History of the Peloponnesian War

Thucydides

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7.1.1

Gylippus and Pythen, after refitting their ships, sailed from Tarentum along the coast to Epizephyrian Locri; and receiving now more positive information that Syracuse was not yet completely invested, but that it was still possible to come with an army and enter it by way of Epipolae, they deliberated whether they should risk sailing into the harbour, keeping Sicily on the right, or, keeping it on the left, should first sail to Himera and then, after having added to their forces the Himeraeans themselves and such others as they might persuade, should proceed overland.

7.1.2

They decided to sail to Himera, especially since the four Athenian ships—which Nicias did after all

7.1.2

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7.1.2

despatch when he learned that the enemy's ships were at Locri—had not yet arrived at Rhegium. They succeeded in crossing the strait before the arrival of this watch-squadron, and after touching at Rhegium and Messene, arrived at Himera.

7.1.3

While there they persuaded the Himeraeans to help them in the war, not only by going on the expedition themselves, but also by furnishing arms for such of the crews of their ships as had none (for their ships they had beached at Himera), and also sent a request to the Selinuntians to meet them at a certain place with all their forces.

7.1.4

A small body of troops was also promised them by the Geloans and some of the Sicels, who were now ready to join them with far greater alacrity, both because of the recent death of Archonidas, who, being king of certain Sicel tribes of that region and a man of influence, had been a friend of the Athenians, and also because Gylippus had apparently come from Lacedaemon full of zeal.

7.1.5

So Gylippus, taking of his own seamen and of the marines those that were equipped with arms, about seven hundred, of Himeraean hoplites and light-armed troops together one thousand and one hundred cavalry, of the Selinuntians some light-armed troops and cavalry, a few Geloans, and of the Sicels about one thousand in all, advanced against Syracuse.

7.2.1

Meanwhile the Corinthians had put to sea from Leucas with the rest of their ships and were bringing aid as fast as they could; indeed, Gongylus, one of the Corinthian commanders, though he had set out last with a single ship, was the first to arrive at Syracuse, being a little ahead of Gylippus. Finding the Syracusans on the point of holding an assembly to discuss the abandonment of the war, he prevented the meeting and encouraged them, saying that not only were still other ships about to arrive, but also Gylippus son of Cleandridas, who had been sent by the Lacedaemonians to assume the command.

7.2.2

The Syracusans were encouraged, and at once went out with their whole army to meet Gylippus;

7.2.3

for they were informed that he was already near. He, after taking on his way the Sicel fort of Ietae and marshalling his men in readiness for battle, reached Epipolae; and ascending it by way of Euryelus, where the Athenians also had made their ascent at first,

7.2.3

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7.2.3

he formed a junction with the Syracusans and advanced against the wall of the Athenians.

7.2.4

And he happened to have come at the critical moment when the double wall

7.2.4

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of seven or eight stadia in extent had already been completed by the Athenians down to the Great Harbour, except for a short stretch next to the sea, where they were still building. As for the rest of the encircling line, stones had already been dumped along the greater part of the stretch which ran to Trogilus and the outer sea, and it was left so, some parts half finished, other parts quite finished. So close had Syracuse come to destruction.

7.3.1

The Athenians were at first thrown into a tumult by the sudden attack of Gylippus and the Syracusans, but drew up to meet them. But Gylippus halted near them under arms and sent forward a herald to say that if they were willing to quit Sicily within five days, taking what belonged to them, he was ready to make a truce.

7.3.2

They, however, treated the messenger with contempt and sent him back without any answer. After this they prepared for battle against one another.

7.3.3

But Gylippus, seeing that the Syracusans were in a state of confusion and could not readily get into line, led his troops back into the more open ground. And Nicias did not lead the Athenians against him, but kept quiet near his own wall. When Gylippus saw that they were not coming up, he led his army off the field to the height called Temenites, and they bivouacked there.

7.3.4

But on the next day he led out the main body of his army and stationed it opposite the walls of the Athenians, in order to prevent their sending reinforcements to any other point; then, sending a detachment against the fort at Labdalum, he captured it and put to death all whom he took in it; for the place (it should be explained) was not within sight of the Athenians.

7.3.5

On the same day, too, an Athenian trireme that was keeping watch at the mouth of the Great Harbour was captured by the Syracusans.

7.4.1

After this the Syracusans and their allies proceeded to build a single wall running upwards from the city across Epipolae at an angle with the Athenian wall, in order that the Athenians, if they could not prevent its completion, might no longer be able to wall them off.

7.4.2

By this time the Athenians had finished their wall next to the sea and had come up to the high ground; and Gylippus, since a certain part of the Athenian wall was weak, took his army by night and advanced against this.

7.4.3

But the Athenians, who happened to be bivouacking outside the walls, perceived this movement and advanced against him; and he, on observing this, quickly led his men back again. The Athenians accordingly built this part of the wall higher and kept guard there themselves;

7.4.4

but their allies they now disposed along the rest of the wall, at the points where they were each to keep guard. Nicias determined also to fortify the place called Plemmyrium, a headland opposite the city, which juts out in front of the Great Harbour and makes its entrance narrow. If this were fortified, it seemed to him that the bringing in of supplies would be an easier matter; for the Athenians could keep watch upon the harbour of the Syracusans at nearer range, and would not, as now, be obliged to put out against the enemy from the inner bay of the Great Harbour, should they show any activity with their fleet. And in general from now on he gave his attention more to naval warfare, seeing that matters on land were less hopeful for themselves, now that Gylippus had come.

7.4.5

Accordingly, taking over his ships and some troops he built three forts, in which most of the stores were deposited; and the large boats and the ships of war were now moored there.

7.4.6

And it was especially in consequence of this that the condition of the crews then first began to decline. For their water supply was scanty and not near at hand, and at the same time, whenever the sailors went out to fetch firewood they suffered heavily at the hands of the Syracusan horsemen, who overran the country. For the Syracusans had posted a third part of their cavalry at the hamlet near the Olympieum on account of the troops at Plemmyrium, that these might not go out and commit depredations.

7.4.7

Meanwhile Nicias, learning that the rest of the Corinthian ships were sailing up, sent twenty vessels to watch for them, with orders to waylay them in the neighbourhood of Locri, Rhegium, or the approach to Sicily.

7.5.1

Gylippus, on the other hand, continued to build the wall across Epipolae, using the stones which the Athenians had previously dumped along the line for their own use, and at the same time he continually led out the Syracusans and their allies and drew them up before the wall; and the Athenians would always draw up to meet them.

7.5.2

But when it seemed to Gylippus that the right moment had come, he commenced the onset; and coming to close quarters they fought between the walls, where the cavalry of the Syracusans was of no use.

7.5.3

And when the Syracusans and their allies had been defeated and had taken up their dead under a truce, and the Athenians had set up a trophy, Gylippus called his troops together and said that the mistake was not theirs but his own, for by arranging his line of battle too much between the walls he had deprived them of the benefit of their cavalry and javelin-men. He would therefore now lead them on again, and he urged them to make up their minds to this—that in point of men and equipment they would not be inferior;

7.5.4

and as for their spirit, it was not to be endured if they, being Peloponnesians and Dorians, confronting Ionians and islanders and a mixed rabble, were not going to make it a point of honour to conquer them and drive them out of the country.

7.6.1

After this, when there was a favourable opportunity, he led them on again. Now Nicias and the Athenians thought that, even if the Syracusans were unwilling to begin fighting, they themselves could not possibly look idly on while the wall was being built past their own—for already the enemy's wall had all but passed the end of the Athenians' wall, and if it once got by, from then on it would be all one to them whether they fought and conquered in every battle or did not fight at all— accordingly they advanced against the Syracusans.

7.6.2

And Gylippus, leading forth his hoplites more outside the walls than before, closed with the enemy, having his cavalry and javelin-men posted on the flank of the Athenians, in the open space where the work on both walls ended.

7.6.3

And in the battle his cavalry attacked the left wing of the Athenians, which was opposed to them, and routed it; and in consequence of this the rest of the army also was beaten by the Syracusans and driven headlong within the fortifications.

7.6.4

And the following night they succeeded in building their wall beyond the works of the Athenians and in getting past, so that they themselves were no longer hampered by them, and had altogether deprived the Athenians, even if they should be victorious, of the possibility of ever investing them.

7.7.1

After this the remaining twelve ships of the Corinthians, Ambraciots, and Leucadians,

7.7.1

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7.7.1

which were under the command of Erasinides, a Corinthian, sailed into the harbour, eluding the watch kept by the Athenians, and helped the Syracusans to build the rest of their cross-wall.

7.7.2

And Gylippus went into the other districts of Sicily to collect reinforcements for both his army and his navy, and at the same time to win over any of the cities that were either not zealously supporting the war or still held altogether aloof from it.

7.7.3

And another set of envoys representing the Syracusans and the Corinthians were despatched to Lacedaemon and Corinth, in order that further troops might be sent across the sea in whatever way might be available—in merchant-ships, small craft, or in any other way whatever—in view of the fact that the Athenians also were sending home for fresh troops.

7.7.4

Moreover, the Syracusans were manning a fleet and practising with a view to trying their hand at sea also; and in general they were much encouraged.

7.8.1

Nicias, perceiving this and seeing the enemy's strength and his own perplexities increasing day by day, on his part also sent word to Athens on many occasions, giving detailed reports of what was happening, and especially now, because he thought that they were in a critical situation and that there was no hope of safety unless the Athenians, with all possible speed, should either recall them or send out reinforcements in no small numbers.

7.8.2

But fearing that his messengers might not report the actual facts, either through inability to speak or from lapse of memory,

7.8.2

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7.8.2

or because they wanted to please the crowd, wrote a letter, thinking that in this way the Athenians would best learn his own view, obscured in no way by any fault on the part of the messenger, and could thus deliberate about the true situation.

7.8.3

So the messengers whom he sent departed, bearing the letter and the verbal reports which they were to deliver; but as regards the camp, the object of his care was now rather to keep on the defensive than to run voluntary risks.

7.9.1

At the end of the same summer Euetion, an Athenian general, made in concert with Perdiccas an expedition against Amphipolis with a large force of Thracians, and though he failed to take the city, brought some triremes round into the Strymon and blockaded it from the river, using Himeraeum as his base. So the summer ended.

7.10.1

The following winter the messengers of Nicias, on reaching Athens, gave the messages which they had been ordered to give by word of mouth, answering any questions that were asked, and delivered the letter. And the clerk of the city came before the Athenians and read them the letter, which ran as follows:

7.11.1

"What has been done before this, Athenians, you have been informed in many earlier letters; but now it is more than ever the time for you to learn in what condition we are and then to take counsel.

7.11.2

When in most of our battles we had beaten the Syracusans, against whom we were sent, and had built the fortifications in which we now are, there came Gylippus, a Lacedaemonian, with an army collected from the Peloponnesus and from some of the cities in Sicily. In the first battle he was defeated by us, but on the next day, under pressure from their numerous cavalry and javelin-men, we drew back within our walls.

7.11.3

At the present time, then, we have discontinued our work of circumvallation on account of the superior numbers of the enemy and are keeping quiet; for we cannot use our whole army because the guarding of the walls has absorbed a part of our heavy-armed force. The enemy meanwhile have built a single wall past ours, so that it is no longer possible to invest them, unless one should assault this counter-wall with a large force and take it.

7.11.4

So it has turned out that we, who are supposed to be besieging others, are rather ourselves under siege, at least by land; for we cannot even go far into the country because of their cavalry.

7.12.1

"And they have also sent envoys to the Peloponnesus for another army, and Gylippus has gone to the cities of Sicily, to persuade such of them as are now neutral to join them in the war, and to bring from other cities, if he can, still further reinforcements for his army and navy.

7.12.2

For they plan, as I hear, to make an attempt upon our walls with their land-force and at the same time to try their luck at sea also with their fleet.

7.12.3

And let it not seem incredible to any of you that they will try also by sea. For our fleet, as the enemy also have learned, though at first it was in prime condition as regards both the soundness

7.12.3

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7.12.3

of the ships and the unimpaired condition of the crews, is not so now; the ships are water-logged, from having been at sea for so long a time already, and the crews have wasted away.

7.12.4

For it is not possible to draw the ships up on shore and dry them out, because the fleet of the enemy, which is quite a match for us and in number is even superior, keeps us in continual expectation that it will sail against us.

7.12.5

They keep practising in plain view; the initiative to make attack lies with them; and they have a better opportunity to dry their ships than we, for they are not blockading others.

7.13.1

"We, on the contrary, could hardly enjoy this advantage even if we had a great superiority in the number of our ships, and were not compelled, as now, to use them all for guard-duty. For if we relax our vigilance ever so little, we shall not have our supplies, which are even now with difficulty brought past their city and into our camp.

7.13.2

And our crews have been and are still being wasted, for the reason that our sailors, forced to go out to a distance for wood and forage and water, are constantly being killed by the cavalry. And now that we have been reduced to equal terms with the enemy, our servants are deserting. Of the mercenaries also, some, who embarked on our ships under compulsion, go home to their cities on the first opportunity; others, who were in the first place stirred by the prospects of high pay and thought they were going to make money rather than to fight, now that, contrary to their expectation, they see on the enemy's side the fleet and everything else offering resistance, either go over as professed

7.13.2

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7.13.2

deserters, or get away as best they can—for Sicily is large—and there are also some who, being themselves engaged in traffic, have persuaded the trierarchs to take Hyccarian slaves on board in their stead, and thus have robbed our navy of its perfection of discipline.

7.14.1

"You to whom I write understand that a crew only keeps at its prime for a short space,

7.14.1

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7.14.1

and that it is only a few of the sailors who can both set a ship in motion and keep the oar-strokes in time.

7.14.2

But of all these difficulties, that which causes me most distress is that I, the general, cannot prevent these abuses—for the temper of you Athenians is hard to control—and that we have no source from which to get recruits for manning our ships, while the enemy has many sources of supply; on the contrary, the resources that we brought with us must suffice for our present needs as well as make up for our constant losses;

7.14.2

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7.14.2

for the only cities that are now in alliance with us, Naxos and Catana, cannot help us in this.

7.14.3

And if but one advantage more shall be gained by the enemy—that the regions of Italy which supply us with food, seeing in what plight we are and that you are not sending reinforcements, should go over to the enemy—the war will be all over for them without a battle, for we shall be besieged into surrender. "I could have written you things more pleasant than these, but certainly not more useful, if you are to have full knowledge of the situation here before deciding upon your course;

7.14.4

and, besides, knowing as I do your tempers—that you do indeed prefer to hear what is most pleasant, but afterwards find fault if the results are in any respect disappointing—I have thought it safer to reveal the truth.

