History of the Peloponnesian War

Thucydides

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8.1.1

When the news reached Athens, even though the actual soldiers who had escaped from the action itself gave a clear report, they for long refused to believe that the armament could have been so utterly destroyed. When, however, they were convinced, they were angry with the orators who had taken part in promoting the expedition—as though they had not voted for it themselves—and they were also enraged at the oracle-mongers and soothsayers and whoever at that time by any practice of divination had led them to hope that they would conquer Sicily.

8.1.2

Everything indeed on every side distressed them, and after what had happened they were beset with fear and utmost consternation. For having lost, both each man separately and as a state, many hoplites and horsemen and the flower of the youth, while they saw none like it left them, they were heavy of heart; and again, seeing no ships in the docks in sufficient number nor money in the treasury nor crews for the ships, they were at the moment hopeless of safety. They thought that their enemies in Sicily would sail with their fleet straight for the Peiraeus, especially as they had won so great a victory, and that their foes at home, now doubly prepared in all respects, would attack them at once with all their might both by land and by sea, and that their own allies would revolt and join them.

8.1.3

Nevertheless it was their opinion that, as far as their present circumstances permitted, they should not give up, but should both make ready a fleet, providing timber and money from whatever source they could, and put their relations with their allies, and especially with Euboea, on a safe footing; moreover, that they should reduce the expenses of the city to an economical basis, and should select a board of elderly men who should prepare measures with reference to the present situation as there might be occasion.

8.1.4

In the panic of the moment they were ready, as is the way with a democracy, to observe discipline in everything. And as they had determined, so they proceeded to act; and the summer ended.

8.2.1

The following winter, in view of the great disaster that had befallen the Athenians in Sicily,

8.2.1

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8.2.1

there was at once excitement among all the Hellenes. Some, who were allies of neither party, thought that, even if they were not called upon for aid, they should no longer hold aloof from the war, but should go of their own accord against the Athenians; for they believed, one and all, that the Athenians would have come against them if they had succeeded in Sicily; they also believed that the rest of the war would be short and that it would be glorious to have a part in it. The allies of the Lacedaemonians, on the other hand, were more than ever animated by a common eagerness quickly to be relieved of

8.2.2

their great hardships. But most of all the subjects of the Athenians were ready, even beyond their power, to revolt from them, because they judged of the situation under the influence of passion and would not even leave them the plea that they would be able to hold out through

8.2.3

the following summer. The Lacedaemonian state was encouraged by all these things, and especially because their allies in Sicily would in all probability be present to help them with a large force as soon as spring came, since necessity had now compelled them to

8.2.4

acquire a navy. Being hopeful, then, in every way, they determined to set their hands to the war wholeheartedly, reckoning that when it should have ended successfully they would thereafter be free from such dangers as would have beset them from the side of the Athenians if these had acquired the resources of Sicily in addition to their own; and that, having overthrown them, they would themselves now hold securely the hegemony of all Hellas.

8.3.1

Accordingly Agis their king set out with an army at once during this same winter from Deceleia, and levied money from the allies for the maintenance of the fleet; then turning toward the Malian Gulf, he carried off from the Oetaeans, in pursuance of a long-standing enmity,

8.3.1

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the greater part of their cattle and exacted money from them. Furthermore, he compelled the Achaeans of Phthiotis and the other subjects of the Thessalians in that region—though the Thessalians were unwilling and remonstrated—to give him hostages and money; then he deposited the hostages at Corinth and tried to bring their countrymen into the alliance.

8.3.2

The Lacedaemonians, moreover, made requisition upon the states for the building of one hundred ships, fixing the levy for themselves and the Boeotians at twenty-five each, for the Phocians and Locrians at fifteen, for the Corinthians at fifteen, for the Arcadians, Pellenians and Sicyonians at ten, and for the Megarians, Troezenians, Epidaurians and Hermionians at ten. And they went on with their other preparations with the expectation of beginning the war promptly with the opening of spring.

8.4.1

During this same winter the Athenians also were making their preparations to build ships, in accordance with their decision, and for this they had collected timber; and they fortified Sunium, in order that there might be protection for their grain-ships as they rounded the promontory. Furthermore, they abandoned the fortress in Laconia

8.4.1

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8.4.1

which they had built as they sailed along the Peloponnesian coast toward Sicily; and in general, if there seemed to be any useless expenditure anywhere, they retrenched in order to save money; but above all they kept an eye on their allies, that they might not revolt from them.

8.5.1

While both sides were carrying out these measures and busily equipping themselves for the war precisely as if they were just beginning it, first of all the Euboeans in the course of this winter sent envoys to Agis to discuss revolting from Athens. Receiving their proposals, he summoned from Lacedaemon Alcamenes son of Sthenelaïdas and Melanthus to take command in Euboea, and they came with about three hundred neodamodes,

8.5.1

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8.5.1

while Agis began arranging for their crossing. But in the meantime the Lesbians also came, they also desiring to revolt;

8.5.2

and as the Boeotians assisted them in their negotiations, Agis was persuaded to delay matters so far as the Euboeans were concerned and began arranging their revolt for the Lesbians, giving them as harmost Alcamenes, who was to have sailed to Euboea; furthermore, the Boeotians promised them ten ships and Agis the same number. These negotiations were carried on without the authority of the Lacedaemonian state;

8.5.3

for so long as he was stationed at Deceleia with his own force Agis possessed full power to send troops anywhere he wished as well as to levy them and to exact money. And at that time the allies hearkened to him far more, one might say, than to the Lacedaemonians in Sparta; for he had a force at his own disposal and his appearance anywhere instantly inspired fear. So he was working in the interest of the Lesbians, but the Chians

8.5.3

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8.5.3

and Erythraeans, who also were ready to revolt, betook themselves, not to Agis, but to Lacedaemon.

8.5.4

And with them went an envoy from Tissaphernes, who was military governor of the coast-lands for King Darius

8.5.4

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8.5.4

son of Artaxerxes. For Tissaphernes was also trying to induce the Peloponnesians to come over to Asia, promising to furnish them maintenance.

8.5.5

For the King, as it chanced, had lately demanded of him the tribute from his own province, for which he had fallen into arrears, since he was not able to exact it from the Hellenic cities because of the Athenians. He therefore thought that if he should weaken the Athenians he would be better able to collect his tribute; he also intended at the same time to make the Lacedaemonians allies of the King, and, in accordance with the King's command, either to take alive or to kill Amorges, bastard son of Pissuthnes,

8.5.5

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8.5.5

who was in revolt in Caria. Accordingly the Chians and Tissaphernes were negotiating in common for the same object.

8.6.1

About the same time Calligeitus son of Laophon, a Megarian, and Timagoras son of Athenagoras, a Cyzicene, both being fugitives from their own countries and living at the court of Pharnabazus

8.6.1

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8.6.1

son of Pharnaces, came to Lacedaemon. They had been sent by Pharnabazus to bring ships to the Hellespont, in order that he too, just as Tissaphernes was eager to do, might, if possible, cause the cities in his own province to revolt from the Athenians on account of the tribute, and by his own efforts secure for the King the alliance of the Lacedaemonians.

8.6.2

As the two sets of envoys, those from Pharnabazus and those from Tissaphernes, were negotiating these matters separately, there was much rivalry among the people of Lacedaemon, one side trying to persuade the people to send ships and troops to Ionia and Chios first, the other to the Hellespont.

8.6.3

The Lacedaemonians, however, were by far more inclined to accept the proposals of the Chians and Tissaphernes. For Alcibiades was cooperating with them, being an hereditary friend of the ephor Endius and on the most intimate terms with him. (This was, in fact, the reason why their house had acquired its Laconian name; for Endius was called Endius son of Alcibiades).

8.6.3

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8.6.4

But in spite of their inclination, the Lacedaemonians first sent Phrynis, one of the Perioeci, to Chios to see whether the Chians had as many ships as they claimed, and whether in other respects the power of the city was equal to the representations made. When he brought back word that what they had heard was true, they at once made the Chians and the Erythraeans allies, and voted to send them forty ships, there being, from what the Chians said, no fewer than sixty already there.

8.6.5

And at first they were going to send them ten of these under the command of Melanchridas, who was their admiral; but afterwards, when an earthquake occurred, instead of Melanchridas they sent Chalcideus, and instead of ten ships they made ready five in Laconia. So the winter ended, and with it the nineteenth year of the war of which Thucydides wrote the history.

8.7.1

At the beginning of the following summer, as the Chians pressed them to send the ships, and

8.7.1

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8.7.1

were afraid that the Athenians might become aware of their negotiations—for all these embassies were kept secret from them—the Lacedaemonians sent to Corinth three Spartans, that they might as quickly as possible haul the ships over the Isthmus from the Corinthian Gulf to the sea on the side toward Athens, and give orders for the whole fleet to sail to Chios—the ships which Agis was getting ready for Lesbos as well as the rest. And the number of ships of the allied contingents at that place was all together thirty-nine.

8.8.1

Accordingly, Calligeitus and Timagoras, who were acting on behalf of Pharnabazus, did not join in the expedition to Chios, nor did they give the money—twenty-five talents

8.8.1

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8.8.1

—which they had brought with them for the despatching of the ships, but intended to sail later with another armament by themselves.

8.8.2

Agis, on the other hand, when he saw the Lacedaemonians eager for the expedition to Chios first, did not himself maintain a different view; but when the allies came together at Corinth and deliberated, they decided: in the first place, to sail to Chios with Chalcideus in command, he being in charge of the equipping of the five ships in Laconia; then to proceed to Lesbos with Alcamenes as commander—the one whom Agis was intending to send; and, finally, to go to the Hellespont, Clearchus son of Ramphias having already been assigned to command in this region.

8.8.3

Furthermore, they decided to carry across the Isthmus half of the ships at first, and that these were to set sail immediately, in order that the attention of the Athenians might not be directed toward the ships that were setting out more than toward those that were afterwards being carried across the Isthmus.

8.8.4

For they proposed to make the voyage from here to Chios openly, despising the impotence of the Athenians, because no considerable fleet of theirs was as yet making its appearance. And in accordance with their decision they at once conveyed twenty-one ships across.

8.9.1

The Corinthians, however, although the others were impatient for the voyage, were not disposed to sail with them until they should have celebrated the Isthmian Games, which were held at that time. And Agis was quite ready to allow them to preserve inviolate the Isthmian truce

8.9.1

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8.9.1

while he made the expedition an affair of his own.

8.9.2

But as the Corinthians did not agree and delay ensued, the Athenians became more aware of the designs of the Chians, and sending Aristocrates, one of their generals, they charged them with the plot, and when they denied it, bade them, as their guarantee of good faith, send some ships along with the Athenian fleet as a contribution to the allied force;

8.9.3

and they sent seven. Their reason for sending these ships was that most of the Chians had no knowledge of the negotiations, and the oligarchs, who were in the plot, were not only unwilling as yet to incur the hostility of the populace, before they had acquired any strength, but also because of the delay of the Peloponnesians no longer expected them to come.

8.10.1

In the meantime the Isthmian Games were celebrated, and the Athenians, since the truce had been proclaimed,

8.10.1

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8.10.1

sent deputies to them; and so the designs of the Chians became more manifest to them. And when they returned they immediately made arrangements that the ships should not set sail from Cenchreiae without their knowledge.

8.10.2

But the Peloponnesians, after the festival, put to sea for Chios with twenty-one ships under the command of Alcamenes. And the Athenians at first sailed up to them with an equal number of ships, and tried to draw them out into the open sea. But when the Peloponnesians did not follow them very far but turned back, the Athenians also withdrew; for they had the seven Chian ships in the ranks of their fleet and did not consider them trustworthy.

8.10.3

But they afterwards manned additional ships, bringing their number up to thirty-seven, and then pursued the enemy as they sailed along the coast, until they put in at Peiraeum in Corinthian territory. This is a deserted port, the last toward the borders of Epidauria. The Peloponnesians lost one ship out at sea, but brought the rest together and cast anchor.

8.10.4

And now, when the Athenians attacked them, both by sea with their fleet and on land, having put men ashore, there was great confusion and disorder; and most of the Peloponnesian ships were disabled by the Athenians on the beach and their commander Alcamenes was slain. And some Athenians also were killed.

8.11.1

After drawing off, the Athenians posted a sufficient number of ships to keep watch upon those of the enemy, but with the rest cast anchor at an islet not far distant, on which they proceeded to make their camp; and they also sent to Athens for reinforcements.

8.11.2

For the Corinthians had joined the Peloponnesians the day after the battle, bringing reinforcements to their fleet, and not long afterward the peoples of the neighbourhood also came. And the Peloponnesians, seeing the difficulty of guarding the ships in a desert place, were in perplexity; and they even thought of burning the ships, but afterwards determined to draw them up on shore and, settling down there with their land-force, to keep guard over them until some favourable opportunity of escape should offer. And Agis, hearing of their predicament, sent to them Thermon, a Spartan.

8.11.3

Now the first news that came to the Lacedaemonians was that the ships had put to sea from the Isthmus—for orders had been given to Alcamenes by the ephors to despatch a horseman as soon as that should happen—and they were planning to send immediately their own five ships under the command of Chalcideus, and Alcibiades with him; afterwards, when they were eager to sail, word came to them about their ships having taken refuge at Peiraeum; and they were so discouraged, because in this their first undertaking in the Ionian war they had failed, that they from that time on ceased planning to send out the ships that were in home waters, but on the contrary even thought of recalling some that had previously gone out to sea.

8.12.1

Now when Alcibiades learned of this, he again urged Endius and the other ephors not to shrink from the expedition, saying that their fleet would have completed the voyage before the Chians could hear of the disaster to their ships, and that he himself, when he reached Ionia, would easily persuade the cities to revolt by telling them of the weakness of the Athenians and the zeal of the Lacedaemonians; for he would be more readily believed than others.

8.12.2

And to Endius he said privately that it would be an honour for him, through the agency of Alcibiades, to cause Ionia to revolt and to make the King an ally to the Lacedaemonians, urging him not to let this become the achievement of Agis;

8.12.3

for he happened himself to be at variance with Agis.

8.12.3

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8.12.3

So having persuaded Endius and the other ephors, he put to sea with the five ships in company with Chalcideus the Lacedaemonian, and they made the voyage with all speed.

8.13.1

About the same time the sixteen Peloponnesian ships, which had served with Gylippus in Sicily throughout the war, were on their way home; and as they were off Leucadia they were intercepted and roughly handled by the twenty-seven Athenian ships under the command of Hippocles son of Menippus, who was on the look-out for the ships from Sicily; but all except one escaped the Athenians and sailed into Corinth.

8.14.1

Meanwhile Chalcideus and Alcibiades as they sailed for Chios seized all whom they encountered, that their coming might not be reported. The first point on the mainland at which they touched was Corycus,

8.14.1

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8.14.1

where they released their captives; then after a conference with some Chians who were co-operating with them and who urged them to sail to Chios without giving any notice, they arrived at Chios suddenly.

8.14.2

Now the people at large were in a state of wonderment and consternation, but the oligarchs had arranged that the council should chance to have just assembled; speeches were accordingly made by Chalcideus and Alcibiades, who announced that many additional ships were on the way, but did not disclose the fact of the blockade of their fleet at Peiraeum, and then the Chians revolted from Athens, and so later on did the Erythraeans.

8.14.3

After this three ships were detached from the fleet and brought about the revolt of Clazomenae. And the Clazomenians immediately crossed over to the mainland and fortified Polichne, on the chance that they themselves might have need of it in case they should withdraw from the island

8.14.3

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8.14.3

on which they lived. These peoples, then, being in revolt, were all engaged in fortifying and preparing for war.

8.15.1

News of the revolt of Chios came quickly to Athens, and they felt that the danger which encompassed them was by now great and manifest, and that the rest of their allies would not be inclined to keep quiet when the greatest state of all had seceded. And so they took up the question of the fund of a thousand talents,

8.15.1

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8.15.1

which during the whole war they had jealously refrained from touching, and under the influence of their consternation immediately rescinded the penalties which had been imposed upon any speaker who should propose to touch this money, or any presiding officer who should put such a proposal to a vote, and then voted to use this fund and man a considerable number of ships. They also voted that of the ships which were employed in the blockade at Peiraeum there should be sent at once the eight that, leaving guard-duty, had gone in pursuit of the fleet under Chalcideus, but after failing to overtake it had returned to their post—the commander of these eight being Strombichides son of Diotimus—and that soon afterwards twelve others under Thrasycles should leave the blockade and go to the rescue.

