twenty hoplites. So great a number of men, and all of the same age, perished here, the best men in truth whom the city of Athens lost in this war; and Procles, one of the two generals, perished also.

3.98.5

When they had received back their dead from the Aetolians under a truce and had retreated to Naupactus, they were afterwards taken back by the fleet to Athens. Demosthenes, however, remained behind in Naupactus and the region round about, for he was afraid of the Athenians because of what had happened.

3.99.1

About the same time the Athenian forces over in Sicily sailed to Locris

3.99.1

1

3.99.1

and disembarking there defeated the Locrians who came against them and took a guard-house which was situated on the river Halex.

3.100.1

During the same summer the Aetolians, who had previously sent three envoys to Corinth and Lacedaemon, namely Tolophus the Ophionean, Boriades the Eurytanian, and Teisander the Apodotian, urged them to send an army against Naupactus because this city had brought the Athenians against them.

3.100.2

So towards autumn the Lacedaemonians sent three thousand hoplites of their allies, among whom were six hundred from Heracleia, the city which had recently been founded in Trachis. The commander of the expedition was Eurylochus a Spartan, who was accompanied by the Spartans Macarius and Menedaïus.

3.101.1

And when the army was collected at Delphi, Eurylochus sent a herald to the Ozolian Locrians; for the road to Naupactus lay through their territory, and he also wished to induce them to revolt from Athens.

3.101.2

Of the Locrians the people of Amphissa co-operated with him chiefly, these being afraid on account of their enmity to the Phocians; and after these had taken the lead in giving him hostages they persuaded the rest, who were afraid of the invading army, to do likewise—first their neighbours the Myoneans, who held the country from which Locris was most difficult of access, then the Ipneans, Messapians, Tritaeeans, Chalaeans, Tolophonians, Hessians and Oeantheans. All these tribes also took part in the expedition. The Olpaeans gave hostages, but did not take the field with the others; and the Hyaeans refused to give hostages until a village of theirs, Polis by name, was taken.

3.102.1

When all preparations had been made, and the hostages had been deposited at Cytinium in Doris, Eurylochus advanced with his army against Naupactus through the Locrian territory, taking on his march two of their towns, Oeneon and Eupalium, which refused to yield.

3.102.2

And when they reached the territory of Naupactus, the Aetolians meanwhile having come to their support, they ravaged the land and took the outer town, which was not fortified; and advancing against Molycreium, a colony founded by the Corinthians but subject to Athens, they took it.

3.102.3

But Demosthenes the Athenian, who happened to have remained in the neighbourhood of Naupactus after his retreat from Aetolia, got information of the expedition, and fearing for the town went and persuaded the Acarnanians, though with difficulty on account of his withdrawal from Leucas, to come to the aid of Naupactus.

3.102.4

And they sent with him on board the fleet

3.102.4

1

3.102.4

one thousand hoplites, who entered the place and saved it; for there was danger that they might not be able to hold out, since the walls were extensive and the defenders few in number.

3.102.5

Eurylochus and his men, perceiving that the army had entered and that it was impossible to take the town by storm, now withdrew, not to the Peloponnesus, but to the district of Aeolis, as it is now called, to Calydon, namely, and Pleuron, and the other towns of that region, and to Proschium in Aetolia.

3.102.6

For the Ambraciots came and urged him to join them in an attack upon Amphilochian Argos and the rest of Amphilochia, and at the same time upon Acarnania, saying that if they got control of these places all the mainland would be brought into alliance with the Lacedaemonians.

3.102.7

Eurylochus was persuaded, and dismissing the Aetolians remained inactive, keeping his army in these regions until the Ambraciots should take the field and the time should come for him to join them in the neighbourhood of Argos. And the summer ended.

3.103.1

The following winter the Athenians in

3.103.1

1

3.103.1

Sicily, with their Hellenic allies and such of the Sicels as had been unwilling subjects and allies of the Syracusans but had now revolted from them and were taking sides with the Athenians, attacked the Sicel town Inessa, the acropolis of which was held by the Syracusans, but being unable to take it

3.103.2

they departed. On their retreat, however, the allies, who were in the rear of the Athenians, were attacked by the Syracusan garrison of the fort, who fell upon them and put to flight part of the army, killing not a few

3.103.3

of them. After this Laches and the Athenians took the fleet and made several descents upon Locris; and at the river Caicinus they defeated in battle about three hundred Locrians who came out against them, under the command of Proxenus son of Capato, took the arms of the fallen, and returned to Rhegium.

