History of the Peloponnesian War

Thucydides

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6.1.1

During the same winter the Athenians wished to

6.1.1

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6.1.1

sail again to Sicily with a larger armament than that conducted by Laches and Eurymedon,

6.1.1

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6.1.1

and subdue it, if they could, most of them being ignorant of the great size of the island and of the large number of its inhabitants, Hellenic as well as Barbarian, and that they were undertaking a war not very much inferior to that against

6.1.2

the Peloponnesians. For the voyage round Sicily, for a merchantman, is one of not much less than eight days; and although it is so large only a distance of about twenty stadia of the sea divides the island from the mainland.

6.2.1

Sicily was settled originally in the following manner, and the whole number of the nations that occupied it were these. Most ancient of all those who are reported to have settled in any part of the island were the Cyclopes and Laestrygonians, as to whom, however, I am able to tell neither their stock nor whence they came nor whither they went;

6.2.2

let it suffice as the story has been told by the poets,

6.2.2

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and as each man has formed his opinion about them. The Sicanians appear to have been the first to settle there after them, indeed, as they themselves assert, even before them, as being indigenous, but as the truth is found to be, they were Iberians and were driven by the Ligurians from the River Sicanus in Iberia. From them the island was then called Sicania, having been called Trinacria before;

6.2.3

and they still inhabit the western parts of Sicily. But on the capture of Ilium some of the Trojans, who had escaped the Achaeans, came in boats to Sicily, and settling on the borders of the Sicanians were called, as a people, Elymi, while their cities were named Eryx and Egesta. And there settled with them also some of the Phocians, who on their return at that time from Troy were driven by a storm first to Libya and thence to Sicily.

6.2.4

The Sicels, again, crossed over from Italy, where they dwelt, to Sicily, fleeing from the Opicans—as is probable and indeed is reported— on rafts, having waited for their passage till the wind was from the shore; or perhaps they sailed thither in some other way also. Even now there are Sicels still in Italy; and the country was named Italy after Italus, a king of the Sicels who had this name.

6.2.5

These crossed over to Sicily in a vast horde and conquering the Sicanians in battle forced them back to the southern and western parts of the island, causing it to be called Sicily instead of Sicania. They settled there after they had crossed and held the best parts of the land for nearly three hundred years before the Hellenes came to Sicily; and even now they still hold the central and northern parts of the island.

6.2.6

Phoenicians, too, had settlements all round Sicily, on promontories along the sea coast, which they walled off, and on the adjacent islets, for the sake of trade with the Sicels. But when the Hellenes also began to come in by sea in large numbers, the Phoenicians left most of these places and settling together lived in Motya,

6.2.6

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Soloeis

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and Panormus

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near the Elymi, partly because they trusted in their alliance with the Elymi and partly because from there the voyage from Sicily to Carthage is shortest. These, then, were the barbarians and such was the manner in which they settled in Sicily.

6.3.1

Of the Hellenes, on the other hand, the first to sail over were some Chalcidians from Euboea who settled Naxos

6.3.1

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with Thucles as founder,

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and built an altar in honour of Apollo Archegetes.

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This is now outside of the city, and on it the sacred deputies,

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when they sail from Sicily, first offer sacrifice.

6.3.2

The following year Syracuse

6.3.2

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was founded by Archias, one of the Heracleidae from Corinth, after he had first expelled the Sicels from the island, no longer surrounded by water, on which now stands the inner city; and at a later period also the outer city was connected with it by walls and became populous.

6.3.3

In the fifth year after the settlement of Syracuse, Thucles and the Chalcidians, setting forth from Naxos, drove out the Sicels in war and settled Leontini, and after it Catana.

6.3.3

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The Catanaeans, however, chose for themselves Evarchus as founder.

6.4.1

About the same time Lamis also came to Sicily with a colony from Megara and settled in a place called Trotilus, beyond the river Pantaeyas; but afterwards, having removed from there and joined the settlement of the Chalcidians at Leontini, he was a little later driven out by them, and then after colonizing Thapsus

6.4.1

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met his death. His followers were expelled from Thapsus and settled then at a place called Megara Hyblaea,

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since Hyblon, a Sicel king, gave up the land to them and led them to the site.

6.4.2

After dwelling there two hundred and forty-five years, they were driven out of the town and country by Gelon, tyrant of Syracuse. But before they were driven out, a hundred years after they had settled there, they founded Selinus,

6.4.2

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sending thither Pammilus, who came from the mother-city Megara and joined in the settlement.

6.4.3

In the forty-fifth year after the settlement of Syracuse Gela

6.4.3

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was founded by Antiphemus from Rhodes and Entimus from Crete, who together led out the colony The city got its name from the river Gela, but the place where the acropolis now is and which was the first to be fortified is called Lindii.

6.4.3

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6.4.4

The institutions given it were Dorian. Just about one hundred and eight years after their own foundation, the Geloans colonized Acragas

6.4.4

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; and they named the city after the river Acragas, making Aristonous and Pystilus founders, and giving it the institutions of the Geloans.

6.4.5

Zancle was settled, in the beginning, by pirates who came from Cyme, the Chalcidian city in Opicia; but afterwards a large number of colonists came from Chalcis and the rest of Euboea and shared the land with them, the founders being Perieres and Crataemenes, the one from Cyme, the other from Chalcis. Its name at first was Zancle, and it was so called by the Sicels because the place is sickle-shaped: for the Sicels call a sickle “zanclon.” Afterwards these settlers were driven out by Samians and other Ionians, who in their flight before the Persians landed in Sicily

6.4.5

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;

6.4.6

but the Samians were expelled not long afterwards by Anaxilas, tyrant of Rhegium, who colonized the place with a mixed population and changed its name to Messene

6.4.6

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after his own original fatherland.

6.5.1

Himera

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was colonized from Zancle by Eucleides, Simus and Sacon. Most of the colonists were Chalcidians; but there settled with them also fugitives from Syracuse who had been vanquished in a factional quarrel, the Myletidae as they were called. Their language was a mixture of Chalcidic and Doric, but Chalcidic institutions prevailed. Acrae and Casmenae were colonized by the Syracusans:

6.5.2

Acrae

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seventy years after Syracuse, Casmenae

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nearly twenty years after Acrae.

6.5.3

Camarina

6.5.3

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was first colonized by the Syracusans, just about one hundred and thirty-five years after the foundation of Syracuse, its founders being Dascon and Menecolus. But the Camarinaeans were driven out by the Syracusans in a war which arose from a revolt, and some time later Hippocrates, tyrant of Gela,

6.5.3

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receiving the territory of the Camarinaeans as ransom for some Syracusan prisoners of war, himself became founder and recolonized Camarina. And again the place was depopulated by Gelon, and was then colonized for the third time by the Geloans.

6.6.1

Such were the nations, Hellenic and barbarian,

6.6.1

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that inhabited Sicily; and such was the magnitude of the island which the Athenians were bent upon invading. To give the truest explanation, they were eager to attain to empire of the whole of it, but they wished at the same time to have the fair pretext of succouring their own kinsmen and their

6.6.2

old allies.

6.6.2

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But most of all they were instigated by envoys of the Egestaeans who were present and invoked their aid more earnestly than ever. For bordering as they did on the Selinuntians they had got into war with them about certain marriage rights and about disputed territory; and the Selinuntians, bringing in the Syracusans as allies, were pressing them hard in the war both by land and by sea. And so the Egestaeans, reminding the Athenians of their alliance which had been made with the Leontines in the time of Laches and the former war,

6.6.2

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begged them to send ships to their relief; saying many other things but chiefly this, that if the Syracusans should go unpunished for depopulating Leontini, and by destroying those of their allies that were still left should get the whole of Sicily into their power, there was danger that some time, lending aid with a great force, both as Dorians to Dorians on account of kinship, and at the same time as colonists to the Peloponnesians that had sent them out, they might help to pull down the power of

6.6.3

the Athenians. It would be wise, therefore, with their allies that were still left, to oppose the Syracusans, especially as the Egestaeans would furnish money sufficient for the war. And the Athenians, hearing in their assemblies these arguments of the Egestaeans and their supporters, who constantly repeated them, voted first to send envoys to Egesta to see whether the money was on hand, as they said, in the treasury and in the temples, and at the same time to ascertain how matters stood with reference to the war with the Selinuntians.

6.7.1

Accordingly the Athenian envoys were despatched to Sicily. But during the same winter the Lacedaemonians and their allies, except the Corinthians, invaded the Argive territory, ravaged a small part of the land and carried off some corn in wagons which they had brought with them; then having settled the Argive fugitives at Orneae, leaving with them also a small body of troops, after they had made a truce for a certain time, on condition that the Orneates and Argives were not to injure one another's land, they went home with the rest of their force.

6.7.2

When the Athenians came not long afterwards with thirty ships and six hundred hoplites, the Argives, in company with the Athenians, went out in full force and besieged the garrison at Orneae for a single day; but under cover of night, when the besieging army had bivouacked at a distance, the garrison of Orneae escaped.

6.7.3

The next day the Argives, on learning this, razed Orneae to the ground and withdrew, and later the Athenians also went home with their ships. The Athenians also conveyed by sea some of their own cavalry and the Macedonian exiles that were with them to Methone, which borders on Macedonia, and ravaged the country of Perdiccas.

6.7.4

And the Lacedaemonians sent to the Chalcidians in Thrace, who were observing a truce renewable every ten days with the Athenians, and urged them to join Perdiccas in the war; but they were unwilling. So the winter ended, and with it the sixteenth year of this war of which Thucydides wrote the history.

6.8.1

The next year at the opening of spring the

6.8.1

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Athenian envoys returned from Sicily, and with them the Egestaeans, bringing sixty talents

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of uncoined silver as a month's pay for sixty ships, which they were to ask the

6.8.2

Athenians to send. And the Athenians, calling an assembly and hearing from the Egestaeans and their own envoys other things that were enticing but not true, and that the money was ready in large quantity in the temples and in the treasury, voted to send to Sicily sixty ships, with Alcibiades son of Cleinias, Nicias son of Niceratus, and Lamachus son of Xenophanes as generals with full powers, to aid the Egestaeans against the Selinuntians, and also to join in restoring Leontini, in case they should have any success in the war; and further to settle all other matters in Sicily as they might deem best

6.8.3

for the Athenians. But on the fifth day after this a meeting of the assembly was again held, to determine in what way the ships could be equipped most speedily, and in case the generals should need anything further for the expedition, to vote

6.8.4

it for them. And Nicias, who had been elected to the command against his will, and thought the city had not come to a right decision, but that, with a slight and specious pretext, it was the conquest of all Sicily, a great undertaking, at which they aimed, came forward with the purpose of averting this, and advised the Athenians as follows:—

6.9.1

"This assembly was convoked with reference to our armament, to consider in what way we should make the expedition to Sicily; to me, however, it seems that we ought to consider yet again this very question, whether it is best to send the ships at all, and that we ought not, on such slight deliberation about matters of great importance, at the instigation of men of alien race, to undertake a war that does not concern us.

6.9.2

And yet from such an enterprise I for my part get honour, and have less dread than others about my life,

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although I consider that he is quite as good a citizen who takes some forethought for his life and property; for such an one would, for his own sake, be most desirous that the affairs of the city should prosper. But nevertheless neither in the past have I, for the sake of being preferred in honour, spoken contrary to my judgment, nor shall I do so now, but I shall speak just as I deem best.

6.9.3

Against tempers, indeed, like yours my words would be unavailing, if I should exhort you to preserve what you have already and not to hazard present possessions for things that are unseen and in the future; that, however, neither is your haste timely, nor is it easy to attain what you are striving for, this I shall show.

6.10.1

"I say, then, that you, leaving behind you many enemies here, are bent upon sailing there land bringing upon you here still other enemies.

6.10.2

And you think perhaps that the treaty which has been made affords you some security—a treaty which indeed, as long as you are quiet, will be a treaty in name (for so certain men here and among our enemies have managed these matters); but should you perchance suffer defeat with a considerable force, our foes will be quick to make their attack upon us. For the compact in the first place was concluded by them under compulsion through stress of misfortune and with less credit to them than to us; and, besides, in the compact itself there are many disputed points.

6.10.3

There are also some states which have not as yet accepted even this agreement, and these not the weakest; on the contrary, some of them are at open war with us, while others again, merely because the Lacedaemonians still keep quiet, are themselves also kept in restraint by a truce renewable every ten days.

6.10.4

But very probably, if they should find our power divided—the very thing we are now so anxious to bring about—they would eagerly join in an attack upon us along with the Siceliots, whose alliance they would heretofore have given much to obtain.

6.10.5

And so we must consider these matters and resolve not to run into danger while the state is still amid the waves, and reach out after another empire before we have secured that which we have, seeing that the Chalcidians in Thrace, after so many years of revolt from us, are still unsubdued, while others at various points on the mainland render us a dubious allegiance. But we, it seems, must rush to bring aid to Egestaeans, being, forsooth, our allies, on the ground that they are wronged, while on those by whose revolt we ourselves have long been wronged we still delay to inflict punishment.

6.11.1

"And yet these, if once brought under control, we might also keep under control; but the Siceliots, even if we should get the better of them, we should find it hard to govern, far off as they are and formidable in numbers. But it is folly to go against men when victory will not bring control over them and failure will not leave matters in the same condition as before the attack was made.

6.11.2

The Siceliots, moreover, it seems to me, at least as things now stand, would be even less dangerous to us if the Syracusans should acquire rule over them—that prospect with which the Egestaeans especially try to terrify us.

6.11.3

For now they might perhaps come against us singly out of regard for the Lacedaemonians, but in the other case,

6.11.3

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it is not likely that an imperial city would make war against an imperial city; for by whatsoever means they, in concert with the Peloponnesians, might despoil us of our sway, by the same means very likely would their own empire be pulled down by these same Peloponnesians.

6.11.4

And as to us, the Hellenes there would be most in awe, first, if we should not come at all; next, if after showing our power we should after a brief interval depart. For it is, as we all know, things that are farthest off and least allow a test of their reputation which excite wonder; but if we should suffer a defeat, they would very quickly despise us and join our enemies here in attacking us.

6.11.5

And just this has been your experience, men of Athens, with regard to the Lacedaemonians and their allies: because you have got the better of them beyond your expectation—in comparison with what you feared at first—you despise them now and aim even at the conquest of Sicily.

6.11.6

You have no right, however, to be elated at the misfortunes of your opponents, but only when you have mastered their spirits should you feel confidence; nor must you believe that the Lacedaemonians, on account of their humiliation, have anything else in view than to discover in what way they may even yet defeat us and retrieve their own dishonour—the more so as they have been in the highest degree and for the longest time courting a reputation for valour.

6.11.7

And so the issue before us, if we are prudent, is not the fate of the Egestaeans, a barbaric people in Sicily, but how we shall keep a sharp watch upon a state which is intriguing against us with the devices of oligarchy.

6.12.1

"And we should remember that we have but lately recovered somewhat from a great pestilence and war, so as to recruit our strength both in money and in men; and these resources it is but right to expend for ourselves here, and not for these fugitives that are begging our aid, whose interest it is to lie cleverly, and, at their neighbour's cost, supplying nothing but words themselves, either, in case of success, to show no proper gratitude, or, in the event of failure, to involve their friends in ruin.

6.12.2

And if there be anyone here who, elated at being chosen to command, exhorts you to sail, considering—especially as he is too young to command—only his own interest, how he may get admiration for his raising of fine horses, and then, because that is very expensive, how he may also get some profit from his command, do not afford this man, at the cost of the state, opportunity to make a personal display, but rather consider that such men damage the public interest while they waste their own property, and that the matter is one of great seriousness, and not such as a youth may decide and rashly take in hand.