7.15.1

“And now I beg you to believe that neither your soldiers nor your generals have been blameworthy so far as concerns the original objects of our expedition; but since all Sicily is united and the enemy expects another army from the Peloponnesus, decide at once upon a course of action, knowing that the troops which are now here are not a match even for the enemy which at present confronts us, but that you must either recall these or send to reinforce it another armament equally large, both army and fleet, and no small amount of money; and you must send a general to relieve me, since I am unable to remain because of a disease of the kidneys.

7.15.2

And I submit that I have a claim upon your indulgence, for when I was strong I served you well in many a position of command. But whatever you intend to do, do it promptly at the opening of spring and without postponements, knowing that the enemy will procure fresh resources, some near at hand in Sicily, and others from the Peloponnesus, and that these last, though they will arrive less promptly, nevertheless, if you do not take care, will either elude you as they did before, or else outstrip you.”

7.16.1

Such were the disclosures made by the letter of Nicias. But when the Athenians heard it read, they did not relieve Nicias of his command, but in order that he might not to have to face his difficulties alone while in ill-health, they chose two men who were on the spot, Menander and Euthydemus,

7.16.1

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7.16.1

to assist him until the arrival of the other two who should be chosen as his colleagues. And they voted to send another armament, both land-force and fleet, to be recruited from the Athenians on the muster-roll and from the allies.

7.16.2

And as colleagues for Nicias they elected Demosthenes

7.16.2

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7.16.2

son of Alcisthenes, and Eurymedon

7.16.2

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7.16.2

son of Thucles. Eurymedon was despatched to Sicily immediately, about the time of the winter solstice, with ten ships; and he took with him one hundred and twenty talents of silver,

7.16.2

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7.16.2

and at the same time bore a message to the army in Sicily that reinforcements would come and that care would be taken of them.

7.17.1

But Demosthenes remained behind and busied himself with preparations for his departure, which he planned to make at the opening of spring, sending to the allies requisitions for troops and getting ready at home money and ships and hoplites.

7.17.2

And the Athenians also sent twenty ships round the Peloponnesus, to see that no one should cross over from Corinth and the Peloponnesus to Sicily.

7.17.3

For the Corinthians, when the Syracusan envoys arrived and reported that the situation in Sicily was more favourable, felt much greater confidence than before, thinking that their former despatch of the fleet had been well timed, and accordingly not only were they themselves preparing to send hoplites to Sicily in merchant-ships, but also the Lacedaemonians were intending in the same manner to despatch troops from the rest of the Peloponnesus.

7.17.4

The Corinthians were also manning twenty-five ships, in order that they might try an engagement with the squadron on watch at Naupactus

7.17.4

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7.17.4

and that the Athenians at Naupactus might not find it so easy to prevent their merchant-vessels from putting to sea, since they would be busy keeping watch upon the triremes arrayed against them.

7.18.1

The Lacedaemonians were also making ready for their invasion of Attica, both in accordance with their previous resolution and because the Syracusans and Corinthians urged it, when they heard of the reinforcements to be sent from the Athenians to Sicily, so that, as they said, these might be wholly prevented by the invasion. And Alcibiades was likewise insistently telling them that they should fortify Deceleia and not relax their efforts in the war.

7.18.2

But most important of all was the fact that a degree of confidence had come to the Lacedaemonians, because they believed that the Athenians, once they had on their hands a twofold war—with themselves and with the Siceliots—would be more easily overthrown, and because they regarded the Athenians as having been the first to break the treaty. In the former war

7.18.2

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7.18.2

they felt that the transgression had been rather on their own part; for the Thebans had entered Plataea in time of truce,

7.18.2

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7.18.2

and, although it had been stipulated in the former agreements

7.18.2

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7.18.2

that neither party was to resort to arms if the other were willing to submit the question to arbitration, yet they themselves refused to respond to the summons when the Athenians invited them to arbitrate. On this account they considered that they deserved their misfortune, having in mind both the disaster at Pylos

7.18.2

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7.18.2

and any other that had befallen them.

7.18.3

But now the Athenians, setting out from Argos with thirty ships,

7.18.3

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7.18.3

had ravaged a part of Epidaurus and Prasiae and other places, and at the same time were making predatory excursions from Pylos; and as often as differences arose about any of the points of dispute in the treaty and the Lacedaemonians proposed arbitration, they were unwilling to resort to it; at this time, therefore, the Lacedaemonians, considering that the unlawful conduct, of which they had themselves formerly been guilty, had shifted round and now rested upon the Athenians, were zealous for the war.

7.18.4

And during this winter they sent out requisitions for iron to their allies, and in general were making ready the tools needed in the fortification of Deceleia. And at the same time they were not only devising on their own part ways and means for sending reinforcements in merchant-ships to the army in Sicily, but were also compelling the rest of the Peloponnesians to do likewise. So the winter ended, and with it the eighteenth year of this war of which Thucydides wrote the history.

7.19.1

At the very beginning of the next spring,

7.19.1

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7.19.1

earlier than ever before, the Lacedaemonians and their allies invaded Attica, under the command of Agis son of Archidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians. And at first they ravaged the plain of Attica and then proceeded to fortify Deceleia,

7.19.1

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7.19.1

apportioning the work to the several allied states.

7.19.2

Deceleia is distant from the city of Athens about one hundred and twenty stadia, and about the same distance, or not much more, from Boeotia. The purpose of the fort they were building was to dominate the plain and the most fertile parts of the country, with a view to devastating them, and it was visible as far as the city of Athens.

7.19.3

And while the Peloponnesians in Attica and their allies were building this fort, those in the Peloponnesus were at the same time despatching the hoplites in merchant-ships to Sicily, the Lacedaemonians having picked out the best of the Helots and Neodamodes,

7.19.3

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7.19.3

of both together about six hundred hoplites, with Eccritus the Spartan as commander, and the Boeotians having selected three hundred hoplites, in command of whom were Xenon and Nicon, both Thebans, and Hegesander, a Thespian.

7.19.4

Now these set out in the first contingent from Taenarus in Laconia and made for the open sea; and following them, but not long afterwards, the Corinthians sent out five hundred hoplites, some from Corinth itself, others being Arcadians whom they had taken on for hire, appointing in command of them Alexarchus, a Corinthian. The Sicyonians also despatched at the same time as the Corinthians two hundred hoplites under the command of Sargeus, a Sicyonian.

7.19.5

Meanwhile the twenty-five Corinthian ships, which had been manned during the winter, lay opposite the twenty Athenian ships at Naupactus, until their hoplites in the merchant-ships had got well on their voyage from the Peloponnesus; it was for this purpose, indeed, that they had been manned in the first place—that the Athenians might not give their attention so much to the merchant-ships as to the triremes.

7.20.1

Meanwhile the Athenians, simultaneously with the fortification of Deceleia and at the very beginning of spring, sent thirty ships round the Peloponnesus under the command of Charicles son of Apollodorus, whose orders were on reaching Argos to summon to the ships Argive hoplites, in accordance with the terms of their alliance.

7.20.2

And they also were setting Demosthenes on his way to Sicily, as they had planned to do, with fifty Athenian ships and five Chian, twelve hundred Athenian hoplites from the muster-roll, and as many islanders as it was possible to get into their service from each place; and from their other allies who were subjects they collected whatever these had anywhere that was serviceable for the war. But Demosthenes had received instructions first of all, as he was sailing round, to co-operate with Charicles in his operations on the coast of Laconia.

7.20.3

So he sailed to Aegina and waited there for any part of the armament that had been left behind, and also until Charicles should take on board the Argive hoplites.

7.21.1

In Sicily, during the same spring and at about the same time, Gylippus returned to Syracuse, bringing from each of the cities which he had prevailed upon as large a body of troops as he could secure.

7.21.2

And calling together the Syracusans, he told them that they should man as many ships as possible and try their luck in fighting at sea; for he hoped thereby to accomplish something for the furtherance of the war that would be worth the risk.

7.21.3

And Hermocrates most of all joined in urging them not to be faint-hearted about attacking the Athenians with their ships, saying that with the Athenians also their maritime skill was not a legacy from their fathers or a possession for all time, but that on the contrary they were originally more landsmen than the Syracusans, and had only taken to the sea when forced to do so by the Persians. He added that those who with daring confront daring men like the Athenians appear most formidable to them; for that quality which enables the Athenians to terrorize their neighbours, to whom they are sometimes not superior in power, though they always attack them with confidence—this very quality the Syracusans would likewise exhibit to their opponents.

7.21.4

And lie said that he was well aware that the Syracusans, by daring unexpectedly to make a stand against the Athenian fleet, would have an advantage over them, dismayed as they would be on that account, which would more than outweigh the damage which the Athenians might inflict by their skill on the inexperience of the Syracusans.

7.21.5

He urged them, therefore, to proceed to the trial of their fleet and not to shrink from it. So the Syracusans, under the persuasions of Gylippus, Hermocrates, and perhaps others, were eager for the sea-fight and began to man the slips.

7.22.1

When the fleet was ready, Gylippus led out his whole land-force under cover of night, intending in person to make an assault by land upon the forts of Plemmyrium, and at the same time, on a preconcerted signal, thirty-five Syracusan triremes sailed to the attack from the Great Harbour, while forty-five sailed round from the lesser harbour, where their ship-yard was, purposing to form a junction with those inside the harbour and simultaneously attack Plemmyrium, so that the Athenians, thus assailed from both directions, might be thrown into confusion.

7.22.2

But the Athenians, hastily manning sixty ships to oppose them, with twenty-five engaged the thirty-five Syracusan ships that were in the Great Harbour, and with the rest went to meet the squadron that was sailing round from the ship-yard. And so they at once engaged in battle in front of the mouth of the Great Harbour, and for a long time held out against one another, one side wishing to force the entrance, the other to prevent this.

7.23.1

Meanwhile Gylippus, noticing that the Athenians on Plemmyrium had gone down to the sea and were giving their attention to the sea-fight, surprised them by making a sudden attack at daybreak upon the forts; and first he captured the largest, and afterwards the two smaller ones also, their garrisons not awaiting the attack when they saw the largest so easily taken.

7.23.2

Of the garrison of the fort that was taken first, all that succeeded in escaping to the boats and to a certain merchant ship were rescued and brought to camp, but it was with difficulty; for the Syracusans were at the time having the best of the fight with their ships in the Great Harbour, and a trireme, and that a fast sailer, was sent in pursuit. But when the other two forts were taken, the Syracusans, as it chanced, were by this time losing the fight, and those who fled from these forts had less difficulty in sailing past them.

7.23.3

For the Syracusan ships that were fighting in front of the entrance, after they had forced back the Athenian ships, sailed into the harbour in disorder, and falling foul of one another made a present of their victory to the Athenians, who routed not only this squadron but also the ships by which they were at first being beaten inside the harbour.

7.23.4

And they sank eleven of the Syracusan ships, slaying most of the men, except only the crews of three ships, whom they took alive; but of their own ships three were destroyed. And drawing up on shore the wrecks of the Syracusan ships and setting up a trophy on the little island that faces Plemmyrium, they withdrew to their own camp.

7.24.1

The Syracusans had fared thus in the sea-fight, but they held possession of the forts on Plemmyrium and set up three trophies for these. One of the two forts last taken they demolished, but the other two they repaired and garrisoned.

7.24.2

In the capture of the forts many men were killed or made prisoners, and much property in all was taken; for since the Athenians used the forts as a warehouse, there were in them many wares belonging to merchants as well as food, and also much property belonging to the trierarchs

7.24.2

1

7.24.2

—in fact the sails and other tackle of forty triremes were taken there, as well as three triremes that had been drawn up on shore.

7.24.3

But the greatest and most serious blow suffered by the Athenian army was the taking of Plemmyrium; for the work of bringing in provisions through the entrance to the harbour could no longer be carried on with safety (since the Syracusans lying in wait there with ships hindered this, and from now on the convoys could only make their entrance by fighting), and in general this event brought consternation and discouragement to the army.

7.25.1

After this the Syracusans sent out twelve ships under the command of Agatharchus, a Syracusan. One of these headed for the Peloponnesus, having on board some envoys who were to explain the situation in Sicily, that they were full of hope, and to urge the still more vigorous prosecution of the war on the continent of Greece. The other eleven ships sailed to Italy,

7.25.1

1

7.25.1

since they heard that boats laden with supplies for the Athenians were approaching. And falling in with these boats, they destroyed most of them;

7.25.2

and they also burned some timber in the territory of Caulonia, which was lying there ready for the Athenians to use in ship-building.

7.25.3

After this they went to Locri, and while they were lying there at anchor, one of the merchant-ships that had sailed from the Peloponnesus arrived in port, bringing some Thespian hoplites.

7.25.4

Taking these on board their ships, the Syracusans sailed along the coast toward home. But the Athenians, who were watching for them at Megara with twenty ships, captured one ship together with its crew, but they could not take the rest, which escaped to Syracuse. Skirmishing also occurred in the harbour about the piles which the Syracusans drove down in the sea in front of their old dockyards with the object that the ships might lie moored inside the piles and the Athenians might not sail up and ram their ships.

7.25.5

The Athenians brought up against the piles a ship of ten thousand talents

7.25.5

1

7.25.5

burden on whose deck were wooden towers and bulwarks;

7.25.6

then from small boats they attached ropes to the piles and pulled them up with windlasses or broke them off, or else they dived down and sawed them off. Meanwhile the Syracusans kept hurling missiles at them from the dockyards, and they returned the fire from the merchant-ship; and finally the Athenians destroyed most of the piles. But the most troublesome part of the stockade was that which was out of sight;

7.25.7

for there were some of the piles which they had driven down so that they did not project above the surface of the water, and consequently it was dangerous to approach the stockade, for any one if he did not look out might impale his ship as on a sunken rock. But these also were disposed of by divers, who dived down and sawed them off for pay. But nevertheless the Syracusans drove their piles down again.

7.25.8

And they contrived many other devices against one another, as might be expected when the two armies were in hostile array so near to each other;

7.25.9

and they resorted to skirmishing and to stratagems of every sort. The Syracusans also sent to the Sicilian cities Corinthian, Ambraciot and Lacedaemonian envoys, to report the capture of Plemmyrium and to explain in regard to the sea-fight that they had been defeated, not so much by the strength of the enemy, as by their own confusion; and in general they were to declare that they were full of hope and to beg the cities to give them aid against the enemy with both ships and land-forces, seeing that the Athenians on their part were expecting another army, and, if the Syracusans could forestall them by destroying the present army before the new one came, the war would be at an end. The forces in Sicily were thus occupied.