3.104.1

During the same winter the Athenians purified Delos in compliance with a certain oracle. It had been purified before by Peisistratus the tyrant,

3.104.1

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3.104.1

not indeed the whole of the island but that portion of it which was visible from the temple; but at this time the whole of it was purified, and in the following manner.

3.104.2

All the sepulchres of the dead that were in Delos they removed, and proclaimed that thereafter no one should either die or give birth to a child on the island, but should first be carried over to Rheneia. For Rheneia is so short a distance from Delos that Polycrates the tyrant of Samos, who for some time was powerful on the sea and not only gained control of the other islands

3.104.2

1

3.104.2

but also seized Rheneia, dedicated this island to the Delian Apollo, and bound it with a chain to Delos.

3.104.2

2

3.104.2

It was at this time, after the purification, that the Athenians first celebrated their penteteric

3.104.2

3

3.104.2

festival in Delos.

3.104.3

There had indeed in ancient times been a great gathering at Delos of the Ionians and the inhabitants of the neighbouring islands; and they used to resort to the festival with their wives and children, as the lonians now do to the Ephesian games; and a contest was formerly held there, both gymnastic and musical, and choruses were sent thither by the cities.

3.104.4

The best evidence that the festival was of this character is given by Homer

3.104.4

1

3.104.4

in the following verses, which are from the hymn to Apollo:

3.104.4

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3.104.4

“At other times, Phoebus, Delos is dearest to thy heart, where the lonians in trailing robes are gathered together with their wives and children in thy street;

3.104.5

there they delight thee with boxing and dancing and song, making mention of thy name, whenever they ordain the contest.” And that there was a musical contest also to which men resorted as competitors Homer once more makes clear in the following verses from the same hymn. After commemorating the Delian chorus of women he ends his praise of them with the following verses, in which he also mentions himself: Come now, let Apollo be gracious and Artemis likewise, and farewell, all ye maidens. Yet remember me even in after times, whenever some other toil-enduring man, a dweller upon the earth, shall visit this isle and ask: 'O maidens, what man is the sweetest of minstrels to you of all who wander hither, and in whom do you take most delight? Do you make answer, all with one accord, in gentle words, 'The blind man who dwells in rugged Chios.'

3.104.6

Such is Homer's testimony, showing that in ancient times also there was a great concourse and festival in Delos. And in later times the people of the islands and the Athenians continued to send their choruses with sacrifices, but the contests, and indeed most of the ceremonies, fell into disuse in consequence, probably, of calamities, until the Athenians, at the time of which we now speak, restored the contests and added horse-races, of which there had been none before.

3.105.1

During the same winter the Ambraciots, fulfilling the promise by which they had induced Eurylochus to keep his army there, made an expedition against Amphilochian Argos with three thousand hoplites, and invading its territory took Olpae, a stronghold on the hill near the sea, which the Acarnanians had fortified and had at one time used as a common tribunal

3.105.1

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3.105.1

of justice; and it is about twenty-five stadia from the city of Argos, which is by the sea.

3.105.2

Meanwhile some of the Acarnanian troops came to the relief of Argos, while the rest encamped at a place in Amphilochia which is called Crenae, keeping guard to prevent the Peloponnesians with Eurylochus from passing through unobserved to join the Ambraciots.

3.105.3

They also sent for Demosthenes, who had led the army of the Athenians into Aetolia, to come and be their leader, as well as for the twenty Athenian ships

3.105.3

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3.105.3

which happened to be off the coast of Peloponnesus under the command of Aristotle son of Timocrates and Hierophon son of Antimnestus.

3.105.4

A messenger was also sent by the Ambraciots at Olpae to the city of Ambracia with a request that all the forces of the town should be dispatched to their aid, for they feared that Eurylochus and his troops might not be able to make their way through the Acarnanians, and, in that case, that they themselves would either have to fight single-handed, or, if they wished to retreat, would find that unsafe.

3.106.1

Now the Peloponnesian forces under Eurylochus, when they learned that the Ambraciots had arrived at Olpae, set out from Proschium with all speed to reinforce them, and crossing the Acheloiis advanced through Acarnania, which was without defenders because of the reinforcements which had been sent to Argos, and as they advanced they had the city of Stratus with its garrison on their right, and the rest of Acarnania on their left.