6.13.1

"It is of such youths, when I see them sitting here in answer to the appeal of this same man, that I am afraid; and I make a counter-appeal to the older men, if any of you sit by one of these, not to be shamed into fear lest he may seem to be a coward if he do not vote for war, and not, though that may be their feeling, to have a morbid craving for what is out of reach, knowing that few successes are won by greed, but very many by foresight; on the contrary, on behalf of our country, which is now running the greatest risk it has ever run, hold up your hands in opposition and vote that the Siceliots, keeping the same boundaries with respect to us as at present-boundaries no one can find fault with—namely, the Ionian Sea, if one sail along the coast, and the Sicilian, if one cross the open deep—shall enjoy their own possessions and settle their own quarrels among themselves.

6.13.2

But tell the Egestaeans in particular that, as they went to war with the Selinuntians in the first place without the Athenians, so they must bring it to an end by themselves; and for the future let us not make allies, as we are wont to do, whom we must assist when they fare ill, but from whom we shall get no help when we are ourselves in need.

6.14.1

“And do you,, Mr. President, if you think it your duty to care for the state arid you wish to prove yourself a good citizen, bring these matters again to a vote and lay the question once more before the Athenians. If you fear to put the issue to vote again, reflect that it would involve no guilt to break the law in the presence of so many witnesses, but that you would thus become a physician for the state when it has taken evil counsel; and remember that this is the part of a good governor—to benefit his country as much as possible, or willingly at least to do it no harm.”

6.15.1

Thus Nicias spoke. Most of the Athenians that came forward advised the people to make the expedition and not to rescind the vote, while some spoke against it.

6.15.2

But most zealous in urging the expedition was Alcibiades son of Cleinias, wishing as he did to oppose Nicias, because, along with their general political disagreement, Nicias had made invidious reference to him,

6.15.2

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and above all he was eager to be made general and hoped thereby to subdue both Sicily and Carthage, and in case of success to promote at the same time his private interests in wealth as well as in glory.

6.15.3

For being held in high esteem by his townsmen, he indulged desires beyond his actual means, in keeping horses as well as in his other expenses. And it was precisely this sort of thing that most of all later destroyed the Athenian state.

6.15.4

For the masses, afraid of the greatness of his lawless arid sensual self-indulgence in his manner of living, as also of his designs as revealed in every single intrigue in which he was involved, became hostile to him on the ground that he was aiming at a tyranny; and, though publicly he managed the affairs of the war most excellently, in his private life every man had been offended at his practices, and so entrusting the city to other hands after no long time they brought it to ruin.

6.15.5

He now came forward and advised the Athenians as follows:—

6.16.1

"It belongs to me more than to others, Athenians, to have command—for I must needs begin with this, since Nicias has attacked me—and I think, too, that I am worthy to command. For those things for which I am railed at bring glory to my ancestors and myself, as well as advantage to my country.

6.16.2

For the Hellenes, who had previously hoped that our state had been exhausted by the war, conceived an idea of its greatness that even transcended its actual power by reason of the magnificence of my display as sacred deputy at Olympia,

6.16.2

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because I entered seven chariots, a number that no private citizen had ever entered before, and won the first prize and the second and the fourth, and provided everything else in a style worthy of my victory. For by general custom such things do indeed mean honour, and from what is done men also infer power.

6.16.3

And again, although whatever display I made in the city, by providing choruses

6.16.3

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6.16.3

or in any other way, naturally causes jealousy among my townsmen, yet in the eyes of strangers this too gives an impression of strength. And that is no useless folly, when a man by his private expenditures benefits not himself only but also his state.

6.16.4

Nor is it unfair, either, that one who has a high opinion of himself should refuse to be on an equality with others, since he who fares ill finds no one to be an equal participator in his evil plight. On the contrary, just as in misfortune we receive no greetings, in like manner let a man submit even though despised by those who prosper; or else, let him mete out equal measure to all, and then claim the like in turn.

6.16.5

I know, however, that men of this stamp, and all others who have in any way stood out as illustrious, are indeed in their own lifetime an offence, most of all to their equals, then also to others, while still among them, but that they leave behind to those who come after the claiming of kinship even where there is none; and, whatever their fatherland, to it they leave exultant pride in them, as men who are not aliens or offenders, but who are their own and have done well.

6.16.6

And such being my ambition and these the grounds on which I am decried in my private life, look at my public acts and see whether I execute them worse than another. I brought together the greatest powers

6.16.6

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6.16.6

of the Peloponnesus without great danger to you or expense and forced the Lacedaemonians to stake all upon a single day at Mantinea

6.16.6

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6.16.6

; and in consequence of this, though victorious in the field, even yet they have not firm confidence.

6.17.1

"Thus did my youthfulness and my seemingly abnormal folly cope with the power of the Peloponnesians in fitting words and with a spirit that inspired faith win assent. And now be not afraid of it, but while I am still in the flower of youth, and Nicias has the reputation of good luck, make the most of the services of us both.

6.17.2

And as to the voyage to Sicily, do not change your minds on the ground that you are going against a formidable power. For it is only with a mixed rabble that the cities there

6.17.2

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6.17.2

are populous, and changes and accessions in the body of their citizens

6.17.2

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6.17.2

are easy.

6.17.3

And for this reason no one is equipped, as he would be in behalf of his own country, either with arms for personal protection or with permanent improvements for the cultivation of his land; but whatever each one thinks he can obtain from the common stock by persuasive oratory or by sedition, in the expectation that if he fails he will settle in some other land, this he provides himself with.

6.17.4

And it is not likely that a rabble of this kind would either listen to counsel with one mind or turn to action with a common purpose; but quickly, if anything were said to please them,

6.17.4

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6.17.4

they would each for himself come over to our side, especially if they are in a state of revolution as we hear.

6.17.5

Further, as regards hoplites neither have they as many as they boast; nor have the rest of the Hellenes proved to have such numbers as they each reckon; on the contrary, Hellas has been very greatly deceived in its estimates of hoplites and in this war has with difficulty been adequately equipped with them.

6.17.6

Such, then, is the situation in Sicily, to judge from what I learn by report, and it is likely to be still more easy to deal with—for we shall have many barbarians, who from hatred of the Syracusans will join us in attacking them;

6.17.7

and matters here will be no actual hindrance, if you are rightly advised. For our fathers had as enemies these same men whom, as they say, you would be leaving behind if you should sail thither, and the Persian besides as a foe, yet acquired their empire without being strong in anything else than in the superiority of their fleet.

6.17.8

As for the present, never were the Peloponnesians more hopeless against us; and let them be never so confident, they can invade us only by land—and that they can do even if we do not make this expedition; but with their fleet they cannot hurt us, for we have in reserve a fleet that is a match for them.

6.18.1

"On what reasonable plea, then, can we hold back ourselves, or make excuse to our allies there for refusing to aid them? We ought to assist them, especially as we have actually sworn to do so, and may not object that they did not help us, either. For we took them into our alliance, not that they might bring aid here, but in order that by annoying our enemies there they might hinder them from coming hither against us.

6.18.2

It was in this way that we acquired our empire—both we and all others that have ever won empire—by coming zealously to the aid of those, whether barbarians or Hellenes, who have at any time appealed to us; whereas, if we should all keep quiet or draw distinctions of race as to whom we ought to assist, we should add but little to our empire and should rather run a risk of losing that empire itself.

6.18.3

For against a superior one does not merely defend oneself when he attacks, but even takes precaution that he shall not attack at all. And it is not possible for us to exercise a careful stewardship of the limits we would set to our empire; but, since we are placed in this position, it is necessary to plot against some and not let go our hold upon others, because there is a danger of coming ourselves under the empire of others, should we not ourselves hold empire over other peoples.

6.18.4

And you cannot regard a pacific policy in the same light as other states might, unless you will change your practices also to correspond with theirs.

6.18.4

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6.18.4

“Calculating, then, that we shall rather strengthen our power here if we go over there, let us make the voyage, that we may lay low the haughty spirit of the Peloponnesians, as we shall if we let men see that in contempt of our present peaceful condition

6.18.4

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6.18.4

we even sail against Sicily;

6.18.5

and that we may, at the same time, either acquire empire over all Hellas, as in all probability we shall, when the Hellenes there have been added to us, or may at least cripple the Syracusans, whereby both ourselves and our allies will be benefited.

6.18.6

And as to safety—both to remain, if things go well, and to come away—our ships will provide that; for we shall be masters of the sea even against all the Siceliots combined. And let not the policy of inaction that Nicias proposes, or his putting the younger at variance with the older men, divert you from your purpose; but in our usual good order, just as our fathers, young men taking counsel with older men, raised our power to its present height, do you now also in the same way strive to advance the state. And consider that youth and age without one another avail nothing, but that the simple, the mediocre, and the very subtle tempered together will have most strength; and that the state, if she remain at peace, will, like anything else, wear herself out upon herself, and her skill in all pursuits will grow old; whereas, if she is continually at conflict, she will always be adding to her experience, and will acquire more, not in word but in deed, the habit of defending herself.

6.18.7

In short, I declare that a state which is accustomed to activity would very quickly be ruined by a change to inactivity; and that those men live most securely whose political action is least at variance with existing habits and institutions, even when these are not the best.”

6.19.1

Thus Alcibiades spoke. After hearing him and the Egestaeans and some Leontine exiles, who coming forward, besought them and implored them for succour, reminding them of their oaths, the Athenians were far more eager for the expedition than before.

6.19.2

And Nicias, seeing that he could no longer deter them with the same arguments, but thinking that by the magnitude of the armament, if he insisted upon a large one, he might possibly change their minds, came forward and spoke as follows:

6.20.1

"Since I see, men of Athens, that you are wholly bent upon the expedition, I pray that these matters may turn out as we wish;

6.20.2

for the present juncture, however, I will show what my judgment is. The cities we are about to attack are, as I learn by report, large, and neither subject to one another nor in need of any such change as a person might be happy to accept in order to escape from enforced servitude to an easier condition, nor likely to accept our rule in place of liberty; and the number is large, for a single island, of cities of Hellenic origin.

6.20.3

For except Naxos and Catana, which I expect will side with us on account of their kinship to the Leontines, there are seven others;

6.20.3

1

6.20.3

and these are equipped with everything in a style very like to our own armament, and not least those against which our expedition is more immediately directed, Selinus and Syracuse.

6.20.4

For they can supply many hoplites, archers and javelin-men, and possess many triremes and a multitude of men to man them. They have wealth, too, partly in private possession and partly in the temples at Selinus; and to the Syracusans tribute has come in from time immemorial from certain barbarians also; but their chief advantage over us is in the fact that they have many horses, and use grain that is homegrown and not imported.

6.21.1

"To cope with such a power we need not only a naval armament of such insignificant size, but also that a large force for use on land should accompany the expedition, if we would accomplish anything worthy of our design and not be shut out from the land by their numerous cavalry; especially if the cities become terrified and stand together, and some of the others, besides Egesta, do not become our friends and supply us cavalry with which to defend ourselves against that of the enemy.

6.21.2

And it would be shameful to be forced to return home, or later to send for fresh supplies, because we had made our plans at first without due consideration. So we must start from home with an adequate armament, realizing that we are about to sail, not only far from our own land, but also on a campaign that will be carried on under no such conditions as if you had gone against an enemy as allies of your subject-states over here, where it would be easy to get whatever further supplies you needed from the friendly territory; nay, you will have removed into an utterly alien land, from which during the winter it is not easy for a messenger to come even in four months.

6.22.1

"And so it seems to me that we ought to take hoplites in large numbers, both of our own and of our allies, and from our subjects, as well as any from the Peloponnesus that we can attract by pay or persuade; many bowmen, and also slingers, in order that they may withstand the cavalry of the enemy. And in ships we must have a decided superiority, in order that we may bring in our supplies more easily. And we must also take with us in merchantmen the grain in our stores here, wheat and parched barley, together with bakers requisitioned for pay from the mills in proportion to their size, in order that, if perchance we be detained by stress of weather, the army may have supplies. For the force will be large, and it will not be every city that can receive it. And all other things so far as possible we must get ready for ourselves, and not come to be at the mercy of the Siceliots; but we must especially have from here as much money as possible; for as to that of the Egestaeans, which is reported to be ready there, you may assume that it is indeed chiefly by report that it will ever be ready.

6.23.1

“For if we go from here provided with an equipment of our own that is not only equal to theirs —except indeed as regards their fighting troops of heavy-armed men—but that even surpasses it in all respects, scarcely even so shall we be able to conquer Sicily or indeed to preserve our own army.

6.23.2

It is, in fact, as you must believe, a city that we are going forth to found amid alien and hostile peoples, and it behooves men in such an enterprise to be at once, on the very day they land, masters of the soil, or at least to know that, if they fail in this, everything will be hostile to them.

6.23.3

Fearing, then, this very result, and knowing that to succeed we must have been wise in planning to a large extent, but to a still larger extent must have good fortune—a difficult thing, as we are but men—I wish, when I set sail, to have committed myself as little as possible to fortune, but so far as preparation is concerned to be, in all human probability, safe.

6.23.4

For these precautions I regard as not only surest for the whole state but also as safeguards for us who are to go on the expedition. But if it seem otherwise to anyone, I yield the command to him.”

6.24.1

So much Nicias said, thinking that he would deter the Athenians by the multitude of his requirements, or, if he should be forced to make the expedition, he would in this way set out most safely.

6.24.2

They, however, were not diverted from their eagerness for the voyage by reason of the burdensomeness of the equipment, but were far more bent upon it; and the result was just the opposite of what he had expected; for it seemed to them that he had given good advice, and that now certainly there would be abundant security.

6.24.3

And upon all alike there fell an eager desire to sail—upon the elders, from a belief that they would either subdue the places they were sailing against, or that at any rate a great force could suffer no disaster; upon those in the flower of their age, through a longing for far-off sights and scenes, in good hopes as they were of a safe return; and upon the great multitude—that is, the soldiers

6.24.3

1

6.24.3

—who hoped not only to get money for the present, but also to acquire additional dominion which would always be an inexhaustible source of pay.

6.24.4

And so, on account of the exceeding eagerness of the majority, even if anyone was not satisfied, he held his peace, in the fear that if he voted in opposition he might seem to be disloyal to the state.

6.25.1

Finally a certain Athenian came forward and, calling upon Nicias, said he ought not to be making excuses and causing delays, but should say at once before them all what force the Athenians should vote him.

6.25.2

He then, though reluctantly, said that he would prefer to deliberate with his colleagues more at their leisure; so far, however, as he could see at present, they must sail with not fewer than one hundred triremes—there would also have to be as many transports as should be determined upon, furnished by the Athenians themselves and others they must call upon their allies to supply—and with hoplites, both of the Athenians and their allies, in all not fewer than five thousand, and more if possible; and the rest of the armament which they must get ready and take with them must be in proportion—bowmen from home and from Crete, and slingers, and whatever else should be determined upon.

6.26.1

Upon hearing this, the Athenians straightway voted that the generals should have full powers, with regard both to the size of the armament and to the whole expedition, to act in whatever way might seem to them best for Athens.

6.26.2

After this the preparation was begun; and they sent notice to their allies and made levies at home. Now the city had just recovered from the plague and from the continuous war, both in point of the multitude of young men who had grown up and of the money that had accumulated in consequence of the truce, so that everything was provided more easily. So the Athenians were engaged in preparation.