8.15.2

As for the seven Chian ships that were assisting them in the blockade of the vessels at Peiraeum, they withdrew them, freeing the slaves aboard them and putting the freemen in fetters. And in place of all the ships that had gone away they speedily manned others and sent them to continue the blockade of the Peloponnesians, and it was their intention to man thirty more. Great indeed was their ardour, and there was nothing trivial in their efforts to send out reinforcements against Chios.

8.16.1

Meanwhile Strombichides with his eight ships arrived at Samos; then after taking on an additional Samian ship he sailed to Teos, whose inhabitants he begged to keep quiet. But at this moment Chalcideus bore down upon him, sailing from Chios to Teos with twenty-three ships, and at the same time the land-force of the Clazomenians and Erythraeans was moving along the shore.

8.16.2

Strombichides, however, observed the enemy in time and promptly put out to sea, and when he was in the open sea and saw how numerous were the ships from Chios, he made flight toward Samos; and the enemy pursued him.

8.16.3

As for the land-force, the Teïans would not at first admit them, but when the Athenians fled they brought them into the city. These troops waited for a while, expecting Chalcideus to join them after the pursuit; but when he tarried, they proceeded on their own account to demolish the fort which the Athenians had built on the mainland side of the city of Teos; and in this work they were assisted by a few of the Barbarian troops that had come up, their commander being Stages, a lieutenant of Tissaphernes.

8.17.1

Chalcideus and Alcibiades, after pursuing Strombichides to Samos, armed the sailors from the Peloponnesian ships and left them at Chios, and replacing the crews of these ships with substitutes from Chios and manning twenty additional ships, they sailed to Miletus, with the intention of causing it to revolt.

8.17.2

For Alcibiades wished, since he was a friend of the leading men of Miletus, to win the Milesians over before the arrival of the Peloponnesian ships, and to fulfil his promise

8.17.2

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8.17.2

to secure for the Chians and himself and Chalcideus and for Endius the author of the expedition the credit of having, in concert with the Chian forces and Chalcideus, brought to revolt the largest possible number of cities.

8.17.3

Accordingly they made most of the voyage without being detected, barely anticipated the arrival of Strombichides and Thrasycles—who by chance had just come from Athens with twelve ships and joined in the pursuit—and induced Miletus to revolt. The Athenians followed at their heels with nineteen ships, and, when the Milesians would not admit them, took up their station at Lade, the island that lies off Miletus.

8.17.4

And now, immediately after the revolt of Miletus, the first alliance between the Lacedaemonians and the King was concluded through Tissaphernes and Chalcideus, on the following conditions:

8.18.1

The Lacedaemonians and their allies have concluded an alliance with the King and Tissaphernes on the following terms: "1. Whatsoever territory and cities the King holds or the forefathers of the King held, shall belong to the King; and from these cities whatsoever money or anything else came in for the Athenians shall be stopped by the King and the Lacedaemonians and their allies acting in common, to the end that the Athenians shall receive neither money nor anything else. "2.

8.18.2

And the war against the Athenians shall be waged in common by the King and the Lacedaemonians and their allies; and an end of the war against the Athenians is not to be made except with the consent of both parties, the King as well as the Lacedaemonians and their allies. “3.

8.18.3

If any revolt from the King, they shall be enemies to both the Lacedaemonians and their allies, and if any revolt from the Lacedaemonians and their allies, they shall be enemies to the King in like manner.”

8.19.1

Such was the alliance. And immediately after this the Chians manned ten more ships and sailed to Anaea,

8.19.1

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8.19.1

wishing to learn about the situation in Miletus and at the same time to induce the cities to revolt.

8.19.2

But a message came from Chalcideus ordering them to sail back again, since Amorges would soon arrive by land with an army, and so they sailed to the temple of Zeus; there they described sixteen ships approaching with which Diomedon had left Athens even after the departure of Thrasycles.

8.19.3

When they saw these ships, they fled to Ephesus with one ship, while the rest made for Teos. Four empty ships were captured by the Athenians, their crews having escaped to the land; the other five took refuge at the city of Teos.

8.19.4

The Athenians then sailed for Samos; and the Chians, putting out to sea with the rest of their ships and acting in concert with the army on land, induced Lebedos to revolt and then Haerae.

8.19.4

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8.19.4

After this each contingent returned home, both the army on land and the fleet.

8.20.1

About the same time the twenty Peloponnesian ships at Peiraeum, which had been chased to shore at the time above mentioned

8.20.1

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8.20.1

and were being blockaded by an equal number of Athenian ships, made a sudden sally, and winning the victory in an engagement captured four of the Athenian ships; they then sailed back to Cenchreiae, where they proceeded again to prepare for the voyage to Chios and Ionia.

8.20.2

And Astyochus came to them from Lacedaemon and on him now devolved, as admiral, the command of the entire fleet. Now when the land-forces withdrew from Teos, Tissaphernes came there in person with an army, demolished whatever was left of the fortification at Teos, and then withdrew. After his departure Diomedon, who arrived a little later with ten Athenian ships, made an agreement with the Teians to receive them also. He then sailed along the coast to Haerae, and after making an assault upon the city without success sailed away.

8.21.1

There also occurred at this time the uprising at Samos which was made against the nobles by the common people in conjunction with some Athenians, who happened to be present on board three ships. And the common people of Samos slew some two hundred in all of the nobles, and having condemned to exile four hundred others, distributed among themselves their land and houses; and when the Athenians, after these events, granted them autonomy on the ground that they were now assured of their fidelity, they administered the affairs of the city thenceforth; and they neither gave to the landowners any other privilege nor permitted any one of the common people from that time on either to give his daughter in marriage to them or to take a wife from them.

8.22.1

After this, during the same summer, the Chians showed no abatement of the zeal which they had displayed from the beginning,

8.22.1

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8.22.1

in approaching the various cities in force, even without the Peloponnesians, and inducing them to revolt; and wishing at the same time that as many as possible should share the danger with them, they made an expedition on their own account with thirteen ships against Lesbos. For they had been ordered by the Lacedaemonians to go against it next, and afterwards to proceed to the Hellespont.

8.22.1

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8.22.1

At the same time the land-force, consisting both of the Peloponnesians who were present and of the allies from that region, moved along the shore toward Clazomenae and Cyme, being under the command of Eualas, a Spartan, while the fleet was in charge of Deiniadas, one of the Perioeci.

8.22.2

The fleet put in at Methymna and induced it to revolt first, and four ships were left there; the rest then effected the revolt of Mytilene.

8.23.1

Meanwhile Astyochus, the Lacedaemonian admiral, sailed with four ships from Cenchreiae, as he had purposed, and arrived at Chios. And on the third day after his coming the twenty-five Athenian ships sailed to Lesbos, being under the command of Leon and Diomedon; for Leon had arrived afterwards with a reinforcement of ten ships from Athens.

8.23.2

On the same day, but at a later hour, Astyochus put to sea, and taking besides his own one Chian ship sailed to Lesbos, in order to give what aid he could. On that day he reached Pyrrha, and thence on the next day Eresus, where he learned that Mytilene had been taken by the Athenians at the first assault.

8.23.3

For the Athenians, arriving unexpectedly, had immediately sailed into the harbour and got the better of the Chian slips; they then landed and after defeating in battle those that resisted them took possession of the city.

8.23.4

Now when Astyochus learned of this from the inhabitants of Eresus and from the Chian ships that came from Methymna with Eubulus—the ships which had been left behind on the occasion above mentioned,

8.23.4

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8.23.4

and now fell in with him in their flight after the capture of Mytilene, being three in number, for one had been captured by the Athenians—he no longer advanced against Mytilene, but instead induced Eresus to revolt, supplied it with arms, and then sent the hoplites on his own ships by land along the coast to Antissa and Methymna, placing Eteonicus in command of them. He himself, meanwhile, took his own and the three Chian ships and sailed along the coast, hoping that the Methymnaeans would be encouraged by the sight of his fleet and would persevere in their revolt.

8.23.5

But since everything at Lesbos was going against him, he took his hoplites aboard and sailed back to Chios. And the forces which had been landed from the ships

8.23.5

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8.23.5

and were intending to proceed to the Hellespont were conveyed again to their several cities. After this, six of the allied ships from the Peloponnesus that were at Cenchreia joined them at Chios.

8.23.6

As for the Athenians, they restored conditions at Lesbos, and sailing from there captured Polichne,

8.23.6

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8.23.6

the Clazomenian settlement on the mainland which was being fortified, and carried all the inhabitants back to the city on the island, except the authors of the revolt; for these had got away to Daphnus. And so Clazomenae again came back to the Athenian alliance.

8.24.1

During the same summer the Athenians, who were at Lade with their twenty ships keeping watch upon Miletus, made a descent at Panormus in Milesian territory and slew Chalcideus, the Lacedaemonian commander, who had come to the rescue with a few men; and two days later they sailed across and set up a trophy, which, however, the Milesians tore down on the ground that the Athenians did not have control of the country when they set it up.

8.24.2

And now Leon and Diomedon, with the Athenian ships from Lesbos, began to make war upon the Chians by sea from the Oenussae islands, which lie off Chios, and from Sidussa and Pteleum, fortresses which they held in Erythraean territory, as well as from Lesbos; and they had on board as marines some hoplites from the muster-roll

8.24.2

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8.24.2

who had been pressed into the service.

8.24.3

And landing at Cardamyle and Boliscus, they defeated in battle those of the Chians who came out to oppose them and slew many, and devastated the settlements in that region; and again at Phanae in another battle they were victorious, and also in a third battle at Leuconium. After this the Chians no longer came out against them, but the Athenians ravaged their country, which was well stocked and had been unharmed from the Persian wars down to that time.

8.24.4

For next to the Lacedaemonians the Chians alone, of all the peoples that I have known, have been at once prosperous and prudent, and the greater their city grew the more securely they ordered their government.

8.24.5

And even as regards this revolt, if men think that they did not consult their safety in undertaking it, they did not venture to make it until they were sure of incurring the danger in concert with many brave allies and perceived that not even the Athenians themselves, after the Sicilian disaster, could any longer deny that their circumstances were beyond a doubt exceedingly bad. And if in the unexpected turns that belong to human life they were somewhat deceived, they made their misjudgment in common with many others who were of the same opinion—that the power of the Athenians would speedily be utterly overthrown.

8.24.6

Now, however, that they were shut off from the sea and were being despoiled by land, some of them attempted to bring the city over to the Athenians. Their rulers perceived this, but themselves kept quiet; however, they fetched from Erythrae the Lacedaemonian admiral Astyochus with the four ships which were with him there, and considered what were the mildest measures, either the seizing of hostages or some other plan, by which they could put an end to the plot. They, then, were thus occupied.

8.25.1

At the end of the same summer there sailed from Athens to Samos one thousand Athenian and fifteen hundred Argive hoplites—for the five hundred of the Argives that were light—armed the Athenians had provided with heavy arms—together with one thousand from the allies. These troops were carried by forty-eight ships, some of which were transports, and were under the command of Phrynichus, Onomacles, and Scironides. From Samos they crossed over to Miletus and encamped there.

8.25.2

But the enemy marched out against them—the Milesians themselves, to the number of eight hundred hoplites, the Peloponnesians who had come with Chalcideus, and a body of mercenaries belonging to Tissaphernes, together with Tissaphernes himself, who was present with his cavalry—and attacked the Athenians and their allies.

8.25.3

Now the Argives with their wing rushed out ahead of the rest and advanced in some disorder, feeling contempt of the enemy as being Ionians and men who would not await their attack, and so were defeated by the Milesians and not fewer than three hundred of them destroyed.

8.25.4

But the Athenians, after defeating the Peloponnesians first and then driving back the barbarians and the miscellaneous crowd—yet without engaging the Milesians, who after their rout of the Argives had withdrawn into the city, when they saw that the rest of their army was being worsted—finally halted, as being already victorious, close to the city itself.

8.25.5

And it so happened in this battle that on both sides the Ionians were victorious over the Dorians; for the Athenians defeated the Peloponnesians opposed to themselves, and the Milesians the Argives. But the Athenians, after setting up a trophy, made preparations for shutting off the place, which had the shape of an isthmus, with a wall, thinking that, if they should bring Miletus over to their side, the other places would readily come over also.

8.26.1

In the meantime, when it was already approaching dusk, word was brought to them that the fifty-five ships from the Peloponnesus and from Sicily were all but there. For from Sicily, where Hermocrates the Syracusan took the lead in urging the Siceliots to take part in what remained to be done for the complete destruction of the Athenians, there had come twenty Syracusan and two Selinuntian ships, besides those from the Peloponnesus, which they had been equipping and which were at last ready; and both squadrons were put in charge of Therimenes the Lacedaemonian with orders to take them to Astyochus the admiral. They first put in to harbour at Leros, the island off Miletus;

8.26.2

and from there, on finding that the Athenians were at Miletus, they sailed into the Iasic Gulf, wishing to know the state of affairs at Miletus.

8.26.3

And when Alcibiades came by horse to Teichiussa, a town in Milesian territory on that part of the gulf to which they had sailed and where they had bivouacked, they learned the story of the battle; for Alcibiades had been present and had fought with the Milesians and with Tissaphernes. And he urged them, if they did not wish to ruin matters in Ionia and their whole cause, to aid Miletus as quickly as possible, and not to suffer it to be invested.

8.27.1

Accordingly they were proposing to go to its aid at daybreak; but Phrynichus, the Athenian general, when he received from Leros accurate information about the enemy's fleet, though his colleagues wished to wait and fight a decisive battle, refused either to do this himself or to permit them or anybody else to do it, so far as he had power to prevent it.

8.27.2

For in a case where it would be possible to fight at a later time, after leisurely and adequate preparation and possessing full information as to the number of the enemy's ships they must meet and how many of their own they would have, he would never, he declared, yielding to the consideration of disgrace, hazard a decisive battle unreasonably.

8.27.3

It was not disgraceful, he said, for Athenians to give way before a hostile navy upon occasion, but it would be more disgraceful if under any circumstances whatever they should be defeated and have to make terms. The state would incur, not only disgrace, but also the greatest danger; for, after their past misfortunes, it was scarcely permissible for it when securely prepared of free will, or

8.27.3

1

8.27.3

through absolute necessity, to take the offensive in any direction, much less was it permissible, when there was no pressure, to rush into self-chosen dangers.

8.27.4

He urged them, therefore, as speedily as possible to take up their wounded and their forces on land and whatever stores they had brought with them, leaving behind, however, the spoils they had taken from the enemy's country, in order that the ships might be light, and sail back to Samos;

8.27.5

then, making that their base, after bringing all their ships together, they might sally forth for attacks if opportunity should offer anywhere. As he advised, so he also acted;

8.27.6

and consequently, though not on the present occasion more than afterwards, nor as regards this decision only, but in general in whatever circumstances he found himself, Phrynichus won the reputation of being a man of sagacity. Thus the Athenians, their victory incomplete, retired from Miletus immediately after nightfall; and the Argives, in all haste and indignant at what had happened, sailed home from Samos.

8.28.1

At daybreak the Peloponnesians weighed anchor from Teichiussa and put to shore, and then, after waiting one day, took into their fleet on the next day the Chian ships that under the command of Chalcideus had been pursued to port.

8.28.1

1

8.28.1

They now wished to sail back to Teichiussa after the stores which they had put ashore there.

8.28.2

On their arrival Tissaphernes, who had come up with his land-forces, persuaded them to sail against Iasus, where Amorges, an enemy, was in occupation. So they made a sudden attack upon Iasus and took it, as the inhabitants had no thought but that the ships were Athenian;

8.28.3

and in the action the Syracusans won most praise. Amorges was taken alive by the Peloponnesians and delivered over to Tissaphernes to lead home to the King, if he so wished, according to his orders

8.28.3

1

8.28.3

; and they sacked Iasus, the army taking very much treasure, for the place was one of ancient wealth.

8.28.4

As for the mercenaries who served with Amorges, they took them into their own camp, and without doing them any harm put them into their ranks, because most of them were from the Peloponnesus. The town they delivered to Tissaphernes, together with all the captives, both bond and free, agreeing to accept from him a Daric stater

8.28.4

1

8.28.4

for each one of them. They then withdrew to Miletus.

8.28.5

Pedaritus son of Leon, who had been sent by the Lacedaemonians to be governor at Chios, they dispatched by land as far as Erythrae in command of the mercenary force of Amorges, and there in Miletus they appointed Philippus governor. So the summer ended.