3.106.2

Then traversing the territory of the Stratians they advanced through Phytia, from there skirted the borders of Medeon, and then passed through Limnaea; and finally they reached the country of the Agraeans, being now outside of Acarnania and in a friendly country.

3.106.3

Arriving next at Mt. Thyamus, which belongs to the Agraeans, they went through the pass over it and came down into Argive territory after nightfall, whence they succeeded in passing unobserved between the city of Argos and the Acarnanian guard at Crenae, finally joining the Ambraciots at Olpae.

3.107.1

After the two armies had effected a junction, at daybreak they took post at a place called Metropolis and made camp. Not long afterwards the Athenians with their twenty ships arrived in the Ambracian Gulf, reinforcing the Argives; and Demosthenes also came with two hundred Messenian hoplites and sixty Athenian bowmen.

3.107.2

The ships lay at sea about the hill of Olpae, blockading it; but the Acarnanians and a few of the Amphilochians—for most of these were kept from moving by the Ambraciots—had already gathered at Argos and were preparing for battle with their opponents, having chosen Demosthenes to command the whole allied force in concert with their own generals. And he, leading them close to Olpae, encamped;

3.107.3

and a great ravine separated the two armies. For five days they kept quiet, but on the sixth both sides drew up in order of battle. Now the army of the Peloponnesians was larger than that of Demosthenes and outflanked it; he, therefore, fearing that he might be surrounded, stationed in a sunken road overgrown with buses an ambush of hoplites and light-troops, about four hundred all together, his purpose being that in the very moment of collision these troops should leap from their hiding-place and take the enemy in the rear at the point where his line overlapped.

3.107.4

When both sides were ready they came to close quarters. Demosthenes with the Messenians and a few Athenian troops had the right wing; the rest of the line was held by the Acarnanians, arrayed by tribes, and such Amphilochian javelin-men as were present. But the Peloponnesians and Ambraciots were mingled together, except the Mantineans; these were massed more on the left wing, though not at its extremity, for that position, which was opposite Demosthenes and the Messenians, was held by Eurylochus and the troops under him.

3.108.1

When finally the armies were at close quarters and the Peloponnesians outflanked with their left the right wing of their opponents and were about to encircle it, the Acarnanians, coming upon them from their ambush, fell upon their rear and routed them, so that they did not stand to make resistance and in their panic caused the greater part of their army to take to flight also; for when they saw the division under Eurylochus, their best troops, being cut to pieces, they were far more panic-stricken. And it was the Messenians, who were in this part of the field under the command of Demosthenes, that bore the brunt of the battle.

3.108.2

On the other hand, the Ambraciots and those on the enemy's right wing defeated the troops opposed to themselves, and pursued them to Argos; and indeed these are the best fighters of all the peoples of that region.

3.108.3

When, however, they returned and saw that their main army had been defeated, and the victorious division of the Acarnanians began to press hard upon them, they made their escape with difficulty to Olpae; and many of them were killed, for they rushed on with broken ranks and in disorder all except the Mantineans, who kept their ranks together during the retreat better than any other part of the army. And it was late in the evening before the battle ended.

3.109.1

On the next day, since Eurylochus and Macarius had been slain, Menedaius had on his own responsibility assumed the command, but the defeat had been so serious that he was at his wit's end how, if he remained, he could stand a siege, blockaded as he was by both land and sea by the Athenian fleet, or, if he retreated, could get away safely. He therefore made overtures to Demosthenes and the Athenian generals regarding a truce for his retreat and also about the recovery of his dead.

3.109.2

And they gave back the dead, set up a trophy themselves, and took up their own dead, about three hundred in number. They would not, however, openly agree to a retreat for the whole army, but Demosthenes with his Acarnanian colleagues secretly agreed that the Mantineans and Menedaius and the other Peloponnesian commanders and the most influential men among them might go back home, if they did so speedily. Their object was to isolate the Ambraciots and the miscellaneous crowd of mercenaries,

3.109.2

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3.109.2

and above all to discredit the Lacedaemonians and the Peloponnesians with the Hellenes of this region, on the ground that they had committed an act of treachery through preference for their own selfish interests.

3.109.3

Accordingly the Peloponnesians took up their dead and hastily buried them as best they could, while those who had permission began secretly to plan their retreat.