6.27.1

But in the meantime the stone statues of Hermes in the city of Athens—they are the pillars of square construction which according to local custom stand in great numbers both in the doorways of private houses and in sacred places—nearly all had their faces mutilated on the same night.

6.27.2

No one knew the perpetrators, but great rewards were publicly offered for their detection; and it was voted, besides, that if anyone, citizen or stranger or slave, knew of any other profanation that had been done, whoever would might fearlessly give information. The matter was taken very seriously;

6.27.3

for it seemed to be ominous for the expedition and to have been done withal in furtherance of a conspiracy with a view to a revolution and the overthrow of the democracy.

6.28.1

Accordingly, information was given by certain metics and serving-men, not indeed about the statues of Hermes, but to the effect that before this there had been certain mutilations of other statues perpetrated by younger men in drunken sport, and also that the mysteries were being performed in private houses in mockery; and Alcibiades, among others, was implicated in the charges.

6.28.2

They were taken up by those who were most jealous of him

6.28.2

1

6.28.2

as an obstacle in the way of their secure preeminence among the people; and these men, thinking that if they could get rid of him they would have first place, magnified the matter and shouted that both the mockery of the mysteries and the mutilation of' the Hermae had been committed with a view to the overthrow of the democracy, and that there was none of these things but had been done in collusion with him, citing as further proofs other instances of his undemocratic lawlessness of conduct.

6.29.1

He defended himself at the time against the informers' charges, and was ready before sailing —for already the preparations had been completed—to be tried on the question of his having done any of these things, and if he had been guilty of any of them to pay the penalty, but demanded that if he were acquitted he should keep his command.

6.29.2

And he protested that they should not accept slanderous charges against him in his absence, but should put him to death at once if he were guilty, and that it was wiser not to send him at the head of so great an army, under such an imputation, until they had decided the question.

6.29.3

But his enemies, fearing that the army might be favourable to him if he were brought to trial at once and that the populace might be lenient, inasmuch as it favoured him because it was through his influence that the Argives and some of the Mantineans were taking part in the campaign, were eager to postpone the trial, suborning other orators who insisted that he should sail now and not delay the departure of the expedition, but that lie should come back and be tried at an appointed time. Their purpose was to have a more slanderous charge —and this they would find it easier to procure in his absence—and then to have him recalled and brought home for trial. So it was determined that Alcibiades should sail.

6.30.1

After that, when it was already midsummer, the departure for Sicily was made. Orders had been given beforehand for most of the allies, as well as for the provision-ships and smaller boats and all the rest of the armament that went with them, to assemble at Corcyra, with the intention that from there they should all cross the Ionian Gulf to the promontory of lapygia in one body. But the Athenians themselves and the allies that were present went down to the Peiraeus at dawn on a day appointed and proceeded to man the ships for the purpose of putting to sea.

6.30.2

And with them went down also all the general throng, everyone, we may almost say, that was in the city, both citizens and strangers, the natives to send off each their own, whether friends or kinsmen or sons, going at once in hope and with lamentations —hope that they would make conquests in Sicily, lamentations that they might never see their friends again, considering how long was the voyage from their own land on which they were being sent. And at this crisis, when under impending dangers they were now about to take leave of one another, the risks came home to them more than when they were voting for the expedition; but still their courage revived at the sight of their present strength because of the abundance of everything they saw before their eyes. The strangers on the other hand and the rest of the multitude had come for a spectacle, in the feeling that the enterprise was noteworthy and surpassing belief.

6.31.1

For this first armament that sailed for Sicily was the costliest and most splendid, belonging to a single city and with a purely Hellenic force, that had ever up to that time set sail. In number of ships, however, and of hoplites the expedition against Epidaurus under Pericles, and the same one afterwards under Hagnon against Potidaea, was not inferior; for in that voyage four thousand Athenian hoplites and three hundred knights and one hundred triremes had participated, and from Lesbos and Chios fifty triremes, and allied troops besides in large numbers.

6.31.2

But they had set off for a short voyage with a poor equipment; whereas this expedition, as one likely to be of long duration, was fitted out for both kinds of service, according as there might be need of either, with ships and also with land-forces.

6.31.3

The fleet was built up at great expense on the part both of the trierarchs and of the city: the state giving a drachma per day for each sailor and furnishing sixty empty

6.31.3

1

6.31.3

warships and forty transports, with crews to man them of the very best; the triearchs giving bounties to the thranitae

6.31.3

2

6.31.3

or uppermost bench of the sailors in addition to the pay from the state, and using, besides, figure-heads and equipments that were very expensive; for each one strove to the utmost that his own ship should excel all others both in fine appearance and in swiftness of sailing. The land-forces were picked out of the best lists, and there was keen rivalry among the men in the matter of arms and personal equipment.

6.31.4

And so it came about that among themselves there was emulation, wherever each was assigned to duty, and the whole thing seemed more like a display of wealth and power before the rest of the Hellenes than an undertaking against enemies.

6.31.5

For if one had reckoned the public expenditure on the part of the state and the private outlay of those who made the expedition—on the part of the city, both what it had already advanced and what it was sending in the hands of the generals, and on the part of private individuals whatever a man had expended on his own person or, if trierarch, on his ship, and what they were going to spend still, and, besides, the money we may suppose that everyone, even apart from the pay he received from the state, provided for himself as travelling expenses, counting upon an expedition of long duration, and all the articles for barter and sale merchant or soldier took with him on the voyage—it would have been found that many talents in all were taken from the city.

6.31.6

And the fame of the armament was noised abroad, not less because of amazement at its boldness and the splendour of the spectacle than on account of its overwhelming force as compared with those whom they were going against; and also because it was the longest voyage from home as yet attempted and undertaken with the highest hopes for the future as compared with their present resources.

6.32.1

When the ships had been manned and everything had at last been put aboard which they were to take with them on the voyage, the trumpeter proclaimed silence, and they offered the prayers that were customary before putting out to sea, not ship by ship but all together, led by a herald, the mariners as well as the officers throughout the whole army making libations with golden and silver cups from wine they had mixed.

6.32.2

And the rest of the throng of people on the shore, both the citizens and all others present who wished the Athenians well, also joined in the prayers. And when they had sung the paean and had finished the libations, they put off, and sailing out at first in single column they then raced as far as Aegina.

6.32.3

The Athenian fleet, then, was pressing on to reach Corcyra, where the rest of the armament of the allies was assembling.

6.32.3

But meanwhile reports of the expedition were coming to Syracuse from many quarters, but were not believed at all for a long time. Nay, even when an assembly was held speeches to the following effect

6.32.3

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6.32.3

were made on the part of others, some crediting the reports about the expedition of the Athenians, others contradicting them, and Hermocrates son of Hermon came forward, in the conviction that he knew the truth of the matter, and spoke, exhorting them as follows:

6.33.1

"Possibly it will seem to you that what I and certain others say about the reality of the expedition against us is incredible, and I am aware that those who either make or repeat statements that seem not credible not only do not carry conviction but are also regarded as foolish; but nevertheless I will not be frightened into holding my tongue when the state is in danger, persuaded as I am that I speak with more certain knowledge than my opponents.

6.33.2

For it is indeed against you, much as you wonder at it, that the Athenians have set out with a large armament for use on land as well as on the sea, on the pretext of an alliance with the Egestaeans and the restoration of the Leontines, but in truth with a covetous desire for Sicily, and above all for our city, thinking that once in possession of it they would easily get possession of the rest also.

6.33.3

With the certainty, then, that they will soon be here, consider in what way with your present resources you can best ward them off, and may neither by despising them be caught off your guard nor through incredulity neglect the whole matter.

6.33.4

If, however, anyone does find my words credible, let him not be dismayed at their daring and power. For neither will they be able to inflict more injury upon us than they will suffer, nor is it without advantage for us that they are coming with a great armament; on the contrary, it is far better so as regards the rest of the Siceliots, for in their consternation they will be more inclined to join our alliance; and if in the end we either overpower them or drive them off baffled in their designs—for I certainly have no fear as to their attaining the success they anticipate —it will prove the most glorious of achievements for us, and one which I at least do not despair of.

6.33.5

For few great armaments, whether of Hellenes or of barbarians, when sent far from their own land, have been successful. The reason is that they are not, in the first place, superior in numbers to the people against whom they go and the neighbours of these— for fear always brings about union; and if, in the second place, they fail on account of lack of supplies in a foreign land, they leave a proud name to those whom they plotted against, even though their failure be due chiefly to themselves.

6.33.6

These very Athenians, for example, when the Persians contrary to expectation signally failed, grew great on the repute that it was Athens they went against; so in our case a like issue is not beyond hope.

6.34.1

"With confidence, then, let us make our preparations here, but also send envoys to the Sicels, to confirm the allegiance of some and to endeavour to make friendship and alliance with others; and let us despatch envoys to the rest of Sicily, to show that the danger is a common one, and to Italy, that we may either secure their alliance for ourselves or else prevent their receiving the Athenians.

6.34.2

And to me it seems best to send also to Carthage. For the Carthaginians are not without expectation, or rather they are always in fear, that some time the Athenians may come against their city; and so they will probably feel that if they shall leave things here to their fate, they may be in trouble themselves, and therefore will be inclined to assist us, secretly perhaps, or openly, or by some means or other. And they, of all men of the present day, are the most able to do so, if they will; for they have an abundance of gold and silver, by which war and everything else is expedited.

6.34.3

And let us send also to Lacedaemon and to Corinth, begging them to bring aid here with all speed, and to stir up the war over there.

6.34.4

And now the measure which I think would be most opportune, but which you on account of your habitual love of ease would be least likely to adopt promptly, shall nevertheless be proposed If we Siceliots—all together, or, in default of this, as many as will join us—were willing to launch all our available naval force and with two months' provisions go to meet the Athenians at Tarentum and the promontory of Iapygia, and make plain to them that the contest will not be first for Sicily, but before that for their passage across the Ionian Sea, we should mightily astound them and force them to reflect that we have as our base a friendly country from which to keep watch and ward—for Tarentum is ready to receive us—whereas for them the open sea is a wide one to cross with all their armament,

6.34.4

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6.34.4

and it is difficult on account of the length of the voyage to keep in formation; consequently, coming up slowly and few at a time, they would be at the mercy of our attack. But if on the other hand they should lighten their ships and attack with the swift-sailing part of their fleet in a more compact body, then, in case they used their oars, we should set upon them when weary with rowing;

6.34.5

or if it did not seem wise to attack them, we could retire to Tarentum again. They, however, having crossed with slender supplies in the prospect of a naval engagement, would be in distress in uninhabited regions, and either would remain and be blockaded, or trying to sail along the coast would leave behind the rest of their equipment, and, having no certainty as to the temper of the cities, whether they would receive them or not, would be discouraged.

6.34.6

And so I for my part am of opinion that, deterred by this consideration, they would not even put out from Corcyra, but either, after taking time for deliberation and spying out how many we are and in what position, would be driven into winter-quarters by the lateness of the season, or in dismay at the unexpected turn of events would abandon the expedition, especially as the most experienced of their generals takes command, as I hear, against his will, and would gladly seize upon an excuse to abandon it if any considerable opposition on our part were observed. And reports of our strength would, I am convinced, be exaggerated;

6.34.7

the opinions of men are apt to veer according to what they are told; and those who are first to attack, or those at any rate who in advance make it clear to the aggressors that they will defend themselves, inspire the greater fear in the foe, who thinks them equal to the emergency.

6.34.8

And precisely this would be the effect at this time upon the Athenians. For they are coming against us in the belief that we shall not defend ourselves, rightly contemning us because we did not join the Lacedaemonians in the effort to destroy them.

6.34.9

But if they Should see us unexpectedly displaying courage, they Would be more dismayed by this unlooked for resistance than by our real power.

6.34.9

“Be persuaded, then, as best of all to take this bold step, but if not that, to make all other preparations for the war with all speed; and let it come home to everyone that contempt of invaders is shown by valour in actual conflict,

6.34.9

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6.34.9

but that at this present time, realizing that preparations made With fear are safest, it would prove most advantageous so to act as though in imminent danger. For the Athenians are surely coming against us; they are, I am quite certain, already under sail, and all but here.”

6.35.1

Such was the speech of Hermocrates. But the Syracusan people were at great strife among themselves: some maintained that the Athenians would not come at all and that the reports were not true; others asked, even if they did come, what could they do to them that they would not themselves suffer still more; others quite contemptuously turned the matter into ridicule. There were, however, a few who believed Hermocrates and feared what was coming.

6.35.2

But Athenagoras, who was a popular leader and at the present time most influential with the masses, came forward and addressed them as follows:—

6.36.1

"As to the Athenians, whoever does not wish them to be so ill witted as to come here and fall into our hands, is either a coward or not loyal to the state; as to the men, however, who tell such stories and fill you with fear, I do not wonder at their audacity so much as at their simplicity, if they fancy we do not see through them.

6.36.2

For men who have some private grounds of fear wish to plunge the city into consternation, in order that in the common fear their own may be overshadowed. So now this is the meaning of these reports, which are not spontaneous, but have been concocted by men who are always stirring up trouble here.

6.36.3

But you, if you are well advised, will examine and form your estimate of what is probable, not from what these men report, but from what shrewd men of much experience, such as I deem the Athenians to be, would be likely to do.

6.36.4

For it is not probable that they would leave the Peloponnesians behind them before they have yet brought the war there surely to an end, and voluntarily come here to prosecute another war quite as great; for I myself think that they are content that we do not come against them, being so numerous and so powerful.

6.37.1

"If, however, they should come, as it is reported, I think Sicily more competent to carry the war through than the Peloponnesus, inasmuch as it is better provided in all respects, and that our city by itself is much stronger than this army which now, as they say, is coming on—aye, even if it should come in twice the number. For I know that neither horses will accompany them—and from here also none will be provided, except a few from Egesta— nor hoplites equal in number to ours, since they have to come on ships; for it is a great thing to make the long voyage to Sicily even with their ships alone, lightly laden. And the rest of the equipment which must be provided against so large a city as ours is not small.

6.37.2

So much, then, do I differ in my judgment from these men that it seems to me, if they brought with them another city as large as Syracuse and settling here on our borders should wage the war, they would hardly fail to be utterly destroyed; much less, then, when all Sicily is hostile—for it will be united—and they are in a camp pitched just after landing from the ships and cannot venture far from their wretched tents and meagre supplies by reason of our cavalry. In short, I think they would not even get a foothold on the land; so much do I judge our forces to be superior.

6.38.1

"But of these things, as I maintain, the Athenians are aware and they are, I am quite sure, taking care of their own interests, and men from here are fabricating stories neither true nor possible,

6.38.2

men whom not now for the first time but always I have known to be wishing, either by reports such as these and still more mischievous than these, or by overt acts, to frighten the mass of you and themselves dominate the city. And I fear, moreover, that some day, by dint of repeated attempts, they may actually succeed; for we are poor hands at taking precautions before we are at their mercy, and, if we have discovered their plots, at dealing conclusively with the plotters.

6.38.3

Therefore it is on this very account that our city is seldom quiet, but is subject to frequent feuds and conflicts—not so much with the enemy as with itself—and sometimes to tyrannies and wicked oligarchies.