8.29.1

During the following winter, after he had placed Iasus in charge of a garrison, Tissaphernes came to Miletus, where he distributed to all the ships a month's pay, as he had promised at Lacedaemon to do, to the amount of an Attic drachma a day for each man; for the future, however, he proposed to give only three obols

8.29.1

1

8.29.1

until he should ask the King;

8.29.2

if the King should so order, he would give the full drachma. But when Hermocrates the Syracusan general remonstrated-for Therimenes, not being admiral, but sailing with the fleet only to turn it over to Astyochus, was complaisant about the pay-a sum was agreed upon notwithstanding that was larger by five ships than three obols for each man.

8.29.2

1

8.29.2

For he gave for fifty-five ships thirty talents a month

8.29.2

2

8.29.2

; and to the others, according as there were more ships than this number, pay was given in the same proportion.

8.29.2

3

8.30.1

The same winter, when the Athenians in Samos had received from home a reinforcement of thirty-five ships under the command of Charminus, Strombichides and Euctemon, after bringing together their ships which were at Chios and all their other ships, they proposed to blockade Miletus with the fleet and to send a force of ships and infantry against Chios, assigning the commands by lot.

8.30.2

And this they did. Strombichides, Onomacles and Euctemon, with thirty ships and a portion of the thousand hoplites that had come to Miletus, whom they took on transports, sailed against Chios according to their lot, while the others, remaining at Samos with seventy-four ships, controlled the sea and made descents upon Miletus.

8.31.1

But Astyochus, who chanced to be at Chios at this time, engaged in collecting hostages as a precaution against the treachery above mentioned,

8.31.1

1

8.31.1

desisted from this work, when he observed that the ships under the command of Therimenes had come and that the affairs of the Peloponnesian alliance were improved, and taking the ten Peloponnesian ships

8.31.1

2

8.31.1

and ten Chian he put to sea, and after attacking Pteleum without success proceeded along the coast to Clazomenae.

8.31.2

There he ordered those who favoured the Athenian cause to remove inland to Daphnus and come over to the Peloponnesian side. In this order Tamos, who was lieutenant-governor of Ionia, also concurred.

8.31.3

When the inhabitants of Clazomenae would not obey, he made an assault upon the city, which was unwalled, but being unable to capture it, he took advantage of a strong wind to sail away, he himself going to Phocaea and Cyme, while the rest of the fleet made harbour among the islands which lie off Clazomenae—Marathussa, Pele, and Drymussa.

8.31.4

There they remained eight days on account of the winds, and meanwhile either plundered and consumed the property of the Clazomenians that had secretly been stored on the islands or else put it aboard their ships; they then sailed to Phocaea and Cyme to join Astyochus.

8.32.1

While Astyochus was still at Phocaea and Cyme, envoys of the Lesbians arrived, proposing to renew their revolt.

8.32.1

1

8.32.1

And in fact Astyochus was persuaded, but as the Corinthians and the other allies were without zeal, in consequence of their former failure, he weighed anchor and sailed for Chios. There his ships, which had been scattered by a storm, arrived at length, some coming from one quarter and some from another.

8.32.2

After this Pedaritus, who at the time mentioned above

8.32.2

1

8.32.2

was moving along the shore from Miletus with a body of infantry, arrived at Erythrae and then crossed over with his army to Chios; and Astyochus also had ready to his hand soldiers from the five ships, to the number of five hundred, who had been left, together with their arms, by Chalcideus.

8.32.2

2

8.32.3

Since, now, certain Lesbians were renewing their proposals to revolt, Astyochus suggested to Pedaritus and the Chians that they ought to take their fleet to Lesbos and bring about the revolt of the island; for thus, he urged, they would either increase the number of their allies or, if they met with failure, would injure the Athenians. But they would not listen to the suggestion, and, furthermore, Pedaritus refused to deliver to him the ships of the Chians.

8.33.1

Astyochus therefore took the five Corinthian ships, a sixth from Megara, one from Hermione, and those which he himself had brought with him from Laconia,

8.33.1

1

8.33.1

and sailed for Miletus in order to take over the office of admiral, with many threats against the Chians, and pledging himself not to aid them if they should have any need of him.

8.33.2

Touching at Corycus in the territory of Erythrae, he spent the night there. And the Athenian fleet from Samos, which was on its way to Chios with the troops, also came to anchor there at the other side of the town, a hill intervening, so that neither fleet had seen the other.

8.33.3

But Astyochus received during the night a letter from Pedaritus saying that some Erythraean prisoners that had been set at liberty had arrived at Erythrae from Samos for the purpose of betraying it; he therefore immediately set sail again for Erythrae, and thus narrowly escaped falling in with the Athenians.

8.33.4

Pedaritus also crossed over and joined him at Erythrae; and they, having investigated the charges against those who were supposed to be intending to betray the town, when they found that the whole story had been given out only to effect the men's escape from Samos, acquitted them and sailed away, Pedaritus to Chios, and Astyochus to Miletus, as he had originally intended.

8.34.1

In the meantime the Athenian armament also left Corycus, and as it was rounding the point of Arginum met with three Chian ships of war; and no sooner did they see them than they made pursuit. Now a great storm came on, and the Chian ships with great difficulty escaped to the harbour; but of the Athenian ships the three that had pursued most hotly were wrecked and cast ashore at the city of Chios, where the men aboard were either taken captive or put to death; the rest of the fleet escaped to the harbour called Phoenicus that lies at the foot of Mt. Mimas. Sailing thence they afterwards came to anchor at Lesbos and began preparing to build their fortifications.

8.34.1

1

8.35.1

During the same winter Hippocrates the Lacedaemonian sailed from the Peloponnesus with ten Thurian ships, under the command of Dorieus son of Diagoras and two colleagues, and one Laconian and one Syracusan ship, and put in at Cnidos, which had at length revolted at the instigation of Tissaphernes.

8.35.2

And when those in authority at Miletus heard of their coming, they gave orders that one half of the newly arrived ships should guard Cnidos and that the other half should cruise around Triopium and seize the merchantmen that touched there on the way from Egypt. Now this Triopium is a headland projecting from the territory of Cnidos and sacred to Apollo.

8.35.3

The Athenians, being informed of their intentions, also sailed from Samos and captured the six ships that were on guard at Triopium, though their crews escaped. After this they sailed to Cnidos, and attacking the city, which was without walls, almost captured it.

8.35.4

The next day they made a second assault, but as the inhabitants had strengthened their defences during the night and had been reinforced by the men who had escaped from the ships at Triopium, the Athenians could not do so much damage as before, and so they withdrew and, after ravaging the territory of the Cnidians, sailed back to Samos.

8.36.1

At about the same time Astyochus arrived at Miletus to take command of the fleet. The Peloponnesians were still well provided with all that their camp required, for sufficient pay was being given, the large amount of property plundered from Iasus was in the possession of the soldiers, and the Milesians were zealously prosecuting the war.

8.36.2

Nevertheless, the Peloponnesians felt that the first compact with Tissaphernes, which had been concluded between him and Chalcideus, was defective and not so much to their interest as to his, and so they drew up another while Therimenes was there. And its terms were as follows:

8.37.1

"Compact of the Lacedaemonians and their allies with King Darius and the King's sons and Tissaphernes. There shall be a treaty and friendship on the following terms: "1.

8.37.2

Whatsoever territory and cities belong to King Darius or belonged to his father or their ancestors, against these shall neither the Lacedaemonians nor their allies go either for war or to do any harm; nor shall either the Lacedaemonians or their allies exact tribute from these cities. Nor shall King Darius or those over whom the King rules go against the Lacedaemonians or their allies for war or to do any harm. "2. If the Lacedaemonians or their allies have need of anything from the King or the King from the Lacedaemonians or their allies, whatever they shall persuade one another to do, this shall be right for them to do. "3.

8.37.3

The war against the Athenians and their allies both parties shall wage in common;

8.37.4

and if they make peace, both shall make it in common. "4. Whatsoever forces shall be in the territory of the King, on the summons of the King, shall be maintained at the expense of the King. “5.

8.37.5

If any of the cities that have entered into this compact with the King shall go against the country of the King, the rest shall strive to prevent this and aid the King to the extent of their power; and if any of those who inhabit the King's territory or any territory over which the King has dominion shall go against the territory of the Lacedaemonians or of their allies, the King shall strive to prevent this and give aid to the extent of his power.”

8.38.1

After making this compact Therimenes turned over the command of the fleet to Astyochus and sailing away in a skiff was never seen again.

8.38.1

1

8.38.2

But the Athenians at Lesbos, who had already crossed over with their army to Chios and exercised control over both land and sea, proceeded to fortify Delphinium, a place which in any case was strong on the landward side and also possessed harbours and was not far distant from the city of Chios.

8.38.3

As for the Chians, since they had been beaten in many battles already, and, besides, were not on very good terms among themselves—nay, now that Tydeus son of Ion and his adherents had already been put to death on the charge of Atticism by Pedaritus and the rest of the city was by compulsion reduced to the rule of an oligarchy, they were now filled with suspicion of one another—they kept quiet; and it was thought that neither they themselves, for these reasons, nor the auxiliaries under the command of Pedaritus were a match for the enemy.

8.38.4

However, they sent to Miletus urging Astyochus to help them; but when he would not hearken, Pedaritus sent a letter about him to Lacedaemon, accusing him of wrong-doing.

8.38.5

Such was the condition into which the Athenians found that affairs had got in Chios; and their fleet at Samos made a number of descents upon the Peloponnesian fleet at Miletus; but when the latter did not come out to meet them, they retired again to Samos and kept quiet.

8.39.1

During the same winter the twenty-seven ships that had been equipped by the Lacedaemonians for Pharnabazus,

8.39.1

1

8.39.1

through the influence of Kalligeitus of Megara and Timagoras of Cyzicus, set sail from the Peloponnesus for Ionia about the time of the solstice; and Antisthenes, a Spartan, sailed with the fleet as its commander.

8.39.2

And the Lacedaemonians also sent with him eleven Spartans to act as advisers to Astyochus, one of whom was Lichas son of Arcesilaus. Their orders were, on arriving at Miletus, to share with Astyochus the general oversight of affairs in whatever way would be for the best, and also to send this fleet, with either the same number of ships or more or fewer, to Pharnabazus in the Hellespont, should this course seem expedient, appointing as its commander Clearchus

8.39.2

1

8.39.2

son of Ramphias, who was sailing with them; also, if it should seem best, to depose Astyochus from his office as admiral and put Antisthenes in his stead; for in view of the letter of Pedaritus they were suspicious of him.

8.39.3

Accordingly these ships, sailing from Malea across the open sea, touched at Melos, and falling in with ten Athenian ships captured three of them, but without their crews, and burned them. After this, fearing that the Athenian ships that had escaped from Melos might, as actually happened, inform the Athenians at Samos of their approach, they sailed toward Crete, making the voyage longer as a measure of precaution, and put in at Caunus in Asia.

8.39.4

From there, feeling that they were now in security, they sent a message to the ships at Miletus with a view to being convoyed along the coast.

8.40.1

At this time the Chians and Pedaritus sent messages to Astyochus, notwithstanding his continuing to hold back, urging him, since they were being blockaded, to come to their aid with all his ships and not to look on and see the largest of the allied cities in Ionia shut off from the sea and devastated by forays on land.

8.40.2

For the slaves of the Chians, who were numerous—and indeed the most numerous in any single city except that of the Lacedaemonians—and at the same time, on account of their multitude, were punished more severely for every misdeed, now that the Athenian army seemed, with the advantage of a fortified position, to be firmly established, immediately began to desert to them in large numbers; and these, because of their knowledge of the country, wrought the greatest damage to it.

8.40.3

So the Chians said that he ought to come to their aid now, while there was still hope and a possibility of checking the enemy, and while the fortification of Delphinium was still in progress and not yet completed, a stronger line of breastworks being now in process of construction round the camp and ships. And Astyochus, although he had not intended to do so, on account of his threat some time before,

8.40.3

1

8.40.3

when he saw that the allies also were eager for the undertaking, was disposed to give the desired aid.

8.41.1

Meanwhile tidings came from Caunus that the twenty-seven ships and the Lacedaemonian advisers had arrived; whereupon Astyochus, thinking that everything else was of secondary importance compared with convoying so large a reinforcement of the fleet, so that they might be more completely masters of the sea, and with getting the Lacedaemonians, who had come to observe his conduct, safely across, immediately gave up the expedition to Chios and sailed to Caunus.

8.41.2

As he proceeded along the coast he landed at Cos Meropis and sacked the town, which was without walls and by reason of an earthquake that had befallen it—the most violent of all within our memory—was now in ruins, the inhabitants having fled to the mountains; and by forays he despoiled the country of everything, except the free population, which he let go.

8.41.3

Coming then from Cos to Cnidos by night, he was forced by the importunity of the Cnidians not to permit his sailors to land, but, just as he was, to sail straight against the twenty Athenian ships, with which Charminus, one of the generals from Samos, was on the look-out for the twenty-seven ships that were approaching from the Peloponnesus—the ships which Astyochus was sailing along the coast to meet.

8.41.4

For the Athenians at Samos had received word from Melos of their approach, and the outposts of Charminus were on the look-out for them in the neighbourhood of Syme, Chalce, Rhodes and the coast of Lycia; for he was already aware of their being at Caunus.

8.42.1

Astyochus, therefore, sailed directly to Syme before his arrival was reported, on the chance that he might find the Peloponnesian ships somewhere on the high seas. But rain and the foggy state of the atmosphere caused his ships to lose their way in the darkness and confusion.

8.42.2

At daybreak, when his fleet was still scattered and one part of it, the left wing, was already visible to the Athenians, while the rest of it was still wandering round the island, Charminus and the Athenians hastily put to sea against them with fewer than their twenty ships, thinking that these were the ships from Caunus which they were watching for.

8.42.3

And falling upon them at once they sank three and damaged others, and in the general action were having the advantage until, to their surprise, the larger body of ships came in sight and they found themselves being hemmed in on all sides.

8.42.4

Thereupon they took to flight, losing six ships, but with the rest they fled for refuge to the island of Teutlussa, and thence to Halicarnassus. After this the Peloponnesians put in at Cnidos, where they were joined by the twenty-seven ships from Caunus, whereupon they sailed out with the whole fleet, set up a trophy at Syme, and finally came to anchor again at Cnidos.

8.43.1

When the Athenians heard about the sea-fight, they sailed to Syme with all the ships they had at Samos. They did not, however, make an attack upon the fleet at Cnidos, nor the Peloponnesians upon them, but took aboard the naval stores that were at Syme and, after touching at Lorymi on the mainland, sailed back to Samos. All the Peloponnesian ships were now at Cnidos and were engaged in making the necessary repairs;

8.43.2

and as Tissaphernes had arrived, the eleven Lacedaemonian advisers were holding conferences with him touching matters that had already been negotiated, if any point in the agreements was unsatisfactory to them, as well as concerning future hostilities, in what way the war might be waged best and most advantageously for both parties. And it was Lichas who examined most closely what was being done, saying that neither of the treaties, neither that of Chalcideus nor that of Therimenes, was wisely framed;

8.43.3

nay, he said that it was monstrous that the King should even now claim authority over all the territory which he and his ancestors had formerly ruled—for that would mean that all the islands should again be in slavery, as well as Thessaly, Locri and everything as far as Boeotia—and that instead of bringing freedom the Lacedaemonians would place the Persian yoke upon the Hellenes. Accordingly he urged that another and better treaty be concluded;

8.43.4

at any rate, the Lacedaemonians would not abide by this, nor did they want his support at all upon such terms. Tissaphernes was offended at this and went away from the conference in a rage without having settled anything.

8.44.1

The Lacedaemonians, however, were minded to sail to Rhodes, since overtures were coming to them from the most influential men there; for they hoped that they could bring over to their side an island that was no mean power because of the large number of seamen and soldiers which it could furnish, and at the same time they thought that they would be able by themselves to maintain their fleet, on the basis of the existing alliance, without asking Tissaphernes for money.

8.44.2

They therefore sailed at once that same winter from Cnidos, and touching first at Camirus in Rhodian territory with ninety-four ships, they so terrified most of the inhabitants, who knew nothing of the plan that was being negotiated, that they fled, especially since the city had no walls. Afterwards the Lacedaemonians called them together as well as the inhabitants of the two cities Lindus and Ialysus, and persuaded the Rhodians to revolt from the Athenians.

8.44.3

So Rhodes came over to the Peloponnesian side. But the Athenians at this juncture, getting notice of their designs, sailed with the fleet they had at Samos, wishing to forestall them, and made their appearance out at sea; but finding that they were a little too late, they sailed back for the moment to Chalce, and thence returned to Samos. Afterwards, however, making raids from Chalce and Cos and Samos, they carried on hostilities against Rhodes.