3.110.1

Word was now brought to Demosthenes and the Acarnanians that the inhabitants of the city of Ambracia,

3.110.1

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3.110.1

in response to the first message that came from Olpae, were marching in full force through the Amphilochian territory, wishing to join the forces in Olpae, and that they were quite unaware of what had happened.

3.110.2

So he immediately sent a part of his army to forestall these troops by setting ambuscades along the roads and occupying the strong positions, and at the same time began preparations to lead the rest of the army against them.

3.111.1

In the meantime the Mantineans and the others who were included in the agreement, leaving camp on the pretext of gathering pot-herbs and firewood, stole away in small groups, gathering at the same time what they pretended to have gone to seek; then when they had already got some distance from Olpae they quickened their pace.

3.111.2

But the Ambraciots and all the others who happened to have come together in a body, when they realized that these were taking their departure, also set out themselves and ran at full speed, wishing to overtake them.

3.111.2

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3.111.3

But the Acarnanians at first thought that all the fugitives were going away without covenant or truce and therefore set off in pursuit of the Peloponnesians; and when some of the generals tried to prevent this, saying that a truce had been made with them, someone hurled javelins at them, believing that they had been betrayed. Afterwards, however, they let the Mantineans and Peloponnesians go, but began to kill the Ambraciots.

3.111.4

And there was much dispute and uncertainty as to whether a man was an Ambraciot or a Peloponnesian. About two hundred of the Ambraciots were slain; the rest of the fugitives escaped into the neighbouring country of Agraea, and were received by Salynthius the king of the Agraeans, who was friendly to them.

3.112.1

Meanwhile the troops from the city of Ambracia arrived at Idomene. Now it consists of two lofty hills, and of these the higher had already been seized unobserved during the night by the troops which Demosthenes had sent forward from his main army; but the lower had previously, as it chanced, been ascended by the Ambraciots, who spent the night there.

3.112.2

After dinner Demosthenes and the rest of the army set out immediately after nightfall, he himself with half of them making for the pass, while the rest took the road through the Amphilochian mountains.

3.112.3

And at dawn he fell upon the Ambraciots, who were still in their beds and had no knowledge at all of what had previously happened.

3.112.4

On the contrary, they supposed these troops to be their own men, for Demosthenes had purposely put the Messenians in front and directed them to accost the enemy in the Doric dialect, thus getting themselves trusted by the outposts; besides, they were indistinguishable to the sight, since it was still dark. So they fell upon the army of the Ambraciots and put them to rout, slaying the majority of them on the spot;

3.112.5

the rest took to flight over the mountains.

3.112.6

But as the roads had already been occupied, and as, moreover, the Amphilochians were well acquainted with their own country and were light infantry opposing heavy-armed troops, whereas the Ambraciots were ignorant of the country and did not know which way to turn, under these circumstances the fleeing men fell into ravines and into ambushes which had previously been set for them and perished.

3.112.7

And some of them, after resorting to every manner of flight, even turned to the sea, which was not far distant, and seeing the Athenian ships, which were sailing along the coast at the very time when the action was taking place, swam toward them, thinking in the panic of the moment that it was better for them to be slain, if slain they must be, by the crews of the ships than by the barbarian and detested Amphilochians.

3.112.8

In this manner, then, the Ambraciots suffered disaster, and but few out of many returned in safety to their city; the Acarnanians, on the other hand, after stripping the dead and setting up trophies, returned to Argos.

3.113.1

On the next day a herald came to the Athenians from the Ambraciots who had escaped from Olpae and taken refuge among the Agraeans, to ask for the bodies of those who had been slain after the first battle, at the time when unprotected by a truce these attempted to leave Olpae along with the Mantineans and the others who were included in the truce.

3.113.2

Now when the herald saw the arms taken from the Ambraciots who came from the city, he was amazed at their number; for he did not know of the recent disaster, but thought that the arms belonged to the men of his own division.

3.113.3

And someone asked him why he was amazed, and how many of his comrades had been slain, the questioner on his part supposing that the herald had come from the forces which had fought at Idomene.

3.113.4

The herald answered, “About two hundred.” The questioner said in reply, “These arms, though, are clearly not those of two hundred men, but of more than a thousand.” And again the herald said, “Then they are not the arms of our comrades in the battle.” The other answered, “They are, if it was you who fought yesterday at Idomene.” “But we did not fight with anyone yesterday;

3.113.5

it was the day before yesterday, on the retreat.” “And it is certain that we fought yesterday with these men, who were coming to your aid from the city of the Ambraciots.” When the herald heard this and realized that the force which was coming to their relief from the city had perished. he lifted up his voice in lamentation and, stunned by the magnitude of the calamity before him, departed at once, forgetting his errand and making no request for the dead.