6.38.4

But if you will only follow me, I will try to see to it that never in our time shall any of these things come to pass, persuading you who are the mass of the people, but chastising the men who devise such things, not only when they are caught in the act—as it is difficult to come upon them—but even for what they would but cannot do. For an enemy one must forestall, not only in what he does, but even in his designs, since indeed a man who is not first to safeguard himself will be first to suffer. As to the oligarchs, on the other hand, I shall sometimes expose them, and sometimes watch them, but sometimes also I shall instruct them, for in this way I think I could best deter them from evil-doing.

6.38.5

And now—a question which I have often asked myself—what do you want, you young men? To hold office already? But that is not lawful; and the law was enacted in consequence of your incompetency, rather than to keep you from office when competent. Well, then, you do not want to be on an equality with the many? And how is it right that the same folk should not be deemed worthy of the same privileges?

6.39.1

"Some will say that a democracy is neither wise nor equitable, and that those that have property are more competent to rule best. But I say, first, that democracy is a name for all, oligarchy for only a part; next, that while the wealthy are the best guardians of property, the wise would be the best counsellors, and the many, after hearing matters discussed, would be the best judges;

6.39.2

and that these classes, whether severally or collectively, enjoy a like equality in a democracy. An oligarchy, on the other hand, gives the many a share of the dangers, but of the advantages it not merely claims the lion's share, but even takes and keeps all. And this is what the powerful among you and the young men are bent upon—a thing impossible to attain in a great city.

6.40.1

“Still, even now, O ye most senseless of all Hellenes that I know, if you do not see that your designs are wicked, or most criminal, if you know and yet dare to persist in them,—even now, I say, either learn wisdom or repent of your folly and strive to advance the common interests of the state for the good of all, reflecting that the good among you would share this in equal or larger measure than the mass of the people, whereas if you have other aims you will run the risk of losing all.

6.40.2

So have done with such reports, understanding that you are dealing with men who are aware of your designs and will not put up with them. For this city, even if the Athenians come, will ward them off in a manner worthy of herself; and we have generals who will look after these matters. And if none of these things be true—as indeed I think they are not—the state will not, through terror at your reports and by choosing you as rulers, place on her neck, of her own choice, the yoke of slavery, but looking at the matter for herself she will pass judgment on your words as if they were deeds; and will not by listening to such reports be deprived of her present liberty, but will try to preserve it by taking active precautions so as to frustrate your designs.”

6.41.1

Such was the speech of Athenagoras. Whereupon one of the generals rose up and forbade any one else to come forward, but himself spoke as follows with reference to the matter in hand:

6.41.2

“Personal imputations it is not wise either for any speaker to utter against another or for those who hear to tolerate; but in view of the reports that are coming in, we should rather see how we, each person and the city as a whole, shall prepare to defend ourselves effectively against the invaders.

6.41.3

And if after all there shall be no need of it, there is no harm in the commonwealth being equipped with horses and arms

6.41.4

and all other things wherein war takes pride—the provision and inspection of such equipment we shall have in charge—and in sending men round to the cities for observation as well as for any other purpose that may seem expedient. These provisions we have in part already made, and whatever we find out we will bring before you.” And the Syracusans, when the general had said thus much, dispersed from the assembly.

6.42.1

Meanwhile the Athenians themselves and all their allies also were already at Corcyra. And first the generals held a final review of the armament and made disposition in what order the forces were to anchor and to encamp. Making three divisions they allotted one to each general, in order that they might not, by sailing together, be at a loss for water and ports and provisions when they put in to shore, and that they might in general be more orderly and easy to control, being thus assigned in divisions to separate commanders.

6.42.2

And next they sent forward to Italy and Sicily three ships, to ascertain which of the cities would receive them. And orders were given to these ships to come back to meet them, that they might know before putting to shore.

6.43.1

After this the Athenians weighed anchor and crossed over from Corcyra to Sicily with a force that was now of this strength: Of triremes there were in all one hundred and thirty-four, and two Rhodian fifty-oared galleys—one hundred of these Attic, sixty of which were swift vessels, the others transports for soldiers, the rest of the fleet being furnished by the Chians and the other allies. Of hoplites there were all together five thousand one hundred-and of these, fifteen hundred were Athenians from the muster-roll and seven hundred Thetes

6.43.1

1

6.43.1

serving as marines on the ships, and the rest allies who shared in the expedition, some from the subject— states, others from the Argives to the number of five hundred, and of Mantineans and other mercenaries two hundred and fifty. Of bowmen there were in all four hundred and eighty, and eighty of these were Cretans; of slingers, seven hundred Rhodians; one hundred and twenty light-armed Megarian exiles; and one horse-transport carrying thirty cavalry.

6.44.1

Such was the strength of the first armament that sailed over for the war.

6.44.1

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6.44.1

And for these, thirty food-bearing transports brought supplies, having also bakers, stone-masons, carpenters, and all tools for wall-building; and there sailed also one hundred boats that were pressed into service, along with the transports. But many boats besides, as well as transports, voluntarily accompanied the expedition, for the sake of trade. All these, at that time, sailed together from Corcyra across the Ionian Gulf.

6.44.2

And when the whole armament reached the Iapygian promontory, or Tarentum, or wherever they severally found opportunity to make land, they sailed along the coast of Italy—some of the cities not receiving them with a market nor into the town, though furnishing them with water and anchorage, and Tarentum and Locri not even with these—until they came to Rhegium, a promontory of Italy.

6.44.3

There they now assembled, and, as the Rhegians did not admit them within the walls, they pitched a camp outside of the town in the precinct of Artemis, where a market also was provided for them; and so drawing up their ships on shore they took a rest. And they also held a conference with the Rhegians, claiming that they as Chalcidians

6.44.3

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6.44.3

should aid the Leontines who were Chalcidians. They, however, said that they would be neutral, but would do whatever the rest of the Italiots should decide.

6.44.4

The Athenians now considered what would be the best course to take with reference to affairs in Sicily; and at the same time they were awaiting the arrival from Egesta of the ships that had been sent ahead, wishing to know about the money, whether there actually was what the messengers had reported at Athens.

6.45.1

Meanwhile, through spies, as well as from many other sources, positive information was already coming in to the Syracusans that the Athenian fleet was at Rhegium; and under these conditions they began to make preparations with all zeal, and were no longer incredulous. They sent around also to the Sicels, to some places guards, to others envoys; they brought garrisons into the forts in the outlying districts; as to affairs in the city, they made an inspection of arms and of horses, to see whether everything was up to full strength; and all other matters they were arranging with a view to a war that was imminent and all but upon them.

6.46.1

The three ships that had gone ahead to Egesta met the Athenians at Rhegium, announcing that the rest of the money which the Egestaeans had promised was not there, but only thirty talents were to be found.

6.46.2

And the generals were at once out of spirits, both because this had turned out contrary at the start, and because the Rhegians, the first people whom they had tried to persuade to join the expedition and with whom it was most likely they should succeed, seeing that they were kinsmen of the Leontines and always friendly to the Athenians, refused their consent.

6.46.3

Nicias, indeed, was expecting this news from the Egestaeans, but for tile other two it was actually somewhat of a surprise. The fact was that the Egestaeans had resorted to the following device at the time when the first envoys of the Athenians came to them to see about the money: they brought them into the temple of Aphrodite at Eryx and showed them the dedicatory offerings—bowls, wine-ladles, censers, and not a little other table-furniture, which being of silver made, though of small value in money, a much greater display. And in giving private entertainments for the crews of the triremes, they not only collected the gold and silver drinking-cups from Egesta itself, but borrowed those from the neighbouring cities, both Phoenician and Hellenic, and brought them each to the banquets as though they were their own.

6.46.4

And as all used for the most part the same vessels and there was a great display of them everywhere, it caused great astonishment to the Athenians from the triremes, and they on returning to Athens spread the report of how much treasure they had seen.

6.46.5

And these men who had been themselves deceived and had at the time persuaded the rest, later, when the story got out that the money was not at Egesta, were much blamed by the soldiers. The generals, however, took counsel in view of the present situation.

6.47.1

It was the judgment of Nicias that they should sail with their whole armament against Selinus, which was the object for which they had chiefly been sent out, and if the Egestaeans should furnish money for the whole army, they should then determine accordingly; otherwise, they should demand that they give maintenance for sixty ships, the number they had asked for, and remaining there they should reconcile the Selinuntians to the Egestaeans, either by force or by agreement. This being accomplished, the Athenians should sail along by the other cities, displaying the power of the city of Athens and making manifest their zeal towards their friends and allies, and then should sail back home—unless perchance they should be able quickly and unexpectedly either to aid the Leontines, or to bring over some of the other cities—and not imperil the safety of the state at the expense of their own resources.

6.47.1

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6.48.1

Alcibiades insisted that they ought not, after sailing out with so great an armament, to go back in disgrace without effecting anything; but urged rather that they send heralds to the other cities, except Selinus and Syracuse, and try to detach some of the Sicels from the Syracusans, and to make friends of others, in order that these might furnish grain and troops, but first of all that they try to persuade the Messenians; for their city, he urged, was most conveniently situated on a line of traffic

6.48.1

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6.48.1

and at the approach to Sicily and would be a harbour and a most suitable watch-station for the armament. Then, after they had brought over these cities and knew with whose assistance they would carry on the war, they should proceed to attack Syracuse and Selinus, unless the latter came to terms with the Egestaeans, and the former permitted them to restore the Leontines.

6.49.1

Lamachus maintained that they ought to sail direct for Syracuse and as soon as possible make the fight near the city, while the Syracusans were still unprepared and their consternation was at its height.

6.49.2

For every army, lie argued, is always most formidable at first, but if it delay before coming into sight, men recover their spirit and even at the sight of it are more inclined to despise than to fear it. But if it attack suddenly, while the enemy are still in terror of its coming, it will have the best chance for victory and in every way will strike fear into them, both by the sight of it—for at this moment it would appear most numerous—and by the expectation of the fate in store for them, but most of all by the immediate peril of the battle.

6.49.3

And, he added, probably many people have been left behind on their farms outside the city on account of the disbelief that the Athenians will come, and while they are bringing in their property the army will not lack supplies, if it once controls the land and invests the city.

6.49.4

And as for the rest of the Siceliots, if we follow this course they will at once be more likely, not to make an alliance with the enemy, but to come over to us, and not to make delays, looking about to see which side will be the stronger. And he said, finally, that they should return and make a naval base and a watch-station at Megara, since it was uninhabited, and not far from Syracuse either by sea or by land.

6.50.1

Lamachus, though speaking to this effect, nevertheless gave his support to the opinion of Alcibiades. After this Alcibiades sailed in his own ship over to Messene and made proposals to the Messenians for an alliance; but as they could not be persuaded, answering that they would not receive him within the city, but would furnish a market outside, he sailed back to Rhegium.

6.50.2

Then the generals straightway manned sixty ships out of their whole number, and taking provisions sailed along the coast to Naxos, leaving at Rhegium the rest of the army and one of the generals.

6.50.3

The Naxians received them into their city, and they sailed on then to Catana.

6.50.4

When the Catanaeans would not receive them—for there were in that place men who favoured the cause of the Syracusans—they moved on to the river Terias, and having bivouacked there sailed next day to Syracuse with all their ships in single file, except ten, for this number they had sent forward to sail into the Great Harbour and observe whether any fleet was launched. After sailing up the commanders of these were to proclaim from the ships that the Athenians had come to reinstate the Leontines in their own country on the ground of alliance and kinship; any Leontines therefore who were in Syracuse should come over without fear to the Athenians as friends and benefactors.

6.50.5

When this proclamation had been made and they had observed the city and the harbours and the features of the country which they would have to make their base for warlike operations, they sailed back to Catana.

6.51.1

An assembly being held there, the Catanaeans would not receive the army but bade the generals come in and say what they wanted. While, then, Alcibiades was speaking, and the attention of the people in the city was wholly directed to the assembly, the soldiers, breaking unobserved through a posterngate that had been badly built into the wall, entered and were walking about in the market-place.

6.51.2

Those Catanaeans who were partisans of the Syracusans, seeing the soldiers inside, at once became much frightened and slipped away, not in any large numbers; the others voted alliance with the Athenians and bade them bring the rest of their army from Rhegium.

6.51.3

After this the Athenians sailed back to Rhegium, then putting out from there with their whole armament for Catana, on their arrival they set about arranging their camp.

6.52.1

Meanwhile news came from Camarina that if the Athenians would go thither the Camarinaeans would join them, and also that the Syracusans were manning a fleet. Accordingly they proceeded with their whole army along the coast, first to Syracuse; and when they found no fleet was being manned, they again continued along the coast to Camarina and putting to shore sent forward a herald. The Camarinaeans, however, would not receive them, saying that the terms of their oath were to receive the Athenians only if they put in with a single ship, unless they themselves sent for more.

6.52.2

So the Athenians sailed away without accomplishing anything; and after landing at a point in Syracusan territory and making raids, when the Syracusan cavalry had come to the rescue and killed some of their light-armed troops that were straggling they went back to Catana.

6.53.1

There they found that the galley Salaminia

6.53.1

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6.53.1

had come from Athens for Alcibiades—to order him to come home and make his defence against the charges which the city was bringing—and for certain of the soldiers also, some of them having been denounced with him as guilty of profanation with regard to the mysteries, and some also with regard to the Hermae.

6.53.2

For after the armament sailed, the Athenians had been pursuing with no less zeal than before their investigation of what had been done in the matter of the mysteries as well as the Hermae; and as they did not test the witnesses, but in their state of suspicion accepted everything, on the credit of bad men they arrested and threw into prison very excellent citizens, thinking it more expedient to sift the matter to the bottom and find out the truth, than that anybody, even one reputed to be good and accused only through the villainy of an informer, should escape without close investigation.

6.53.3

For the people, knowing by tradition that the tyranny of Peisistratus and his sons had become galling at the last, and moreover had been put down, not by themselves and Harmodius, but by the Lacedaemonians,

6.53.3

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6.53.3

were in constant fear and regarded everything with suspicion.

6.54.1

Now the daring deed of Aristogeiton

6.54.1

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6.54.1

and Harmodius was undertaken on account of a love affair, and by relating this at some length I shall prove that neither the Hellenes at large nor even the Athenians themselves give an accurate account about their own tyrants or about this incident.

6.54.2

For when Peisistratus died,

6.54.2

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6.54.2

as an old man, in possession of the tyranny, it was not Hipparchus, as most suppose, but Hippias, as eldest son, that succeeded to the sovereignty. And Harmodius, being then in the flower of youthful beauty, had as his lover Aristogeiton, a citizen of the middle class.

6.54.3

An attempt to seduce him having been made by Hipparchus son of Peisistratus without success, Harmodius denounced him to Aristogeiton. And he, lover-like, deeply resented it, and fearing the power of Hipparchus, lest he might take Harmodius by force, at once plotted, with such influence as he possessed, to overthrow the tyranny.

6.54.4

Meanwhile Hipparchus, having in a second attempt met with no better success in persuading Harmodius, although he had no intention of offering violence, yet laid a plan to insult him in some covert way, as though it were not for this reason.

6.54.5

For he did not generally so exercise his authority as to be oppressive to the mass of the people, but maintained it without giving offence. And indeed the Peisistratidae carried the practice of virtue and discretion to a very high degree, considering that they were tyrants, and although they exacted from the Athenians only five per cent. of their incomes, not only had they embellished their city, but they also carried on its wars and provided sacrifices for the temples.

6.54.6

In other respects the city itself enjoyed the laws before established, except in so far that the tyrants took precaution that one of their own family should always be in office. Amongst others of them who held the annual archonship at Athens was Peisistratus, a son of the Hippias who had been tyrant. He was named after his grandfather and, when he was archon, dedicated the altar of the twelve gods in the Agora and that of Apollo in the Pythian precinct.