8.44.4

The Peloponnesians, on the other hand, levied money from the Rhodians to the amount of thirty-two talents,

8.44.4

1

8.44.4

but otherwise they remained inactive for eighty days, drawing their ships up on shore.

8.45.1

But in the meantime, and even before the Peloponnesians removed to Rhodes, the following negotiations were going on. After the death of Chalcideus and the battle at Miletus, Alcibiades, finding himself under suspicion with the Peloponnesians, and Astyochus having received a letter from Lacedaemon ordering him to be put to death—for he was a personal enemy of Agis and in general appeared untrustworthy—at first withdrew in alarm to Tissaphernes and then proceeded to damage the Peloponnesian cause with him as much as he possibly could.

8.45.2

Becoming his adviser in all matters, he cut down the pay of the troops, so that instead of an Attic drachma

8.45.2

1

8.45.2

only three obols were given, and that not regularly, and he urged Tissaphernes to tell them that the Athenians, who had had experience in naval matters for a longer time, gave only three obols to their men,

8.45.2

2

8.45.2

not so much through lack of money as with the purpose of keeping their sailors from growing insolent by reason of abundance; for some would injure their health by spending their money on things which bring on sickness, while others would desert their ships without leaving behind

8.45.2

3

8.45.2

as a guarantee the part of their pay that was still due.

8.45.3

He also taught him how by the use of money to persuade the trierarchs and generals to agree with him in these matters—all except the Syracusans, and of them Hermocrates alone opposed him, doing so on behalf of the alliance as a whole.

8.45.4

Furthermore, when the several cities asked for money he dismissed them, taking it upon himself to answer on behalf of Tissaphernes that the Chians were shameless people, for though they were the wealthiest of the Hellenes and owed their salvation to outside help, nevertheless they expected others to risk their lives and their money also for the defence of their liberty.

8.45.5

And as for the other states, which before they revolted used to lavish money upon the Athenians, he said that they were doing wrong unless they were willing at this time also to contribute as much or even more for their own protection.

8.45.6

And he further explained that, though Tissaphernes, now that he was waging war on his own resources, was quite properly frugal, yet if ever supplies should come down from the King he would give the men their full pay and would render to the states all reasonable aid.

8.46.1

Alcibiades also urged Tissaphernes not to be too eager to bring the war to an end, nor to take such a course, either by bringing there the Phoenician fleet which he was equipping or by providing pay for a larger number of Hellenes, as would give the command of both the land and the sea to the same people, but to let the dominion be divided between the two sides, so that it would be possible for the King to lead the one party or the other against those that were troublesome to him.

8.46.2

But if the dominion of both land and sea were united, the King himself would have no one with whom he could co-operate in destroying the stronger, and would have no alternative but sooner or later to rise up himself

8.46.2

1

8.46.2

and, at great expense and risk, fight a decisive struggle. The cheaper course was this—at a small fraction of the expense and at the same time with security to himself to wear the Hellenes out one upon the other.

8.46.3

The more suitable partners, he said, with whom to share the sovereignty were the Athenians; for they were less desirous of possessions on land and both their principles and practice in carrying on war were most consistent with his interests; for whereas the Athenians would co-operate with him in making subject to themselves the department of the sea and to him such of the Hellenes as lived in the King's country, the Lacedaemonians, on the contrary, had come to liberate these. It was not reasonable, he added, to suppose that the Lacedaemonians would now be liberating the Hellenes from men who, like themselves, were Hellenes, and would not liberate them from the Persians who were Barbarians, unless these sooner or later got them out of the way.

8.46.4

He therefore urged him, first to wear out both sides, then to curtail the power of the Athenians as much as possible, and finally to get the Peloponnesians out of his country.

8.46.5

And Tissaphernes was more inclined to this course, so far as it was possible to conjecture from what he was doing. For he consequently gave his support and confidence to Alcibiades, as though he thought his advice in the matter good, and not only furnished wretched maintenance to the Peloponnesians, but also would not allow them to fight at sea; instead, he kept telling them that the Phoenician ships would come and that they would then contend with superabundant strength; and thus he injured their cause and diminished the vigour of their fleet, which had been very strong; and in general it was too evident to escape notice that he was not zealously co-operating in the war.

8.47.1

This advice Alcibiades gave to Tissaphernes and the King while he was under their protection, not only because he believed it to be best, but also because he was at the same time working for his own restoration to his fatherland, knowing that, if he did not ruin that prospect, it would some day be possible for him to gain the consent of his countrymen and be restored. And the means by which he thought he could best persuade them was this—to make it appear that Tissaphernes was on intimate terms with him;

8.47.2

and that, in fact, is what happened. For the Athenian soldiers at Samos perceived that he had great influence with Tissaphernes, partly because Alcibiades sent word to the most influential men among them to make mention of him to the best people and say that he wished to come home on condition of there being an oligarchy and not the villainous mob-rule that had banished him, and after securing the friendship of Tissaphernes to be a fellow-citizen with them; but of still greater moment was the fact that even on their own initiative the Athenian trierarchs at Samos and the most influential men were bent upon overthrowing the democracy.

8.48.1

This movement began first in the camp and from there spread to the city of Athens. Then certain men crossed over from Samos and had a conference with Alcibiades, and when he held out to them that he would first make Tissaphernes a friend and then the King also, if there were not a democracy —for so the King would have more confidence in them—the influential citizens, who are apt to bear the heaviest burdens, had great hopes for themselves personally that they would get the government into their own hands and prevail over the enemy as well.

8.48.2

So they went to Samos and set about combining in a conspiracy such men as were suitable, at the same time saying openly to the people that the King would be a friend to them and would furnish money if Alcibiades were restored and they were not ruled by a democracy. The multitude, even if at the moment it was somewhat dissatisfied with the scheme, none the less kept quiet because the prospect of pay from the King seemed easy of attainment;

8.48.3

while those who were trying to establish the oligarchy, as soon as they had made their designs known to the people, once more took up the proposals of Alcibiades for consideration among themselves and the majority of the members of the political clubs. And to most of these the proposals appeared practicable and trustworthy;

8.48.4

Phrynichus, however, who was still general, did not find them at all satisfactory, but was of opinion that Alcibiades had really no more desire for an oligarchy than for a democracy, and had no other object in view than in some manner, by bringing about in the state a change from its present order, to secure his own return at the invitation of his party associates. The Athenians, however, in the opinion of Phrynichus, must make it their chief concern to avoid being rent with factions. Neither was it in the interest of the King, he said, now that the Peloponnesians were at home on the sea quite as much as the Athenians and held possession of cities in his empire which were not the smallest, to attach himself to the Athenians, whom he did not trust, and thus involve himself in trouble, when it was possible to make friends of the Peloponnesians, from whom he had suffered no harm.

8.48.5

As for the allied cities, to which forsooth they would promise an oligarchical form of government for the reason that they themselves would not be under a democracy, he said that he knew well that neither those which had revolted from the Athenians would be any more likely to come back into the alliance nor would those which still remained allies be more staunch; for they would not want to be slaves with either an oligarchy or a democracy in preference to being free with whichever form they might perchance have such freedom.

8.48.6

And as to those who were called “the good and true” men,

8.48.6

1

8.48.6

he said that the allies believed that they would bring them no less trouble than the popular party, being as they were providers

8.48.6

2

8.48.6

and proposers to the people of evil projects from which they themselves got the most benefit. Indeed, so far as it rested with these men, they, the allies, would be put to death not only without trial but by methods even more violent, whereas the people were a refuge to themselves and a check upon the oligarchs.

8.48.7

This understanding of the matter, he asserted, the allied cities had gained from the facts themselves, and he was quite sure that this was their opinion. Therefore, to himself at least not one of the schemes that were being advocated by Alcibiades at the present time was satisfactory.

8.49.1

But the members of the conspiracy who had assembled went on as they had originally determined and accepted the present proposals, and prepared to send Peisander and others as envoys to Athens, that they might negotiate both about the return of Alcibiades and the overthrow of the democracy in that city and might make Tissaphernes a friend to the Athenians.

8.50.1

But Phrynichus, knowing that there would be a proposal for the recall of Alcibiades and that the Athenians would accept it, and also fearing, in view of the opposition he had shown in his own speech, that if Alcibiades came back he would do him injury as one who had been in his way, now had recourse to the following device.

8.50.2

He sent to Astyochus, the Lacedaemonian admiral, who was at this time still in the neighbourhood of Miletus, secret information by letter that Alcibiades was ruining the Lacedaemonian cause by making Tissaphernes a friend of the Athenians, and also wrote an explicit account of his other doings; he added that it was pardonable in himself to devise evil for an enemy, even though this involved detriment to his state.

8.50.2

1

8.50.3

But Astyochus did not even think of punishing Alcibiades, especially as he no longer came within his reach as formerly, but going up to Magnesia to visit him and Tissaphernes he not only told them the contents of the letter he had received from Samos, himself becoming an informer, but also attached himself, as it was said, to Tissaphernes for his own private gain, both in this and in other matters; and it was for this reason that in dealing with the question of the pay, which was not being paid in full, his insistence was rather feeble.

8.50.4

Alcibiades immediately wrote a letter against Phrynichus to the authorities at Samos, telling them what he had done and urging that he be put to death.

8.50.5

Phrynichus was exceedingly disturbed, since he was in the very greatest danger on account of the information he had given; he accordingly wrote again to Astyochus, reproaching him because his former information had not been concealed, as in honour it should have been, and adding that now he was ready to furnish the Lacedaemonians the opportunity to destroy the whole Athenian army at Samos, stating in detail how he could do this, since Samos was without walls; it was not culpable in himself, he concluded, now that he was in danger of his life through their actions, to do this or anything else rather than perish himself at the hands of his bitterest enemies. But Astyochus gave information of this also to Alcibiades.

8.51.1

And when Phrynichus learned betimes that Astyochus was working to injure him and that a letter from Alcibiades about these matters had all but come, he anticipated it by himself informing the army that the enemy intended, seeing that Samos had no walls and that not all the ships were anchored inside the harbour, to attack the camp; he said that he had certain information of this, and that they ought to fortify Samos as quickly as possible and keep a watch upon everything. Now he was general, and was within his powers in acting thus on his own authority.

8.51.2

So they set about preparing the fortifications, and in consequence of this Samos, which in any case would soon have been ready, was more quickly fortified. Not long afterward came the letter from Alcibiades, saying that the army was being betrayed by Phrynichus and that the enemy would soon attack.

8.51.3

But since Alcibiades was not regarded as a trustworthy man, but was believed, as he knew beforehand the plans of the enemy, to be actuated by personal enmity in attributing to Phrynichus a guilty knowledge of them, the accusation did Phrynichus no harm, but rather confirmed his statement by giving the same information.

8.52.1

After this Alcibiades continued to work on Tissaphernes and to urge him to be a friend to the Athenians. Now though Tissaphernes was afraid of the Peloponnesians, because they were there with a larger fleet than the Athenians, nevertheless he wanted to follow this advice if in any way he could do so, especially now that he had become aware of the disagreement that had arisen at Cnidos among the Peloponnesians

8.52.1

1

8.52.1

about the treaty of Therimenes—for by this time the Peloponnesians were at Rhodes, so that the dispute had already taken place —in the course of which disagreement Lichas had verified the statement made before by Alcibiades, that it was the Lacedaemonian policy to liberate all the cities, declaring that it was intolerable to agree that the King should be master of all the cities over which he himself or his fathers had ever before held sway. Alcibiades, then, as one that contended for a great prize, was assiduously paying court to Tissaphernes.

8.53.1

Meanwhile the envoys that had been sent from Samos with Peisander arrived at Athens and made a statement before a meeting of the people, offering a summary of many arguments but urging with special emphasis that it was possible for them, by recalling Alcibiades and adopting a different form of democratic government, both to have the King as their ally and to prevail over the Peloponnesians.

8.53.2

But as to the democracy, many others spoke against the scheme, and at the same time the enemies of Alcibiades loudly protested that it would be an outrage if, after defying the laws, he should be restored; the Eumolpidae

8.53.2

1

8.53.2

also and the Ceryces

8.53.2

2

8.53.2

bore witness against him on the score of the mysteries, for whose violation he had been banished, and protested in the name of the gods against bringing him back. Whereupon Peisander came forward and in the face of much protest and abuse took each one of the objectors aside and asked him what hope he had of the salvation of the state, now that the Peloponnesians had no fewer ships than they confronting them at sea and a larger number of allied cities, with the King and Tissaphernes furnishing the enemy with money, while they themselves no longer had money, unless someone should persuade the King to change over to the Athenian side.

8.53.3

And when, in answer to this question, they all admitted there was no other hope, he thereupon told them plainly: “Well, this cannot be attained by us unless we form a wiser government and put the offices to a greater extent into the hands of a few, in order that the King may trust us, and unless in our deliberations we take less heed at present about the form of our government than about our salvation (for afterwards it will be possible for us to make a change if there is anything we do not like), and recall Alcibiades, who is the only man in the world to-day who is able to bring this result to pass.”

8.54.1

The assembly was at first displeased when they heard the proposal concerning an oligarchy; but when they had been plainly shown by Peisander that there was no other salvation, through fear and at the same time because they expected to make a change later, they yielded.

8.54.2

So they voted that Peisander and ten others should sail and conduct the negotiations with Tissaphernes and Alcibiades in whatever way might seem best to them.

8.54.3

At the same time, when Peisander brought a false accusation against Phrynichus, they deposed him and his colleague Scironides from command and sent in their stead Diomedon and Leon to take charge of the fleet. For Peisander alleged that Phrynichus had betrayed Iasus and Amorges, and slandered him, because he did not believe him to be friendly to the negotiations with Alcibiades.

8.54.4

And Peisander also visited all the clubs which chanced previously to exist in the city for the control of courts and officials and exhorted them to unite, and by taking common counsel to overthrow the democracy. Then, after he had made whatever other arrangements the circumstances demanded, so that there might be no further delay, he himself and the ten other men made their voyage to Tissaphernes.

8.55.1

In the same winter Leon and Diomedon, who had by now reached the Athenian fleet, made an advance upon Rhodes. They found the ships of the Peloponnesians hauled up on the shore, and having effected a landing and having defeated in battle the Rhodians who rallied to the defence, they retired to Chalce and continued to carry on the war from there rather than from Cos;

8.55.2

for it was easier for them to keep watch there in case the Peloponnesian fleet should put to sea in any direction.

8.55.2

Meanwhile Xenophantidas, a Laconian, had come to Rhodes from Pedaritus at Chios, bringing word that the Athenian fortification

8.55.2

1

8.55.2

was now completed and that, unless they came to their aid with all their ships, the Peloponnesian cause at Chios would be lost. And they intended to go to their aid;

8.55.3

but meanwhile Pedaritus himself, together with the mercenaries under his command

8.55.3

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8.55.3

and the Chians in full force, attacked that part of the Athenian fortification which protected the ships, capturing a portion of it and getting possession of some ships that had been hauled up on shore. But when the Athenians had come out to the rescue and turned the Chians to flight at the outset, the mercenary force that was with Pedaritus was also defeated, and he himself and many of the Chians were killed and arms were captured in great quantity.

8.56.1

After this the Chians were besieged by both land and sea more closely than ever and there was a great famine in the place. Meanwhile the Athenian envoys led by Peisander had reached Tissaphernes and were holding conferences regarding the agreement.

8.56.2

But Alcibiades (for his relations with Tissaphernes were not altogether firm, he being now more afraid of the Peloponnesians and still wishing to follow the policy inculcated by Alcibiades and wear out both parties) now had recourse to this device—that Tissaphernes should make as great demands as possible upon the Athenians and in this way come to no agreement with them. And Tissaphernes also, as it seems to me, wished the same thing, fear being the motive in his case;

8.56.3

but Alcibiades, as soon as he saw that even on his own terms he did not want to reach an agreement, wished it to appear to the Athenians, not that he was unable to persuade him but that the Athenians, after Tissaphernes had been persuaded and in spite of his wishing to come to terms, were not conceding enough.

8.56.4

For Alcibiades made such excessive demands, speaking himself on behalf of Tissaphernes and in his presence, that although for a long time the Athenians yielded whatever he demanded, the blame for the failure must nevertheless fall upon them; for he insisted that all Ionia should be given up, after that the adjacent islands, and so on. When the Athenians did not oppose these demands, finally, at the third conference, fearing that his utter lack of influence would be openly exposed, he insisted that the King be permitted to build ships and sail along the Athenian coasts wherever he wished and with as many ships as he pleased. At that point the Athenians yielded no further, but believing that there was no way out of the matter and that they had been deceived by Alcibiades, departed in anger and made their way back to Samos.