7.26.1

But as for Demosthenes,

7.26.1

1

7.26.1

when the army was collected with which he was to bring aid to Sicily, he set out from Aegina, and sailing to the Peloponnesus effected a junction with Charicles and the Athenian fleet of thirty ships. Then taking on board some Argive hoplites, they sailed against Laconia, ravaging first a part of Epidaurus Limera;

7.26.2

then landing on the coast of Laconia opposite Cythera, where the sanctuary of Apollo is, they ravaged portions of the land and fortified a place shaped like an isthmus, in order that the Helots of the Lacedaemonians might desert thither and that at the same time marauders might make it, as they had made Pylos, a base for their operations.

7.26.3

Immediately afterwards, when he had taken part in occupying this place, Demosthenes sailed on toward Corcyra, in order that he might first take aboard some allied troops there, and then make the voyage to Sicily as quickly as possible. As for Charicles, he waited until he had completed the fortification of the place, and then, leaving a garrison there, sailed back home with his thirty ships, as did the Argives also at the same time.

7.27.1

During this same summer there arrived at Athens thirteen hundred peltasts of the dirk-bearing Thracians of the tribe of Dii, who were to have sailed to Sicily with Demosthenes. But since they came too late, the Athenians were disposed to send them back to Thrace whence they had come.

7.27.2

To keep them for the war that was being carried on from Deceleia seemed too expensive, since each received as pay a drachma a day.

7.27.3

It should be explained regarding Deceleia that, from the time when it was first fortified during this summer by the entire army and was then regularly occupied for the annoyance of the country by garrisons furnished by the several allied states and succeeding each other at fixed intervals of time, its occupation did much harm to the Athenians, and by destruction of property and wastage of men was one of the chief causes that brought ruin to their cause.

7.27.4

For before this summer the enemy's invasions, being of short duration, did not prevent the Athenians from making full use of the land during the rest of the year; but at this time, the occupation being continuous, the enemy sometimes invading the country with a larger force and at others the regular garrison overrunning the country, as it was compelled to do, and carrying off booty, while Agis, the king of the Lacedaemonians, who was present in person, carried on the war in no desultory fashion, the Athenians were suffering great damage.

7.27.5

For they were deprived of their whole territory, more than twenty thousand slaves had already deserted, a large proportion of these being artisans, and all their small cattle and beasts of burden were lost; and now that the cavalry were sallying forth every day, making demonstrations against Deceleia and keeping guard throughout the country, some horses were constantly going lame because of the rocky ground and the incessant hardships they had to endure, and some were continually being wounded.

7.28.1

There was this further disadvantage: the bringing in of provisions from Euboea, which had formerly been managed more expeditiously by way of Oropus overland through Deceleia, now became expensive, the route being by sea round Sunium. Everything alike which the city needed had to be imported, and Athens ceased to be a city and became a garrisoned fortress.

7.28.2

For the Athenians had to keep guard at the battlements, during the day by relays, but at night everybody except the cavalry, some doing duty at the watch-posts, others upon the wall, both summer and winter, and so suffered great hardships. But what weighed most heavily upon them was that they had two wars on their hands at the same time;

7.28.3

and yet they had been brought to such a pitch of determination as no one would have credited before it happened, if he had heard of it. That they, who were themselves being besieged by the Peloponnesians by means of a fortress in their country, should not even thus abandon Sicily, but should in turn be there besieging Syracuse in the same manner, a city which taken by itself is not smaller than the city of Athens; and that they should have caused the Hellenic world to make so amazing a miscalculation of their power and daring —inasmuch as at the beginning of the war some thought that they could hold out one year, others two years, others longer but never more than three years, if the Peloponnesians should invade their country—that in the seventeenth year after the first invasion of Attica they should have gone to Sicily, when already war-worn in all respects, and should have undertaken another war no whit less serious than that which was already being waged with the Peloponnesus—this, I say, was incredible.

7.28.4

For all these reasons, and because at that time Deceleia was doing them much injury and the general expenses which were accruing were very great, they became crippled in the matter of money; and it was at this time that they imposed upon their subjects, instead of a tribute, a duty of five per cent. on all commodities imported or exported by sea, thinking that in this way they should derive more revenue. For their expenses were not on the same scale as before, but had become far heavier, in proportion as the war had become greater, and their revenues were steadily failing.

7.29.1

As for the Thracians,

7.29.1

1

7.29.1

then, who had come too late for Demosthenes, the Athenians immediately sent them back, being unwilling on account of the present shortage of money to incur expense; and they commissioned Dieitrephes to conduct them, giving him instructions to use them, as he sailed along the coast (for they would go by way of the Euripus), in doing whatever damage he could to the enemy.

7.29.2

So he disembarked them in the territory of Tanagra and made a hasty raid; then he sailed immediately after nightfall from Chalcis in Euboea across the Euripus and landing the Thracians in Boeotian territory led them against Mycalessus.

7.29.3

During the night he bivouacked unobserved near the sanctuary of Hermes, about sixteen stadia distant from Mycalessus, but at daybreak assaulted the town, which was not large, and took it; for he fell upon the people off their guard and not expecting that anybody would ever march so far inland from the sea and attack them; furthermore, their wall was weak, and at some points had even fallen down, while elsewhere it had been built low, and at the same time the gates were open because of their feeling of security.

7.29.4

So the Thracians burst into Mycalessus and fell to plundering the houses and the temples and butchering the people, sparing neither old nor young, but killing all whom they met just as they came, even children and women, aye, pack-animals also and whatever other living things they saw. For the Thracian race, like the worst barbarians, is most bloodthirsty whenever it has nothing to fear. And so on this occasion:

7.29.5

in addition to the general confusion, which was great, every form of destruction ensued, and in particular they fell upon a boys' school, the largest in the town, which the children had just entered, and cut down all of them. And this was a calamity inferior to none that had ever fallen upon a whole city, and beyond any other unexpected and terrible.

7.30.1

When the Thebans heard of this event they hastened to the rescue, and overtaking the Thracians before they had advanced far they took away their booty and putting them to flight pursued them to the Euripus, where the boats which had brought them lay at anchor.

7.30.2

And most of those who fell were slain by the Thebans during the embarkation, for they could not swim, and the crews of the boats, when they saw what was happening on shore, anchored the boats beyond bowshot; for elsewhere as they were retreating

7.30.2

1

7.30.2

the Thracians made their defence against the Theban cavalry, which was the first to attack them, not unskilfully, dashing out against them and closing up their ranks again after the manner of fighting peculiar to their country, and in this few of them perished. And a certain number also were slain in the town itself, being caught there while engaged in plundering. All together there were slain of the Thracians two hundred and fifty out of thirteen hundred.

7.30.3

Of the Thebans and the others who took part in the rescue, in all about twenty horsemen and hoplites perished, and among them Scirphondas, one of the Theban Boeotarchs; and of the population of Mycalessus a considerable portion lost their lives. Such was the fate of Mycalessus, which suffered a calamity that, for the size of the city, was not less deplorable than any of the events of this war.

7.31.1

At this time Demosthenes had finished building the fort in Laconia and was on his way to Corcyra;

7.31.1

1

7.31.1

at Pheia

7.31.1

2

7.31.1

in Elis he found lying at anchor a merchant-ship in which the Corinthian hoplites

7.31.1

3

7.31.1

were about to be carried across to Sicily, and destroyed it; but the crew and the hoplites, having escaped, afterwards found another vessel, and continued their voyage.

7.31.2

After this Demosthenes arrived at Zacynthus and Cephallenia, where he took on board some hoplites and sent to the Messenians of Naupactus for others; he then crossed over to the opposite mainland of Acarnania,

7.31.2

1

7.31.2

to the ports of Alyzeia and Anactorium, which the Athenians held.

7.31.3

While he was attending to these matters, he was met by Eurymedon, who was returning from Sicily, whither he had been sent during the preceding winter

7.31.3

1

7.31.3

with the money for the army; and he reported, among other things, that when he was already on his return voyage he had heard of the capture of Plemmyrium by the Syracusans.

7.31.4

These two were joined by Conon,

7.31.4

1

7.31.4

who was in command at Naupactus and brought word that the twenty-five Corinthian ships

7.31.4

2

7.31.4

which were lying at anchor opposite them did not abandon their hostile attitude, but were intending to fight. He therefore begged them to send him some ships, on the ground that his own eighteen ships were too few to contend against the twenty-five of the enemy.

7.31.5

Accordingly Demosthenes and Eurymedon sent with Conon ten ships, the best sailers of all their fleet, to reinforce the ships at Naupactus. They then directed their own attention to the preparations for collecting troops for the expedition, Eurymedon sailing to Corcyra, where he made levies of hoplites and directed the Corcyraeans to man fifteen ships—he was now exercising the joint command with Demosthenes, to which he had been elected, and turned his face again toward Sicily—while Demosthenes gathered slingers and javelin-men from the region of Acarnania.

7.32.1

Meanwhile the envoys, who after the capture of Plemmyrium had gone from Syracuse to visit the cities of Sicily,

7.32.1

1

7.32.1

had succeeded in their mission, and having raised a body of troops were about to bring them home, when, Nicias, hearing of this in time, sent word to the Sicels

7.32.1

2

7.32.1

who were allies of the Athenians and controlled the territory through which the troops would have to pass—and these were the Centoripes,

7.32.1

3

7.32.1

Alicyaeans and others—that they should not allow the enemy to pass, but should get together and prevent their coming through; they would not, he said, attempt it by any other route, since the Agrigentines had refused to give them passage through their territory.

7.32.2

And when the Siceliots were already on the march, the Sicels did as the Athenians requested, and setting an ambush and falling suddenly upon the Siceliots while they were off their guard, destroyed about eight hundred of them and all the envoys except one, the Corinthian; and he conducted those who made their escape, about fifteen hundred in number, to Syracuse.

7.33.1

About the same time the Camarinaeans

7.33.1

1

7.33.1

also arrived with reinforcements, consisting of five hundred hoplites, three hundred javelin-men, and three hundred bowmen. The Geloans

7.33.1

2

7.33.1

also sent a squadron of five ships and four hundred javelin-men and two hundred cavalry.

7.33.2

For already almost the whole of Sicily—except the Agrigentines, who were neutral, but the rest without exception who had before been watching the course of events—had united with the Syracusans and was giving them aid against the Athenians. As for the Syracusans, after the disaster that happened to them in the country of the Sicels they put off their project of attacking the Athenians immediately;

7.33.3

but Demosthenes and Eurymedon, the army being now ready which they had gathered from Corcyra and the mainland, sailed with all their forces across the Ionian Sea to the Iapygian promontory. Proceeding from there, they touched at the Choerades, which are islands of Iapygia, and took on board their ships some Iapygian javelin-men, one hundred and fifty in number, belonging to the Messapian tribe;

7.33.4

and after they had renewed an old alliance of friendship with Artas, who being a chieftain there had furnished them with the javelin-men, they arrived at Metapontum in Italy. There they persuaded the Metapontines to send with them, in accordance with the terms of their alliance, three hundred javelin-men and two triremes, and taking up these they sailed along the coast to Thuria.

7.33.4

1

7.33.5

At Thuria they found that the faction opposed to the Athenians had recently been expelled in a revolution;

7.33.6

and as they were desirous, after collecting their whole armament at that place, to hold a review of it, on the chance that anyone had been left behind, and also to persuade the Thurians both to take part with them in the expedition with all zeal and, in view of the Athenians' present good fortune, to regard the same persons foes and friends as the Athenians did, they waited at Thuria and dealt with these matters.

7.34.1

About this same time the Peloponnesians in the twenty-five ships which lay facing the Athenian fleet at Naupactus in order to cover the passage of the merchant-ships to Sicily, having made preparations for a fight and having manned some additional ships, so that theirs were now but a little fewer than the Athenian ships, anchored off Erineus

7.34.1

1

7.34.1

in Achaea in the district of Rhypae.

7.34.2

The place where they were anchored was crescent-shaped, and the land army, consisting of the Corinthians and the allies from the neighbourhood, having come to their support, was drawn up on either side of them on the projecting headlands, while the ships held the intervening space blocking the entrance; and the commander of the fleet was Polyanthes, a Corinthian.

7.34.3

Against these the Athenians sailed out from Naupactus with thirty-three ships under the command of Diphilus.

7.34.3

1

7.34.4

At first the Corinthians kept quiet; then the signal was raised, when the moment seemed favourable, and advancing against the Athenians they engaged them. And for a long time they withstood one another. Three ships of the Corinthians were destroyed;

7.34.5

of the Athenian ships, none was sunk outright, but some seven were rendered unseaworthy, being struck full in front and having their foreships stove in by the Corinthian galleys, which had their catheads

7.34.5

1

7.34.5

thicker for this very purpose.

7.34.6

The fight was undecided, so that either side claimed the victory— although the Athenians got possession of the wrecks because the wind drove these out to sea and the Corinthians no longer advanced against them—and they drew apart from one another. And no pursuit was made, nor were prisoners taken on either side; for the Corinthians and Peloponnesians were fighting near the shore and thus easily saved themselves, and on the side of the Athenians no ship was sunk.

7.34.7

But when the Athenians had sailed back to Naupactus, the Corinthians at once set up a trophy in token of victory, because a larger number of the enemy's ships had been disabled by them, and they considered that they had not been beaten for the very reason that made the other side consider themselves not victorious. For the Corinthians regarded themselves as conquerors if they were not decisively beaten, and the Athenians considered themselves defeated if they were not decisively victorious.

7.34.8

When, however, the Peloponnesians had sailed away and their army on land had dispersed, the Athenians also set up a trophy in token of victory, in Achaea at a distance of about twenty stadia from Erineus, where the Corinthians were formerly stationed. And so the sea-fight ended.

7.35.1

Demosthenes and Eurymedon,

7.35.1

1

7.35.1

when the Thurians had been induced to join in the campaign with them with seven hundred hoplites and three hundred javelin-men, gave orders that the ships should sail along the coast toward the territory of Croton, while they themselves, after first reviewing all their land forces at the river Sybaris, advanced through the territory of Thuria.

7.35.2

And when they came to the river Hylias and the Crotoniates sent word to them that their army could not go through their territory with their consent, they went down and bivouacked near the sea at the mouth of the Hylias; and their ships met them at that point. On the next day they embarked their army and proceeded along the coast, touching at the various cities, with the exception of Locri, until they reached Petra in the territory of Rhegium.