6.54.7

The people of Athens afterwards, in extending the length of the altar in the Agora, effaced the inscription; but that on the altar of the Pythian Apollo can still be seen in indistinct letters, reading as follows:

6.54.7

This memorial of his office Peisistratus son of Hippias

6.54.7

Set up in the precinct of Pythian Apollo.

6.55.1

That it was Hippias who, as eldest son, succeeded to the sovereignty I positively affirm because I know it even by tradition more accurately than others,

6.55.1

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6.55.1

and anyone might be convinced of it also by this simple fact—he alone of the legitimate brothers appears to have had children, as not only the altar signifies, but also the column commemorating the wrong-doing of the tyrants that was set up on the acropolis of Athens, on which no child of Thessalus or of Hipparchus is inscribed, but of Hippias five, who were borne to him by Myrrhine daughter of Callias son of Hyperochidas; for it was natural for the eldest to marry first.

6.55.2

And on this same column his name is written first after his father's, this also not unnaturally, as he was the eldest after him and had been tyrant.

6.55.3

Nor yet again would Hippias, as it seems to me, have obtained the tyranny at once with ease, if Hipparchus had been in power when killed, and had had to establish himself therein on the same day. Nay, it was owing to the habitual fear which before that he had inspired in the citizens, and the strict discipline he had maintained in the bodyguard, that he got the upper hand with superabundant security and was at no loss, as a younger brother would have been, since in that case he would not previously have been regularly used to power.

6.55.4

Hipparchus, however, as it fell out, having become famous by his tragic fate, obtained in aftertime the credit also of having been tyrant.

6.56.1

So, then, when Harmodius had repulsed his suit, Hipparchus insulted him, as he intended. For after summoning a maiden-sister of his to serve as a basket-bearer

6.56.1

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6.56.1

in some procession, they rejected her, declaring they had never summoned her at all, because she was unworthy.

6.56.2

As Harmodius was indignant at this, Aristogeiton for his sake was far more exasperated. And now the details had been arranged by them with those who were to take part in the execution of their scheme; but they were waiting for the great Panathenaea, for on that day only it excited no suspicion for the citizens who were to take part in the procession to be assembled in arms. They were themselves to begin the attack, but the others were to join them at once in dealing with the bodyguard. The conspirators were not many, for better security;

6.56.3

for they hoped that, if ever so few made the bold attempt, at once even those who were not before privy to it, having arms in their hands, would be inclined to bear a part in winning their own freedom.

6.57.1

And when the festival came on, Hippias with his bodyguard was outside the walls, in the place called the Cerameicus, arranging the order in which the several parts of the procession were to go forward; and Harmodius and Aristogeiton, who were ready with their daggers, stepped forward to put their scheme in effect.

6.57.2

But when they saw one of their accomplices talking familiarly with Hippias, who was accessible to all, they took fright, thinking that they had been informed upon and would in a moment be arrested.

6.57.3

So wishing first to take vengeance, if they could, upon the one who had aggrieved them and because of whom they were risking all, they rushed, just as they were, within the gates and came upon Hipparchus at the place called Leocorium.

6.57.3

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6.57.3

And at once falling upon him recklessly and as men will in extreme wrath, the one inflamed by jealousy, the other by insult, they smote and slew him.

6.57.4

Aristogeiton, indeed, escaped the guards for the moment, as the crowd ran together, but afterwards was caught and handled in no gentle manner; but Harmodius perished on the spot.

6.58.1

When the news was brought to Hippias in the Cerameicus, he went at once, not to the scene of action, but to the hoplites in the procession, before they, being some distance away, had become aware of what had happened, and, disguising his looks so as to betray nothing in regard to the calamity, pointed to a certain place and ordered them to go thither without their arms.

6.58.2

So they withdrew, thinking that he had something to say to them; while he, ordering the mercenaries to take up the arms of the others, immediately picked out those whom he held guilty, and anyone besides who was found with a dagger; for it was customary to march in the processions armed with shield and spear only.

6.59.1

It was in such wise, for an affront in love, that the plot of Harmodius and Aristogeiton was first conceived and their reckless attempt made under the influence of their momentary alarm.

6.59.2

After this the tyranny became harsher for the Athenians, and Hippias, being now in greater apprehension, not only put to death many of the citizens, but also began to look abroad, to see if in any quarter he might find any door of safety open to him in case of a revolution.

6.59.3

At any rate after this he gave his own daughter Archedice in marriage to Aeantides son of Hippocles, tyrant of Lampsacus—an Athenian to a Lampsacene!—perceiving that this family had great influence with King Darius. And there is at Lampsacus a monument of her bearing this inscription:

6.59.3

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6.59.3

This dust covers Archedice daughter of Hippias,

6.59.3

Who was foremost in Hellas among the men of his time:

6.59.3

Her father and husband, her brothers and children were tyrants,

6.59.3

Yet was not her mind lifted up to vainglory.

6.59.3

Hippias, however, after being tyrant for three years more at Athens, was then deposed

6.59.3

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6.59.3

in the fourth year by the Lacedaemonians and the exiled Alcmaeonidae, and retired under truce to Sigeium, from there to Aeantides at Lampsacus, and thence to the court of King Darius;

6.59.4

whence twenty years later, being already an old man, he went with the Persians on the expedition to Marathon.

6.60.1

With these events in mind and recalling all that they knew of them by report, the Athenian people were in an ugly temper at this time and suspicious towards those who had incurred blame in the matter of the mysteries; and the whole thing seemed to them to have been done in connection with a conspiracy that aimed at an oligarchy or a tyranny.

6.60.2

So when, in consequence of their anger on this account, many noteworthy men were already imprisoned and there seemed to be no end of the matter, but day by day they were growing more savage and still more men were being arrested, then at last one of the men in confinement,

6.60.2

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6.60.2

the one in fact who was regarded as the most guilty, was persuaded by one of his fellow-prisoners to make a confession, which may have been true or not; for there are conjectures both ways, but no one has been able, either then or afterwards, to tell the truth with reference to those who did the deed.

6.60.3

At any rate, the other prisoner persuaded this man that, even if he had not done the deed, he ought, having first secured immunity,

6.60.3

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6.60.3

to save himself and free the state from the prevailing suspicion; for, he said, he had a surer chance of saving his life by confessing, with the promise of immunity, than by denying the charge and undergoing trial.

6.60.4

Accordingly he informed against himself and others in the affair of the Hermae; and the people, delighted at getting the truth, as they thought, and already making much ado that they should not discover those who were plotting against the democracy, at once set free the informer and with him all the rest whom he had not denounced; but with regard to those who were accused they instituted trials and put to death all who had been arrested, while on those who had fled they passed sentence of death, offering a reward in money to anyone who killed them.

6.60.5

And in all this it was uncertain whether those who suffered had not been punished unjustly; the city at large, however, at the time was clearly benefited.

6.61.1

With regard to Alcibiades, the Athenians took the matter seriously, being urged on by his enemies, the men who had attacked him before he sailed. And thinking now that they had the truth about the Hermae, they were far more convinced that the profanation of the mysteries also, in which he was implicated, had been committed by him with the same intent, that is of conspiring against the people.

6.61.2

For it so happened that a small Lacedaemonian force, at the moment when they were in commotion about these matters, had come as far as the Isthmus in pursuance of some arrangement with the Boeotians. The opinion prevailed,, therefore, that it had come on agreement at his instigation, and not in the interest of the Boeotians; and that, if they had not themselves been beforehand in arresting the men on the strength of the information given, the city would have been betrayed. And once for a whole night they lay under arms in the precinct of Theseus within the walls.

6.61.3

Furthermore, the friends of Alcibiades at Argos were at the same time suspected of a design to attack the people; and on this account the Argive hostages who had been deposited in the islands

6.61.3

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6.61.3

were at that time delivered by the Athenians to the Argive people to be put to death.

6.61.4

Thus from all sides suspicion had gathered about Alcibiades. And so, wishing to bring him to trial and put him to death, they had sent the Salaminia to Sicily for him and for the others who had been informed upon.

6.61.5

And the orders were to give him formal summons to follow, that he might make his defence, but not to arrest him; for they were solicitous about both their own soldiers in Sicily and the enemy, not wishing to stir up excitement among them, and they were especially desirous that the Mantineans and Argives should remain with them, thinking that it was through him that they had been persuaded to join in the expedition.

6.61.6

So he, in his own ship, and those who were accused with him, sailed off in company with the Salaminia from Sicily, as if for Athens.

6.61.7

When, however, they reached the territory of the Thurians, they followed no further, but left their ship and disappeared, being afraid to sail home for trial in the face of the existing prejudice. The crew of the Salaminia sought for Alcibiades and his companions for some time; but when these were nowhere to be found, they sailed home. Alcibiades, however, being now an outlaw, not long afterwards crossed over by boat from Thurii to the Peloponnesus; and the Athenians through a judgment by default

6.61.7

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6.61.7

sentenced him and his companions to death.

6.62.1

After this the two generals who were left in Sicily, making two divisions of the army and each taking one by lot, sailed with the whole force for Selinus and Egesta, wishing to know whether the Egestaeans would give the promised money, and to look into the affairs of the Selinuntians and learn their points of contention with the Egestaeans.

6.62.2

So sailing along the coast, with Sicily-that is, the part of it which faces the Tyrrhenian gulf-on their left hand, they put into Himera, which is the only Hellenic city in that part of Sicily; and as Himera would not receive them, they proceeded along the coast.

6.62.3

On their passage they took Hyccara, a petty town by the seaside, which, though Sicanian, was yet hostile to the Egestaeans. They enslaved the inhabitants, and turned the town over to the Egestaeans, some of whose cavalry had joined them, but themselves went back with their land-force through the territory of the Sicels until they came to Catana, while the ships sailed round to Catana with the captives.

6.62.4

Nicias, however, had sailed at once

6.62.4

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6.62.4

from Hyccara for Egesta, and after transacting his other business and receiving thirty talents had rejoined the army. Their slaves they sold, receiving for them one hundred and twenty talents.

6.62.5

They sent round also to their allies among the Sicels, bidding them send troops; and with half of their own force went against Hybla Geleatis, a hostile town, but failed to take it. And so the summer ended.

6.63.1

The following winter the Athenians began at once to prepare for the advance upon Syracuse, and the Syracusans also, on their side, to go against them.

6.63.2

For when the Athenians did not, in accordance with their first alarm and expectation, at once attack them, with each successive day their courage revived; and when the Athenians sailed along the opposite coast of Sicily and showed themselves only at a distance from Syracuse, and going against Hybla failed in the attempt to take it by storm, the Syracusans had still greater contempt for them, and, as a crowd is wont to do when it has become elated, demanded that their generals should lead them against Catana, since the Athenians would not come against them.

6.63.3

Moreover, mounted Syracusan scouts constantly rode up to the Athenian army and amongst other insults asked them: “Are you come to settle yourselves here with us, on land which belongs to other people, instead of resettling the Leontines on their own?”

6.64.1

The Athenian generals were aware of all this and purposed to draw the whole of the Syracusan force as far as possible away from the city, and themselves meanwhile to sail down under cover of night and undisturbed to occupy a camp at a suitable place, knowing that they would not be able to do this so well if they should disembark from their ships in the face of an enemy prepared to meet them, or should be detected going by land. For being without horsemen themselves, their own light-armed troops and their mob of camp-followers would, they thought, suffer great harm at the hands of the numerous Syracusan cavalry; but in the way proposed they would take a position where they would not suffer any harm worth mentioning from the cavalry; and certain Syracusan exiles who were with them gave them information as to the position close to the Olympieium, which in fact they subsequently occupied. So then, in furtherance of their plan, the generals devised some such scheme as this:

6.64.2

They sent a man loyal to themselves, but in the opinion of the Syracusan generals no less a friend of theirs. The man was a Catanaean, and said that he had come from men at Catana whose names they recognized and whom they knew to be the remnant of those who were still loyal to them in the city.

6.64.3

He said that the Athenians were in the habit of passing the night in the city away from their arms, and if the Syracusans would come in full force at dawn on an appointed day against their army, they would close the gates on the Athenians in their city and set fire to the ships, and the Syracusans could attack the stockade and easily take the whole army; for there were many Catanaeans who would help them in this undertaking, and the men from whom he himself had come were ready now.

6.65.1

And the Syracusan generals, who were already confident as to the general situation, and intended even without this help to go against Catana, trusted the fellow much too incautiously, and at once, agreeing upon a day on which they would be there, sent him back; and themselves—the Selinuntians and some others of their allies being already present—made proclamation for the whole force of the Syracusans to take the field. And when their preparations were made and the days were near on which they had agreed to come, they proceeded towards Catana and bivouacked at the River Simaethus in the territory of Leontini.

6.65.2

But the Athenians, when they learned of their approach, took all their own army and such of the Sicels or others as had joined them, and embarking on their ships and boats sailed under cover of night against Syracuse.

6.65.3

And they disembarked at daybreak at a point opposite the Olympieium, where they proposed to occupy a camping-place; but the Syracusan horsemen, who were the first to reach Catana and found there that the whole army was gone, turned about and announced this to the infantry, and all then turned back at once and hastened to bring aid to the city.

6.66.1

Meanwhile the Athenians, undisturbed, as the Syracusans had a long way to go, settled their army in a suitable position, where they could begin a battle whenever they wished and the Syracusan horsemen would annoy them the least either in the actual fighting or before; for on one side walls and houses and trees and a swamp furnished a barrier, on the other side a line of cliffs.

6.66.2

They also cut down the trees near at hand and bringing them down to the sea built a stockade by the ships; and at Dascon, where the place was most accessible to the enemy, they quickly erected a bulwark of stones picked up in the fields and of timbers, and pulled down the bridge over the Anapus.

6.66.3

While they were making these preparations nobody came out from the city to hinder them; the first that came against them were the horsemen of the Syracusans, but afterwards the infantry also gathered in full force. And at first they drew near the Athenian camp, but later, when these did not come out against them, they withdrew across the Elorine road and spent the night.

6.67.1

On the next day the Athenians and their allies made preparations for battle, and were drawn up in the following order: On the right were the Argives and Mantineans, the Athenians had the centre, the other allies the rest of the line. Half of their army was in the van, arrayed eight deep; the other half near their sleeping-places, formed in a hollow square, these too arrayed eight deep; and the orders of the latter were, to be on the alert to support any part of the army that was most in distress. And the baggage-carriers they put inside the body of reserves. The Syracusans;

6.67.2

on the other hand, arranged all their hoplites sixteen deep, that is, the whole force of the Syracusans and as many of their allies as were present; for they had received some reinforcements, chiefly from the Selinuntians, but next to them some cavalry from the Geloans, about two hundred in all, and also from the Camarinaeans about twenty horsemen and fifty bowmen. Their cavalry, which was not less than twelve hundred in number, they placed on the right, and on its flank the javelin-men.

6.67.3

As the Athenians were on the point of beginning the attack, Nicias went along the line and exhorted them, nation by nation as well as all together, in the following manner:

6.68.1

“What need is there, soldiers, of long exhortation, when we are all here for one and the same contest? Our array of itself seems to me more calculated to inspire confidence than well chosen words with a weak army.

6.68.2

For where are Argives and Mantineans and Athenians and the best of the islanders, why should not everyone, in company with allies so brave and so numerous, have great hope of victory, especially against men that meet us in a mob and are not picked men as we ourselves are, and against Siceliots, moreover, who scorn us, indeed, but do not stand their ground against us, because the skill they have is not equal to their daring.