8.57.1

Immediately after this, in the course of the same winter, Tissaphernes proceeded to Caunus, wishing to bring the Peloponnesians back to Miletus, and after concluding with them such other agreements as he found practicable, to supply them with maintenance, and not be in a state of complete hostility; for he was afraid that, if they should be in difficulty about the maintenance of a large fleet, they might either be forced to fight the Athenians and suffer defeat, or that, their ships being emptied of men by desertion, the Athenians might get what they wanted without his help; and he was afraid, furthermore and chiefly, that in searching for supplies they might ravage the mainland.

8.57.2

Taking all these possibilities into consideration, therefore, and as a precaution against them, and acting consistently with his policy to reduce the Hellenes to an equality with each other, he sent for the Peloponnesians and gave them supplies, and concluded with them a a third treaty to the following effect:

8.58.1

"In the thirteenth year of the reign of Darius, while Alexippidas was ephor at Lacedaemon, an agreement was made in the plain of the Maeander by the Lacedaemonians and their allies with Tissaphernes, Hieramenes, and the sons of Pharnaces respecting the King's affairs and those of the Lacedaemonians and their allies. 1.

8.58.2

"The King's country, as much of it as is in Asia, shall be the King's; and concerning his own country the King shall determine as he pleases. 2.

8.58.3

"The Lacedaemonians and their allies shall not go against the country of the King to do any harm, nor the King against that of the Lacedaemonians or their allies to do any harm.

8.58.4

If any of the Lacedaemonians or their allies shall go with harmful intent against the country of the King, the Lacedaemonians and their allies shall prevent it; and if any from the King's country shall go with harmful intent against the Lacedaemonians or their allies, the King shall prevent it. 3.

8.58.5

"Maintenance for the ships now present shall be provided by Tissaphernes according to the compact until the King's ships shall come;

8.58.6

and the Lacedaemonians and their allies, after the King's ships arrive, shall be at liberty to maintain their own ships if they so wish. If, however, they desire to receive maintenance from Tissaphernes, he shall furnish it; but the Lacedaemonians and their allies, when the war ends, shall pay back to Tissaphernes whatever money they have received. 4.

8.58.7

“And when the ships of the King arrive, the ships of the Lacedaemonians and their allies and those of the King shall wage war in common, according as it may seem best to Tissaphernes and to the Lacedaemonians and their allies. And if they wish to end the war with the Athenians, it shall be ended on the same footing for both.”

8.59.1

Such was the treaty they made. After this Tissaphernes set about preparing to bring the Phoenician ships, as had been agreed, and to carry out all the other things he had promised; and he wished it to be evident that at all events he was making preparations.

8.60.1

When the winter was now ending the Boeotians took Oropus, where the Athenians had a garrison, by treachery. And they had the cooperation of some men of Eretria and of Oropus itself who were plotting for the revolt of Euboea. For since the place is opposite Eretria, it was impossible, while the Athenians held it, that it should not injure greatly both Eretria and Euboea in general.

8.60.2

Now, therefore, that they had Oropus in their possession, the Eretrians came to Rhodes and invited the Peloponnesians to Euboea. They, however, were more intent upon relieving Chios, which was in distress; so they put off from Rhodes and sailed with all their ships.

8.60.3

When they had arrived in the neighbourhood of Triopium they saw the Athenian fleet on the high seas as they were sailing from Chalce;

8.60.3

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8.60.3

as neither fleet, however, advanced to attack the other, the Athenians arrived at Samos, and the Peloponnesians at Miletus, when they saw that it was no longer possible to bring succour to Chios without a fight. So this winter ended, and with it the twentieth year of this war of which Thucydides wrote the history.

8.61.1

During the following summer season, at the

8.61.1

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8.61.1

very opening of spring, Dercylidas, a Spartan, was sent overland with no small army to the Hellespont to effect the revolt of Abydus, a Milesian colony; and the Chians, while Astyochus was still at a loss as to how he should bring relief to them, were so hard pressed by the siege that they were compelled to risk

8.61.2

a fight at sea. Now it so happened that while Astyochus was still at Rhodes they had brought from Miletus as commander, after the death of Pedaritus, a Spartan named Leon, who had come out with Antisthenes as a marine, and also twelve ships which chanced to be on guard at Miletus, of which five were Thurian, four Syracusan, one Anaean, one Milesian,

8.61.3

and one Leon's own. After, therefore, the Chians had sailed forth in full force and seized a strong position, and their ships at the same time to the number of thirty-six had put to sea against the thirty-two of the Athenians, they came to battle. It proved to be a stubborn fight, and the Chians and their allies did not have the worst of it in the action, but since it was by this time late they withdrew to the city.

8.62.1

Immediately after this, when Dercylidas had completed his march overland from Miletus, Abydus on the Hellespont revolted to Dercylidas and Pharnabazus, as did Lampsacus also two days afterwards.

8.62.2

But Strombichides, learning of this, came from Chios with all speed to the rescue with twenty-four Athenian ships, of which some were transports and carried hoplites; and having defeated in battle the Lampsacenes who came out against him and taken at the first assault the city of Lampsacus, which was without walls, he made booty of goods and slaves but restored the free men to their homes, and then went against Abydus.

8.62.3

And when its inhabitants would not yield and he was unable to take the city by assault, he sailed back to the coast opposite Abydus and made Sestus, a city of the Chersonese which the Persians once held, a fortress and watch-station for the control of the whole Hellespont.

8.63.1

In the meantime not only had the Chians strengthened their command of the sea, but Astyochus also and the Peloponnesians at Miletus, learning the result of the sea-fight and about the departure of Strombichides and his fleet, took courage.

8.63.2

So Astyochus sailed along the coast to Chios with two ships, took on the ships which were there, and with what was now the entire fleet advanced against Samos; but when the Athenians, because their two factions entertained suspicions of one another, would not come out to meet him, he sailed back again to Miletus. For it was about this time, or somewhat earlier, that the democracy at Athens was being overthrown.

8.63.3

When the envoys led by Peisander had come to Samos from Tissaphernes, they had got matters in the army itself still more firmly under their control and had instigated the influential men among the Samians also to attempt in concert with them to establish an oligarchy, although the Samians had risen in revolt against their own countrymen in order to avoid being governed by an oligarchy.

8.63.4

At the same time the Athenians at Samos, after conferring among themselves, had determined, since Alcibiades would not agree with them, to let him alone—for he was not a suitable person, they thought, to come into an oligarchy—but by themselves, as being already actually in peril, to see to it that the movement should not be abandoned, and at the same time to hold out so far as the war was concerned; they had also resolved zealously to contribute from their own private resources either money or whatever else should be necessary, feeling that from now on the burdens they would bear would be for no others than themselves.1

8.64.1

Having thus encouraged one another, they at once proceeded to send Peisander and half of the envoys home in order to arrange matters there, but also with instructions to establish oligarchies in any of the subject cities at which they should stop; the other half they sent to the rest of the subject countries, some to one and some to another;

8.64.2

and Dieitrephes, who was in the neighbourhood of Chios but had been elected to have command on the coast of Thrace, they sent to his post. When he reached Thasos he abolished the democracy there.

8.64.3

About two months, however, after his departure the Thasians fortified their city, feeling that they no longer had any need of an aristocracy attached to Athens and daily looking for freedom to be given them by the Lacedaemonians.

8.64.4

For there were Thasian fugitives, who had been expelled by the Athenians, now present with the Peloponnesians, and these, in concert with their friends in the city, were working with might and main to bring ships and effect the revolt of Thasos. They found, therefore, that the things they most desired had happened-the city had been brought to order and the democracy that would have opposed them had been abolished.

8.64.5

In Thasos, then, the result was the opposite of what the Athenians who were establishing the oligarchy there desired, and it was the same, as it seems to me, in many others of the subject states; for the cities, having acquired soberness of spirit and immunity in carrying out their designs, aimed at downright freedom, caring nothing for the hollow sham of law and order offered by the Athenians.

8.65.1

Peisander, then, and his companions proceeded along the coast abolishing the democracies in the cities, as had been determined upon, and came to Athens, bringing with them from some places hoplites as supporters. There they found that most of the business had already been accomplished by their associates.

8.65.2

For some of the younger men had combined and secretly put to death a certain Androcles, the most prominent leader of the popular party, the man who had done most to bring about the banishment of Alcibiades.

8.65.2

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8.65.2

And him they destroyed for two reasons-on account of his being a popular leader, and somewhat the more because they thought it would gratify Alcibiades, who was likely to be recalled and to make Tissaphernes a friend; and some others that were inconvenient they secretly made away with in the same manner.

8.65.3

Moreover, a proposal had already been openly made by them that no others ought to receive pay except those who were serving in the war, and that not more than five thousand should share in the government, and they only so far as they were especially competent to serve the state with both property and person.

8.66.1

Now this was only a specious pretext intended for the masses, for the very same men who were endeavouring to change the government were going to have control of the state. The people, however, and the council chosen by the bean

8.66.1

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8.66.1

were none the less still convened; but they discussed nothing that was not approved by the conspirators; nay, not only were the speakers from this party, but what should be said had been previously considered by them.

8.66.2

And no one of the others any longer spoke against them, through fear and because it was seen that the conspiracy was widespread; and if any one did oppose, at once in some convenient way he was a dead man. And no search was made for those who did the deed, nor if they were suspected was any legal prosecution held; on the contrary, the populace kept quiet and were in such consternation that he who did not suffer any violence, even though he never said a word, counted that a gain.

8.66.3

Imagining the conspiracy to be much more widespread than it actually was, they were cowed in mind, and owing to the size of the city and their lack of knowledge of one another they were unable to find out the facts.

8.66.4

For the same reason it was also impossible for any man that was offended to pour out his grievances to another and thus plot to avenge himself,

8.66.4

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8.66.4

for he would discover any person to whom he might speak to be either a stranger or, if an acquaintance, faithless.

8.66.5

For all the members of the popular party approached each other with suspicion, as though every one had a hand in what was going on. And, indeed, there were among them men whom one would never have expected to change over and favour an oligarchy; and it was these who caused the greatest distrust among the masses and rendered the most valuable service toward the few in securing their safety by confirming in the populace this distrust of their own people.

8.67.1

It was at this crisis that Peisander and his colleagues arrived and immediately applied themselves to the work that still remained to be done. First they called the popular assembly together and proposed a resolution that ten men should be chosen as commissioners, with full powers, for the drafting of laws, and that these men, after drafting such laws, should bring before the assembly on an appointed day a proposal embodying provisions for the best administration of the state.

8.67.2

In the second place, when the day came they convened the assembly at Colonus, which is a precinct sacred to Poseidon lying at a distance of about ten stadia outside the city, and the commissioners brought in no other measure except the bare proposal that any Athenian should be permitted with impunity to offer any motion he pleased; and if anyone should move to indict the speaker for making an illegal proposal

8.67.2

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8.67.2

or should in any other manner seek to do him harm, they imposed severe penalties upon him.

8.67.3

After that, the proposal was at length offered without concealment that no one should any longer hold office under the constitution as at present established or receive a salary, and that they should choose five men as presidents, and these should choose one hundred, and each of the hundred three others in addition to himself; then these, being four hundred, should enter the senate-chamber and govern as they should judge best, being clothed with full powers, and they should convene the Five Thousand whenever it seemed to them advisable.

8.67.3

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8.68.1

It was Peisander who proposed this resolution and in other respects assisted most zealously, to all appearances, in overthrowing the democracy. The man, however, who devised the method by which the whole matter was brought to this issue and who had for the longest time devoted himself to the problem was Antiphon, a man inferior to none of the Athenians of his own day in force of character and one who had proved himself most able both to formulate a plan and to set forth his conclusions in speech; and although he did not come before the assembly or willingly take part in any public contest, but was under suspicion with the people on account of his reputation for cleverness, yet he was the one man most able to help any who were involved in contests, either in court or before the assembly, in case they sought his advice.

8.68.2

And in his own case, when at a later time the acts of the Four Hundred had been reversed and were being severely dealt with by the popular assembly, and he was under charge of having assisted in setting up that government, he manifestly made the ablest plea for his life of all men up to my time in defending these very acts.

8.68.2

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8.68.3

Phrynichus also showed himself beyond all others most zealous for the oligarchy, through fear of Alcibiades and the certainty that Alcibiades was aware of all the intrigues

8.68.3

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8.68.3

he had carried on at Samos with Astyochus; for he thought that in all probability Alcibiades would never be recalled by an oligarchical government; and when face to face with dangers, after he had once set to work, he proved himself a man who could quite be depended upon.

8.68.4

Theramenes also, the son of Hagnon, was foremost among those who attempted to overthrow the democracy, being a man of no small capacity either in speech or in judgment. Consequently, conducted as it was by many able men, the plot not unnaturally succeeded, even though it was an arduous task; for it was difficult, after the lapse of almost one hundred years

8.68.4

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8.68.4

since the tyrants had been overthrown, to deprive of their liberty the Athenian people, who had been, not only not subject to anyone else, but for more than half of that period had themselves been accustomed to rule over others.

8.69.1

When the assembly had been dissolved, with no opposition from anyone and immediately after sanctioning these measures, the leaders of the oligarchy then introduced the Four Hundred into the senate-chamber in the following manner: all the Athenians were at all times under arms, as a precaution against the enemy at Deceleia, some on the walls and some in the ranks.

8.69.2

On that day, then, they let those who were not privy to their design go away as usual, but those who were in the conspiracy had been quietly told to remain, not close by their arms, but at some distance from them, and if anybody tried to oppose what was going on, to take their arms and permit no interference.

8.69.3

And there were at hand some Andrians and Tenians and three hundred Carystians and some of their colonists from Aegina,

8.69.3

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8.69.3

whither they had been sent by the Athenians to inhabit the island, who had come for this very purpose in their own armour, and to these the same order had already been given.

8.69.4

When these forces had been thus disposed, the Four Hundred, each carrying a concealed dagger and accompanied by the one hundred and twenty young men whom they made use of wherever there was any need of their handiwork, broke in upon the regular senators who were in the senate-chamber, and told them to get their pay

8.69.4

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8.69.4

and go out; and they themselves brought them their pay for all the remainder of their term, and as they went out gave it to them.

8.70.1

When in this manner the senate had quietly withdrawn without making any opposition, and the citizens at large raised no disturbance but kept quiet, the Four Hundred entered the senate-chamber and for the present chose by lot prytanes

8.70.1

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8.70.1

from their own number, and with respect to the gods observed all the usual rites of prayers and sacrifices as they assumed office. Afterwards, however, they departed widely from the democratic manner of administration —except that they did not recall the exiles, because of Alcibiades—and in general governed the city in a high-handed way.

8.70.2

A certain number of men, though not many, they put to death, for they thought it convenient to have them out of their way, while others they imprisoned, and also removed others from the city. Moreover, they made overtures to Agis, king of the Lacedaemonians, who was at Deceleia, saying that they wished to make peace and that it was only reasonable that he should be more ready to come to terms with them, having no longer to deal with the faithless democracy.

8.71.1

But Agis, thinking that the people would not in this way immediately surrender their ancient liberties, and that if they saw a large army of Lacedaemonians they would not remain quiet, and also not being quite sure at present that the Athenians were no longer in a state of disturbance, did not make a conciliatory response to those who had come as envoys from the Four Hundred. He sent instead for a large additional force from the Peloponnesus, and not long afterwards himself took the garrison at Deceleia together with the new arrivals and came down to the very walls of Athens, hoping either that the Athenians, being now in confusion, would more readily submit on terms pleasing to the Lacedaemonians, or else that, in consequence of the turmoil that would in all probability prevail both inside and outside the city, he would not fail at the first assault to capture the long walls at any rate owing to the absence of troops to defend them.

8.71.2

But when he came close and the Athenians made no move whatever from within the walls, but sending out the cavalry and a portion of the hoplites, light-armed troops and bowmen, shot down some of his men in consequence of their approaching too near and got possession of a number of arms and dead bodies, he at length recognized his mistake and led back his army.

8.71.3

He himself, then, and his own troops remained at their post in Deceleia, but the reinforcements that had come he sent back home after they had remained a few days in Attica. After this the Four Hundred, notwithstanding their earlier experience, kept sending envoys to Agis, and as he now received them more readily and advised them to do so, they sent envoys also to Lacedaemon to negotiate an agreement, since they were now desirous of making peace.

8.72.1

They also sent ten men to Samos to reassure the army there and to explain that the oligarchy had been set up, not for the injury of the city or the citizens, but for the salvation of the whole Athenian cause; and also to explain that there were five thousand, not four hundred only, who were participating in the government, although, because of their military expeditions and their activities abroad, the Athenians had never yet come to consult upon any matter so important that five thousand had assembled.