7.36.1

The Syracusans, meanwhile, hearing of their approach, wished to make another trial with their fleet, and also with their land-force, which they had been collecting for the very purpose of striking a blow before the Athenian reinforcements came.

7.36.2

They had prepared the fleet generally in such a way as, after the experience of the former sea-fight, seemed likely to offer some advantage, and in particular had shortened the prows of the ships, and had made them stouter by attaching to them thick catheads and stretching underneath stay-beams extending from them to the ships' sides for the length of six cubits both inside and outside the vessel, adopting the same plan as that followed by the Corinthians when they reconstructed their ships at the prows for the battle fought against the Athenian fleet at Naupactus.

7.36.3

For the Syracusans thought that, in a contest with the ships of the Athenians which had not been built in the same manner for defence against their own, but were of light structure about the prows, inasmuch as the Athenians did not use prow-to-prow attacks so much as deploying and ramming the sides

7.36.3

1

7.36.3

—they themselves would not be at a disadvantage, and that the fighting in the Great Harbour, where there would be many ships in a narrow space, would be favourable to them; for by employing prow-to-prow attacks they would crush the prows of the enemy's ships, striking as they would with beaks stout and solid against hollow and weak ones. The Athenians, on the other hand, would not find it possible in the narrow space to use either the deploying or the breaking-through manoeuvre, on their skilled use of which they depended most;

7.36.4

for they themselves would as far as possible give them no opportunity of using the latter, and the narrow space would prevent them from deploying. But on the other hand they themselves would chiefly employ that method of crashing into their opponents prow to prow which had formerly been imputed to the ignorance of their pilots, because they would find it greatly to their advantage to do so;

7.36.5

for it would not be possible for the Athenians, if forced out of line, to back water in any other direction than towards the land, and that, too, for only a short distance and to a short stretch of shore—the space in front of their own camp—inasmuch as the Syracusans would command the rest of the harbour.

7.36.6

And the enemy, if they were forced to yield at any point, would be driven together into a small space and all to the same point, so that they would fall foul of each other and be thrown into confusion—the very thing that caused the Athenians most damage in all the fighting there, since it was not possible for them, as it was for the Syracusans, to back water to any part of the harbour. The Syracusans saw, moreover, that the Athenians would not be able to sail round into open water, since they themselves would control not only their entrance into the harbour from the sea outside, but also their backing out of the harbour into the sea, especially as Plemmyrium would be hostile to them and the mouth of the harbour was not large.

7.37.1

Such were the devices adopted by the Syracusans as appropriate to their own skill and strength, and at the same time they had now gained greater confidence as the result of the former sea-fight;

7.37.2

so they made their preparations to attack simultaneously by land and by sea. And a short time before the fleet left its station Gylippus led out the land-force from the city and brought it up against that part of the Athenians' wall that faced the city; and the troops stationed at the Olympieium —all the hoplites that were there and the cavalry and the light-armed forces of the Syracusans— advanced against the wall from the other side; and immediately after this the ships of the Syracusans and their allies sailed out against the Athenian fleet.

7.37.3

The Athenians, who at first thought that the enemy would make an attempt with his land-forces only, were thrown into confusion when they saw the ships also suddenly bearing down upon them. Some arrayed themselves upon the walls and in front of them to meet their assailants there; others went out to confront the forces that were rapidly advancing from the Olympieium and the country outside, consisting of cavalry in large numbers and javelin-men; and still others began to man the ships or to run down to the beach to give aid. And when the vessels were manned they put out to meet the Syracusans with seventy-five ships; the ships of the Syracusans numbering about eighty.

7.38.1

But after they had skirmished with one another for a great part of the day, advancing and backing away, and neither side was able to win any advantage worth mentioning, except that the Syracusans sank one or two of the Athenian ships, they separated;

7.38.2

and the land-force at the same time withdrew from the walls. On the next day the Syracusans kept quiet, giving no indication of what they would do next. Nicias, on the other hand, seeing that the issue of the sea-fight had been a draw and expecting the enemy to attack again, compelled the trierarchs to repair their ships, in case any had suffered damage, and anchored merchant-ships in front of the Athenian stockade, which had been planted in the sea in front of their ships to serve in place of an enclosed harbour.

7.38.3

These merchant-ships he placed at intervals of about two hundred feet from one another, in order that any ships which should be hard pressed might find safe refuge inside and again sail out at leisure. In these preparations the Athenians spent the whole day until nightfall.

7.39.1

On the day following the Syracusans came into conflict with the Athenians at an earlier hour, but using the same offensive as before both by land and by sea.

7.39.2

The two fleets faced one another in the same fashion and again spent a great part of the day in skirmishing, until at last Ariston son of Pyrrhichus, a Corinthian, the best pilot of the Syracusan fleet, persuaded the commanders of the Syracusan naval forces to send word to the officers in control in the city and request them to move down to the shore as quickly as possible the market in which goods are offered for sale, forcing all the hucksters to bring there whatever food supplies they had and sell them, in order that the crews might land and at once take dinner close to the ships, and then after a short interval on the same day make a second attack on the Athenians when they were not expecting it.

7.40.1

The Syracusan commanders accordingly, being won over to this plan, sent a messenger, and the market was prepared. Then the Syracusans, suddenly rowing astern, sailed back to the city, where they disembarked and at once made their dinner on the spot.

7.40.2

But the Athenians, thinking that the enemy had withdrawn to the city because they believed themselves to be outmatched, disembarked at their leisure and busied themselves with various other duties as well as with their dinner, in the belief that for that day at least there would be no more fighting at sea.

7.40.3

But suddenly the Syracusans manned their ships and again sailed against them; whereupon the Athenians, in great confusion and most of them without food, embarked in disorder and at last with much ado got under weigh.

7.40.4

For some time they held off from one another, keeping on their guard; but after a while the Athenians thought it unwise, by further delay, to exhaust themselves with fatigue by their own act, and decided to attack as quickly as possible, and accordingly bore down upon the enemy and with a cheer began the fight.

7.40.5

The Syracusans received them, and employing their ships in prow-to-prow attacks, as they had planned to do, with their specially prepared beaks stove in the forward parts of the Athenian vessels for a considerable distance, while the men on the decks hurled their javelins at the Athenians and inflicted great damage upon them. But far greater damage was done by the Syracusans who rowed around in light boats, darted under the oar-banks of the hostile ships, and running up alongside hurled javelins from their boats in among the sailors.

7.40.5

1

7.41.1

Finally, by pursuing this manner of fighting with all their strength, the Syracusans won, and the Athenians took to flight, endeavouring to make their escape through the line of merchant-ships

7.41.1

1

7.41.1

into their own place of anchorage.

7.41.2

The Syracusan ships pursued them hotly as far as the merchantmen, but there the dolphin-bearing cranes

7.41.2

1

7.41.2

that were suspended from the merchantmen over the channels between the vessels checked them.

7.41.3

Two Syracusan ships, however, elated by their victory, approached too close to the cranes and were destroyed, one of them being captured together with its crew.

7.41.4

The Syracusans, having sunk seven of the Athenian ships and damaged many others, and having taken prisoner most of the men upon them and killed the rest, then withdrew and set up a trophy for both the sea-fights. They now cherished the confident belief that they were far superior to the Athenians on the sea, and they thought that they should get the better of the army on land as well. So they, on their part, proceeded to make preparations to attack the enemy again on both elements.

7.42.1

At this juncture, however, Demosthenes and Eurymedon arrived with the reinforcements from Athens, consisting of about seventy-three ships, including the foreign vessels, and nearly five thousand hoplites, both Athenian and allied, and not a few Barbarian and Hellenic javelin-men, slingers, and bowmen, together with an adequate supply of other equipment. The Syracusans and their allies were seized with no little consternation at the moment, wondering if they were never to have any final deliverance from their peril;

7.42.2

for they saw that in spite of the fortification of Deceleia an army equal or nearly equal to the first one had come to reinforce it, and that the power of the Athenians was apparently great in all directions. The first Athenian army, on the other hand, had, considering their past misfortunes,

7.42.2

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7.42.2

recovered a certain confidence. Demosthenes, seeing how matters stood, was of the opinion that it would not do to waste time and thus invite the same experience that Nicias had met with.

7.42.3

For Nicias when he first came inspired terror; but as he did not immediately attack Syracuse but spent the winter at Catana, he came to be despised, and Gylippus forestalled him by coming from the Peloponnesus with an army. This force the Syracusans would not even have sent for if he had attacked without delay; for they would have supposed that they could cope with him unaided, and would not, therefore, have discovered that they were too weak until they had been completely walled in, so that, even if they had sent for reinforcements then, these would no longer have availed them to the same extent. Demosthenes, therefore, taking these facts into consideration and realizing that he also at the present time was most formidable to his opponents on the very first day after his arrival, wished at the earliest possible moment to reap the full benefit of their present consternation at his army.

7.42.4

Accordingly, seeing that the Syracusan cross-wall, by which they had prevented the Athenians from completing their investment, was a single one, and that, if one should get control of the ascent to Epipolae and after that of the camp upon it, the wall itself could easily be taken—for the enemy would not then stand his ground against them—

7.42.5

he was eager to make the attempt. He thought this to be the shortest way to end the war; for he would either be successful and take Syracuse, or else would lead his army home and not wear out to no purpose both the Athenians who took part in the expedition and the entire state.

7.42.6

In the first place, then, the Athenians went out and proceeded to ravage the land of the Syracusans in the region of the Anapus river, and at this time, as at first, they had the upper hand with their army both by land and by sea; for on neither element did the Syracusans come out to meet them except with their cavalry and javelin-men from the Olympieium.

7.43.1

Afterwards it seemed best to Demosthenes, before going further, to make an attempt with engines upon the cross-wall. But when he brought his engines up they were burned by the enemy, who defended themselves from the wall, and the assaults which he made at many points with the rest of his army were regularly repulsed; it therefore seemed best not to waste more time, and so with the consent of Nicias and his other colleagues he undertook, as he had planned, the attack upon Epipolae.

7.43.2

Now it seemed impossible to approach the heights in the daytime and make the ascent without being observed; he accordingly ordered provisions for five days, took with him all the stonemasons and carpenters, and also a supply of arrows, and whatever things they would need while building a wall, in case they should succeed in their undertaking, and after the first watch, accompanied by Eurymedon and Menander, led out the entire army and advanced to Epipolae, leaving Nicias behind in the fortifications.

7.43.3

When they had reached Epipolae, taking the route by Euryelus, which had been followed by the former army in the first ascent, they got by the Syracusan guards without being observed, and advancing to the Syracusan fort at that point captured it and killed some of the guards;

7.43.4

most of these, however, fled at once to the camps, of which there were three upon Epipolae—one belonging to the Syracusans, one to the other Siceliots, and one to the allies—and brought word of the attack, informing also the six hundred Syracusans who were posted as an advanced guard on that part of Epipolae.

7.43.5

These hastened at once to the rescue, but Demosthenes and the Athenians met them and put them to rout despite their vigorous resistance. This body of Athenians then straightway pressed forward, in order that, taking advantage of their present impulse, they might not be too late to accomplish the purpose for which they had come; while another party at the very first proceeded to seize the cross-wall of the Syracusans, where the guards did not wait to receive them, and to lay low the battlements.

7.43.6

But the Syracusans and their allies, as well as Gylippus with his own troops, came up from the outworks; yet, since this daring attempt had been made upon them unexpectedly at night, they were still dazed as they attacked the Athenians and were at first forced back by them.

7.43.7

But while the Athenians were by now going forward, in some disorder, considering themselves victorious and wishing as quickly as possible to push their way through all the enemy's forces that had not yet been engaged, in order that they might not rally again when they themselves relaxed their onset, it was the Boeotians who first made a stand against them, and by making a charge routed and put them to flight.

7.44.1

By this time the Athenians were getting into a state of so great confusion and perplexity that it has not been easy to learn from either side just how the several events occurred. In the daytime things are clearer, of course, yet even so those who are present do not know everything that happens, but each man barely knows what happens near himself; but in a battle by night—the only one that took place in this war between large armies—how could anyone know anything clearly?

7.44.2

For though there was a bright moon, they could only see one another, as it is natural to do in moonlight—seeing before them the vision of a person but mistrusting their recognition of their own friends. There were, besides, large numbers of hoplites belonging to both sides moving about in a narrow space. And on the Athenian side, some were already being defeated, while others, still in their first onset, were advancing unchecked;

7.44.3

but of the rest of their army a large portion had only just finished the ascent and others were still coming up, so that they did not know which body to join. For the front lines were already all in confusion in consequence of the rout that had taken place, and the two sides were difficult to distinguish by reason of the outcries.

7.44.4

The Syracusans and their allies, as they were winning, were cheering one another and indulging in no little shouting—it being impossible in the night to communicate in any other way— while at the same time they held their ground against their assailants; the Athenians were trying to find their own comrades, and regarded as hostile whatever came from the opposite direction, even though it might be a party of friends belonging to the troops already in flight, and as they were constantly calling out the demand for the watchword, the only means they had of distinguishing friend from foe, they not only caused much confusion in their own ranks, everybody making the demand at the same time, but also made their watchword known to the enemy. They had not the same opportunity, however, of learning the enemy's watchword, because the Syracusans, who were winning the day and had not become scattered, had less difficulty in recognizing one another.

7.44.5

The result was that if a body of Athenians, even though superior in number, fell in with a party of the enemy, these would make their escape, inasmuch as they knew the Athenian watchword, whereas if they on their part could not give the answer they were put to the sword.

7.44.6

But that which put the Athenians at the greatest disadvantage and did them most harm was the singing of the paean; for the song of both armies was very similar and caused perplexity. Whenever, that is, the Argives or the Corcyraeans or any Dorian contingent of the Athenian army would raise the paean, the Athenians were just as much terrified thereby as when the enemy sang.

7.44.7

And so finally, when once they had been thrown into confusion, coming into collision with their own comrades in many different parts of the army, friends with friends and citizens with fellow-citizens, they not only became panic-stricken but came to blows with one another and were with difficulty separated.

7.44.8

And as they were being pursued by the enemy many hurled themselves down from the bluffs and perished; for the way down from Epipolae was narrow; and of those who in their attempt to escape got down to the level ground, the greater part, and especially those who belonged to the first expedition and therefore had a better acquaintance with the country, got through to the camp, but of those who had come later, some missed the roads and wandered about over the country, and these when day came were destroyed by the Syracusan cavalry, which were scouring the fields.