6.68.3

This, too, must be fixed in the mind of everyone, that we are far from our own land and not near to any friendly country, unless you shall win such by your own swords. And my admonition is the opposite of the exhortation which, I am sure, the enemy is addressing to his troops; for they urge that the contest will be for fatherland, but I remind you that it will be, not in our fatherland, but where you either must win victory or may not easily get away; for their cavalry will be upon us in great numbers.

6.68.4

Be mindful, therefore, of your own reputation, and attack the enemy with spirit and with the thought that our present necessity and the straits in which we stand are more to be feared than our foes.”

6.69.1

After such an exhortation Nicias straightway led on his army; but the Syracusans were not expecting to fight at just that moment, and some of them, as the city was near them, had even gone home; and these, though they came running to the lines as fast as they could, were late, and had to fall in wherever each one happened to reach the main body. For they were not lacking in zeal nor in daring either in this battle or in those which followed; nay, in bravery they were not inferior to their enemies, so far as they had experience, but through their lack of experience in spite of themselves they failed to do justice to their good intentions. Nevertheless, though they did not expect the Athenians to be the first to attack, and though they were forced to defend themselves in haste, they took up their arms at once and went against them.

6.69.2

And at first the stone-throwers and slingers and bowmen skirmished, driving each other back, first one side and then the other, as light-armed troops would be likely to do. Afterwards the soothsayers brought forward the customary sacrifices and trumpeters stirred the hoplites to the charge.

6.69.3

So they advanced—the Syracusans, to fight for fatherland and every man for his own present safety and future freedom; on the other side the Athenians, to fight for an alien land in order to win it for their own and to save their own land from the disaster of defeat; the Argives and those of the allies that were independent, to help the Athenians in securing the objects for which they had come, and having won victory to see again their own fatherland; the subject-allies, above all zealous for their own immediate safety, for which there was no hope unless they conquered, then also with the secondary motive that having helped the Athenians to overthrow another power they might find the terms of their own subjection milder.

6.70.1

When they had come to close combat, they held out for a long time against one another; and there chanced to occur at the same time some claps of thunder and flashes of lightning and much rain, so that this too contributed to the fear of those who were fighting for the first time and were but little conversant with war, whereas to those who were more experienced

6.70.1

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6.70.1

the storm seemed of course to be due merely to the season of the year, but the fact that their antagonists were not overcome caused them far greater alarm.

6.70.2

When, however, the Argives had first driven back the left wing of the Syracusans, and after them the Athenians had repulsed their own opponents, then the rest also of the Syracusan line began to break and was reduced to flight.

6.70.3

But the Athenians did not pursue far; for the Syracusan cavalry, being numerous and undefeated, held them in check, and falling upon their hoplites, if they saw any ahead in pursuit, drove them back. They only followed up in a body as far as it was safe, and then drew back and set up a trophy.

6.70.4

The Syracusans, on the other hand, collecting on the Elorine road and drawing up as well as possible under the circumstances, in spite of their defeat sent some of their own men to the Olympieium as a guard, fearing that the Athenians might disturb some of the treasures which were there; and the rest withdrew to the city.

6.71.1

The Athenians, however, did not go to the temple, but collecting their own dead and placing them on a pyre they passed the night where they were. But on the next day they gave back under truce the Syracusan dead, of whom and of their allies about two hundred and sixty were slain; then gathering up the bones of their own dead—of themselves and their allies about fifty—and taking with them the spoils of the enemy, they sailed back to Catana.

6.71.2

For it was winter, and it seemed as yet impossible to carry on the war from this base until they should send to Athens for horsemen, besides collecting them from their allies in Sicily, that they might not be altogether at the mercy of the enemy's cavalry. And they wanted at the same time to collect money from the island itself, and to have a supply come from Athens; also to bring over some of the cities, which they hoped would be more ready to listen to them since the battle; and to prepare other things, both food and whatever was needed, with a view to attacking Syracuse the next spring.

6.72.1

With this purpose they sailed away to Naxos and Catana to spend the winter. The Syracusans, on the other hand, after burying their own dead, called an assembly.

6.72.2

And there came before them Hermocrates son of Hermon,

6.72.2

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a man who was in general second to none in point of intelligence, and had shown himself in this war both competent by reason of experience and conspicuous for courage. He encouraged them and protested against their giving way because of what had happened:

6.72.3

their spirit, he told them, was not defeated; it was their lack of discipline that had done mischief. They had not, however, been so much inferior as might have been expected, especially as they had been pitted against troops who were the foremost among the Hellenes in experience, mere tiros so to speak against skilled craftsmen.

6.72.4

Much mischief had also been caused by the large number of the generals and the division of command—for they had fifteen generals—and the disorder and anarchy among the troops. If only a few men of experience should be chosen as generals, and during this winter they should get the hoplite-force ready, providing arms for those who had none, in order that the number might be as large as possible, and enforcing the general training, in all likelihood, he said, they would get the better of the enemy, if to courage, which they had already, discipline were added when it came to action. For both these things would improve of themselves; their discipline would be practised in the midst of dangers, and their courage, in proportion as their confidence in their skill increased, would prove more self-reliant than ever.

6.72.5

The generals, then, whom they should elect ought to be few in number and clothed with full powers and they should give them their oath that they would in very truth allow them to command according to their judgment; for in this way whatever ought to be kept secret would be better concealed, and their preparations in general would be made in an orderly way and without evasions.

6.73.1

The Syracusans, when they had heard him, voted everything as he advised, and chose three generals, Hermocrates himself, Heracleides son of Lysimachus, and Sieanus son of Execestus.

6.73.2

They also sent envoys to Corinth and Lacedaemon to induce an allied force to join them, and to persuade the Lacedaemonians to prosecute the war with the Athenians openly in their behalf and more persistently, in order that they might either draw them away from Sicily, or else to some extent prevent their sending reinforcements to their army in Sicily.

6.74.1

The Athenian army at Catana, directly after its return,

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sailed to Messene, in the hope that it would be betrayed to them. But the negotiations were not successful. For as soon as Alcibiades left his command under summons from home, knowing that he would be an exile, he gave information of the plot, of which he was cognizant, to the friends of the Syracusans at Messene; these had previously put the conspirators to death, and at this time, when the Athenians arrived, those who were of this faction, being already in revolt and under arms, were strong enough to prevent their admission.

6.74.2

So the Athenians stayed there about thirteen days, and as they were vexed by storms and without provisions and were making no progress at all, they retired to Naxos, and constructing dock-yards and building stockades round their camp, went into winterquarters there. They also sent a trireme to Athens for money and cavalry, that these might be on hand at the opening of spring.

6.75.1

During this winter the Syracusans also proceeded to build a wall next to the city, along the entire extent that faces Epipolae, taking in the Temenites precinct,

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in order that, in case of a possible reverse, they might riot be so easily shut in as if the circuit of the town were smaller; and they also put a garrison at Megara and another at the Olympieium, and fixed palisades on the sea-shore at all points where landings were possible.

6.75.2

And knowing that the Athenians were wintering at Naxos, they went out with all their forces against Catana and ravaged some of its territory, then having set fire to the tents and the camp of the Athenians they returned home.

6.75.3

Moreover, on learning that the Athenians had, in accordance with an alliance concluded with the Camarinaeans in the time of Laches,

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sent envoys to these, in the hope that they might win them to their side, they themselves sent a counter-embassy; for they had suspicions that the Camarinaeans had not been zealous in sending such help as they had sent for the first battle, and might not wish to aid them in future, seeing that the Athenians had fared well in the fight, but might rather be induced, on the plea of their former friendship, to go over to the Athenians.

6.75.4

Accordingly, when Hermocrates and others had arrived at Camarina from Syracuse, and from the Athenians Euphemus and the rest, an assembly of the Camarinaeans was held and Hermocrates, wishing to prejudice them against the Athenians, spoke as follows:

6.76.1

"We have come on this embassy, men of Camarina, not because we feared that you will be dismayed by the presence of the Athenian force, but rather through fear of the words that are going to be said on their part, lest these persuade you before you hear anything from us.

6.76.2

For they are come to Sicily on the pretext that you hear, but with the design that we all suspect; and to me they seem to wish, not to resettle the Leontines, but rather to unsettle us. For surely it is not reasonable to suppose that, while desolating the cities in their own country, they are resettling the cities of Sicily, and that they care for the Leontines, on the score of kinship, as being Chalcidians, while holding in slavery the Chalcidians in Euboea, of whom these are colonists.

6.76.3

Nay, one and the same design has guided them in acquiring their possessions over there and is now guiding them in their endeavour to acquire possessions here: after they had become leaders, by the free choice of their associates, both of the Ionians and of all those, descendants of the Ionians, who were members of the alliance that was concluded, avowedly, for revenge upon the Persians, they charged some with refusal to serve, others with warring upon one another, others with whatever specious charge they had at hand, and so reduced them to subjection.

6.76.4

And so, after all, it was not for ' freedom' that they withstood the Persians, neither the Athenians to win it for the Hellenes nor the Hellenes to win it for themselves, but they fought for the enslavement of the rest to themselves, and the Hellenes for a change of master, not to one more unwise, but more wickedly wise.

6.77.1

"But we are not come now, easy though it be to denounce the Athenian state, to declare before those who know already how many are its misdeeds; but much more to blame ourselves, because, though we have warning examples in the way that the Hellenes over there have been enslaved because they would not defend one another, and though the same sophisms are now practised upon us—restorings of Leontine kinsmen and succourings of Egestaean allies!—we are unwilling to combine together and with more spirit show them that here are not Ionians nor yet Hellespontines and islanders, who are always taking some new master, Persian or whoever it may be, and continue in a state of slavery, but Dorians, free men sprung from independent Peloponnesus, and now dwelling in Sicily.

6.77.2

Or are we waiting until we shall be taken one at a time, city by city, when we know that in this way only can we be conquered, and when we see them resorting to this policy, endeavouring to cause division among some of us by means of cunning words, to set others at war one with another by the hope of obtaining allies, and to ruin others in whatever way they can by saying something alluring to each? And do we think that, when a distant compatriot perishes before us, the same danger will not come also to ourselves, but rather that whoever before us meets with disaster merely incurs misfortune by himself alone?

6.78.1

"And if the thought has occurred to anyone that it is the Syracusans, not himself, who are enemies to the Athenians, and thinks it preposterous that he should incur danger for our country, let him reflect that it will not be chiefly for our country, but equally for his own at the same time that he will fight in our land, and with the greater safety, too, inasmuch as he will enter the contest, not when we have already been ruined, and not isolated himself, but having us as allies; and that the object of the Athenians is not to punish the enmity of the Syracusans, but having us as a pretext to make your ' friendship ' still more secure.

6.78.2

If, moreover, anyone is envious, or even afraid of Us—for greater states are exposed to both these passions—and for this reason wishes that the Syracusans shall be humbled, indeed, in order that we may be sobered, but shall survive for the sake of his own safety, he indulges a wish that is not within human power to attain. For it is not possible for the same person to be in like measure the controller of his own desires and of Fortune;

6.78.3

and if he should err in judgment, when he has to lament his own ills he may perhaps some day wish once more to become envious of our good fortune. But that will be impossible, if he abandons us and does not consent to incur the same dangers, which are not about names but about facts; for though nominally a man would be preserving our power, in fact he would be securing his own safety.

6.78.4

And most of all it were fitting that you, men of Camarina, who are on our borders and will incur danger next, should have foreseen these things and not be, as now, slack in your alliance, but rather should have come to us of yourselves, and just as you, in case the Athenians had come against Camarina first, would be calling upon us and begging us not to yield an inch, so should you be seen in like manner now also using the same exhortation. But neither you, so far at least, nor the rest have bestirred yourselves for this.

6.79.1

"But through timidity, perhaps, you will make much of the point of right as between us and the invaders, alleging that you have an alliance with the Athenians. That alliance, however, you made, not against your friends, but in the event of any of your enemies attacking you; and you were to aid the Athenians only when they were wronged

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by others, and not when, as now, they are themselves wronging their neighbours.

6.79.2

Why, not even the Rhegians, themselves Chalcidians, are willing to help to restore the Leontines who are Chalcidians. And it is monstrous if they, suspicious of what this fine plea of right really means in practice, are unreasonably prudent,

6.79.2

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while you, on a speciously reasonable pretext, desire to aid those who by nature are your enemies, and in concert with your bitterest foes to ruin those who by a still closer tie of nature are your kinsmen.

6.79.2

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Nay, that is not right;

6.79.3

but it is right to aid us and not be afraid of their armament. For if we all stand together, it is not formidable. The only danger is—and this is just what they are eager for—that we may stand opposed to each other; for not even when they came against us alone and proved superior in battle did they effect what they wished, but quickly went away.

6.80.1

"So then, if only we be united, we have reason not to be disheartened, but rather to enter into the proposed alliance more heartily, especially as aid is sure to come from the Peloponnesians, who are altogether superior to these people in matters of war. And no one should regard as fair to us, while safe for you, that prudent course of yours—to aid neither, forsooth, as being allies of both. Indeed it is not as fair in fact, as when urged to justify you.

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For if through your failure to take sides as allies the sufferer shall be defeated and the conqueror shall prevail, what else have you done by this selfsame standing aloof but refused to aid the one to secure his salvation and to prevent the other from incurring guilt? And yet it were more honourable for you, by siding with those who are being wronged

6.80.2

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and are at the same time your kinsmen, at once to guard the common interest of Sicily and not suffer the Athenians, seeing that they are your 'good friends', to make a serious mistake.

6.80.2

“Summing up, then, we Syracusans say that it is no hard matter to demonstrate, either to you or to others, what you yourselves know as well as we;

6.80.3

but we do entreat you, and at the same time we protest, if we fail to persuade you, that while we are plotted against by Ionians,

6.80.3

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our inveterate enemies, we are betrayed by you, Dorians by Dorians.

6.80.4

And if the Athenians shall subdue us, it is by your decisions that they will prevail, but it is in their own name that they will be honoured, and the prize of victory they will take will be none other than those who procured them the victory; if, on the other hand, we shall conquer, you also will have to pay the penalty of being the cause of our perils.

6.80.5

Reflect, therefore, and choose here and now, either immediate slavery with no danger or, if you join us and prevail, the chance of not having to take, with disgrace, these men as masters, and also, as regards us, of escaping an enmity that would not be transitory.”

6.81.1

Such was the speech of Hermocrates; after him Euphemus, the envoy of the Athenians, spoke as follows:-

6.82.1

"We had come here for the renewal of the alliance

6.82.1

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6.82.1

which formerly existed, but as the Syracusan has attacked us it is necessary to speak also about our empire, showing how rightly we hold it.

6.82.2

Now the strongest proof of this the speaker himself stated--that Ionians have always been enemies to the Dorians. It is even so. Accordingly, we, being Ionians, considered in what we way we should be least subject to the Peloponnesians who are Dorians and not only more numerous than we but our near neighbors.

6.82.2

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And after the Persian wars we acquired a fleet and rid ourselves of the rule and supremacy of the Lacedaemonians, it being not in any way more fitting that they give orders to us than we to them, except in so far as they at the time were stronger. Having, then, ourselves become leaders of those who were before subject to the King, we so continue, thinking that we should in this way be least subject to the Peloponnesians, because we have power with which to defend ourselves. And to say the exact truth, not unjustly, either, did we subdue both the Ionians and the islands, whom the Syracusans say we have enslaved though they are our kinsmen.