3.113.6

Indeed this was the greatest calamity that befell any one Hellenic city in an equal number of days during the course of this whole war. The number of those who fell I have not recorded, seeing that the multitude reported to have perished is incredible when compared with the size of the city. I know, however, that if the Acarnanians and Amphilochians had been willing to hearken to the Athenians and Demosthenes and had made an attack upon Ambracia they would have taken it at the first onset; but as it was, they were afraid that the Athenians, if they had the town in their possession, would be more troublesome neighbours than the Ambraciots.

3.114.1

After this the Acarnanians apportioned a third of the booty to the Athenians and distributed the rest among their cities. The portion which fell to the Athenians was captured from them on the voyage home; but the dedicatory offerings now to be seen in the Athenian temples, consisting of three hundred panoplies, were set apart as Demosthenes' share, and were brought home by him when he returned. Furthermore, his return could now, in consequence of this exploit, be made with less apprehension after his earlier misfortune in Aetolia.

3.114.2

The Athenians in the twenty ships also departed, returning to Naupactus. As for the Acarnanians and Amphilochians, after the Athenians and Demosthenes had gone home, they concluded a truce with the Ambraciots and Peloponnesians who had taken refuge with Salynthius and the Agraeans, allowing them to withdraw from Oeniadae, whither they had gone after leaving Salynthius.

3.114.3

The Acarnanians and Amphilochians also concluded for the future a treaty of alliance with the Ambraciots to last for one hundred years, on the following terms: The Ambraciots were not to join the Acarnanians in any expedition against the Peloponnesians; nor were the Acarnanians to join the Ambraciots against the Athenians, but they were to give aid in defence of one another's territory; the Ambraciots were to restore all places or hostages belonging to the Amphilochians which they now held; and they were not to give aid to Anactorium, which was hostile to the Acarnanians.

3.114.4

On these terms of agreement they brought the war to an end. But after this the Corinthians sent to Ambracia a garrison of their own troops, consisting of about three hundred hoplites, under the command of Xenocleidas son of Euthycles, who, making their way with difficulty across he mainland, finally reached their destination. Such was the course of events at Ambracia.

3.115.1

During the same winter the Athenians in Sicily made a descent from their ships upon the territory of Himera, in concert with the Sicels from the interior who had invaded the extreme border

3.115.1

1

3.115.1

of Himeraea; and they also sailed against the islands of Aeolus.

3.115.2

Returning thence to Rhegium, they found that Pythodorus son of Isolochus, an Athenian general, had come to succeed Laches in command of the fleet.

3.115.3

For their allies in Sicily had sailed to Athens and persuaded them to aid them with a larger fleet; for though their territory was dominated by the Syracusans, yet since they were kept from the sea by only a few ships they were collecting a fleet and making preparations with the determination not to submit.

3.115.4

And the Athenians manned forty ships to send to them, partly because they believed that the war in Sicily could sooner be brought to an end in this way, and partly because they wished to give practice to their fleet.

3.115.5

Accordingly they despatched one of their generals, Pythodorus, with a few ships, and were planning later on to send Sophocles son of Sostratidas and Eurymedon son of Thucles with the main body of the fleet.

3.115.6

Pythodorus, now that he had taken over the command of Laches' ships, sailed toward the end of the winter against the Locrian fort which Laches had previously captured;

3.115.6

1

3.115.6

but he was defeated in battle by the Locrians and returned to Rhegium.

3.116.1

At the beginning of the following spring

3.116.1

1

3.116.1

the stream of fire burst from Aetna, as it had on

3.116.2

former occasions. And it devastated a portion of the territory of the Catanaeans who dwell on the slope of Mount Aetna, the highest mountain in Sicily. This eruption took place, it is said, fifty years after the last preceding one;

3.116.2

1

3.116.2

and three eruptions all told are reported to have occurred since Sicily has been inhabited by

3.116.3

the Hellenes.

3.116.3

1

3.116.3

Such was the course of events in this winter, and therewith ended the sixth year of this war of which Thucydides composed the history.

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