7.45.1

On the next day the Syracusans set up two trophies on Epipolae, one where the Athenian ascent was made, the other at the place where the Boeotians made the first resistance; and the Athenians recovered their dead under truce.

7.45.2

Not a few were killed, both of the Athenians and their allies; the arms taken, however, were out of all proportion to the dead, for while some of those who were forced to leap down the bluffs perished, some escaped.

7.46.1

After this the Syracusans, their earlier confidence now being restored as a result of their unexpected good fortune, sent Sicanus with fifteen ships to Agrigentum, which was in a state of revolution, in order that he might if possible win over that city; and Gylippus went out once more by land to the other parts of Sicily to secure additional troops, being in hope that he could even carry the walls of the Athenians by storm, now that the engagement on Epipolae had turned out thus.

7.47.1

Meanwhile the Athenian generals were deliberating about the situation in view both of the calamity that had happened and of the utter discouragement that now prevailed in the army. They saw that they were not succeeding in their undertaking, and that the soldiers were finding their stay burdensome.

7.47.2

For they were distressed by sickness for a double cause, the season of the year being that in which men are most liable to illness, while at the same time the place in which they were encamped was marshy and unhealthy; and the situation in general appeared to them to be utterly hopeless.

7.47.3

Demosthenes, therefore, was of the opinion that they should not remain there any longer, but since the plan which had induced him to risk the attack upon Epipolae had failed, his vote was for going away without loss of time, while it was still possible to cross the sea and to have some superiority over the enemy with at any rate the ships of the armament which had come to reinforce them.

7.47.4

From the point of view of the State, also, he said, it was more profitable to carry on the war against the enemy who were building a hostile fortress in their own territory than against the Syracusans, whom it was no longer easy to conquer; and furthermore, it was not right that they should continue the siege and spend a great deal of money to no purpose.

7.48.1

Such was the judgment of Demosthenes. Nicias, however, although he also thought that their situation was bad, did not wish expressly to reveal their weakness, or that they should be reported to the enemy as openly voting in full council for the retreat; for, he urged, they would be far less likely, when they should wish to retreat, to do this unobserved.

7.48.2

Besides, the affairs of the enemy, from such information as he had beyond the rest, still afforded some hope that they would turn out to be worse than their own, if they persisted in the siege; for they would wear the enemy out by cutting off his supplies, especially since now with their present fleet they were to a greater extent than before the masters of the sea. And, in fact, there was a party in Syracuse that favoured submitting to the Athenians, and it was secretly sending proposals to him and urging him not to withdraw. Having knowledge of these things, although in reality he still wavered between the two alternatives and kept pondering them, yet in the speech which he openly made at that time he refused to lead the army away.

7.48.3

For he knew well, he said, that the Athenians would not approve of the generals withdrawing without any vote of their own to that effect. For

7.48.3

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7.48.3

those who would vote on their case would not be men who would form their judgments from seeing the facts with their own eyes, as they themselves had seen them, and not from listening to the harsh criticisms of others; on the contrary, whatever calumnies any clever speaker might utter, by these the Athenians would be persuaded.

7.48.4

And of the soldiers now present in Sicily, many, he said—aye, the majority—who were now crying out that they were in a desperate plight, as soon as they arrived in Athens would cry out just the reverse, that their generals had been bribed to betray them and withdraw. Accordingly, he at any rate did not wish, knowing as he did the character of the Athenians, to be put to death on a shameful charge and unjustly at the hands of the Athenians, but rather to fight and die, if so he must, his own death at the hands of the foe. And bad as their own situation was, that of the Syracusans, he said, was still worse;

7.48.5

for in point of money, since they were supporting a mercenary force and at the same time bearing the expense of patrol guard-posts, and had now for a year been maintaining a large fleet besides, they were already embarrassed, and hereafter would be quite without resources;

7.48.5

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7.48.5

indeed, they had spent two thousand talents already and were in debt for many talents more, and if they should lose any portion whatsoever of their present force by not being able to pay for its maintenance, their cause would be ruined, since it depended upon mercenary troops and had not, like their own, the backing of necessity.

7.48.5

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7.48.6

They ought, therefore, he concluded, to stay on and continue the siege, and not go back home beaten by money, in which they had by far the greater resources.

7.49.1

To such effect Nicias spoke with confidence, because he had accurate knowledge of affairs in Syracuse, both of their lack of money and that a party existed there that wished the government to come under the control of the Athenians and was constantly making overtures to him to keep him from withdrawing; and at the same time, though beaten in the field, he had as much confidence as ever in the fleet at any rate.

7.49.2

Demosthenes, however, would not consent on any consideration whatever to continue the siege; if they could not lead the army home without a vote of the Athenians, but must stay on in Sicily, he said that they should do this only after removing to Thapsus or to Catana. From this new base they could overrun with their army large tracts of the country and support themselves by ravaging the enemy's property, and at the same time do him damage; and as for the fleet, they would thenceforth do their fighting, not in a narrow space, which was more in the enemy's favour, but in the open sea, where there was plenty of room and the advantages of skill would be on their side, and they would not have to make their retreats and advances setting out from and falling back into a scant and circumscribed base.

7.49.3

To sum up his position in a word, he said that he did not at all approve of remaining any longer in the same place, but urged that they should now as quickly as possible move to another place and make no delay.

7.49.4

And Eurymedon concurred with him in these views. But since Nicias objected, some hesitation and delay ensued; and at the same time there was a suspicion that it was because of some superior knowledge that he insisted. And so in this way the Athenians delayed to the end and continued to remain where they were.

7.50.1

Meanwhile Gylippus and Sicanus

7.50.1

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7.50.1

had returned to Syracuse. Sicanus had failed to win over Agrigentum, for while he was still at Gela the party at Agrigentum that was friendly to the Syracusans had been driven out; but Gylippus brought with him a large additional force from Sicily as well as the hoplites that had been sent on board the merchant-ships from the Peloponnesus the preceding spring,

7.50.1

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7.50.1

and had reached Selinus on their way from Libya. It seems that they had been driven out of their course to Libya, where the Cyrenaeans had given them two triremes and pilots for their voyage;

7.50.2

as they sailed along the shore of Libya they had joined forces with the Euesperitae, who were being besieged by the Libyans, and had defeated the latter; and sailing thence along the coast to Neapolis, an emporium of the Carthaginians, from which place the distance to Sicily is shortest—two days and one night—and from there crossing to Sicily, they arrived at Selinus.

7.50.3

As soon as these reinforcements arrived, the Syracusans began their preparations to attack the Athenians again on both elements—by sea and by land. The Athenian generals, on the other hand, seeing that the enemy had been reinforced by a fresh army, while their own situation was not only not improving, but on the contrary was daily growing worse in all respects, and especially through the distress caused by the sickness among the troops, repented that they had not moved away before. And since even Nicias no longer opposed as earnestly as before, but only urged that the matter be not openly put to a vote, they sent out word as secretly as possible to all the officers for a departure by sea from the camp, and that they should be ready whenever the signal should be given.

7.50.4

But after all was ready and when they were about to make their departure, the moon, which happened then to be at the full, was eclipsed.

7.50.4

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7.50.4

And most of the Athenians, taking the incident to heart, urged the generals to wait. Nicias also, who was somewhat too much given to divination and the like, refused even to discuss further the question of their removal until they should have waited thrice nine days, as the soothsayers prescribed. Such, then, was the reason why the Athenians delayed and stayed on.

7.51.1

The Syracusans on their part, on learning about this, were far more aroused than before and determined not to give the Athenians any respite, seeing that these had now of their own act confessed themselves no longer superior either with their fleet or with their land-force, for otherwise they would not have laid plans for their departure; and at the same time, because they did not want them to settle down somewhere else in Sicily where it would be more difficult to carry on war against them, they were determined to force them to fight a sea-battle as quickly as possible on the spot, in a place that suited themselves.

7.51.2

Accordingly they regularly manned their ships and practised for as many days as they thought sufficient. Then, when the favourable moment came, they assaulted on the first day the Athenian walls, and when a small body of hoplites and of horsemen came out against them by certain gates, they cut off a number of the hoplites, and putting them to flight followed in pursuit; and as the entrance to the camp was narrow, the Athenians lost seventy horses and a few of the hoplites.

7.52.1

So on this first day the Syracusan army withdrew; but on the following day they sailed out with their ships, seventy-six in number, and at the same time advanced with their land-force against the walls. The Athenians put out to sea to meet them with eighty-six ships, and closing with them commenced the battle.

7.52.2

Eurymedon, who commanded the right wing of the Athenians, wished to surround the ships of the enemy, and had therefore steered his ships out from the line rather too near the shore, when the Syracusans and their allies, after they had defeated the Athenian centre, cut off him also in a recess of the inner bay of the harbour and destroyed both him and the ships that followed him; and after that they set about pursuing the entire Athenian fleet and driving them ashore.

7.53.1

Now Gylippus, when he saw the ships of the enemy being defeated and driven ashore at a point beyond the stockades and their own camp, wishing to destroy the men as they landed, and also that the Syracusans might more easily tow the ships away from a shore that would be friendly to them, came down to the causeway

7.53.1

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7.53.1

with part of his army to assist them.

7.53.2

The Tyrrhenians, however, who were guarding the causeway for the Athenians, saw these troops rushing to the attack in disorder and went out against them, and falling upon the first comers put them to flight and drove them into the marsh called Lysimeleia.

7.53.3

But afterwards, when a larger force of the Syracusans and their allies had now arrived, the Athenian troops also went out against them and, fearing for their ships, engaged in battle with the enemy, whom they defeated and pursued, killing a few hoplites; and as for the ships, they saved most of them and assembled them at their camp, but eighteen were captured by the Syracusans and their allies and their crews slain to a man.

7.53.4

Against the ships also that remained the Syracusans, wishing to set them afire, turned loose an old merchant-ship which they had filled with faggots and pine-wood, after casting fire into it, the wind being in the direction of the Athenians. And the Athenians, alarmed for their ships, devised in their turn means for hindering and quenching the flames, and having stopped the fire and prevented the ship from coming near, escaped the danger.

7.54.1

After this the Syracusans set up a trophy, both for the sea-fight and for the cutting off of the hoplites at the wall—the engagement in which they had captured the horses;

7.54.1

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7.54.1

and the Athenians set up a trophy for the fight in which the Tyrrhenians drove the Syracusan infantry into the marsh, and also for their own victory with the main body of the army.

7.55.1

The victory of the Syracusans having now proved decisive by sea also—for before this they had always been afraid of the new fleet that had come with Demosthenes—the Athenians were in utter despondency. Great had been their miscalculation, and far greater still was their regret at having made the expedition. For of all the cities with which they had gone to war, these alone were at that time similar in character to their own, democratic in constitution like themselves, and strong in ships, cavalry and size.

7.55.2

And so, finding themselves unable either to bring about a change in their form of government,

7.55.2

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7.55.2

and thus introduce among them that element of discord by which they might have brought them over to the Athenian side, or to subdue them by means of a military force that was greatly superior, and having failed in most of their undertakings, they had even before this been at their wits' end, and now that they had suffered defeat even with their fleet, a thing that they could never have anticipated, they were in far greater perplexity still.

7.56.1

The Syracusans, on the other hand, began at once to sail fearlessly about the harbour and determined to close up the entrance to it, in order that the Athenians might no longer be able, even if they wished, to sail out unobserved.

7.56.2

For the Syracusans were no longer concerned with merely saving themselves, but also with preventing the Athenians from being saved, thinking, as indeed was the case, that in the present circumstances their own position was much superior, and that if they could defeat the Athenians and their allies both by land and by sea the achievement would appear a glorious one for them in the eyes of the Hellenes. All the other Hellenes, they reflected, would immediately be either liberated from subjection or relieved from fear, since the military forces that would remain to the Athenians would not be strong enough to sustain the war that would afterwards be brought against them; and they themselves, being regarded as the authors of all this, would be greatly admired not only by the world at large but also by posterity.

7.56.3

And indeed the struggle was a worthy one, both in these respects and because they were showing themselves superior, not to the Athenians only, but to their numerous allies as well, and that too not standing alone but associated with the friends who had come to their aid, thus taking their place as leaders along with the Corinthians and Lacedaemonians, having also given their own city to bear the brunt of the danger and taken a great step forward in sea-power.

7.56.4

Indeed, a larger number of nations than ever before had gathered together at this one city, if one except the vast throng of those who in this war rallied to the support of the city of Athens and the city of the Lacedaemonians.

7.57.1

For the following nations on either side had entered the war at Syracuse, coming against Sicily or in behalf of Sicily, to aid the Athenians to win the country or the Syracusans to save it; and they chose sides, not so much on the ground of right or even of kinship, but either out of regard for their own advantage or from necessity, according to the circumstances in which they each happened to be placed.

7.57.1

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7.57.2

The Athenians themselves, as Ionians, went of their own free will against the Syracusans, who were Dorians, and with them went as members of the expedition the Lemnians, the Imbrians,

7.57.2

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7.57.2

and the Aeginetans, who at this time held Aegina, as also the Hestiaeans who inhabit Hestiaea in Euboea, all these being colonists of the Athenians and having the same language and institutions as they had.

7.57.3

Of the rest, some took part in the expedition as subjects, others in consequence of an alliance, although independent, and some were mercenaries.

7.57.4

The peoples that were subjects and tributaries were the Eretrians, Chalcidians, Styreans and Carystians from Euboea; from the islands the Ceans, Andrians and Tenians; and from Ionia the Milesians, Samians and Chians. Of these last, however, the Chians followed as independent allies, not subject to the payment of tribute but furnishing ships instead.

7.57.4

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7.57.4

Of the above-mentioned almost all were Ionians and colonists of Athens—except the Carystians, who are Dryopians

7.57.4

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7.57.4

—and although they followed as subjects and under compulsion, nevertheless they were Ionians going against Dorians. Besides these there were Aeolians: the Methymnaeans,

7.57.4

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7.57.4

who paid service with ships and not with tribute, and as tributaries the Tenedians and Aenians. These, though Aeolians, were constrained to fight against Aeolians, that is, the Boeotians, their founders, who were on the side of the Syracusans;

7.57.5

while the Plataeans

7.57.5

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7.57.5

were the only outright Boeotians who were opposed to Boeotians—as was natural considering their hatred. And there were the Rhodians and Cytherians, both Dorians; the Cytherians, although colonists of the Lacedaemonians, bore arms with the Athenians against the Lacedaemonians who were with Gylippus, while the Rhodians, Argives by descent, were compelled to make war not only upon the Syracusans, who were Dorians, but also upon the Geloans, their own colonists,

7.57.5

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7.57.5

who were serving with the Syracusans.