6.82.4

For they came against us, their mother-city, along with the Persians, and had not the courage to revolt and sacrifice their homes, as we did when we abandoned our city, but chose slavery for themselves and wished to impose the same condition on us.

6.83.1

"We have dominion, therefore, both because we are worthy of it—seeing that we furnished the largest fleet and unhesitating zeal toward the Hellenes, and that they, readily taking the course they did in the interest of the Persians, were doing us harm—and at the same time because we aimed at strength with which to resist the Peloponnesians.

6.83.2

And we do not say in fine phrases that we deserve to rule either because we alone overthrew the Barbarian or because we incurred danger for the liberty of these men more than for that of all the Hellenes, including our own. But no one can be reproached because he makes provision for his proper safety. And now when for the sake of our own security we have come here also, we see that your interests also are the same as ours.

6.83.3

And this we prove to you both from these men's calumnies and from those suspicions of yours which most tend to undue alarm, because we know that those who are suspicious through excessive fear may indeed take delight for the moment in seductive speech, but afterwards when it comes to action consult their own interests.

6.83.4

For just as we have said that we hold our dominion over there because of fear, so we say that for the same reason we have come here with the help of our friends to place your affairs on a footing of safety for us, and not to enslave you, but rather to prevent your being enslaved.

6.84.1

"And let no one object that we are solicitous for you when it does not concern us; let him reflect that, if you are preserved and by not being weak are able to offer resistance to the Syracusans, we should be less liable to injury through their sending a force to aid the Peloponnesians.

6.84.2

And herein you become at once our chief concern For this very cause, too, it is reasonable that we should restore the Leontines, so that they shall not be subjects like their kinsmen in Euboea, but shall be as powerful as possible, in order that, bordering as they do on the Syracusans, they may from their own territory be troublesome to these in our behalf.

6.84.3

For as to matters in Hellas, we by ourselves are a match for our enemies, and in regard to the Chalcidians, whom he says we are inconsistent in freeing here after enslaving them at home, it is to our interest that they should possess no armament and should contribute money only; but as to matters here, it is to our interest that both the Leontines and our other friends should enjoy the fullest measure of independence.

6.85.1

"To an autocrat or an imperial city nothing is inconsistent which is to its interest, nor is anyone a kinsman who cannot be trusted; in every case one must be enemy or friend according to circumstances. And in Sicily it is to our advantage, not that we should weaken our friends, but that our enemies should be powerless because of the strength of our friends. And you must not mistrust us;

6.85.2

for we lead our allies in Hellas as they are each useful to us: the Chians and Methymnaeans as independent, on the condition of furnishing ships; the majority on more compulsory terms, with payment of tribute in money; others, though islanders and easy to be reduced, on terms of absolute freedom as our allies, because they occupy strategic positions along the coast of the Peloponnese.

6.85.3

So that it is natural that matters here also should be ordered with an eye to our advantage, and, as we say, with reference to our fear of the Syracusans. For they aim at dominion over you, and wish, after uniting you with themselves on the ground of your suspicion of us, then by force, or because of your isolation when we shall have gone away unsuccessful, themselves to rule Sicily. And that is sure to happen if you unite with them; for neither will so great a force, if once combined, be any longer easy for us to handle, nor would the Syracusans lack strength to deal with you if we should not be present.

6.86.1

"And if there be anyone who does not accept this view, that which has taken place will itself prove his error. For you brought us over before,

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flaunting in our faces no other terror but this, that we ourselves should be in danger if we should permit you to come under the power of the Syracusans.

6.86.2

And it is not right for you now to distrust the very argument by which you thought it right to persuade us then, nor to be suspicious because we are present with a force out of all proportion to the strength of the Syracusans; far more should you distrust them.

6.86.3

We certainly are not able to maintain ourselves in Sicily without you; and even if we should prove false and subdue Sicily, we should be unable to hold it on account of the length of the voyage and the difficulty of guarding cities that are as large and well equipped as continental cities

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; whereas these Syracusans, in hostile proximity to you, not with a mere army in the field, but a city greater than our present force, are always plotting against you, and whenever they get an opportunity against you singly, do not let it slip, as they have shown several times already and especially in their dealings with the Leontines;

6.86.4

and now they make bold to urge you to oppose those who seek to prevent these things and who up to this time have kept Sicily from being under their dominion, as though you were without sense.

6.86.5

But it is to a safety far more real that we in our turn invite you, begging you not to throw away that safety which we both derive from one another; and to consider that for them, even without allies, the way is always open against you because of their numbers, whereas for you the opportunity will not often present itself to defend yourselves with the help of so great an auxiliary force. But if through your suspicions you suffer this force to depart with its object unaccomplished, or, worse still, defeated, you will hereafter wish that you could see even the merest fraction of it when its presence will no longer avail you aught.

6.87.1

“Nay, be not moved, men of Camarina, either you or the other peoples of Sicily, by the calumnies of these men. We have told you the whole truth concerning the matters of which we are suspected, and now again briefly recalling to your minds the chief points of our argument, we fully expect to convince you.

6.87.2

We say, namely, that we hold sway over the cities in Hellas in order that we may not have to obey some other power, but that we are trying to free those here, in order that we may not be injured by them. We are obliged to be active in many matters,

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because we have many dangers to guard against; and we come as allies, now as before, to those of you here who are wronged, not uninvited, but by your express invitation.

6.87.3

And do not you, by constituting yourselves either judges of our conduct or by tutoring us in moderation

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—a hard task at this late day!—make any attempt to divert us, but in so far as anything in our busy activity and our character is at the same time to your interest, take this and make use of it; and think, not that these qualities of ours are hurtful alike to all, but that they are even profitable to far the greater part of the Hellenes.

6.87.4

For everyone in every place, even where we are not already present, both he that thinks he will suffer wrong, and he that plots to do wrong—on account of the certain prospect that is ever present in their minds, in the one case that he will obtain succour from us in return for his allegiance, in the other that, if we shall come, he will run the risk of not escaping unscathed for his wrongdoings—are both alike under constraint, the latter to be moderate however unwilling, the former to be saved without effort of his own.

6.87.5

This common safety, then, which is now offered to anyone who may ask for it as well as to you, reject not; but availing yourselves of it as others do, join forces with us and instead of having always to be on your guard against the Syracusans, change your course and at length plot against them even as they have plotted against you.”

6.88.1

Thus Euphemus spoke. But what the Camarinaeans had felt was this: They were well disposed to the Athenians, except in so far as they thought that these would enslave Sicily; but with the Syracusans, as is usual with next-door neighbours, they were always at variance. And it was because they were more afraid of the Syracusans, as being so near, that they had in the first instance sent them the few horsemen,

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lest they might prove superior to the Athenians even without their aid; and they now resolved for the future to keep on giving to them rather than to the Athenians assistance in fact, though as moderately as possible, and for the present, in order that they might not seem to show less favour to the Athenians, especially since these had proved the stronger in the battle, to give in word the same answer to both.

6.88.2

Having thus determined, they made answer, that, as they were allies of both parties that were at war, it seemed to them to be consistent with their oath to aid neither at present.

6.88.3

So the envoys of both sides went away. The Syracusans on their side were getting ready for the war, while the Athenians who were encamped at Naxos were negotiating with the Sicels, in the effort to bring over as many of them as possible.

6.88.4

Now, of the Sicels that lived more toward the flat country and were subjects of the Syracusans not many

6.88.4

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6.88.4

had revolted; but the Sicel settlements in the interior, which even before had always been independent, with few exceptions straightway sided with the Athenians, bringing down grain for the army and in some cases money also.

6.88.5

Against those that did not come over the Athenians took the field, and compelled some to do so, but were kept from compelling others by the Syracusans, who sent garrisons to their relief. Removing also the anchorage of their fleet from Naxos to Catana, and restoring the camp which had been burned by the Syracusans, they passed the winter there.

6.88.6

They sent also a trireme to Carthage on a mission of friendship, in the hope that they might be able to get some aid; and they sent one also to Tyrrhenia, as some of the cities there offered of themselves to join them in the war. They also despatched messengers to the various Sicel tribes, and sending to Egesta urged them to send as many horses as possible;

6.88.7

and they were getting ready for the circumvallation bricks and iron and whatever else was needful, with a view to taking the war in hand as soon as spring opened.

6.88.7

Meanwhile the Syracusan envoys, who had been sent to Corinth and Lacedaemon, as they sailed along the coast tried to persuade the Italiots

6.88.7

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6.88.7

not to tolerate the conduct of the Athenians, as the plot was aimed equally against them;

6.88.8

and when they reached Corinth they made an appeal to the Corinthians, urging them to send them aid on grounds of kinship. And the Corinthians at once took the lead in voting to aid them with all zeal themselves, and also sent envoys along with them to Lacedaemon, to help in persuading them not only to prosecute the war at home more openly against the Athenians, but also to send aid in some form to Sicily.

6.88.9

Accordingly there were present at Lacedaemon these envoys from Corinth, and also Alcibiades with his fellow-exiles. He had, at the time of which we have spoken,

6.88.9

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6.88.9

at once crossed over on a freight-boat from Thuria, going first to Cyllene in Elis, and had afterwards, on the summons of the Lacedaemonians themselves, come to Lacedaemon under safe-conduct;

6.88.10

for he feared them on account of his intrigues in the affair of the Mantineans. So it happened that in the Lacedaemonian assembly the Syracusans, the Corinthians, and Alcibiades, making the same appeal, were prevailing upon the Lacedaemonians. The ephors indeed and others in authority were already intending to send envoys to Syracuse to prevent their making terms with the Athenians, but were not disposed to send them aid; Alcibiades, however, coming forward, inflamed the Lacedaemonians and goaded them on, speaking as follows:

6.89.1

"It is necessary first of all to speak to you about the prejudice against me, in order that you may not through suspicion of me give a less favourable hearing to matters of public concern.

6.89.2

When my ancestors on account of some complaint had renounced their office as your proxenoi, I myself, seeking to revive the relationship, courted your favour in other matters and especially in regard to your misfortune at Pylos.

6.89.2

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6.89.2

And although I continued zealous, you, in making peace with the Athenians, by negotiating through my personal enemies conferred power upon them but brought dishonour upon me.

6.89.3

For these reasons you deserved the injury you suffered when I turned to the side of the Mantineans and Argives, and when I opposed you in other matters.

6.89.3

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6.89.3

And if anyone at the actual moment of suffering was unduly angry at me, let him now look at it in the light of the truth and be led to a different conviction; or if anyone thought worse of me because I was more inclined to the cause of the people, let him not even on that ground suppose that he was rightly offended.

6.89.4

For my family have always been at variance with tyrants, and as all that is opposed to despotic power has the name of democracy, so from the fact of that opposition of ours the leadership of the people has remained with us. Besides, while the city was a democracy, it was necessary in most respects to conform to existing conditions. We tried, however, to pursue a moderate course in politics in contrast with the prevailing licence.

6.89.5

But there have been others, both in the time of our forefathers and now, who led the masses into more evil ways; and these are the very men who have driven me out.

6.89.6

But it was of the whole people that we were leaders, deeming it right to help to preserve that form of government under which the state had, as it chanced, attained its highest greatness and completest freedom, and which had come down to us—for as to democracy of course, all of us who have any sense well understood what it was, and I better than anyone, inasmuch as I have greater cause to abuse it; but indeed nothing new can be said about an admitted folly—and it did not seem to us wise to change our democratic constitution when you, our enemies, were waiting at our gates.

6.90.1

"With regard, then, to the prejudices against me, that is how things fell out; but with reference to the matters about which you must take counsel and which I, if I have any superior knowledge, must bring to your notice, give me now your attention.

6.90.2

We sailed to Sicily, first, to subdue the Siceliots, if we could, and after them the Italiots also; and then to make an attempt upon the empire of the Carthaginians and upon the city itself.

6.90.3

If these things, either all, or at least the greater part of them, succeeded, then we intended to attack the Peloponnesus, bringing here the whole Hellenic force that had joined us there, hiring besides many barbarians, both Iberians and others of the peoples there that are admittedly the most warlike of the barbarians at the present day, and building many triremes in addition to our own, as Italy has timber in abundance. Laying a blockade with these triremes round the Peloponnesus, and at the same time attacking it with our infantry by land, having thus taken some of its cities by assault and walled in others, we expected easily to reduce it, and after that to have sway over the whole Hellenic race.

6.90.4

As to money and food, for making any of these projects more feasible, the additional territory acquired in Sicily would of itself furnish these in sufficient quantity, independently of our home revenues.

6.91.1

"That such were the objects of the expedition which has sailed, you have heard now from one who knows most accurately what we purposed; and the rest of the generals will, if they can, carry out these plans without change. But that the people over there cannot hold out unless you aid them, let me now show you.

6.91.2

The Siceliots have indeed less military experience than the Athenians, yet if they were united in one body they could, even as it is, gain the victory. But the Syracusans alone, being already worsted in battle with their full force and at the same time hemmed in at sea, will be unable to withstand the army of the Athenians now there.

6.91.3

And if this city shall be taken, all Sicily is theirs, and so presently will Italy be also; nor will it be long before the danger which I have just now predicted from that quarter would fall upon you.

6.91.4

Therefore let nobody think that you are deliberating about Sicily only, but about the Peloponnesus also, unless you do quickly the following things: send thither by ship such a body of troops as, after working their own passage at the oar, can at once serve as hoplites; also what I consider even more indispensable than the army, a Spartan as commander, that he may organize the forces already present and press into service those that are unwilling. For in this way the friends you have already will be encouraged, and those who are in doubt will come over with less misgiving.

6.91.5

And the war here you must at the same time prosecute more openly, in order that the Syracusans, convinced that you are really concerned, may offer greater resistance, and the Athenians be less able to send reinforcements to their own troops.

6.91.6

You ought likewise to fortify Deceleia in Attica,

6.91.6

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6.91.6

the very thing the Athenians are always most in dread of and reckon the only peril of which they have not made full trial in this war. And the surest way in which anyone can hurt his enemies is this: acting on certain information, he should inflict upon them that which he perceives they most fear; for it is natural that every man should have the most accurate knowledge of his own dangers and should fear them accordingly.

6.91.7

But as to the benefits which you yourselves will gain by this menacing stronghold

6.91.7

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6.91.7

and will prevent your opponents from obtaining, I will pass over many and sum up only the most important. Whatever their country is stocked with will for the most part come into your hands, either by capture or by voluntary surrender.

6.91.7

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6.91.7

And the revenues of the Laureian silver mines and whatever profits they now derive from their land and from their courts,

6.91.7

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6.91.7

they will at once be deprived of, and above all of the tribute from their allies, that would be less regularly brought in; for these, convinced that the war is now being prosecuted on your part with all your might, will take their obligations lightly.

6.92.1

“The accomplishment of any of these projects promptly and more zealously depends, men of Lacedaemon, upon you, for that they are possible— and I do not think that I shall prove wrong in my judgment—I am fully assured.

6.92.2

And I claim that no one of you shall think more harshly of me because I, who seemed once to be a lover of my city, now make assault with all my might upon her, in concert with her bitterest enemies;

6.92.3

nor do I think that my word should be suspected on the score of the outcast's zeal. For outcast as I am from the villainy of those that expelled me, I am not ousted from doing you good service, if you will but hearken to me; and the worse enemies are not those who, like you, have merely hurt their enemies, but those who have forced their friends to become foes.