8.72.2

So after giving them these and other instructions as to the proper explanations to offer, they sent them off immediately after their own assumption of office, fearing lest— as actually happened—a crowd of sailors might of itself not be willing to abide by the oligarchical form of government, and so, the mischief having once begun at Samos, bring about their own overthrow.

8.73.1

For in Samos a reaction had already set in against the oligarchical movement, and the following events took place at about the very time when the Four Hundred were organizing.

8.73.2

Those of the Samians who at the earlier time

8.73.2

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8.73.2

rose up against the aristocrats and were of the popular party changed sides again, being persuaded both by Peisander, on his arrival,

8.73.2

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8.73.2

and by his Athenian accomplices at Samos, and became conspirators; they were fully three hundred in number, and were intending to attack the others, as being of the democratic party.

8.73.3

And Hyperbolus, one of the Athenians, a depraved fellow who had been ostracized,

8.73.3

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8.73.3

not through any fear of his power and consequence, but because he was a villain and a disgrace to the city, they put to death, herein acting in concert with Charminus,

8.73.3

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8.73.3

one of the generals, and a group of the Athenians at Samos, thus giving them a pledge of good faith. And in other like deeds they co-operated with them and were eager to attack the populace.

8.73.4

But the people, becoming aware of their design, disclosed it to Leon and Diomedon, two of the generals—for these submitted to the oligarchy unwillingly, because they held their office by the choice of the popular party—and also to Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus, the former of whom was a trierarch and the latter a hoplite, as well as to others who were reputed to be always foremost in opposition to the conspirators; and they begged these not to look on and see them destroyed and Samos alienated from the Athenians, the island to which alone it was due that the empire had held together up to this point.

8.73.5

These men, on hearing their plea, went to the soldiers one by one and besought them not to permit this thing, and especially to the men of the Paralus,

8.73.5

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8.73.5

those who sailed on the Paralus being Athenians and free men one and all and always opposed to an oligarchy even before it came; and Leon and Diomedon, whenever they sailed to any other place, used to leave the Samians some ships as a guard.

8.73.6

Consequently, when the three hundred attacked them, all these, and especially the crew of the Paralus, joined in the defence, so that the popular party in Samos prevailed. And they put to death of the three hundred some thirty who were chiefly responsible for the plot, and three they punished with banishment; as for the rest, they declared an amnesty, and enjoying a democratic government lived together henceforth as fellow-citizens.

8.74.1

The ship Paralus, having on board Chaereas son of Archestratus, an Athenian, who had zealously worked for the change in government, was sent by the Samians and the Athenian soldiers with all speed to Athens to announce what had been done; for they did not yet know that the Four Hundred were in power.

8.74.2

As soon as they came to port the Four Hundred at once threw some two or three of the crew into prison, and depriving the rest of their ship and transferring them to another vessel, a troop-ship, they assigned them to guard duty in the neighbourhood of Euboea.

8.74.3

But Chaereas, on seeing the present state of affairs, immediately managed in some way to get off unobserved and returned to Samos, where he gave the soldiers an account of the situation in Athens, going beyond the facts in making them worse than they were. He said that they were scourging everybody by way of punishment, that it was not permitted to say a word against those who controlled the government, that the wives and children of citizens were being insulted, and that the oligarchy intended to seize and keep in confinement the relatives of all the men serving in the army at Samos who were not of their way of thinking, in order that, if they did not submit to their authority, these might be put to death; and he added many other false statements.

8.75.1

On hearing these things the soldiers at first rushed upon those who had been the chief promoters of the oligarchy, and such of the others as had had a hand in it, to stone them; afterwards, however, when restrained by those who took a neutral position and admonished by them not to ruin their cause when the enemy's ships were lying so near in hostile array, they desisted.

8.75.2

After this, Thrasybulus son of Lycus and Thrasyllus, who had been the chief leaders in the revolution, being now openly in favour of changing the government at Samos to a democracy, bound all the soldiers by the most solemn oaths, and particularly those who were of the oligarchical faction, that they would in very truth maintain a democracy and live in harmony, would zealously prosecute the war with the Peloponnesians, and would be foes to the Four Hundred and would make to them no overtures for peace.

8.75.3

The same oath was also taken by all the Samians who were of military age, and in all they did and in whatever might result from the risks they ran the soldiers made common cause with the Samians, being convinced that neither for these nor for themselves was there any haven of safety, but that, should either the Four Hundred prevail or the enemy stationed at Miletus, they were doomed to utter destruction.

8.76.1

So during this period they had come to a state of bitter contention in Samos, the one party attempting to compel the city to accept a democracy, the other to impose an oligarchy upon the army.

8.76.2

But the soldiers immediately held an assembly, in which they deposed their former generals and such of the trierarchs as they suspected, and chose others in their stead, among whom were Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus.

8.76.3

Moreover, they rose in their places and made various recommendations for their own guidance, in particular urging that there was no need to be discouraged because the city

8.76.3

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8.76.3

had revolted from them; for it was the minority who had abandoned them, who were the majority, and also were in every way better provided with resources.

8.76.4

For since they themselves possessed the entire fleet, they would compel the other cities under Athenian sway to make their regular contributions precisely as if their headquarters were at Athens. And they had, in Samos, a state that was not weak; on the contrary, it had come within a very little of wresting from Athens the control of the sea when it waged war with her;

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and as for the enemy, they would defend themselves against them from the same strong base as before. Furthermore, they were better able, since they possessed the fleet, to provide themselves with supplies than were the people of Athens. Indeed it was because they themselves had been stationed at Samos as an advanced guard that the Athenians at home had even before this commanded the entrance to the Peiraeus;

8.76.5

and now, they added, the others would be brought to such a strait, in case they should not consent to give them back their constitution, that they themselves would actually be better able to exclude them from the sea than the others to exclude them.

8.76.6

Trifling and indeed insignificant was the help which the city was able to give them in overcoming the enemy, and they had lost nothing, seeing that the people at home were able neither to send them money any longer— the soldiers now providing it for themselves—nor to give them good counsel, which is the object for which a state exercises control over armies in the field. Nay, even in this respect

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the other party had erred in abolishing the laws of their fathers, whereas they themselves were trying to preserve them and would endeavour to compel the oligarchs also to do so. Thus the men in the army who could give good counsel were at least as good as those in the city.

8.76.7

Alcibiades, furthermore, if they would merely secure for him immunity from punishment and restoration from exile, would gladly procure for them the alliance of the King. Finally, and most important of all, if they should wholly fail to attain their ends, so long as they possessed so large a fleet there were many places of refuge where they could find both cities and territory.

8.77.1

Having thus deliberated together in public assembly and encouraged one another, they went on with their preparations for war no less than before. And the envoys who had been sent to Samos by the Four Hundred, learning how matters stood after they had already reached Delos, remained there inactive.

8.78.1

About this time the Peloponnesian soldiers in the fleet at Miletus were clamouring among themselves, saying that their cause was being ruined by Astyochus and Tissaphernes; by the former because he was unwilling to fight, either before this while they themselves were still the stronger and the Athenian fleet was small, or now when the enemy were said to be rent with factions and their ships had not yet been brought together; nay, they kept waiting for the Phoenician ships which Tissaphernes was to furnish—a mere pretence and not a fact—and thus ran the risk of being worn out by delay; as for Tissaphernes, on the other hand, he was not only not producing these ships, but he was even doing harm to the fleet by not giving it maintenance regularly or in full. Therefore, they said, they ought to wait no longer but should fight to an issue. In all this it was the Syracusans who were most insistent.

8.79.1

Astyochus and the allies were aware of their murmuring, and it was determined after a council to fight a decisive battle; so when the disturbance at Samos was also reported to them, they put to sea with their entire fleet, one hundred and twelve in all, and bidding the Milesians proceed by land towards Mycale they sailed in the direction of Mycale themselves.

8.79.2

But the Athenians, with the eighty-two ships whose base was at Samos and which happened then to be lying at Glauce on the promontory of Mycale—where Samos is only a short distance from the mainland, in the direction of Mycale—when they saw the Peloponnesian ships sailing against them, retreated to Samos, not thinking themselves strong enough in point of numbers to hazard their all on a battle.

8.79.3

Besides, they had learned beforehand from Miletus that the enemy desired to fight, and they were expecting Strombichides to come to their aid from the Hellespont with the ships from Chios that had gone to Abydus;

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for a messenger had previously been sent to him. So they retired to Samos;

8.79.4

but the Peloponnesians sailed on to Mycale and encamped there, together with the Milesians and the troops of the neighbouring peoples that constituted the army on land.

8.79.5

The next day, when they were about to advance against Samos, word was brought to them that Strombichides had arrived with the ships from the Hellespont; so they sailed back at once to Miletus.

8.79.6

The Athenians, on the other hand, on receiving these reinforcements, themselves made an advance upon Miletus with one hundred and eight ships, wishing to come to a decisive battle; but when nobody came out against them they sailed back again to Samos.

8.80.1

During the same summer, immediately after this, when the Peloponnesians, though their whole fleet had come together, failed to come out to meet the enemy, thinking themselves unequal to the contest, they were perplexed, not knowing from what source they should get money to maintain so many ships, especially since Tissaphernes provided it wretchedly; so they sent Clearchus son of Rhamphias with forty ships to Pharnabazus, according to the orders with which he had originally set out from the Peloponnesus.

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For Pharnabazus was inviting them to come to him and was ready to furnish maintenance;

8.80.3

moreover at the same time overtures were made to them for the revolt of Byzantium. So these forty Peloponnesian ships put out into the open sea, in order that they might escape detection by the Athenians as they made the voyage. Meeting with a storm, the greater number, under Clearchus, took refuge at Delos and afterwards came back to Miletus

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(though Clearchus afterwards went by land to the Hellespont and assumed command); the rest, to the number of ten, got safely into the Hellespont with their commander, Helixus of Megara, and effected the revolt of Byzantium.

8.80.4

Afterwards, when the Athenians at Samos heard of this, they sent some ships to the Hellespont as a reinforcement and guard, and an insignificant sea-fight occurred off Byzantium, eight ships opposing eight.

8.81.1

Now among those who held control at Samos,

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Thrasybulus, after he had effected the revolution, always held very strongly to the same opinion, that they should recall Alcibiades, and finally in a meeting of the assembly he won the majority of the soldiers to his view. And when these had passed a resolution recalling Alcibiades and granting him immunity, he sailed across to Tissaphernes and brought Alcibiades back to Samos, thinking that their only salvation was to convert Tissaphernes from the Peloponnesian side to their own.

8.81.2

Accordingly, an assembly was held, in which Alcibiades complained with much lamentation of his personal misfortune in being exiled; he also spoke at length on matters of state, inspiring in them no slight hopes regarding the future, and went on to magnify to excess his own influence with Tissaphernes. His object was that those who were in control of the oligarchy at home should fear him and that the political clubs which conspired against him should more surely be broken up; also that the army at Samos should hold him in greater honour and feel a greater degree of confidence themselves; and finally that the enemy should be filled with all possible suspicions of Tissaphernes and so deprived of their present hopes. Accordingly, Alcibiades in a spirit of boasting went on and made these great promises:

8.81.3

that Tissaphernes had solemnly pledged to him that, if he could but trust the Athenians, so long as he had anything left of his own they should not lack subsistence, no, not even if in the end he had to sell his own bed; and that he would bring the Phoenician ships, which were already at Aspendus, and deliver them to the Athenians and not to the Peloponnesians; but, he had added, he could place confidence in the Athenians only on condition that he, Alcibiades, should be restored in safety and become surety to him.

8.82.1

As they heard these and many other promises, they not only elected Alcibiades general without delay, to act with the generals already in office, but also entrusted to him all their affairs; and there was not a man of them that would have exchanged for anything his present hopes both of his own safety and of having revenge upon the Four Hundred, and they were ready at that moment both to despise their present enemies on the strength of the words they had heard and to sail to the attack of Peiraeus.

8.82.2

But Alcibiades roundly objected to their leaving behind them their nearer enemies and sailing against the Peiraeus, though many insisted upon that course; his first business, he said, since he had been elected general, would be to sail to Tissaphernes and arrange with him the conduct of the war.

8.82.3

So after this assembly he at once went away to Tissaphernes, in order that he might be thought to be in communication with him about everything; at the same time he wished to be held in greater honour by him and to show him that he had now been elected general and was therefore in a position to do him either good or evil. And thus it fell out that Alcibiades was merely using Tissaphernes to frighten the Athenians and the Athenians to frighten Tissaphernes.

8.83.1

When the Peloponnesians at Miletus heard of the recall of Alcibiades, although they were before this distrustful of Tissaphernes, they were now filled with a still greater suspicion of him.

8.83.2

For they had had this experience of him, that after they had refused to go out against the Athenians and fight when these made their advance against Miletus, Tissaphernes became far more slack in the matter of giving them their pay and thus intensified the hatred in which even before these events he was held by them on account of Alcibiades.

8.83.3

So the soldiers would gather in groups, as had been their wont—and not the soldiery only, but also some of the others, who were men of consideration—and would cast up their accounts with one another, proving that they had never yet received their pay in full, but that what was given was short and even that not paid regularly; and they declared that unless they were either to have a decisive battle or get away to some place where they could get subsistence the crews would desert the ships; and for all this, they held, Astyochus was to blame, because he bore with Tissaphernes' whims for the sake of his private gain.

8.84.1

While they were thus reckoning up their grievances the following disturbance occurred in connection with Astyochus.

8.84.2

It seems that the Syracusan and Thurian sailors, in proportion as the majority of them were allowed most freedom, were to that degree also the most bold and importunate in demanding their pay from him. But he answered them somewhat haughtily and made threats; and against Dorieus, who was supporting the plea of his own seamen, he even raised his stick.

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When the mass of the troops saw this, in sailor fashion they cried out in rage and rushed at Astyochus with the intention of stoning him; he, however, saw this in time and took refuge at an altar. But he was not actually stoned, and they were separated.

8.84.4

The Milesians, furthermore, took the fort of Tissaphernes that had been built in Miletus, falling upon it unawares, and drove out the garrison that was in it. These doings were approved by the allies in general, and especially by the Syracusans.

8.84.5

Lichas,

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however, was not pleased with them and said that the Milesians and other inhabitants of the King's country ought even to slave for Tissaphernes in a reasonable way and to court his favour until they should bring the war to a successful conclusion. But the Milesians were angry with him for these and similar sayings; and when he afterwards fell sick and died they did not suffer him to be buried where the Lacedaemonians who were present wished to lay him.

8.85.1

While the relations between the soldiers and Astyochus and Tissaphernes were in such discord, Mindarus came from Lacedaemon to succeed Astyochus as admiral and took over the command; and Astyochus sailed home.

8.85.2

But Tissaphernes sent with him as envoy one of his retinue, Gaulites, a bilingual Carian, to lay accusation against the Milesians for taking his fort and at the same time to make a defence of himself, since he knew that the Milesians were on their way to Sparta chiefly to denounce him, and that with them went Hermocrates, who was intending to show that Tissaphernes, together with Alcibiades, was ruining the cause of the Peloponnesians and pursuing a two-faced policy.

8.85.3

Tissaphernes had always been at enmity with Hermocrates in connection with the payment of the wages;

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8.85.3

and more recently, when Hermocrates had been banished from Syracuse and another set of generals had come to Miletus to take command of the Syracusan fleet

8.85.3

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8.85.3

—and they were Potamis, Myscon and Demarchus—Tissaphernes set upon Hermocrates, now that he was an exile, much more violently than ever, charging against him, among other things, that he had once asked him for money, and because he did not obtain it had shown him enmity.

8.85.4

Astyochus, then, together with the Milesians and Hermocrates, sailed away to Lacedaemon; Alcibiades, on the other hand, had already left Tissaphernes and crossed over again to Samos.

8.86.1

And the envoys who had been sent by the Four Hundred, at the time above mentioned,

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to appease the soldiers at Samos and explain matters, now arrived from Delos when Alcibiades was already there; and at a meeting of the assembly they attempted to speak.

8.86.2

But the soldiers were at first unwilling to hear them, and with shouts threatened to kill the subverters of the democracy; afterwards, however, when with difficulty they had quieted down, they heard them.

8.86.3

The envoys announced that the revolution had been made, not for the destruction of the state, but for its preservation, not in order that Athens might be betrayed to the enemy (for that could have been done at the time of the Lacedaemonian invasion, when the revolutionists were already in power); they stated, moreover, that all the Five Thousand would participate in the government in their turn; furthermore, their relatives were neither being insulted, as Chaereas was slanderously saying, nor suffering any ill, but remained in their homes, each in possession of his own property.