7.57.6

Of the inhabitants of the islands off the shores of the Peloponnesus, the Cephallenians and Zacynthians

7.57.6

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7.57.6

went with the Athenians as independent allies, it is true, but on account of their insular position were under a measure of restraint, because the Athenians were masters of the sea.

7.57.7

The Corcyraeans, who were not only Dorians but confessedly Corinthians, were serving against the Corinthians and Syracusans, though colonists of the former and kinsmen of the latter, under the specious pretext indeed of compulsion, but really quite as much from choice, on account of their hatred of the Corinthians. Also the Messenians, as they are now called, who live in Naupactus,

7.57.7

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7.57.7

as well as the Messenians at Pylos, which was now in the possession of the Athenians, were taken along as participants in the war.

7.57.8

Furthermore, there were a few exiles from Megara

7.57.8

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7.57.8

who, because of their misfortune, were fighting against the Selinuntians,

7.57.8

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7.57.8

who were Megarians. So far as the rest were concerned, their part in the expedition was, as compared with the others, of a more voluntary character.

7.57.9

The Argives,

7.57.9

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7.57.9

on the one hand, were led to take part, not so much by their alliance, as by their hatred of the Lacedaemonians, and out of regard each for his own immediate advantage, associating themselves, Dorians against Dorians, with the Athenians who were Ionians; the Mantineans, on the other hand, and other Arcadians went as mercenaries, for they were accustomed to go against any who at any time were pointed out to them as enemies, and at this time were led by desire of gain to regard as enemies the Arcadians who were with the Corinthians.

7.57.9

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7.57.9

The Cretans and the Aetolians were also induced by pay; and in the case of the Cretans it so fell out that, although they had assisted the Rhodians in the founding of Gela,

7.57.9

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7.57.9

they went, not with their colonists, but against them, and of their own free will, for hire. Some of the Acarnanians served, it is true, for gain, but the greater portion were moved by friendship for Demosthenes and goodwill

7.57.9

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7.57.9

toward the Athenians, whose allies they were, to come to their aid.

7.57.10

All these were within the boundary of the Ionian Gulf;

7.57.11

but of the Italiots the Thurians and Metapontians took part in the expedition, being reduced at this time to such straits by party crises that they could not do otherwise; and of the Siceliots the Naxians and the Catanaeans. Of Barbarians there were the Egestaeans, who had brought the Athenians to Sicily, and the greater part of the Sicels; and of those outside of Sicily a certain number of Tyrrhenians,

7.57.11

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7.57.11

who had a quarrel with the Syracusans, and some Iapygian mercenaries.

7.57.11

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7.57.11

So many were the peoples who took part in the struggle on the side of the Athenians.

7.58.1

The Syracusans, on the other hand, were aided by the Camarinaeans,

7.58.1

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7.58.1

who were their next neighbours, and the Geloans, who lived next to the Camarinaeans;

7.58.2

then, since the Agrigentines were neutral,

7.58.2

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7.58.2

by the Selinuntians,

7.58.2

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7.58.2

who were settled in the country beyond. All these occupied that part of Sicily which faces Libya, but the Himeraeans

7.58.2

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7.58.2

came from the part which faces the Tyrrhenian Sea, where they were the only Hellenic inhabitants; and they alone from that region came to the aid of the Syracusans.

7.58.3

Such were the Hellenic peoples in Sicily, all Dorians and independent, that fought on their side; but of Barbarians, the Sicels alone—those, that is, that had not gone over to the side of the Athenians. Of the Hellenes outside of Sicily there were the Lacedaemonians, who furnished a Spartan as commander-in-chief, but no troops except Neodamodes

7.58.3

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7.58.3

and Helots; the Corinthians, who alone were at hand with both a fleet and a land-force; the Leucadians and Ambraciots, both induced by the tie of kinship;

7.58.3

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7.58.3

from Arcadia

7.58.3

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mercenaries sent by the Corinthians; the Sicyonians, who served under compulsion;

7.58.3

4

7.58.3

and, from outside the Peloponnesus, the Boeotians.

7.58.3

5

7.58.4

As compared with all these, who came from abroad, the Siceliots themselves supplied a greater number of troops of every kind, inasmuch as the cities they inhabited were large; and in fact the forces they collected comprised hoplites in large numbers, as well as ships, horses, and a miscellaneous horde of vast numbers. And again, in comparison with all the rest, speaking roughly, the Syracusans themselves provided the larger number, both on account of the greatness of their city and because they were in the greatest danger.

7.59.1

Such were the forces that had been brought together for the assistance of either side, and at this time

7.59.1

1

7.59.1

both had all their contingents at hand, and no further reinforcements came to either.

7.59.2

The Syracusans and their allies, then, naturally conceived the thought that it would be a glorious achievement for them to crown the victory which they had won in the sea-fight by taking the whole vast armament of the Athenians and preventing their escape in either way, either by sea or by land.

7.59.3

Accordingly, they began at once to close the entrance to the Great Harbour, which was about eight stadia wide, with triremes ranged broadside and with large and small boats, mooring them at anchor; and they made other preparations in case the Athenians should still venture to fight at sea, and there was nothing small about any of the designs they formed.

7.60.1

But the Athenians, observing the closing of the harbour and being aware of the general plans of the enemy, thought it desirable to hold a council.

7.60.2

So the generals and the taxiarchs came together and took counsel with reference to the difficulties which now confronted them both in other ways, and especially owing to the fact that they no longer had supplies for their immediate needs—for in the expectation that they would sail away they had already sent word to Catana and stopped the bringing in of provisions—and were not likely to have them in the future, unless they should hold the mastery at sea. They determined, therefore, to abandon their upper walls,

7.60.2

1

7.60.2

and cutting off by means of a cross-wall the smallest possible space, close to the ships, that would suffice for the stores and for the sick, to put a garrison in this: they would then take the rest of their land-force and man all their ships, not only those which were fit for service, but also the less seaworthy, putting aboard every available man, and fight the issue out at sea; if they won, they would proceed to Catana, but if not, they would burn their ships, and, forming in line of battle, make their retreat by land, taking whatever route would enable them soonest to reach some friendly place, whether Barbarian or Hellenic.

7.60.3

These plans having once been determined upon, they acted accordingly: they descended stealthily from the upper walls and manned all their ships, compelling everyone to embark who, provided lie was of military age, seemed to be at all fit for service.

7.60.4

So there were manned altogether about one hundred and ten ships; and they put on board a large number of archers and javelin-men, both of the Acarnanians and of the other foreigners,

7.60.4

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7.60.4

and in general they made such provision as was possible under the stress of necessity and with the object they had in view.

7.60.5

But when almost all their preparations were ready, Nicias, seeing that the soldiers were not only discouraged, because contrary to their wont they had been badly beaten at sea, but that they also, on account of the scarcity of provisions, were anxious to risk a battle as soon as possible, called them all together before giving the order for battle and exhorted them, speaking as follows:

7.61.1

"Soldiers of Athens and of our allies, the impending contest will concern you all alike—a contest both for salvation and for fatherland for each of you no less than for the enemy; for if we win the present battle with our fleet, it is possible for everyone to live to see his own city, wherever it may be.

7.61.2

And we ought not to be discouraged, much less feel as do the rawest recruits, who, when they have been defeated in their first contests, cherish ever afterwards a foreboding, inspired of their fear, that takes on the colour of their disasters.

7.61.3

But as many of you here present as are Athenians, and have already had experience in many wars, and you our allies, who always take part in our campaigns, remember the unexpected turns in war, and in hope that fortune may take her stand on our side also, and with the resolve to retrieve your defeat in a manner worthy of this vast multitude of your army that you see before you, make ready for battle.

7.62.1

"But as regards anything that could be helpful to us, in view of the narrowness of the harbour, in combating such a throng of ships as will fill it and the forces which the enemy has placed on their decks—conditions which injured us before —all this has now been made ready by us also, as far as our circumstances permit, after consultation with our pilots.

7.62.2

Indeed, many bowmen and javelin-men will go on board, and a multitude such as we should not use if we were making a fight in the open sea, because they would hamper our skill by increasing the weight of our ships, whereas in the land-battle that we are forced to fight here from the decks of our ships they will be of advantage.

7.62.3

And we have contrived whatever counter-devices were necessary in the construction of our ships, and especially to combat the thickness of the enemy's catheads, a device from which we suffered most injury, we have provided grappling-irons, which will prevent the ship that has rammed us from backing off again, if the marines perform the service that will then devolve upon them.

7.62.3

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7.62.4

For we have been forced to the extremity of having to fight a land-battle on shipboard, and it is manifestly to our interest neither to back water ourselves nor to suffer them to do so, especially since the whole shore, except the small part of it that our land-force holds, is hostile.

7.63.1

"Remembering these things, you must fight to the last with all your strength and not allow yourselves to be driven ashore, but when ship collides with ship be resolved never to separate until you have swept into the sea the hoplites on the enemy's decks.

7.63.2

And these things I urge upon the hoplites not less than upon the sailors, inasmuch as such work belongs rather to those on deck; and, besides, we still have the better of the enemy in most points with our land-force.

7.63.3

As for the sailors, I exhort them, and at the same time I even implore them, not to be overmuch dismayed by our calamities, since the forces we now have on the decks are better and our ships more numerous; and I would have you—those of you that is who have hitherto been accounted Athenians without being so

7.63.3

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7.63.3

—reflect how well worth preserving is the proud feeling that because of your knowledge of our language and your imitation of our ways you have been admired through. out Hellas, and in point of advantage have had no less a share in our empire than ourselves, while as regards the fear you inspired in our subjects and the freedom from injury you enjoyed you have had a much greater share.

7.63.4

Do you, therefore, who alone are partners with us in our empire as free men, be just and do not utterly betray it; but with scorn both for the Corinthians, whom you have frequently beaten, and for the Siceliots, not one of whom, when our navy was at its best, ever presumed even to stand up against us, ward them off; and show that even amid weakness and misfortune your skill is more than a match for the strength and good fortune of your opponents.

7.64.1

“As to those of you who are Athenians, I remind you once more that you left behind you in your docks at home no other ships like these nor hoplites of military age, and if the outcome shall be aught else but victory for you, your enemies here will straightway sail yonder, and our fellow-citizens who are left at home will be unable to ward off both the enemies there and the new invaders. Those of you who are here would at once come under the power of the Syracusans—and you yourselves know with what purpose you came against them—and those who are there under the power of the Lacedaemonians.

7.64.2

So, therefore, since you are constrained to fight this one battle on behalf of both yourselves and them, be steadfast now, if ever you were, and remember, one and all, that those of you who will now be aboard the ships are for the Athenians both army and navy, and all that is left of the State and the great name of Athens. For her sake, if anyone surpasses another in skill or in courage, he will never find a better occasion for displaying them, at once for his own advantage and for the salvation of us all.”

7.65.1

After making this exhortation Nicias immediately gave orders to man the ships. Gylippus and the Syracusans, on the other hand, observing the actual preparations which they were making, could easily perceive that the Athenians were going to fight at sea;

7.65.2

furthermore, the device of the grappling-irons had already been reported to them, and while they were equipping their ships to meet every other contingency, they also took precautions against this. For they stretched hides over the prows and a considerable portion of the upper works of the ships, in order that when the grapnel was thrown it might slip off and not get hold.

7.65.3

And when all was ready, Gylippus and his generals exhorted their men as follows:

7.66.1

"That the deeds which have already been achieved are glorious and that the contest will be for glories still to come, you, Syracusans and allies, seem to us most of you to be aware—otherwise you would not have laid your hands to the task so zealously; but if anyone has not perceived this as clearly as he should, we will make it plain.

7.66.2

The Athenians came against this country in the first place for the enslavement of Sicily, and after that, if they should be successful, for that of the Peloponnesus also and the rest of Hellas, having already acquired a dominion greater than that of any Hellenes either of the past or of the present time; but you, the first men who ever withstood their fleet, with which they had obtained the mastery everywhere, have already defeated them on the sea and in all probability will defeat them in this present battle.

7.66.3

For when men have once suffered abatement just where they claim to be superior, what is left of their self-esteem is weaker than it ever was —than if they had never thought themselves superior at all—and their pride being mortified by the disappointment,

7.66.3

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7.66.3

they give way out of all proportion to their actual strength. And at the present moment this is what the Athenians have probably suffered.

7.67.1

"With us, however, the feeling that before animated us, which led us, even though we were inexperienced, to venture our all, is now more fully confirmed; and since there has been added to it the conviction that we are strongest, because we have defeated the strongest, the hope of each man is doubled. And, generally speaking, the greatest hope inspires in men the greatest zeal for their undertakings.

7.67.2

Furthermore, as regards their imitation of our arrangements, whereas these are familiar to us as a part of our manner of fighting and we shall be able to adapt ourselves to meet each one of them, yet from their point of view, as soon as they find many hoplites upon their decks, contrary to their established usage, and many javelin-men also, landlubbers so to speak—Acarnanians and others— put aboard ships, men who will not even know how to discharge their darts sitting down,

7.67.2

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7.67.2

will they not inevitably imperil their ships and all be in confusion among themselves, as they move about in a fashion not their own?

7.67.3

Even by the superior number of their ships they will not be profited—in case any one among you has become afraid from the fact that he will have to fight against an unequal number; for in a small space a large number of ships will be slower to carry out any action they may plan, but very easily damaged by the devices which we have adopted. But if you seek the absolute truth, learn it from intelligence which we consider certain:

7.67.4

it is through the overwhelming character of their misfortunes and because they are compelled by their present difficulties, that they have reached the desperate resolution—trusting more to fortune than to their own preparation—of risking a battle in whatever way they can, in order that they may either force their way out and sail away, or after defeat may make their retreat by land; for they know that in any case they could not fare worse than at present.

7.68.1

“Against a disorderly array like this, therefore, and against the fortune of our bitterest foes that has surrendered itself into our hands, let us give battle with fury; and let us consider that against enemies it is a most lawful act if for the punishment of the aggressor anyone thinks fit to glut his heart's animosity; and again, that vengeance on foes will be within our power—and that, as the proverb has it, is of all things the sweetest.

7.68.2

And that they are enemies, and the worst of enemies, you all know; since they came against our land to enslave it, and, if they had succeeded in that, would have inflicted upon our men all that is most painful, upon our women and children the worst indignities, and upon the city as a whole the most shameful of appellations.