6.92.4

And as to love of country— I have it not when I am wronged, but had it when I possessed my civil rights in security. And it is not, as I conceive, against a country still my own that I am now going, but far rather one no longer mine that I am seeking to recover. And the true patriot is not the man who, having unjustly lost his fatherland, refrains from attacking it, but he who in his yearning for it tries in every way to get it back.

6.92.5

So I urge you, Lacedaemonians, to use me without misgiving for any danger and for any hardships, recognising that, according to the saying which is on everybody's lips, if as an enemy I did you exceeding injury, I might also be of some sufficient service to you as a friend, in so far as I know the affairs of the Athenians, while I could only conjecture yours. And I urge, too, that you yourselves now, convinced that you are deliberating about interests that are of the greatest importance, shrink not from sending an expedition into Sicily, and also into Attica, in order that, by keeping a small detachment on the island, you may preserve the large interests you have over there and may overthrow the power of the Athenians both present and prospective, and after that may yourselves live in security and be accepted by all the Hellenes of their free will, not by force but through affection, as their leaders.”

6.93.1

Such was the speech of Alcibiades; and the Lacedaemonians, who had already before this been disposed to make an expedition against Athens, but were still hesitating and looking about them, were now far more encouraged when Alcibiades himself explained these matters in detail, thinking that they had heard them from the one man who had most certain knowledge.

6.93.2

And so they now turned their attention to the fortification of Deceleia and, in particular, to sending immediately some assistance to the Sicilians. Having appointed Gylippus son of Cleandridas commander of the Syracusan forces, they ordered him, in consultation with the envoys of the Syracusans and Corinthians, to devise how under present circumstances help might come to the Syracusans in the best and quickest way.

6.93.3

And Gylippus bade the Corinthians send to him at once at Asine

6.93.3

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6.93.3

two ships, and to equip all the rest they intended to send, and to be ready to sail whenever opportunity offered.

6.93.4

Having made these arrangements the envoys left Lacedaemon and set out for home. At this time also there arrived at Athens from Sicily the trireme that had been sent by the generals for money and cavalry. And the Athenians, hearing their request, voted to send to the army both the supplies and the cavalry. And the winter ended, and with it the seventeenth year of this war of which Thucydides wrote the history.

6.94.1

At the very beginning of the following

6.94.1

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6.94.1

spring, the Athenians in Sicily set out from Catana and proceeded along the coast toward Megara, from which, as has been stated before,

6.94.1

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6.94.1

the Syracusans in the time of the tyrant Gelon had expelled the inhabitants, holding their territory themselves. Here they landed and ravaged

6.94.2

the fields; then, attacking a stronghold of the Syracusans without success, they went back again along the coast with both land-force and fleet to the river Terias, and going inland ravaged the plain and set fire to the grain. Meeting with a small force of Syracusans, they killed some of them and after setting up a trophy withdrew to their ships. Having sailed back then to Catana and supplied themselves with provisions from there, they advanced with their whole army to Centoripa,

6.94.2

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6.94.2

a

6.94.3

Sicel town; and when they had brought it over by capitulation they returned, burning at the same time the grain of the Inessians

6.94.3

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6.94.4

and Hyblaeans.

6.94.4

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6.94.4

On their arrival at Catana they found that the horsemen had come from Athens, two hundred and fifty in number—with accoutrements but without the horses, for it was expected that horses would be procured in Sicily—as well as thirty mounted archers and three hundred talents

6.94.4

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6.94.4

of silver.

6.95.1

During the same summer the Lacedaemonians, making an expedition to Argos, got as far as Cleonae, but when an earthquake occurred they retired. After this the Argives invaded the Thyreatis, which lies on their borders, and took much booty from the Lacedaemonians, which was sold for not less than twenty-five talents.

6.95.1

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6.95.2

And in the course of the same summer, not long afterwards, the people of Thespiae attacked the government but did not succeed; for succour came from Thebes and some were arrested, while others fled for refuge to Athens.

6.96.1

During the same summer the Syracusans, on learning that the Athenians had received their cavalry and that they were about to march against them immediately, thinking that unless the Athenians should get possession of Epipolae, a precipitous place lying directly above the city, they themselves, even if they were defeated in battle, could not easily be walled in, determined to guard the approaches to it, in order to prevent the enemy from ascending secretly by that way, since they could not possibly do so by any other road.

6.96.2

For at all other points the place overhangs the city and slopes right down to it, the whole height being visible from it; and it is called Epipolae by the Syracusans because it lies as an upper surface above the rest of the country.

6.96.3

So they went out at daybreak in full force to the meadow along the river Anapus—for Hermocrates and his fellow-generals, as it chanced, had just come into office—and proceeded to hold a review of the hoplites. And they selected first six hundred picked men of these, under the command of Diomilus, a fugitive from Andros, that these might be a guard for Epipolae, and if there were need of them anywhere else might be quickly at hand in a body.

6.97.1

And the Athenians during the night preceding the day on which the Syracusans held their review, came from Catana with their whole force and put in unobserved at the place called Leon, which is six or seven stadia distant from Epipolae, disembarking the land-force there and anchoring their ships at Thapsus. That is a peninsula, with a narrow isthmus, extending into the sea and not far distant from the city of Syracuse, either by sea or by land.

6.97.2

The naval force of the Athenians, having run a stockade across the isthmus, lay quiet on Thapsus; but the land-force advanced at once at a run to Epipolae, and got up by way of Euryelus before the Syracusans, when they became aware of it, could come up from the review which they were holding in the meadow.

6.97.3

They brought aid, however, everyone with what speed he could, the others as well as the six hundred under Diomilus; but they had not less than twenty-five stadia to go, after leaving the meadow, before they reached the enemy.

6.97.4

Consequently the Syracusans fell upon the Athenians in considerable disorder, and being defeated in battle on Epipolae, retired into the city, Diomilus and about three hundred of the rest being slain.

6.97.5

After this the Athenians, having set up a trophy and given up their dead under truce to the Syracusans, next day went down against the city itself; but when the enemy did not come out against them they withdrew and built a fort at Labdalum, on the verge of the bluffs of Epipolae looking towards Megara, that it might serve as a magazine for their baggage and stores whenever they advanced either to fight or to work at the wall.

6.98.1

Not long afterwards there came from Egesta three hundred horsemen, and from the Sicels, Naxians, and some others about one hundred; and the Athenians had already two hundred and fifty, for whom they received some horses from the Egestaeans and Catanaeans and purchased others; so that altogether six hundred and fifty cavalry were mustered.

6.98.2

Placing a garrison at Labdalum, the Athenians advanced to Syce, where they took position and built the round fort

6.98.2

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6.98.2

with all speed. The Syracusans were struck with consternation by the rapidity of their building; and they went out against them, determined to give battle and not look on idly.

6.98.3

And when they were already drawing up for the conflict the generals of the Syracusans, seeing that their own army had become disordered and did not readily get into line, led them back to the city, all save a part of the cavalry. These remained behind and tried to prevent the Athenians from bringing stones and scattering to any great distance.

6.98.4

But one tribal

6.98.4

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6.98.4

division of the Athenian hoplites, and with these all their cavalry, attacked and routed the Syracusan cavalry, killed some, and set up a trophy of the cavalry fight.

6.99.1

On the next day some of the Athenians proceeded to build the wall to the north of the round fort, while others brought together stones and wood and began to lay these down along the line towards the place called Trogilus, in which direction the line of circumvallation would be shortest from the Great Harbour to the outer sea.

6.99.2

But the Syracusans, at the suggestion of their generals, and especially of Hermocrates, were no longer inclined to risk pitched battles with their whole force against the Athenians. It seemed better to build a wall across the line where the Athenians were going to bring their wall, so that if they got ahead of them the Athenians would be blocked off, and they decided at the same time, if the Athenians should attack them while at this work, to send a part of the army against them;

6.99.3

and they expected that they would get ahead of the Athenians in occupying the approaches with their stockades, and that they would cease from their work and all turn against them. Accordingly they went out and proceeded to build, starting from the city and carrying a cross-wall below the round fort of the Athenians, chopping down the olive-trees of the precinct and setting up wooden towers.

6.99.4

The Athenian ships had not yet sailed round from Thapsus into the Great Harbour, but the Syracusans were still masters of the parts about the sea, and the Athenians brought their supplies from Thapsus by land.

6.100.1

When it seemed to the Syracusans that enough of their counter-wall had been constructed with stone-work and stockade,

6.100.1

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6.100.1

and the Athenians did not come to hinder them—for they feared that the enemy might more easily deal with them if their forces were divided, and at the same time they were pushing on their own wall of circumvallation—leaving one division as a guard for their cross-wall, they withdrew to the city. Meanwhile the Athenians destroyed their pipes which ran underground into the city and supplied it with drinking-water. Then watching when most of the Syracusans were in their tents at midday—some of them having even gone to their homes in the city—and when those at the stockade were guarding the place carelessly, they stationed in front three hundred picked Athenians and a chosen body of the light-armed troops in heavy armour to go at a run suddenly against the counter-wall; while the rest of the army advanced in two divisions, one with one general against the city, in case they should come to the rescue, the other with the other general to that part of the stockade which is by the postern gate.

6.100.2

The three hundred attacked and took the stockade, the guards leaving it and fleeing to the outwork around Temenites.

6.100.2

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6.100.2

And their pursuers burst in with them; but these, after getting in, were forced out again by the Syracusans, some of the Argives and a few of the Athenians being slain there.

6.100.3

Then the whole army withdrew and pulled down the counter-wall and tore up the stockade, bringing the stakes over to their own lines, and set up a trophy.

6.101.1

The next day the Athenians, starting from the round fort, began to fortify the bluff which is above the marsh,

6.101.1

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6.101.1

where on this side of Epipolae it looks toward the Great Harbour, and where they would find the line of circumvallation shortest as they came down through the level ground and the marsh to the harbour.

6.101.2

The Syracusans meanwhile also went out and proceeded to build another stockade, starting from the city, through the middle of the marsh;

6.101.3

and they dug at the same time a ditch alongside, that it might not be possible for the Athenians to complete their wall to the sea. But the latter, when their wall to the bluff was finished, again attacked the stockade and ditch of the Syracusans, having ordered their ships to sail around from Thapsus into the Great Harbour at Syracuse and themselves gone down about daybreak from Epipolae to the level ground. Laying down doors and planks through the marsh where the soil was clayey and firmest and crossing over on these, they took at daylight the ditch, and all but a little of the stockade, and later the remaining part.

6.101.4

A battle occurred also, in which the Athenians were victorious, those of the Syracusans on the right wing fleeing to the city, those on the left along the river. Wishing to cut off the latter from the crossing, the three hundred picked men of the Athenians pushed on at a run to the bridge.

6.101.5

But the Syracusans became alarmed, and, as most of their cavalry was there, closed with these three hundred, routed them, and attacked the right wing of the Athenians. On their charge the first division of this wing also became involved in the panic.

6.101.6

And Lamachus, seeing this, came to their aid from his own place on the left wing, with a few bowmen and the Argives, whom he took with him; and advancing across a ditch and being cut off with a few of those who had crossed with him, he was killed himself and five or six of his followers. These the Syracusans at once hastily snatched up and succeeded in carrying over the river to safety, themselves retreating when the rest of the Athenian army began now to advance.

6.102.1

Meanwhile those of them who had fled at first to the city, seeing what was going on, themselves took courage, and coming back from the city drew up against the Athenians in front of them; and they sent a part of their number against the round fort on Epipolae, thinking that they would find it without defenders and be able to take it.

6.102.2

And they did indeed take and demolish their outwork of one thousand feet in length, but the round fort itself Nicias prevented their taking; for he happened to have been left behind there on account of illness. He ordered the attendants to set fire to the engines and wood that had been thrown down before the wall, seeing that they would be unable through lack of men to be saved in any other way.

6.102.3

And it turned out so; for the Syracusans, coming no nearer because of the fire, now retreated. And, besides, reinforcements were already coming up to the round fort from the Athenians below, who had chased away the enemy there, and their ships at the same time were sailing down, as they had been ordered, from Thapsus into the Great Harbour.

6.102.4

Seeing these things, the men on the heights and the main army of the Syracusans hastily withdrew into the city, thinking that with the force they then had at their disposal they could no longer prevent the building of the wall to the sea.

6.103.1

After this the Athenians set up a trophy and restored their dead to the Syracusans under truce, themselves getting back the bodies of Lamachus and his men. The whole of their armament being now present, both fleet and land-force, starting from the bluff of Epipolae they proceeded to cut off the Syracusans by a double wall down to the sea.

6.103.2

Provisions were coming in for the army from all quarters of Italy. And there came also as allies to the Athenians many of the Sicels, who before had been hesitating, and from Tyrrhenia three fifty-oared galleys. And other matters were progressing according to their hopes.

6.103.3

For the Syracusans no longer thought they could win at war, as no aid had come to them even from the Peloponnesus; and indeed they were discussing terms of agreement, not only among themselves, but even with Nicias, who now since the death of Lamachus had sole command.

6.103.4

No decision was reached; but, as is natural when men are in perplexity and more straitly besieged than before, many proposals were made to him, and still more were discussed in the city. For under their present evils they had some suspicion even of one another; and the generals under whose lead these things had happened were deposed, on the ground that their disasters were due to their ill-luck or treachery, and in their stead were chosen Heracleides, Eucles, and Tellias.

6.104.1

Meanwhile Gylippus the Lacedaemonian and the ships from Corinth

6.104.1

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6.104.1

were already at Leucas, proposing to bring aid to Sicily in all haste. As the reports that were coming to them were alarming and all to the same false purport, that Syracuse had already been completely walled off, Gylippus no longer had any hope of Sicily, but wishing to save Italy, he himself and Pythen the Corinthian, with two Laconian vessels and two Corinthian, crossed the Ionian gulf to Tarentum as quickly as possible; while the Corinthians, after manning, in addition to their own ten, two Leucadian and three Ambracian ships, were to sail later.

6.104.2

From Tarentum, Gylippus, after first going on a mission to Thuria, on account of his father having been once a citizen there,

6.104.2

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6.104.2

and failing to win them over, weighed anchor and sailed along the coast of Italy. Caught by a wind, which settling in the north blows violently in that region, he was carried out to sea, and then after a most violent storm again reached Tarentum; and there hauling ashore all of his ships that had suffered from the storm he set to repairing them.

6.104.3

But Nicias, although he heard that he was sailing up, despised the small number of his ships, just as the Thurians had done, and thinking they were coming equipped rather as privateers than as men-of-war, he took as yet no precautions.

6.105.1

About the same time in this summer, the Lacedaemonians and their allies invaded Argos and ravaged most of the country. And the Athenians brought succour to the Argives with thirty ships, an act which violated their treaty with the Lacedaemonians in the most overt manner.

6.105.2

For before this they waged the war, in cooperation with the Argives and Mantineans, by predatory excursions from Pylos and by making landings round the rest of the Peloponnesus rather than in Laconia; and although the Argives frequently urged them only to make a landing with arms on Laconian territory, devastate in concert with them even the least part, and then go away, they refused. But at this time, under the command of Pythodorus, Laespodias, and Demaratus, they landed at Epidaurus Limera, Prasiae, and other places, and laid waste some of their territory, and so gave the Lacedaemonians from now on a more plausible excuse for defending themselves against the Athenians.

6.105.3

After the Athenians had withdrawn from Argos with their ships, and the Lacedaemonians also had retired, the Argives made an incursion into Phliasia, ravaging part of their land and killing some of the inhabitants, and then returned home.

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