8.86.4

But though they said all this and more, the soldiers were none the more inclined to give heed to them, but were angry, and one after another offered various suggestions, but particularly that they should sail against the Peiraeus. And Alcibiades seems then in an eminent degree, and more than anyone else, to have benefited the state; for when the Athenians at Samos were bent upon sailing against their own people—and if they had the enemy would most certainly have been masters of Ionia and the Hellespont—it was he who prevented it.

8.86.5

And in that critical moment no other man would have been able to restrain the crowd, but he stopped them from sailing, and reproaching those who were on their own private account angry at the envoys, he caused them to desist.

8.86.6

And he sent the envoys away with this answer from himself: he did not object to the Five Thousand ruling, but bade them depose the Four Hundred and set up the senate as it had been before—the body of Five Hundred;

8.86.7

and if there had been any curtailment with a view to economy, so that the soldiers in the field might have better maintenance, he quite approved of that. As for the rest, he bade them not yield a step to the enemy;

8.86.8

for so long as the city was saved there was great hope of a reconciliation among themselves, but if once one party or the other should go to the ground, whether the one at Samos or that at Athens, there would be no one left to be reconciled with. Envoys from the Argives also came to Samos with offers of assistance to the Athenian democracy there; but Alcibiades dismissed them with words of commendation, telling them to come when summoned.

8.86.9

Now the Argives had come with the crew of the Paralus, who at the time above mentioned

8.86.9

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had been sent out in the troop-ship with instructions to cruise round Euboea and to convey to Lacedaemon the three Athenian envoys from the Four Hundred, Laespodias, Aristophon and Melesias. But when they had got as far as Argos on their voyage, the crew had seized the envoys and delivered them to the Argives, on the ground that they were among those who had been chiefly instrumental in overthrowing the democracy. They themselves, however, did not go back to Athens thereafter, but came from Argos to Samos, bringing with them the envoys in their trireme.

8.87.1

During the same summer, at the very moment when, for various other reasons and especially because of the recall of Alcibiades, the Peloponnesians were vexed with Tissaphernes, feeling that he was now openly favouring the Athenians, he, wishing, as it seemed, to clear himself in their eyes of these calumnies, prepared to go to Aspendus after the Phoenician ships, and bade Lichas accompany him; but as regards the army he would appoint Tamos in his place, so as to ensure supplies during his own absence. But the story is told in different ways, and it is not easy to be certain what motive he had for going to Aspendus, and why, after going, he did not bring back the ships.

8.87.2

For that the Phoenician ships, one hundred and forty-seven in number, came as far as Aspendus is certain;

8.87.3

but the reason why they did not finish the journey is variously conjectured. Some say that his purpose was to accomplish by his absence what he actually designed—to exhaust by delay the resources of the Peloponnesians (at any rate supplies were furnished no better, but even worse than before, by Tamos, to whom this duty had been assigned); others say that it was with the idea of bringing the Phoenician ships as far as Aspendus and then exacting money from them for their discharge (for in any case he was not intending to make any use of them); and still others say that it was because lie was being denounced at Lacedaemon, and wanted the report to go out that he was not acting wrongly but, as everybody could see, had gone for the ships and these were really manned for service.

8.87.4

To me, however, it seems perfectly clear that it was with the purpose of wearing out the resources of the Hellenes and keeping matters in suspense that he did not bring the fleet—of exhausting them while he was making the journey to Aspendus and delaying there, and also of equalizing them, that he might make neither side stronger by joining it. For if he had indeed wished it, he could, it seems plain, by appearing on the scene have brought the war to a definite conclusion; for by bringing his fleet he would in all probability have given the victory to the Lacedaemonians, who, in fact, even as it was were confronting the Athenians with a fleet that fully matched theirs and was not inferior to it.

8.87.5

But that which convicted him most clearly was the excuse he gave for not bringing the ships, when he said that they were not so many as the King had ordered to be collected; but he, on the contrary, would surely have won all the more gratitude in such a case, by saving a great deal of the King's money and obtaining the same results with smaller outlay.

8.87.6

At any rate, whatever his intentions, Tissaphernes went to Aspendus and conferred with the Phoenicians; and the Peloponnesians by his orders sent Philippus, a Lacedaemonian, with two triremes to bring the ships back.

8.88.1

But Alcibiades, when he learned that Tissaphernes as well was on his way to Aspendus, sailed thither himself with thirteen ships, promising the army at Samos a sure and great benefit; for he would either secure the ships himself for the Athenians, or else at any rate prevent their joining the Peloponnesians. It is likely that he had long been aware of the purpose of Tissaphernes —that he had no intention of bringing the ships— and wished to prejudice him as much as possible in the eyes of the Peloponnesians on the score of his friendship for himself and the Athenians, that so he might be under greater compulsion to join the Athenian side. So he put to sea, laying his course eastward, straight toward Phaselis and Caunus.

8.89.1

When the envoys sent by the Four Hundred arrived at Athens on their return from Samos and reported what Alcibiades had said— urging them to hold out and make no concessions to the enemy, and saying that he had great hopes both of reconciling the army to the people at home and of prevailing over the Peloponnesians—most of those who shared in the oligarchy,

8.89.1

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8.89.1

who were even before this in distress, and would have been glad to be safely rid of the business in any way, were far more encouraged.

8.89.2

And they were already beginning to form groups and criticize the state of affairs, having as their leaders some of the very men who were members of the oligarchy and held office, such as Theramenes son of Hagnon, Aristocrates son of Scelias, and others. These had been among the foremost of those who had taken an active part in the revolution, but being afraid in real earnest, as they said, of the army at Samos and of Alcibiades, as well as of those who were sending envoys to Lacedaemon, who they thought might, by acting without the sanction of the greater number, work some harm to the city, they did not indeed openly profess that they wanted to avoid reducing the government to an extreme oligarchy, but maintained that they ought to appoint the Five Thousand in fact and not merely in name, and to establish the government on the basis of a greater equality.

8.89.3

Now this phrase of theirs was a mere political catchword, and in their personal ambitions most of them eagerly pursued the sort of methods by which an oligarchy formed out of a democracy is most sure to come to ruin; for all demand forthwith, not equality, but each that he shall be quite the first himself; whereas under a democracy an election is held and every man acquiesces more readily in the result because he feels that those to whom he owes his defeat

8.89.3

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8.89.3

are not his equals.

8.89.3

2

8.89.4

But what most evidently encouraged these men was the fact that Alcibiades' position at Samos was so strong, and their opinion that the power of the oligarchy would not last long. Each one, therefore, strove to become the foremost leader of the people himself.

8.90.1

But those of the Four Hundred who were most opposed to such a course—the leading spirits like Phrynichus, who had been general at Samos and had then quarrelled with Alcibiades,

8.90.1

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8.90.1

and Aristarchus, a man who had been conspicuously and for the longest time opposed to the democracy, and Peisander,

8.90.1

2

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Antiphon,

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3

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and other men of the greatest influence—before this time, that is, as soon as they were established in power and then when the army at Samos had revolted from them in favour of a democratic form of government, had been sending ambassadors of their own to Lacedaemon

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and making earnest efforts to come to an understanding, and had also been constructing their fort in the place called Eetioneia; and now far more than ever, when their ambassadors returned from Samos, did they bestir themselves, seeing that not only the majority of the people but also men of their own party who had before been esteemed trustworthy were changing their views.

8.90.2

So they despatched Antiphon, Phrynichus, and ten others in all haste, since they were alarmed by the situation both at home and at Samos, enjoining upon them to effect a reconciliation with the Lacedaemonians on any terms that would be at all tolerable.

8.90.3

And they set to work with greater zeal than ever building their fort at Eetioneia.

8.90.3

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And the purpose of this fort was, as Theramenes and his adherents said, not that they might prevent the Samian fleet from entering the Peiraeus in case they should attempt to force their way in, but rather that they might admit the enemy whenever they wished with both his army and fleet. For Eetioneia is a mole extending out from the Peiraeus, and immediately beside it is the entrance to the harbour.

8.90.4

It was therefore being connected by a wall with the wall which already existed somewhat inland, and in such a way that if only a few men were stationed inside it would control the entrance; for both the old wall running inland and the new inner wall that was being built facing the sea came to an end in the second of the two towers, the one that lay exactly at the mouth of the harbour, which was narrow.

8.90.5

They also cut off with a wall inside the harbour a portico which was very large and immediately adjoined this inland wall; and this they controlled themselves, and compelled everybody to deposit in it the corn that was already on hand as well as to discharge there that which came in by sea, and to take it from there if they wished to sell it.

8.91.1

Now Theramenes had been freely talking about these proceedings for some time, and after the ambassadors came back from Lacedaemon without having accomplished anything toward an agreement for the people as a whole, he kept saying that this fort would in all probability bring ruin upon the city.

8.91.2

For at this very time it so happened that, on the invitation of the Euboeans, ships from the Peloponnesus to the number of forty-two, among which were Italian vessels from Tarentum and Locri and some from Sicily, were already lying off Las in Laconia and preparing for their passage to Euboea, under the command of Hegesandridas son of Hegesander, a Spartan; and Theramenes declared that these were on their way, not to Euboea, but to Eetioneia to help the men who were fortifying it, adding that unless they immediately took precautions their cause would be lost before they knew it.

8.91.3

And in fact there was something of the kind afoot on the part of those whom he thus accused, and what he said was not altogether mere calumny. For the persons in question wished above all, preserving their oligarchy, to rule both Athens and the allies, but, failing in that, to keep their ships at least and their fortifications and be independent; and if they were debarred from this course also, at any rate not to be themselves the first to meet with destruction at the hands of the restored democracy, but actually to bring in the enemy and, giving up walls and ships, make any sort of terms as to the fate of the city, if only they might have immunity for their own persons.

8.92.1

It was with this object in view that they were now diligently building this fort, which was furnished with posterns and entrances and ways for letting the enemy in, and they wished to have it finished in time.

8.92.2

Now hitherto the talk had been confined to small groups and indulged in with some attempt at secrecy; but finally Phrynichus, after his return from his mission to Lacedaemon, was stabbed in full market as the result of a plot by a man of the frontier-patrol, and before he had gone far from the senate-chamber suddenly died. The assassin escaped, while his accomplice, an Argive fellow, was seized and put to the torture by the Four Hundred, but did not reveal the name of anyone who instigated the deed nor anything else, except that he knew many who were wont to come together in the house of the commander of the frontier-patrol and at other houses. So now at length, when no signal action had been taken in consequence of this, Theramenes and Aristocrates and all the rest of the Four Hundred and those outside that body who were of the same way of thinking, went to work more boldly.

8.92.3

For at this same time the Peloponnesian ships had already sailed round from Las, and after taking station at Epidaurus had overrun Aegina; and Theramenes said it was not likely, if their destination were Euboea, that they would have run up the gulf as far as Aegina and then put in to Epidaurus to anchor, unless they had come on invitation for the purposes which he himself had always been denouncing; it was therefore impossible, he concluded, to keep quiet any longer.

8.92.4

Finally, when there had been many other seditious speeches and insinuations, they at last took hold of the situation in earnest. The hoplites in the Peiraeus who were engaged in building the fort at Eetioneia—one of their number being Aristocrates, a taxiarch who commanded the contingent of his own tribe—arrested Alexicles, who was a general of the oligarchical faction and very favourably inclined toward the members of the political clubs, took him into a house and confined him there. Among those who took part with them in this exploit was Hermon, one of the frontier-patrol and commander of the detachment stationed at Munichia;

8.92.5

and, most important of all, the mass of the hoplites were in sympathy with all this.

8.92.6

But when the act was announced to the Four Hundred, who happened to be in session in the senate-chamber, immediately all except those who disapproved of this state of things

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were ready to rush to arms and began to threaten Theramenes and his followers. But he, justifying himself, said that he was ready to go immediately and assist in the rescue of Alexicles. So he took one of the generals who was in accord with him and proceeded to the Peiraeus; and Aristarchus and some young men of the Knights also went to the rescue. There ensued a tumult that was widespread and alarming;

8.92.7

for the people in the city thought that the Peiraeus had been taken and that the man under arrest had been put to death, while the people in the Peiraeus thought that the men of the city were all but upon them.

8.92.8

But owing to the efforts of the older men to stop those in the city who were running hither and thither and flying to their arms and also of Thucydides, the Athenian proxenus at Pharsalus, who was then in Athens and zealously threw himself in everybody's way and loudly called upon them not to ruin the state when the enemy was near at hand awaiting his turn, the people were with difficulty quieted and refrained from attacking one another.

8.92.9

As for Theramenes, he went to the Peiraeus (he was himself one of the generals) and, so far as shouting was concerned, showed anger at the hoplites; but Aristarchus and those who were opposed to the populace were really displeased.

8.92.10

Most of the hoplites, however, grappled with the task in hand and showed no change of purpose, and they asked Theramenes whether he thought that the fort was being built with any good end in view, and whether it were not better demolished. He answered that if it seemed good to them to demolish it, so it seemed to him also. Thereupon the hoplites and many of the people of Peiraeus at once mounted the fortification and began to tear it down.

8.92.11

And the exhortation addressed to the crowd was, “Whoever wants the Five Thousand to rule in place of the Four Hundred, let him set to work.” For in spite of everything they were still concealing their purpose under the name of the “Five Thousand,” so as not to say outright, “Whoever wants the

8.92.11

people

8.92.11

to rule”; for they were afraid that the Five Thousand did in reality exist and that one man in speaking to another might without knowing it get into trouble.

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And in fact this was the reason why the Four Hundred did not wish either that the Five Thousand should actually exist or that it should become known that they did not exist— because they thought, on the one hand, that to make so many men partners in the government was outright democracy, and, on the other hand, that the uncertainty would inspire fear in each against his neighbour.

8.93.1

On the next day the Four Hundred, though much disturbed, assembled nevertheless in the senate-chamber. But the hoplites in the Peiraeus, after they had released Alexicles, whom they had arrested, and demolished the fortification, went to the theatre of Dionysus in Munichia, and grounding arms held a meeting of the assembly; then, a vote to that effect having been passed, they proceeded straightway to the city and again halted in the Anacium.

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But certain men came to them from the Four Hundred, who had been chosen as their delegates, and talked with them, man with man, and tried to persuade any that they saw were reasonable both to keep quiet themselves and to help to keep the rest in restraint, saying that they would publish the names of the Five Thousand, and that from these should be constituted in turn the Four Hundred in whatever way should seem best to the Five Thousand; meanwhile, they urged, they should by all means not ruin the city or drive it into the arms of the enemy.

8.93.3

Finally, the whole body of hoplites, as speeches were made by many and to many, was more calm than before, and was now alarmed chiefly about the general safety of the state. So they came to an agreement to hold, on an appointed day, a meeting of the assembly in the precinct of Dionysus and consider the question of concord.

8.94.1

When the time had come for the meeting of the assembly in the precinct of Dionysus and they had all but gathered there, it was announced that Hegesandridas with his forty-two ships had left Megara and was sailing along the coast of Salamis; and the hoplites to a man believed that this was precisely the move that had long since been predicted by Theramenes and his party

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and that the ships were coming in to occupy the fort; and they felt that its demolition had served a useful purpose.

8.94.2

Now it may well be that Hegesandridas was acting in accordance with some prearranged understanding when he hovered about Epidaurus and that neighbourhood, but it is probable that in tarrying there he also had regard to the dissension prevailing among the Athenians, and was hopeful that possibly he might arrive in the very nick of time.

8.94.3

However this may be, when his movements were reported to the Athenians they immediately advanced at a run with all their forces to the Peiraeus, thinking that a new war, launched by the enemy and more serious than their own domestic feud, was not far away, nay, was actually at their port. Some went aboard the ships that were lying ready, others began launching additional ships, while others still hastened to the defence of the walls and the entrance of the harbour.

8.95.1

But the Peloponnesians' ships, after sailing along the coast and doubling Sunium, came to anchor between Thoricus and Prasiae, but afterwards went on to Oropus.

8.95.2

And the Athenians, in all haste and making use of unpractised crews under stress of necessity, inasmuch as the city was in a state of sedition and they were eager with the least delay to rally to the defence of their chief possession—for Euboea now meant everything to them, since they were debarred from Attica

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—sent Thymochares and some ships to Eretria.

8.95.3

When they arrived and were joined by those already at Euboea the fleet numbered thirty-six ships. And they were forced to fight immediately; for Hegesander had no sooner breakfasted than he led out his ships from Oropus, and Oropus is only about sixty stadia distant from the city of Eretria by sea.