7.68.2

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7.68.3

Wherefore it is fitting that no one of us should be soft-hearted, or count it a gain that they should depart without risk to us. For this, even if they win the victory, they will do all the same; whereas if we accomplish, as it is likely we shall, that which we wish—that these men be punished, and that we hand over to Sicily, which enjoyed it before, a liberty still more secure— how glorious the prize! And of all hazards those are rarest which harm least in consequence of failure but benefit most because of success.”

7.69.1

Gylippus and the Syracusan generals also, after they in their turn had thus exhorted their soldiers, began immediately to man their ships as soon as they saw that the Athenians were doing so.

7.69.2

But Nicias, dismayed by the situation that confronted him and realizing the nature of the struggle and how near at hand it was now, since in a moment more they would put to sea, and thinking, as men usually do on the eve of great battles, that everything that had been done on their side was still incomplete, and what had been said by the generals was not yet adequate to the occasion, again called up the trierarchs one by one, addressing them by their father's name, their own name, and that of their tribe,

7.69.2

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7.69.2

and admonished them: if anyone had any claim to distinction, he urged him not to prove false to his own reputation; if any had illustrious ancestors, they should not dim the glory of their fathers' deeds of valour; he also reminded them of their fatherland, the freest in the world, and of the uncontrolled liberty in daily life that all possessed in it; and then went on to add whatever else men would be likely to say at so critical a moment, when they do not guard themselves against uttering what might to some seem trite and commonplace—appeals to wives and children and ancestral gods such as are put forward in almost the same words in support of every cause—but in the dismay of the moment, thinking that these sentiments will be useful, shout them at the top of their voices.

7.69.3

And when he thought that he had exhorted them, not enough, but as much as the scanty time allowed, he withdrew, and leading the infantry down to the sea drew them up so as to cover as large a space as possible, in order that they might render the greatest possible service in inspiring courage in the men on board the ships.

7.69.4

But Demosthenes and Menander and Euthydemus—for these went on board to take command—putting off from the Athenian camp, sailed at once to the barrier

7.69.4

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7.69.4

of the harbour and the outlet that had been left in it, wishing to force their way to the outer sea.

7.70.1

But the Syracusans and their allies, who had already put out with about the same number of ships as before, were now on guard at the exit with a squadron of them and also round the rest of the harbour, their purpose being to fall upon the Athenians simultaneously from all directions; and at the same time their troops on land came up to help them wherever the Athenians' ships put to shore. In command of the Syracusan fleet were Sicanus and Agatharchus, each having a wing of the main fleet, while Pythen and the Corinthians held the centre.

7.70.2

Now when the Athenian fleet drew near the barrier they charged and in the first onset had the better of the ships stationed there, and they set about trying to break the chains which fastened the boats together; but afterwards, when the Syracusans and their allies bore down upon them from all directions, the battle no longer raged next to the barrier only, but was becoming general all over the harbour. And it was obstinately fought, beyond any of the battles that had gone before.

7.70.3

For on both sides much zeal was shown on the part of the sailors to make the charge whenever the order was given, and on the part of the pilots much pitting of skill against skill and mutual rivalry; and the marines took good care, whenever ship collided with ship, that the service on deck should not fall short of the skill of the rest; and everyone was eager to show himself foremost at the post of duty to which he had himself been assigned.

7.70.4

And since many ships had come into conflict in a small space—for never did so many ships fight in so small a space, both sides together falling little short of two hundred—attacks with the beak were few because it was not possible to back water or to break through the line.

7.70.4

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7.70.4

But chance collisions were more frequent, as ship fell foul of ship in the attempt to flee or in making a charge upon another ship. And as long as a ship was bearing down, the men on the decks of the opposing ship used against it javelins and arrows and stones without stint;

7.70.5

but when they came to close quarters, the marines fought hand to hand in the attempt of each side to board the ships of the other.

7.70.6

And it happened in many places, on account of the narrowness of the space, that while the ships of one side were ramming the enemy they were also being rammed themselves, and that two ships, sometimes even more, had unavoidably got entangled about one; it also devolved upon the pilots to make defence on one side and plan attack on the other, not at one point at a time, but at many points and in every direction; and the great din arising from the collision of many ships not only caused consternation, but also prevented the men from hearing the orders of their boatswains. For there was constant exhortation and shouting on the part of the boatswains on either side, both in carrying out their duties and as the rivalry of the moment inspired them;

7.70.7

on the Athenian side they shouted to their men to force the passage out, and, if they would win a safe return to their fatherland, now, if ever hereafter, to set themselves zealously to the task; on the side of the Syracusans and their allies they cried that it would be glorious to prevent the enemy's escape, and, by winning the victory, to exalt the honour each of his own native land.

7.70.8

Moreover, the generals on each side, if they saw any ship in any part of the field drawing back when it was not absolutely necessary to do so, would call out the name of the trierarch and demand, the Athenian generals whether they were withdrawing because they considered the land of bitterest foes to be now more their own than the sea which Athens had acquired with no little toil, and the Syracusan, whether, when they knew clearly that the Athenians were eager to escape no matter how, they would themselves flee before men who were in flight.

7.71.1

And the armies on the shore on both sides, so long as the fighting at sea was evenly balanced, underwent a mighty conflict and tension of mind, the men of Sicily being ambitious to enhance the glory they had already won, while the invaders were afraid that they might fare even worse than at present.

7.71.2

For the Athenians their all was staked upon their fleet, and their fear for the outcome like unto none they had ever felt before; and on account of the different positions which they occupied on the shore they necessarily had different views of the fighting.

7.71.2

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7.71.3

For since the spectacle they were witnessing was near at hand and not all were looking at the same point at the same time, if one group saw the Athenians prevailing anywhere, they would take heart and fall to invoking the gods not to rob them of their safe return; while those whose eyes fell upon a portion that was being defeated uttered shrieks of lamentation, and by the mere sight of what was going on were more cowed in spirit than the men who were actually fighting. Others, again, whose gaze was fixed on some part of the field where the battle was evenly balanced, on account of the long-drawn uncertainty of the conflict were in a continual state of most distressing suspense, their very bodies swaying, in the extremity of their fear, in accord with their opinion of the battle; for always they were within a hair's breadth of escaping or of perishing.

7.71.4

And in the same Athenian army one might hear, so long as the combatants were fighting on equal terms, every kind of cry at the same time—wailing, shouting, “We are winning,” “We are beaten,” and all the divers kinds of cries that a great army in great danger would be constrained to utter.

7.71.5

The men also on board the Athenian ships were affected in a similar way, until at last the Syracusans and their allies, after the fighting had been maintained a long time, routed the Athenians and pressing on triumphantly, with loud cries and exhortations, pursued them to the land. Thereupon as regards the naval force such ships as had not been captured in the deep water were driven to shore, some to one place, some to another, and the men tumbled out of the ships and rushed for the camp;

7.71.6

as for the army on land, their emotions were no longer at variance, but with one impulse all broke forth into wailing and groaning, being scarcely able to bear what was happening, and ran along the shore, some to the ships, in order to help their comrades, some to what remained of their wall, in order to guard it; while still others, and these the greater number, were now concerned only about themselves and how they might be saved.

7.71.7

And at the moment there reigned a consternation greater than any fear felt before. These men had now suffered a fate not unlike that which they had themselves inflicted upon the Lacedaemonians at Pylos; for when their fleet had been destroyed there, the men who had crossed over to the island were also as good as lost to them.

7.71.7

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7.71.7

And so at the present time the Athenians could have no hope of getting safely away by land unless something quite extraordinary should happen.

7.72.1

The battle having been thus stubbornly fought and many men and ships lost on both sides, the Syracusans and their allies were victorious and gathered up their wrecks and their dead and after that sailed home and set up a trophy.

7.72.2

The Athenians, however, were so affected by the magnitude of their present ills that they did not even give a thought to wrecks or dead, or ask leave to take them up, but were planning an immediate retreat during the night.

7.72.3

But Demosthenes went to Nicias and proposed that they should man once more what remained of their fleet and force their way out, if they could, at daybreak, saying that a larger number of seaworthy ships still were left to them than to the enemy; for there yet remained to the Athenians about sixty, but to their opponents less than fifty. Nicias agreed to this proposal, and the generals desired to man the ships at once;

7.72.4

but the sailors refused to embark, because they were utterly dejected by their defeat and felt that it was no longer possible for them to win. So they were now unanimously of the opinion that they must make their retreat by land.

7.73.1

But Hermocrates the Syracusan, suspecting their intention and thinking that it would be a serious matter if so large an army, retreating overland, should settle somewhere in Sicily and be disposed to renew the war upon Syracuse, went to those in authority and explained that they ought not to permit the Athenians to withdraw during the night—giving the reason which led him to this opinion—but that the Syracusans and their allies should immediately march out in full force and build barricades across the roads and forestall the enemy by guarding the narrow passes.

7.73.2

Now the officials were as firmly of this opinion as Hermocrates and thought that these steps should be taken, but since the soldiers had as yet hardly had the rest they so eagerly desired after the great battle and, besides, there was a festival—for the Syracusans happened on this day to be offering a sacrifice to Heracles—they believed it would be no easy matter to induce the men to answer the summons; for in their great joy over the victory most of them had taken to drinking at the festival; and “We expect,” they said, “that they would obey any orders from us rather than to take up arms and march out.” So when it was clear to the officials, considering all these things, that the plan was impracticable, and Hermocrates was no longer making any impression upon them, he himself thereupon devised the following plan:

7.73.3

fearing that the Athenians might leave quietly during the night and get through the most difficult places before they could prevent this, he sent certain of his own friends with some horsemen to the Athenian camp when it was growing dark. These rode up close enough to be heard and called upon certain persons by name, as though they were friends of the Athenians—for there were some who regularly reported to Nicias all that went on in Syracuse

7.73.3

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7.73.3

—and bade them tell Nicias not to lead his army away that night, since the Syracusans were guarding the roads, but to withdraw at his leisure, in the daytime, after having made full preparations.

7.73.4

After saying this these men departed, and those who had heard reported it to the Athenian generals.

7.74.1

So the Athenians, in view of the announcement, in which they saw no trickery, stayed on for that night. And since, even as things were,

7.74.1

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7.74.1

they had not set out immediately, it seemed to them best to wait during the following day also, in order that the soldiers might pack up what was most useful, as well as they could in the circumstances, and then be off, leaving everything else behind and taking along only such of the supplies on hand as would serve for the sustenance of the body.

7.74.2

But the Syracusans and Gylippus went out ahead of them with their infantry and blocked up the roads in the country by which it was likely that the Athenians would travel, set guards at the fords across the streams and rivers, and posted themselves, at such points as seemed favourable, for the reception of the Athenian army, with the intention of opposing its progress. They also sailed up with their ships and began to haul down the Athenian ships from the beach and tow them away; the Athenians themselves had already, it is true, burned some few of their ships, as had been their purpose with the whole fleet,

7.74.2

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7.74.2

but all the rest the Syracusans, at their leisure and without opposition, taking them one at a time according as they happened to have run aground, lashed to their own ships and brought to the city.

7.75.1

After this, when it seemed to Nicias and Demosthenes that adequate preparations had been made, the departure of the army at last took place —on the third day following the sea-fight.

7.75.2

And it was terrible, not in one aspect only of their fortunes, in that they were going away after losing all their ships, and, in place of high hopes, with danger threatening both themselves and their State, but also in that, on the abandonment of their camp, it fell to the lot of each man to see things that were painful both to sight and mind.

7.75.3

The corpses were still unburied, and whenever a man saw one of his own friends lying dead, he was plunged into grief commingled with fear; and the living who were being left behind, wounded or sick, far more than the dead seemed piteous to the living, and were more wretched than those that had perished.

7.75.4

For turning to entreaty and lamentation, they drove the men to distraction; begging to be taken along and calling aloud upon each one if they saw anywhere a comrade or a kinsman, clinging to their tent-mates now going away and following after them as long as they were able, and then, when the bodily strength of one or another failed, falling behind, though not without faint

7.75.4

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7.75.4

appeals to the gods and lamentations; so that the whole army, being filled with grief and in such perplexity, found it hard to depart, even out of a country that was hostile, and though they had endured already sufferings too great for tears and feared for the future what they might still have to suffer.

7.75.5

There was also a general feeling of dejection and much self-condemnation. For indeed they looked like nothing else than a city in secret flight after a siege, and that no small city; for in the entire throng no fewer than four myriads were on the march together. And of these, the rest all bore whatever each could that was useful, while the hoplites and the horsemen, contrary to their wont, carried their own food, some for want of attendants, others through distrust of them; for there had been desertions all along and in greatest numbers immediately on their defeat. But even so they did not carry enough, for there was no longer food in the camp.

7.75.6

Furthermore, the rest of their misery and the equal sharing of their ills—although there was in this very sharing with many some alleviation—did not even so seem easy at the moment, especially when one considered from what splendour and boastfulness at first to what a humiliating end they had now come. For this was indeed the very greatest reversal that had ever happened to an Hellenic armament;

7.75.7

for it so fell out that in place of having come to enslave others, they were now going away in fear lest they might rather themselves suffer this, and instead of prayers and paeans, with which they had sailed forth, were now departing for home with imprecations quite the reverse of these; going too as foot-soldiers instead of seamen, and relying upon hoplites rather than a fleet. And yet, by reason of the magnitude of the danger still impending, all these things seemed to them tolerable.

7.76.1

But Nicias, seeing the despondency of the army and the great change it had undergone, passed along the ranks and endeavoured to encourage and cheer the soldiers as well as the circumstances permitted, shouting still louder in his zeal as he came to each contingent, and being desirous, by making his voice heard as far as possible, to do some good:

7.77.1

“Even in your present condition, Athenians and allies, you should still have hope—in the past men have been saved from even worse straits than these—and not blame yourselves too much either for your reverses or for your present unmerited miseries.

7.77.2

I myself, who have the advantage of none of you in strength of body—nay, you see how I am afflicted by my disease—and who was once thought, perhaps, to be inferior to no one in good fortune as regards both my private life and my career in general, am now involved in the same danger as the meanest among you. And yet my life has been spent in the performance of many a religious duty toward the gods and many a just and blameless action towards men.

7.77.3

Wherefore, in spite of all, my hope for the future is still confident, and our calamities do not frighten me as much as they might well have done. Perhaps they may even abate; for our enemies have had good fortune enough, and if we have roused the jealousy of any of the gods by our expedition we have already been punished sufficiently.

7.77.4

Others have ere now, we know, gone against their neighbours, and after acting as men will act, have suffered what men can bear. It is therefore reasonable that we also should now hope that the divine dispensations will be more kindly towards us—for we are now more deserving of the gods' pity than of their jealousy—and, furthermore you should, when you look upon yourselves and see what fine hoplites you are and what a multitude you are when marching in battle array, not be too greatly dismayed; nay, remember that wherever you establish yourselves you are at once a city, and that in all Sicily there is no other city which could either sustain an attack from you or drive you out if you once made a settlement anywhere.

7.77.5

And as to the march, you yourselves must see to it that it is safe and orderly, and each one of you must have no other thought than this—that the place, wherever it may be, in which you will be forced to fight, will be, if you conquer, both your country and your fortress.

7.77.6

And we must make haste upon our journey both night and day alike, for such supplies as we have are scanty; and if we reach some friendly place in the country of the Sicels—and we can still depend upon them because of their fear of the Syracusans—then only you may consider that you are in security. Directions have been sent ahead to the Sicels that they are to meet us and bring provisions with them.

7.77.7

Know the whole truth, fellow-soldiers: you must of necessity be brave men, since there is no place near at hand which you can reach in safety if you are cowards; and if you escape your enemies now, the rest of you will win all that you surely long to see once more, and those who are Athenians will raise up again, however fallen, the great power of their State; for it is men that make a State, not walls nor ships devoid of men.”

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Such were the words of exhortation which Nicias uttered as he passed along the ranks; and if he saw any part of the army straggling or not marching in line, he brought them together and into order; and Demosthenes did likewise, speaking in much the same terms to the soldiers under him.

7.78.2

And now the army began the march, arrayed in a hollow square, first the division of Nicias leading the way, then that of Demosthenes following.

7.78.3

The baggage-carriers and most of the miscellaneous throng were enclosed inside the ranks of the hoplites. When they reached the crossing of the river Anapus, they found some of the Syracusans and their allies drawn up there, and after routing these and securing the passage they went forward; but the Syracusan cavalry rode alongside and kept attacking them, while their light-armed troops showered javelins upon them.

7.78.4

On this day the Athenians advanced about forty stadia and bivouacked at a hill; but on the next day

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they began the march early and after proceeding about twenty stadia-descended into a level place, where they encamped; for they wished to get something to eat from the houses, the place being inhabited, and to get there a supply of water to take with them, since for many stadia ahead in the direction in which they were to go water was not plentiful.

7.78.5

Meanwhile the Syracusans had gone ahead and were engaged in making a wall across the pass in front; and this was over a steep hill, with a precipitous ravine on either side, called the Acraean Bald.

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7.78.6

On the next day

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the Athenians went forward, and the cavalry and javelin-men of the Syracusans and their allies, being in considerable force, sought to impede their march on either side by hurling javelins and riding alongside. For a long time the Athenians kept up the fight, but at length returned to the camp of the day preceding. And they no longer had provisions as before, for by reason of the enemy's cavalry it was no longer possible to leave the main body.

7.79.1

Early the next morning

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they set out again upon their march, and forced their way through to the hill where a wall had been built across the pass; there they found in front of them the enemy's infantry drawn up behind the wall, not a few shields deep, for the place was narrow.

7.79.2

The Athenians attacked and tried to storm the wall; but when they found themselves targets for the missiles of large numbers of the enemy on the hill, which was steep—and of course the men up above them could reach them more easily—and were unable to force their way through, they drew back and rested.

7.79.3

It so happened, furthermore, that at this same time there was some thunder and rain,

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as is apt to be the case toward the fall of the year; and this caused the Athenians to be still more despondent, for they believed that all these things too were conspiring for their destruction.

7.79.4

While they were resting, Gylippus and the Syracusans sent a part of their army to build a wall across the line of march in their rear, at a point on the road by which they had come;

7.79.5

but the Athenians sent a detachment of their own men and prevented it. After that the Athenians moved their whole army back into the more level country and bivouacked. On the next day

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they advanced again, and the Syracusans surrounded them and attacked them on every side, wounding many; if the Athenians attacked they retreated, but if they retreated they would charge, falling chiefly upon the rearmost in the hope that by routing them a few at a time they might put the whole army in a panic.

7.79.6

Now for a long time, fighting in this fashion, the Athenians resisted, then after they had advanced five or six stadia they rested in the plain; and the Syracusans on their part left them and went back to their own camp.

7.80.1

During the night, finding their army in wretched plight, since by now they were in want of all supplies and many had been wounded in many assaults made by the enemy, it was determined by Nicias and Demosthenes to kindle as many fires as possible and then withdraw the army, not now by the route which they had at first planned, but in the opposite direction to that in which the Syracusans were watching for them—that is, towards the sea.

7.80.2

(But previously the line of march which I have been describing had not been toward Catana,

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but toward the other side of Sicily, in the direction of Camarina and Gela and the cities in that region both Hellenic and Barbarian.)

7.80.3

So they kindled many fires and then set out during the night. And just as in all armies, and most of all in the largest, terrors and panics are apt to arise, especially at night and when they are marching through a hostile country with the enemy not far away, so confusion fell upon them also.

7.80.4

The army of Nicias, as it was in the van,

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kept together and got a long distance ahead, but that of Demosthenes, about half or more of the whole, became separated and proceeded in considerable disorder.

7.80.5

Nevertheless at dawn they reached the sea, and taking the road called Elorine marched on, intending when they reached the river Cacyparis

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to follow this stream up into the interior of the island; for they hoped that the Sicels, whom they had sent for, would meet them in that region.

7.80.6

But when they came to the river, there also they found a Syracusan guard blocking the way with a wall and a palisade. Forcing their way past them, they crossed the river and advanced again towards another river, the Erineus;

7.80.6

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for their guides bade them take that route.

7.81.1

Meanwhile, when day came

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and the Syracusans and their allies realized that the Athenians had gone away, most of them blamed Gylippus, saying that he purposely had let the Athenians get away; and pursuing them in hot haste, following the road which they could readily see that the enemy had taken, they overtook them about dinnertime.

7.81.2

And when they came up with the troops under Demosthenes, which were far in the rear and proceeding in a rather leisurely and disorderly fashion, due to the confusion into which they had fallen the night before, they fell upon them at once and began a battle; and since they were separated from the others the Syracusan cavalry found it easier to surround them and drive them together.

7.81.3

The division of Nicias was about fifty stadia ahead; for Nicias marched his men more rapidly, thinking that in the circumstances safety lay, not in standing firm and fighting of their own choice, but in retreating as rapidly as possible, fighting only as they were forced to do so.

7.81.4

But it was the fortune of Demosthenes to be for the most part in more continual trouble because, being far in the rear on the retreat, the enemy pressed upon him first, and now also, when he saw the Syracusans in pursuit, he was more taken up with ordering his troops for battle than with pressing forward, and so wasted time until he was surrounded by the enemy and both he and his men were in a state of utter confusion. For huddled together in a plot of ground surrounded by a wall, on either side of which a road passed, there being inside the wall a considerable number of olive trees, they were pelted with missiles from every side.

7.81.5

And the Syracusans had good reason to adopt attacks of this kind rather than contests at close quarters; for to risk their lives against men in despair was not now to their advantage, so much as to that of the Athenians. Besides, they considered that success was already assured; therefore everyone spared himself somewhat, not wishing to throw away his life before the end, and they all thought that even as it was, and following this manner of fighting, they would subdue and capture the enemy.

7.82.1

And so when they had assailed the Athenians and their allies with missiles from all sides throughout the day and saw that they were at length worn out by reason of their wounds and general misery, Gylippus and the Syracusans and their allies made proclamation, first, that any of the islanders

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who so wished might come over to their side on a guarantee of freedom;

7.82.2

and some states, but only a few, came over. Afterwards, however, an agreement was made with all the rest of the troops under Demosthenes that if they would surrender their arms no one should suffer death either by violence or by imprisonment or by deprivation of the bare necessities of life.

7.82.3

So they all surrendered, six thousand in number; and they gave up all the money they had, casting it into upturned shields; and four of these were filled. These captives the Syracusans immediately took to the city; as for Nicias and his men, they reached the river Erineus that same day, and after crossing it Nicias encamped his army on a height.

7.83.1

The next day

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the Syracusans overtook Nicias and told him that the troops under Demosthenes had surrendered, bidding him do likewise; but Nicias was incredulous, and obtained a truce that he might send a horseman and find out.

7.83.2

And when the horseman had gone and brought back word that they had indeed surrendered, Nicias announced by herald to Gylippus and the Syracusans that he was ready to agree, on behalf of the Athenians, to repay to the Syracusans all the money which they had spent upon the war, on condition that they should let his army go; and until the money should be paid, he would give Athenians as hostages, one man for each talent.

7.83.3

Gylippus and the Syracusans, however, would not accept these terms, but renewing the attack and surrounding the Athenian army plied these men also with their missiles until evening.

7.83.4

And they were in a wretched plight through want of food and of all necessaries. Nevertheless they waited for the quiet time of night and intended then to proceed. But no sooner had they taken up their arms than the Syracusans perceived it and raised the paean.

7.83.5

So the Athenians, seeing that their movements were detected, again put down their arms—all except about three hundred men, who forced their way through the guards and proceeded during the night by whatever way they could.

7.84.1

When day came

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Nicias led his army forward; but the Syracusans and their allies kept attacking in the same fashion, hurling missiles and striking them down with javelins on all sides.

7.84.2

The Athenians pushed on to the river Assinarus,

7.84.2

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7.84.2

partly because they thought, hard pressed as they were on all sides by the attack of numerous horsemen and of the miscellaneous troops, that they would be somewhat better off if they crossed the river, and partly by reason of their weariness and desire for water.

7.84.3

And when they reached it, they rushed in, no longer preserving order, but everyone eager to be himself the first to cross; and at the same time the pressure of the enemy now made the crossing difficult. For since they were obliged to move in a dense mass, they fell upon and trod one another down, and some perished at once, run through by their own spears, while others became entangled in their trappings and were carried away by the current.

7.84.4

The Syracusans stood along the other bank of the river, which was steep, and hurled missiles down upon the Athenians, most of whom were drinking greedily and were all huddled in confusion in the hollow bed of the river.

7.84.5

Moreover, the Peloponnesians went down to the water's edge and butchered them, especially those in the river. The water at once became foul, but was drunk all the same, although muddy and dyed with blood, and indeed was fought for by most of them.

7.85.1

At length, when the dead

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7.85.1

now lay in heaps one upon the other in the river, and the army had perished utterly, part in the river, and part—if any got safely across—at the hands of the cavalry, Nicias surrendered himself to Gylippus, having more confidence in him than in the Syracusans; and he bade him and the Lacedaemonians do with himself whatever they pleased, but to stop slaughtering the rest of the soldiers. Whereupon Gylippus at last gave orders to make prisoners;

7.85.2

and those of the survivors who had not been secretly appropriated by the Syracusan soldiers—and these were many— were brought in a body to Syracuse alive. They also sent men in pursuit of the three hundred, who had got through the guards the night before, and captured them.

7.85.3

Now that part of the army which was collected into the common stock was not large,

7.85.3

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7.85.3

but that which was secretly taken by the soldiers was large, and all Sicily was filled with them, inasmuch as they had not been taken by capitulation, as had the force under Demosthenes.

7.85.4

Besides, no small number had been killed; for the slaughter at the river had been very great—in fact, not inferior to any in this Sicilian war. And in the other frequent encounters which occurred on the march not a few had lost their lives. Notwithstanding all this, many escaped, some at the time, others afterwards, having become slaves and then making their escape; and the refuge for these was Catana.

7.86.1

When the forces of the Syracusans and their allies had been brought together, they took with them as many of the captives as they could and the booty and returned to the city.

7.86.2

All the rest of the prisoners they had taken of the Athenians and their allies they sent down into the stone-quarries, thinking it the safest way to keep them; but Nicias and Demosthenes they put to the sword, though against the wish of Gylippus. For he thought that it would be a glorious achievement if, in addition to his other successes, he could also bring the generals of the enemy home to the Lacedaemonians.

7.86.3

And it so happened that the one, Demosthenes, was regarded by the Lacedaemonians as their bitterest foe, on account of what had taken place on the island of Sphacteria and at Pylos; the other, for the same reason, as a very good friend; for Nicias had eagerly desired

7.86.3

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7.86.3

that the Lacedaemonian prisoners taken on the island should be released, when he urged the Athenians to make peace.

7.86.4

For these reasons the Lacedaemonians were friendly towards him, and it was not least on that account that he trusted in Gylippus and surrendered himself to him. But it was said that some of the Syracusans were afraid, seeing that they had been in communication with him, lest, if he were subjected to torture on that account, he might make trouble for them in the midst of their success; and others, especially the Corinthians, were afraid, lest, as he was wealthy,

7.86.4

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he might by means of bribes make his escape and cause them fresh difficulties; they therefore persuaded their allies and put him to death.

7.86.5

For this reason, then, or for a reason very near to this, Nicias was put to death—a man who, of all the Hellenes of my time, least deserved to meet with such a calamity, because of his course of life that had been wholly regulated in accordance with virtue.

7.87.1

The prisoners in the stone-quarries were at first treated harshly by the Syracusans. Crowded as they were in large numbers in a deep and narrow place, at first the sun and the suffocating heat caused them distress, there being no roof; while the nights that followed were, on the contrary, autumnal and cold, so that the sudden change engendered illness.

7.87.2

Besides, they were so cramped for space that they had to do everything in the same place; moreover, the dead were heaped together upon one another, some having died from wounds or because of the change in temperature or like causes, so that there was a stench that was intolerable. At the same time they were oppressed by both hunger and thirst—the Syracusans having for eight months given them each only a half-pint of water and a pint of food a day

7.87.2

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7.87.2

; and of all the other ills which men thrown into such a place would be likely to suffer there was none that did not befall them.

7.87.3

Now for some seventy days they lived in this way all together; then all the rest, except the Athenians and any Siceliots and Italiots that had joined the expedition, were sold.

7.87.4

The total number of prisoners taken, though it is difficult to speak with accuracy, was nevertheless not fewer than seven thousand.

7.87.5

This event proved to be the greatest of all that had happened in the course of this war, and, as it seems to me, of all Hellenic events of which we have record —for the victors most splendid, for the vanquished most disastrous.

7.87.6

For the vanquished, beaten utterly at every point and having suffered no slight ill in any respect—having met, as the saying goes, with utter destruction—land-force and fleet and everything perished, and few out of many came back home.

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Such was the course of events in Sicily.

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