8.95.4

When, therefore, he began his advance, the Athenians on their part began at once to man their ships, supposing that the crews were beside their vessels. But they chanced to be providing themselves with food for their breakfast, not in the market-place—for by design on the part of the Eretrians nothing was being offered for sale there —but from the houses in the furthest parts of the town; and this had been so arranged in order that while they were manning at their leisure the enemy might surprise them by their attack and force them to put to sea in haphazard fashion.

8.95.5

Besides, a signal had been hoisted at Eretria to apprise the Peloponnesian fleet at Oropus when to put to sea. So the Athenians put to sea under such disadvantage as regards preparation and engaged in battle off the harbour of Eretria;

8.95.6

for some little time, however, they nevertheless did hold their own, but afterwards turned to flight and were pursued to shore. And such of them as took refuge in the city of Eretria, assuming that it was friendly, suffered a most cruel fate, being butchered by the inhabitants; but those who escaped to the fort in Eretrian territory which the Athenians themselves held were saved, as also all the ships that reached Chalcis.

8.95.7

The Peloponnesians, having captured twenty-two Athenian ships and having either slain or taken prisoner their crews, set up a trophy. And not long afterwards they succeeded in persuading all Euboea to revolt except Oreus, which the Athenians themselves held, and proceeded to set in order the general affairs of the island.

8.96.1

When the report of what had happened in Euboea reached Athens, there was greater consternation than ever before. For neither the disaster in Sicily, great though it seemed at the time, nor any other event had ever yet so frightened them.

8.96.2

At a time when their army at Samos was in revolt, when there were no more ships to be had nor men to man them, when they were in a state of sedition at home and there was no telling when a conflict might break out among themselves, when, to crown all, a disaster had now come upon them of this magnitude, in which they had lost both their fleet and, worst of all, Euboea, from which they derived more benefit than from Attica—had they not every reason to be despondent?

8.96.3

But what alarmed them most and touched them most nearly was the possibility that the enemy, now victorious, might dare to make straight for Athens and attack the Peiraeus, which was now without ships to defend it; and they believed that they were all but there already.

8.96.4

And indeed, if they had been more bold, the enemy could readily have done this very thing, and they would either, by setting up a blockade, have caused the city to be still more torn by factions, or else, if they had remained and laid siege to it, would have compelled the fleet in Ionia, though hostile to the oligarchy, to come to the rescue of their own relatives and of the city as a whole; and thereby the Hellespont would have been theirs, and Ionia, and the islands, and everything as far as Euboea— indeed almost the whole empire of the Athenians.

8.96.5

But it was not on this occasion only that the Lacedaemonians proved the most convenient people in the world for the Athenians to make war upon, but on many others also. For being widely different in character—the one people being quick, the other slow; the one adventurous, the other timorous—it was especially in the case of a naval power that they were most helpful. And the Syracusans proved this; for it was because they were most similar in character to the Athenians

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that they made war upon them most successfully.

8.97.1

However this may be, after the announcement of their defeat the Athenians, in spite of their difficulties, manned twenty ships, and also called meetings of the assembly—one immediately, which was called to meet on that occasion for the first time in the place called Pnyx, where at other times also they had been wont to meet.

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At this meeting they deposed the Four Hundred, voted to deliver the management of affairs to the Five Thousand (and all who could furnish themselves with a hoplite's outfit were to belong to this number), and decided that no one was to receive pay for any office, the offender to be accounted accursed.

8.97.2

Other meetings also were held later, at frequent intervals, as a result of which they appointed supervisors of the laws

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and voted the other measures pertaining to their form of government. And during the first period the Athenians appear to have enjoyed the best government they ever had, at least in my time; for there was a moderate blending of the few and the many, and this it was that first caused the state to recover from the wretched plight into which it had fallen.

8.97.3

And they also voted to recall Alcibiades and others with him; and sending envoys both to him and to the army at Samos, they urged them to take a hand in their affairs.

8.98.1

At this change the party of Peisander and Alexicles and all the leading supporters of the oligarchy at once secretly left the city and went to Deceleia; but Aristarchus, alone of these, since he chanced to be a general, hastily took some bowmen of the most barbarous sort

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and proceeded to Oenoe.

8.98.2

It was an Athenian fortress on the borders of Boeotia, and the Corinthians, having called to their aid the Boeotians, were besieging it on their own account, because of a misfortune they had suffered at the hands of the garrison at Oenoe when they lost some men as they were returning from Deceleia.

8.98.3

So Aristarchus, after first making his plans known to the besiegers, deceived the garrison at Oenoe by telling them that their partisans in the city had made terms with the Lacedaemonians, and that, among other things, this garrison must surrender the place to the Boeotians; for the agreement had been made on these conditions. The garrison trusted him because he was a general, being in complete ignorance because they were in a state of siege, and evacuated the fort under a truce.

8.98.4

In this manner Oenoe was taken and occupied by the Boeotians, and thus the oligarchy at Athens and the struggle between the factions came to an end.

8.99.1

During this summer, about the same time as these events, the situation of the Peloponnesians in Miletus was as follows:

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None of the officers appointed by Tissaphernes at the time when he went to Aspendus would give them maintenance, and neither the Phoenician ships nor Tissaphernes himself had yet come; Philippus, who had been sent with him,

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and also another person, a Spartan named Hippocrates who was at Phaselis, had written letters to Mindarus, the admiral, saving that the ships would never come and that they were being wronged in all things by Tissaphernes; moreover, Pharnabazus was inviting them to come and was eager, when he should have got the assistance of the Peloponnesian fleet, to do just what Tissaphernes was to have done and to cause the rest of the cities within his province to revolt from the Athenians, hoping to gain some advantage thereby. In these circumstances, then, Mindarus put off from Miletus, in good order and, giving his fleet the command without previous notice that his move might not become known to the Athenians at Samos, he sailed for the Hellespont with seventy-three ships; for earlier in this same summer sixteen ships had sailed thither and had overrun a portion of the Chersonesus. Mindarus, however, was caught by a storm and forced to make harbour at Icarus; there he remained five or six days by reason of bad weather and then went on to Chios.

8.100.1

When Thrasyllus heard that Mindarus had put to sea from Miletus, he also sailed at once from Samos with fifty-five ships, making all haste that the enemy might not enter the Hellespont before him.

8.100.2

But learning that Mindarus was at Chios and believing that he could keep him there, he posted scouts both at Lesbos and on the mainland opposite, in order that, if the enemy's ships should make a move in any direction, he should have knowledge of it; as for himself, he sailed along the coast to Methymna, and gave orders to prepare barley-meal and general provisions, with the idea that, if a considerable time elapsed, he would use Lesbos as a base for attacks upon Chios. At the same time, since Eresus in Lesbos had revolted, he wished to sail against it and take it if possible.

8.100.3

For some exiles who had been driven out of Methymna, and those the most influential citizens, had brought over from Cyme about fifty hoplites that had been taken into their clubs, had hired still others from the mainland, and now with these troops, about three hundred in all, commanded by Anaxarchus a Theban on the strength of kinship,

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had made an attack upon Methymna first; and when they had been foiled in this attempt by the timely arrival of the Athenian garrison in Mytilene, and had been again repulsed in a battle fought outside the walls, they had made their way over the mountain and had brought about the revolt of Eresus.

8.100.4

Thrasyllus therefore now sailed thither with all his fleet, intending to assault the town. Thrasybulus also had already arrived there from Samos with five ships, after word had been brought to him of the crossing of the exiles; but being too late to save Eresus, he had merely anchored there on his arrival.

8.100.5

The Athenian fleet was likewise reinforced by two vessels that were returning home from the Hellespont and by five

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Methymnaean ships, so that there were present in all sixty-five ships. It was with the troops from these ships that they were preparing to take Eresus by assault, with the aid of engines or in any way they could.

8.101.1

Meanwhile Mindarus and the Peloponnesian ships at Chios, having spent only two days in provisioning and having received from the Chians three Chian tessaracosts

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for each man, on the third day set sail in all haste from Chios, avoiding the open sea that they might not fall in with the Athenian fleet at Eresus, but keeping Lesbos on their left, and making for the mainland.

8.101.2

They first touched at the harbour of Cartereia in the territory of Phocaea, where they dined, and then, sailing along the Cymaean coast, supped at Arginussae

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on the mainland opposite Mytilene.

8.101.3

Thence they proceeded long before dawn along the coast until they came to Harmatus, on the mainland opposite Methymna; there they breakfasted in haste and then sailed along the coast past Lectum, Larisa, Hamaxitus and the other places in that region, arriving at Rhoeteum before midnight. Some of the ships even made harbour at Sigeium and other places in that neighbourhood.

8.102.1

But the Athenians who were at Sestus with eighteen ships, when their signallers gave them notice and they observed the sudden blaze of numerous fires on the hostile shore, realized that the Peloponnesians were entering the straits. So that same night, making what speed they could and keeping close to the shore of the Chersonesus, they sailed toward Elaeus, wishing to get by the enemy's ships and out into the open water.

8.102.2

And they did elude the sixteen ships at Abydos,

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although these had been cautioned by a friendly boat that sailed

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up to be on the alert in case the Athenians should try to leave the straits; but the ships commanded by Mindarus, which they descried at dawn—and these immediately gave chase—they could not outstrip with their entire fleet, but though most of their ships made good their escape to Imbros and Lemnos, four of them that brought up the rear were overtaken near Elaeus.

8.102.3

One of these, which was stranded at the sanctuary of Protesilaus, was captured with all on board, and two others without their crews; the fourth, which had been deserted by its crew, the enemy burned close to Imbros.

8.103.1

After this Mindarus took all his ships, including those which had been at Abydus and were now united with his fleet, eighty-six vessels in all, and for that day invested Elaeus;

8.103.2

but when it would not yield they all sailed back to Abydus. The Athenians at Eresus, on the other hand, misled by their scouts and never imagining that the enemy could sail past them unobserved, were assaulting the walls at their leisure; but when they learned the truth they abandoned Eresus at once and hastened with all speed to the defence of the Hellespont.

8.103.3

And they captured two of the Peloponnesian ships, which fell in with them at that moment, having put out into the open sea too boldly in their pursuit. A day later they reached Elaeus and cast anchor; then they brought thither the ships at Imbros that had taken refuge there and spent the next five days preparing for the battle.

8.104.1

When that time had elapsed they began the battle in the following manner. The Athenians, arrayed in single column, were sailing close in to sore in the direction of Sestus, when the Peloponnesians, observing their movements from Abydus, went out to meet them.

8.104.2

When they both realised that a battle was imminent, the Athenians, with seventy-six ships, extended their line parallel with the shore of the Chersonesus, from Idacus to Arrhiana, while the Peloponnesians, with eighty-six ships, extended theirs from Abydus to Dardanus.

8.104.3

The right wing of the Peloponnesians was held by the Syracusans, the other by Mindarus himself, who had there his fastest ships; on the Athenian side, Thrasyllus had the left wing and Thrasybulus the right, the other generals being stationed at intervals throughout the line.

8.104.4

The Peloponnesians were eager to strike the first blow, and by outflanking the Athenian right with their own left wing to cut them off from the exit to the straits, if possible, meanwhile in the centre driving them to the shore, which was not far distant. The Athenians perceived their intention, and at the point where their opponents wished to bar their way they proceeded to extend their line to prevent it, and were succeeding in this manoeuvre; indeed, their left had already passed the headland called Cynossema.

8.104.5

But in the centre, as the result of this movement, their line of ships became weak and straggling; and especially since the number of their ships was smaller and the turn of the coast at Cynossema is sharp and angular, so that what was happening on the other side of it was not visible.

8.105.1

Accordingly the Peloponnesians, falling upon their centre, drove the Athenian ships ashore and landed to follow up their victory, having had a decided advantage in the action.

8.105.2

To assist their centre was in the power neither of Thrasybulus and his men on the right, by reason of the multitude of the ships that were pressing hard upon them, nor of the followers of Thrasyllus on the left; for that part of the field was concealed from him by the headland of Cynossema, and at the same time the Syracusans and the rest who were arrayed against him, being not inferior in number, hemmed him in. But finally the Peloponnesians, pursuing fearlessly in the flush of victory, some chasing one vessel, some another, began to fall into disorder in a part of their own line.

8.105.3

The Athenians under Thrasybulus, realizing this, now ceased extending their flank, and immediately facing about began to fight the ships that were bearing down upon them, and put them to rout; then intercepting the ships in the victorious part of the Peloponnesian line that had strayed out of line, they smote them and drove most of them into headlong flight without resistance. It so chanced that the Syracusans on their part had already given ground to Thrasyllus and his division, and they took to flight still more when they saw the rest fleeing.

8.106.1

After the rout was thus effected, the Peloponnesians fled for refuge for the most part to the river Pydius at first, but afterwards to Abydus. The Athenians took only a few ships—for the Hellespont is narrow and afforded their opponents places of refuge near at hand—yet the victory which they won in this battle was indeed most opportune.

8.106.2

Hitherto they had been afraid of the Peloponnesian feet, on account not only of the gradual losses

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they had suffered, but especially of their disaster in Sicily; but now they ceased either to reproach themselves or to consider their enemy any longer of any account in naval matters.

8.106.3

However, they did capture of the enemy's fleet eight Chian ships, five Corinthian, two Ambracian, two Boeotian, and one each belonging to the Leucadians, Lacedaemonians, Syracusans, and Pellenians; and they lost fifteen themselves.

8.106.4

So they set up a trophy on the headland where the Cynossema stands, brought in the wreckage, restored to the enemy their dead under a truce, and sent a trireme to Athens to announce their victory.

8.106.5

When the ship arrived and the Athenians heard the news of the good fortune that was beyond their hopes, coming as it did on the heels of the disasters that had recently befallen them in Euboea and in the course of their factional dissensions, they were greatly encouraged, and believed that their cause might still prevail if they should zealously lay their hands to the work.

8.107.1

On the fourth day after the battle, after they had hastily refitted their ships, the Athenians at Sestos sailed against Cyzicus, which had revolted; and descrying the eight ships from Byzantium

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lying at anchor off Harpagium and Priapus, they sailed against them, defeated in battle the forces which on shore aided them, and captured the ships. Then going on to Cyzicus, they brought it back into the Athenian alliance, since it had no walls, and levied upon it a fine of money.

8.107.2

Meanwhile the Peloponnesians on their part left Abydus and sailed to Slaeus, where they recovered such of their captured ships as were sound—the Elaeusians had burned the rest—and sent Hippocrates and Epicles to Euboea to fetch the ships that were there.

8.108.1

At about this same time Alcibiades sailed back to Samos with the thirteen ships

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from Caunus and Phaselis, reporting that he had prevented the coming of the Phoenician ships to join the Peloponnesians and that he had made Tissaphernes more friendly to the Athenians than before. He then manned nine ships in addition to those he had, and exacted much money of the Halicarnassians, and also fortified Cos.

8.108.2

Having done these things and appointed a governor at Cos, when it was already nearing autumn he returned to Samos. As for Tissaphernes, on hearing that the Peloponnesian fleet had sailed from Miletus to the Hellespont, he broke up his camp at Aspendus and set out for Ionia.

8.108.3

For while the Peloponnesians were in the Hellespont, the Antandrians, who are Aeolians, had brought some hoplites from Abydus overland by way of Mount Ida and introduced them into their city, since they were being unjustly treated by Arsaces the Persian, lieutenant of Tissaphernes.

8.108.4

Now this was the man who, when the Delians settled at Atramytteium,

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at the time when they were removed from Delos by the Athenians for the purpose of purifying that island, professing a quarrel which he did not openly declare and proffering opportunity of military service to their leading men, had led them out on an expedition on a pretence of friendship and alliance, and then, waiting until they were at their midday meal, had surrounded them with his own troops and shot them down.

8.108.5

The Antandrians, therefore, fearing that on account of this act of his he might some day commit some outrage upon them also, and because, furthermore, he was imposing upon them burdens which they were not able to bear, had driven his garrison out of their acropolis.

8.109.1

When Tissaphernes heard of this further act on the part of the Peloponnesians, in addition to what they had done at Miletus

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and Cnidos,

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—for there also his garrisons had been expelled-thinking that he had got into exceeding disrepute with them and fearing that they might do him some further mischief still, and at the same time because he was vexed that Pharnabazus should accept their services, and in less time and at less expense than himself be more successful in coping with the Athenians—for all these reasons he determined to go to the Hellespont and see the Peloponnesians, that he might complain of what had been done at Antandros and might also defend himself as plausibly as he could against the slanderous charges they made against him in connection with the Phoenician ships and other matters.

8.109.2

And so he came first to Ephesus and offered sacrifice to Artemis.

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